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• ABSTRACT 
The analysis of local politics has too often been partial and one-sided. 
Dominant approaches to its study have tended to emphasise either the 
institutions of local government, or the logic of the local state, or (more 
recently) its relationship to localities. This thesis seeks to bring together 
a range of different approaches in ways which make it easier to explore 
the processes of local politics, acknowledging that no single approach is 
likely to provide all the answers. But it argues that those debates which 
build links between politics and geography, around the notion of locality , 
are particularly helpful, as long as they do not lose sight of politics 
within the state (as expressed, for example, in Rhodes' discussion of 
policy networks), and (following Duncan, Goodwin, Halford, and Savage) as 
long as localities are not understood as coherent expressions of 
underlying relations. Following a critical discussion of the locality 
debates (associated with the ESRC's Changing Urban and Regional System 
programme), it is suggested that notions of local growth coalition (as 
developed by Cox and Mair) and urban corporatism (as developed by Harvey) 
may be helpful in analysing change at local level. This suggestion is taken 
further through a case study of the development of 'local socialism' and of 
local economic policies in Sheffield in the 1980s. The concluding chapter 
seeks to set out the lessons which can be drawn from the Sheffield 
experience, relating back to the earlier argum'ents, as well as suggesting 
ways of integrating those conclusions with the analyses of the state 
developed by Jessop at a more abstract level. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Capitalism is a global system. As a result many of the most important 
decisions seem to be taken in the board rooms of multinational companies, 
or are explained as the consequences of the impersonal operation of market 
forces, for which no individual or group of individuals can be held 
responsible. Political actions look less and less able to influence the 
operation of this system because there are no effective international 
political structures, and most individual countries are left to find their 
own accomodations within an increasingly hostile economic environment. 
Governments are forced to compete to attract companies looking for sites 
to develop, offering packages of land, financial incentives and promises of 
disciplined labour forces. They read the entrails of economic statistics to 
assess whether they need to raise or lower interest rates, decrease or 
increase levels of public spending. 
In such a world it is, perhaps, difficult to understand why anyone 
would be interested in local politics. If national governments are weak and 
international structures underdeveloped, then surely it is difficult not to 
conclude that local politics must merely be an irrelevant sideshow. Yet in 
many of the countries of Western Europe, at least, local government has 
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been at the centre of major controversies throughout the 1980s (see, e.g., 
King and Pierre 1990 and Pickvance and Preteceille 1991). Just when it 
looks as if economic processes are truly global, local governments have 
increasingly become involved in the development of their own economic 
policies. 
In principle perhaps such an outcome is not as paradoxical as it might 
at first appear. At a theoretical level it is not difficult to see how moves 
towards globalisation might also lead to an extension of local initiative, 
precisely because it undermines the position of national states and makes 
it much more difficult to understand what a national economy looks like: if 
the economic boundaries between nations are becoming increasingly 
porous, then it becomes less easy to discount the importance of local 
economies just because the boundaries between them are difficult to 
specify. Places may also be defined by their residents in terms of their 
relation to global rather than simply 'local' processes (including, for 
example, links to cultures based in other countries) yet arguably, too, in a 
context of global uncertainty, it may become more important to be clearer 
about security and identity at local level, where social interaction is more 
possible (see, e.g., Massey 1991 a for a discussion of the notion of a global 
sense of place, Robins 1990 for a discussion of globalisation. Cooke 1990 
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discusses similar questions). 
These concerns provide the context for the discussion which follows. 
It is possible to accept the general proposition that local and global 
processes and the interactions between them are vitally important in 
shaping the world in which we live, but it is less easy to understand the 
implications of such a view for the practice and development of activities 
at local level. In order to develop this understanding it is necessary to 
explore the balance of different influences which shape what is possible 
and the extent to which locally based interests (whether economic, 
cultural or political) can themselves influence events and create new 
opportunities. The argument which follows is principally concerned with 
the operation of local politics, and in particular with attempts to develop 
alternative forms of local economic policy in an area of traditional or 
declining industry; in part because this is the clearest arena in which local 
interests can be seen to find formal expression, and in part because 
globalisation might also be expected to encourage significant changes in 
the organisation and role of the local state. 
The argument starts with an assessment of existing approaches to the 
problem of local politics, looking first at those which dominate in the 
field of local government studies, before turning to theories of the local 
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state. One of the weaknesses of such approaches is that they rarely 
consider the significance of the label 'local' in the studies the develop. It 
is simply taken for granted as a defining characteristic of an area of study. 
This leads into more recent arguments, mainly from debates within the 
discipline of geography, which explore the meaning and value of terms such 
as 'local' or 'locality'. In turn, many of these debates show little 
understanding of the significance of theories of politics or the state, so it 
is suggested that it is necessary to bring the different approaches 
together, with the help of theories which utilise notions such as 'growth 
coalitions' and 'urban corporatism'. 
In order to explore the most effective ways of doing this a case study 
of local socialist initiatives in the field of economic policy is developed. 
These initiatives are set within the wider context of political change 
within the U.K. in the 1980s, before being explored in more detail in the 
case of Sheffield. The moves from radical rhetoric in the early 1980s to 
the language (and practice) of 'public-private' partnership at the end of the 
decade are charted, and the implications of the shifts are assessed. Stress 
is placed on the need to set the Sheffield experience in the context of the 
restructuring of state and politics through the 1980s, linking the 
processes of local politics (including professional politics) to these wider 
4 
shifts. 
Finally, more general conclusions are drawn about the position of 
local politics and the local state within the structures of capitalism in the 
last decades of the twentieth century. In particular, it is argued that 
whilst there is scope for the development of independent initiatives at 
local level, the local state is increasingly the site of corporatist political 
arrangements, within which elected local government is playing the part of 
co-ordination and providing infrastructural support. This conclusion is 
consistent with the arguments linking the global and the local which are 
raised earlier, since it suggests that the key levels at which business 
interests are likely to be involved are international (e.g. European) and 
local (or regional). One implication of this is that apparent 
decentralisation of responsibility and political representation may not be 
accompanied by increased 'autonomy' for local government and the local 
state, both because it may be accompanied by tighter control from the 
centre, but also - more important - because it may imply greater influence 
for business interests (whether strictly local or the local expression of 
wider interests). 
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Chapter 2. Local government, local politics and the local state. 
If the experience of the 1980s is any guide, then debates about local 
government reform are likely to remain heated but confused, with 
conclusions which remain uncertain and the continual promise of more 
'reforms' which are likely to resolve little. In order to move beyond the 
agenda set by the attempts at 'reform' introduced at the centre it is 
necessary to look further than the apparently straightforward 
descriptions of conflict between central and local government, which 
encourage academics to line up with one side or the other. The argument 
which follows is structured in ways which are intended to make this 
. 
possible, leading from a discussion of academic debates focused on notions 
of the local state, locality and the possibility of forms of urban or local 
corporatism, to a consideration of the political and organisational 
frameworks within which local governments and local states operate, 
before turning to a particular case study through which processes of 
interaction can be explored in ways which allow tentative conclusions to 
be drawn about the nature of local political arrangements at the start of 
the 1990s. 
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2.1 From local government to local state and back again 
Until the 1970s the academic analysis of local government in the 
United Kingdom was largely conducted through straightforward, apparently 
commonsense, case studies of policy formation and the institutional 
arrangements were generally taken for granted. The main criticisms 
focused on the calibre of councillors and officers. Within this tradition 
local government was only 'local' in the sense that it was not national -
the necessary administrative consequence of a welfare state which had to 
be delivered at local level - and was grafted on to an existing structure of 
local government, bequeathed from the nineteenth century (Keith-Lucas and 
Richards 1978). Indeed, in the 1960s it was the legacy of the past 
(including its democratic basis) which was blamed for the perceived 
ineffiencies of the system. Dearlove neatly summarises these arguments, 
"Most commentators have described the system as democratic, 
inefficient, subject to massive and increasing central control, and 
dominated by councillors (and officers) of declining calibre" (Dearlove 
1979, p.22). What was needed, it was argued, was better management and 
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more appropriate organisation in larger units to meet the technical 
requirements of service delivery. 
Academic analysis tended to be somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, 
many writers in the field - such as Stewart 1971 and 1974 - shared the 
view that substantial reorganisation was required, but at the same time 
they were committed to the existing institutions and professions of local 
government. In practice much of their work focused on providing more or 
less direct assistance to those being researched. The literature was 
dominated by writing oriented towards advising officers and councillors 
how to operate on particular issues with little analysis of how local 
politics worked. Dunleavy has criticised much of the academic writing on 
local government in the 1960s and 1970s for being written from the pOint 
of view of the 'inside dopester', that is based on information drawn from 
close relationships with political actors, rather than an attempt to 
analyse their behaviour: with the role of "mediating the objective 
perceptions and valuable insights of local politicians to a wider audience 
... or that of policy advisor, removed from the routines of day-to-day 
administration, capable of taking a larger view and perhaps versed in a 
more sophisticted appreciation of democratic theory, but fundamentally 
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concerned with the same goals and operating in the same ideological frame 
as local government itself" (Dunleavy 1980, p.7). Dunleavy's criticism 
retains much force, and is reinforced by the extent to which writing in the 
field continues to come from those who rely on close relationships with 
local government for training and consultancy contracts. Whilst there is no 
suggestion of direct corruption in this relationship, it does imply a rather 
narrow focus substantially driven by the concerns of those with whom 
continuing relationships have to be maintained (see also Dearlove's sharp 
critique 1979, pp.258-9). Even the new initiatives of the1980s (often 
summarised as 'local socialism') were generally discussed in much the 
.same way, with academics reporting on them and offering support, rather 
than analysis of political processes (see, e.g. Boddy and Fudge 1984b, Chs 1 
and 4-9). 
One result of the dominance of local government experts (associated 
with major academic institutions such as the Institute of Local Gvernment 
Studies in Birmingham and the School for Advanced Urban Studies in 
Bristol) seems to have been that other traditions have been squeezed into 
secondary positions. Even pluralist analysis has existed at the margins, 
often justifying itself in terms which emphasise access to or membership 
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of the policy communities under discussion. Both Gyford (1976) and 
Alexander (1982), for example, start by noting their direct involvement as 
councillors, and Blowers (1980) builds on his experience as Chair of 
Bedfordshire's Environmental Services Committee. But pluralist 
approaches have, at least, had a degree of legitimation within the political 
science tradition, and local politics has been seen as an arena in which 
broader questions associated with those approaches could be explored, 
particularly in the context of (often rich) case studies of specific 
authorities (and, sometimes, by implication, places) (see. e.g. Dearlove 
1973. Hampton 1970. and Newton 1976b). Although these analyses were 
able to problematise (and politicise) otherwise rather neutral 
. 
interpretations of local politics. they retained some of the broader 
weaknesses of pluralist analysis. In particular, although they were able to 
investigate party politics and the politics of interest groups. they were 
rarely able to get behind the formal structures of council and officers, to 
the extent that Newton, for example, pointed to the significance of 
officers in the decision-making process, but was unable to do much more 
than comment that: "much of the current literature on officer-member 
relations overemphasizes the power of officers and underemphasizes that 
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of members" (Newton 1976b, p. 164). Whilst the importance of 
intra-organisational politics might be formally acknowledged, it was, in 
practice, largely ignored. 
In addition, pluralist approaches found it difficult to deal adequately 
with the wider economic and political context within which local politics 
has to be placed. Although - as Newton and Dearlove did - it was possible 
for them to point to imperfections within simple pluralist models, 
highlighting inequalities in access to power, it was more difficult for 
them to identify systematic forms of exclusion, without moving 
substantially away from the basic models. Yet, as Offe notes, it is only by 
integrating the analysis of organisation, "global social system" and the 
behaviour of social actors that it is possible to develop "a sufficiently 
complex explanation" of the operation of interest groups (Offe 1981, p. 
123). 
One way of doing this might have been to take up and develop 
community power analysis, but this was slow to cross the Atlantic, with 
Saunders (1980) being a rare exception (although some other case studies 
also moved in this direction with their emphasis on links between political 
and economic elites at local level - e.g. Blowers 1984, Clements 1969, Lee 
1 1 
1963). Saunders' analysis of Croydon highlights the extent to which certain 
issues are simply removed from the political agenda, as well as the 
importance of informal debates within local elites, although he later 
comments that "in retrospect" his analysis supports a notion of "imperfect 
pluralism in which business interests had achieved dominance over 
particular issues of direct relevance to them" rather than one in which 
elites determine policy across the board (Saunders 1986, p. 34). In any 
case, it is important to note that such forms of analysis are still likely to 
underestimate the ways in which local political processes interact with 
national economic and political structures, which, as Dunleavy suggests, 
may be more important than local ones, even on issues such as the 
development of council housing (Dunleavy 1981, pp. 346-351). 
It is in this context that one might have expected marxist influenced 
literature to be most helpful, since it starts from a position which 
stresses the importance of the wider political economy. But, most marxist 
writing in the U.K. in the 1960s and early 1970s effectively dismissed 
local government as a significant area for intervention (or debate). It was 
merely another aspect of capitalism and the capitalist state, allowing 
little scope for political variation. Miliband, for example, criticised 
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pluralist analysis of local politics in the U.S.A. arguing that, "As in 
national terms, business at local and state level is not only at an enormous 
competitive advantage in getting those things it wants; it is also uniquely 
well placed to prevent those things from being done or even seriously 
discussed and considered, which it does not want" (Miliband 1969 pp. 175). 
And in the UK he concluded that, "Here too the largest part by far of the 
population remains for ever ruled by others who mayor may not have 
welfare and radical orientations, who mayor may not combine these 
orientations with bureaucratic propensities, but who are, in any case, 
them" (Miliband 1969, p. 178). 
In the 1970s, however, there were a series of attempts to theorise 
and understand the nature of local government - or what was often called 
the 'local state' - from marxist or marxist influenced perspectives. Here 
the theoretical focus was generally on the identification of broad 
conceptual divisions, although often backed up by rich empirical material. 
The most powerful of this work - generally drawing its inspiration from 
the structuralist marxism associated with Althusser and Poulantzas -
sought to identify clearly separate objects of scientific study - hence 
'local state' (Cockburn 1977, O'Connor 1973) or 'urban politics' (Castells 
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1977, 1978, Dunleavy 1980), rather than the incoherent and everyday 'local 
government'. For Cockburn the key role of the 'local state', within the 
broader framework of the capitalist state, was the management of the 
community, which was defined as the reproduction of labour power. A 
similar division was identified by O'Connor, for whom the local state was 
principally concerned with the management of social consumption. Castells 
and Dunleavy focused on collective consumption as the defining 
characteristic of the 'urban'. 
The strength of all these approaches lay in the ways in which they 
brought issues of concern within local government to the centre of wider 
debates. No longer was that level of government (whatever it was labeled) 
simply a backwater of little relevance to political life. Instead, not only 
could it only properly be understood as part of a wider system of political 
economy, but that wider system itself could only be understood if the local 
state (or urban politics) was recognised as a crucial part of it. At the same 
time these theorists moved away from models which explained all aspects 
of the state simply in terms of the unfolding of the logic of capitalist 
development, while retaining a perspective which located developments 
within the wider constraints of capitalist development. 
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Their weakness, however, lay in the difficulty they had in identifying 
political processes. There is a large gap between the wider processes and 
abstractions 1dentified and the actual practices of local politics. Not only 
is there little reference to intra-organisational politics, but the very 
notion of the 'local' is absent. 'Local' government, the local state or 'urban' 
politics in these models is a layer or level of the state or politics, rather 
than a series of activities identified with any particular place. Place - at 
least at a theoretical level - seems irrelevant, except insofar as the 
political processes identified have to have some spatial expression. 
However, because the active pursuit of politics cannot be discussed 
outside of time and space, the importance of place receives implicit 
recognition at the level of empirical research, in the consideration of 
particular cases (e.g. Cockburn's analysis is linked to a case study of 
Lambeth, and Dunleavy undertook a detailed analysis based on a case study 
of Newham, Dunleavy 1981). But the case studies are being used - as 
Dunleavy argues, following Mitchell - "to establish necessary dependencies 
amongst the elements in a given context. .. case studies are concerned to 
establish logical relations ... The case demonstrates the operation of general 
principles in a defined context (the real context)" (Dunleavy 1981, p. 199). 
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Paradoxically, however, although the cases are principally intended to 
confirm the logic of already existing theoretical structures, in practice 
they help to undermine them by introducing locally based political 
dynamics, indicating, if not yet explicitly acknowledging, their 
significance. Despite the emphasis in these writings on theoretical 
development, an implicit dichotomy is developed between theory and 
practice in ways which leave the practice relatively untheorized. And as 
long as cases are used primarily as ways of exploring and identifying 
necessary relations, then the importance of place - of difference between 
places - will tend be undervalued because it implies uniqueness, rather 
than universality. Sayer makes this point very clearly: "In social systems 
we have a continually changing jumble of spatial relations, not all of them 
involving objects which are causally indifferent to one another. So even 
though concrete studies may not be interested in spatial form per se, it 
must be taken into account if the contingencies of the concrete and the 
differences they make to outcomes are to be understood" (Sayer 1984, p. 
131). 
Despite their attempts to move away from what they see as the 
failings of structural marxism, similar problems arise with the dual state 
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thesis developed by Cawson and Saunders (Cawson and Saunders 1983, 
Saunders 1982,1984 and 1986). The argument here contrasts national and 
local politics and identifies functional divisions between different levels 
of the state. Within this approach, the national level is said to be mainly, 
concerned with issues relating to major class and functional interests - in 
particular (although not only) capital and labour. Decisions on issues 
related to production and the economy are taken at that level and 
bargaining is between major interests. In this model, too, the local state 
concerns itself principally with issues of social consumption (and, 
possibly, the provision of urban infrastructure) in part because Saunders 
initially drew on O'Connor's taxonomy of state spending and Ofte's 
distinctions between what he called the 'allocative' and 'productive' 
funcions of the capitalist state to justify the division he identified 
(O'Connor 1973 and Offe 1975 and 1984). 
But the dual state thesis also goes further, to suggest that because of 
its focus on social consumption the local state is more open, more 
pluralist and less corporatist than the national state. In its later 
formulations the thesis moved away from any explicit reliance on O'Connor 
"in favour of a distinction between the 'politics of production' and the 
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'politics of consumption'" (Saunders 1986, p. 9). Because the local state is 
not responsible for the issues which are of central concern to business 
(which are dealt with at national level) there is a degree of space for 
initiative at local level which can be utilised by local groups. A distinction 
is made between 'class politics' - effectively the politics of production-
and 'sectoral politics' - effectively the politics of consumption. It is this 
which defines or makes possible the 'relative autonomy' of the local state, 
both in the sense that it is not merely the creature of central government, 
and - perhaps more important - that it does not simply operate as an 
expression of the 'needs' of capital. The model implies that at national 
level structural factors effectively determine political decision-making 
(class politics), whilst at 'local' level diverse political interest groups 
(sectoral politics) have a more or less direct influence on policy-making, 
through a sort of 'imperfect pluralism'. 
The dual state thesis is not presented as offering a necessary set of 
relations between national and local state, or even one which explains 
every divison of functional responsibility between the two levels. It is, 
rather, according to Saunders to be understood as an ideal type, whose 
value should be assessed in terms of its usefulness as a basis for 
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empirical research. For its supporters, it is said to raise questions rather 
than settling them (Saunders 1986, pp 13-17). Unfortunately, however, 
this expression of of the theory is rather disingenuous. However often it is 
claimed that it is an ideal type rather than a model, in practice rather 
stronger conclusions are frequently drawn. For example, Saunders argues 
that there is a division within British politics between areas of social 
consumption within which "policies are still by and large resolved in the 
competitive arena of democratic politics" and areas of social investment 
which have "been insulated by means of corporate bias" (Saunders 1982, p. 
60). In other words, despite the emphasis on ideal types, it is not long 
before the move is made from type to 'reality', yet when this elision is 
criticised, the response comes that the thesis has been misunderstood and 
misrepresented: it is, after all, merely an ideal type, a heuristic device for 
aiding understanding and encouraging empirical research. 
In theoretical terms, one of the key problems of the method adopted 
by Saunders is that the choice of a particular ideal type is always difficult 
to justify, because it starts from assumptions which are not clearly 
stated - for example, in this case it arises from "the questions in which 
we are interested" (Saunders 1982, p. 58). In other words, in choosing 
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which ideal types to develop (out of the many which could be developed) 
the main justification is practical relevance. But this leaves the 
underlying principles of choice - and (as Bhaskar notes) the sources of the 
values underlying them - unstated. Bhaskar draws an analogy with the 
natural sciences to suggest that theoretical interests are a necessary 
basis for choice: "Thus while it is practical interests which determine 
which out of the infinite number of possible compounds of carbon are 
studied, it is theoretical interests which motivate the identification of its 
electronic structure ... There is nothing in the infinite variety of the surface 
of the social cosmos to necessitate a difference in principle in the 
structure of the search for explanatory mechanisms" (Bhaskar 1979, p. 71). 
In the case of the dual state thesis, there seems to have been a sleight of 
hand involved, in which the language of neo-marxism is used as a starting 
point, drawing on the theoretical divisions provided by Offe and O'Connor, 
and then rejected to allow the thesis itself much more flexibility in the 
'real' world of local politics. 
Even where the dual state thesis has been used as a starting point for 
empirical research, the results are not very encouraging. Saunders' own 
work on the regional level of the state (Saunders 1985; see also Duncan 
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and Goodwin 1988 Ch 7) suggests that identifying the regional level as a 
means of shifting production issues from local (more pluralist) to more 
corporate forms of politics is not very helpful, particularly in the wake of 
privatisation policies which have simply removed many 'regional 
institutions' (such as the water authorities and public transport) out of the 
political arena. Blowers' analysis of the politics of development and 
pollution in Bedfordshire also uses the dual state thesis as a theoretical 
starting point, and appears rather more successful in showing its value, 
noting the greater power of producer interests in the decision-making 
process, but also pointing to the significance of consumer interests at 
local level. But the results of Blowers' researches are also equivocal, 
because they suggest that producer interests are powerful at local as well 
as national (and regional) levels (Blowers 1984). Despite his later 
preference for neo-pluralism, Saunders' own research also interestingly 
points to the increased significance of 'corporatist' modes of mediation at 
local level, particularly in the extent of representation of business 
interests, but possibly also in a decline of representation for traditional 
welfare state professionals (Saunders 1984, p.35). If using the dual state 
thesis as a starting point begins to call into question the divisions it 
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purports to identify then it may represent a theoretical cui de sac rather 
than a way into theoretically informed research. There is a danger that all 
the theory does is to add a layer of generalising legitimacy, to what may 
be entirely contingent relationships (to be found in particular local 
governments at a particular time). 
The best known theories of the local state, whether developed by 
Castells, Cockburn, or Saunders, all identified the local state with the 
pOlitics of welfare (whether expressed in terms of the reproduction of 
labour power, collective consumption, or social consumption). Each started 
from an apparently necessary set of divisions within capitalism as the 
basis for drawing these conclusions. But it was increasingly clear that 
such logical divisions were difficult to sustain, either empirically or 
theoretically. Empirically, evidence was soon accumulated which 
suggested that other issues were also of interest to existing local states. 
Planning policies and the politics they involved, in particular, were felt to 
fit rather uneasily with such models (see, e.g., Flynn 1983, Reade 1987, 
Simmie 1981 and 1985) and there was a growing interest in the 
development of local economic policies (see Ch. 7), which also suggested a 
different focus for the local state. At a theoretical level, it was suggested 
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by some that the local state might be better understood in terms which 
stressed its role in the politics of development and land use (see, e.g., 
Logan and Molotch 1987, Smith 1988) or social control (see, e.g. Gottdiener 
1987 Ch. 6). 
The notion of the local state as it is used in academic debate is no 
longer dependent on an analysis which starts from the identification of 
functional divisions between levels of the state. But this also means that 
the value of using the term has become less clear: it tends to be used in 
sociological and marxist influenced literature, and to be avoided in much 
pOlitical science literature and (not surprisingly) in the literature of local 
·government studies. In the course of the 1980s, the criticism of local 
state theories of various kinds encouraged a move back to the language of 
local and central government. Stoker simply seems to use the terms local 
state and local government interchangeably (Stoker 1988, Ch. 10), while 
Rhodes explicitly rejects the notion of the local state, arguing that it adds 
little to theorisations of sub-central governments, the term which he 
prefers (Rhodes 1988, pp. 97-98). At the end of the decade the dominant 
approach once more focused on local government rather than local state, 
with an emphasis on the extent to which its position had been undermined 
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by the centre (see, e.g., Crouch and Marquand 1989, especially the 
Introduction) and the extent to which new possibilities had been opened up 
for officers and councillors by the experience of the 1980s (see, for 
example, Brooke 1989a and b on the notion of the 'enabling' authority, and 
the debates in Stewart and Stoker 1989). 
The value of such moves (particularly in the writing of Stoker and 
Rhodes) is that it is possible to connect more clearly with contemporary 
political debates, while retaining a commitment to wider theorisations of 
politics. But giving up attempts to theorise local government as part of the 
state carries with it the danger that the notion of local government will be 
left as unproblematic and unproblematised. It becomes easy to slip back 
into discussions of officers and politicians in a largely untheorised way 
which makes it difficult to explore the broader power relations within 
local government and surrounding it and to acknowledge the political 
Significance of private and public sector agencies outside the direct 
control of elected governments. Yet agencie~ of this sort are becoming 
increasingly important at local level. One of the strengths of the notion of 
the local state is that it makes it easier to locate local political 
arrangements within a wider social environment, and to explore both how 
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they help to shape that environment and are shaped by it. It also makes it 
easier to avoid an instrumental view of state or governmental power 
. 
because of its stress on the state as a social relation or 'institutional 
ensemble': as Jessop notes, it is not the state which has power, instead 
"state power should be seen as a form-determined condensation of the' 
balance of political forces" (Jessop 1990b, p. 167). 
Here, too, it is apparent that the choice of terms may also imply a 
move away from forms of theorising which are concerned to explore the 
significance of the state as a 'capitalist state'. If the term 'government' is 
used intead, the implication is that there is little connection between 
.wider social relations and political arrangements;' The neo-marxist 
theorists of the 1970s tended to present the 'local state' as a more or less 
direct expression of capitalist interests at local level, but if Jessop's 
formulation is used instead, then it becomes easier to understand that may 
still be useful to see the state as a capitalist state. He argues that: "The 
state is a strategically selective terrain whic~ can never be neutral among 
all social forces and political projects; but any bias is always tendential 
and can be undermined or reinforced by appropriate strategies. For, within 
the strategically selective limits established by state structures and 
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operating procedures, the outcome of state power also depends on the 
changing balance of forces engaged in political action both within and 
beyond the state" (Jessop 1990b, p. 3S3). Although there is no absolute 
logic of capital to be unambiguously translated into state form, or 
political initiative, the structural constraints implied for politics by the 
capitalist state form are real enough: above all in the way in which the 
division between private economy and the state means that the latter. 
remains dependent on the private sector as the source of economic 
well-being (Jessop 1990b, pp. 178-180) . 
. 2.2 From local state to local politics 
One characteristic of all the theories of the local state (and related 
approaches) is, as we have indicated, that they make little explicit 
allowance for local factors. Indeed, in some versions the significance of 
such factors is directly dismissed. Dunleavy" for example, stresses the 
structural context of urban politics and non-local sources of urban policy 
change, before going on explicitly to question the importance of local 
politics (Dunleavy 1980, chs. 3, 4 and 5). But this theoretical purity is 
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generally diluted as soon as discussion moves towards the operation of 
local governments and attempts are made to give recognition to notions of 
'relative autonomy'. Then locally based phenomena are allowed to influence 
and sometimes effectively to shape political behaviour. Although the 
theoretical starting points make this difficult, in practice attempts were 
made to explore both the constraints and possibilities of independent 
action by and through the local state, and this brought in local factors 
almost unasked. Attempts were being made to explore the extent and 
possible meaning of 'relative autonomy' at the level of the local state. 
In many ways, their conclusions seemed to be rather pessimistic: 
.8enington (1976) complained that techniques of corporate management 
were taking power away from backbench councillors and local 
communities; Cockburn (1977) argued that the local state was best 
understood as a subsidiary part of a wider (national) capitalist state, 
reinforcing the power of capital through local welfare provision; for 
Castells (1977) the local state merely respo,nded to the demands of capital 
in ensuring the reproduction of labour power through the provision of 
collective consumption goods and services; Dearlove (1979) maintained 
that the 1972 Local Government Act was designed to take access to power 
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away from working class communities and instead encourage the 
development of more 'efficient' technical approaches, supervised by middle 
class counciliors; even Dunleavy (1980) and Saunders (1980) only seemed 
able to allow a degree of 'local' autonomy by granting power to local 
political elites (networks of influence) whose members might disagree 
with each other, but which nevertheless continued to exclude other groups. 
Yet there was another side to these analyses, confirmed in their 
opposition to changes which were said to be reducing the scope for local 
autonomy. If changes were being introduced to reduce the power of the 
working class, or groups oppressed on grounds of gender or race, then the 
.implication was that these groups must have had some access to power in 
the past. And, if properly mobilised, there might be some scope for 
political intervention by them in the future, too. In other words, politics 
could not be reduced to structural factors, but might even generate 
sufficient pressure to challenge, or undermine existing structures. The 
political implications of these writings were relatively unexplored at'the 
time. The main criticism made of Cockburn's approach, for example, was 
that it was excessively 'functionalist' in explaining the changing role of 
the 'local state' as stemming from its (necessary) role within capitalism 
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(see, e.g., Duncan and Goodwin 1982); similarly, Caste lis was initially 
criticised for utilising an Althusserian structuralism which allowed little 
scope for pofitical agency (Lowe 1986, p. 12). Yet the main message to be 
drawn from these texts was not one of fatalism, nor of a crude 
anti-statism, as might have been expected from such criticisms. On the 
contrary, it was that there were opportunities for autonomous action by 
groups of people working within, and 'client' groups operating outside, the 
state machine which could point towards alternative ways of organising 
society. 
So, for Castells (well before his auto-critique in 1983), the notion of 
,Collective consumption allowed the possibility of identifying a whole 
range of autonomous social and political movements which might be able 
to challenge the state. He argued, for example, that in France in the mid 
1970s the left had been able to develop broad campaigns over issues of 
collective consumption as part of a drive to take over political power at 
councilleve!. The success of these campaigns was partly a prelude to 
national electoral victory, but he suggested that it also provided a basis on 
which to implement radical local political programmes (Castells 1978). In 
its early formulations the possibility of urban social movements suggested 
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a basis on which alliances could be formed, led by the working class, and 
ultimately capable of overthrowing capitalism. In later formulations, it 
. 
was suggested that urban movements made it possible to build broader, 
cross-class, more pluralist alliances (Lowe 1986, pp. 24-26). 
From a rather different perspective Cockburn (1977) argued that there 
was a real possibility of opening up a politics based on notions of social 
reproduction and community, in which women would playa central part in 
undermining the logic of the local state, in developing politics at "the 
point of collective reproduction" (Cockburn 1977, p. 167. See also 
Pp177-183). Instead of believing that the state was an institution which 
.could only be transformed by full frontal assault, it was argued that what 
was needed was a multiplicity of campaigns, of 'counter-organisation', 
involving employees and those they were supposed to serv~ thr~ugh the 
welfare state. "Because the state is a form of relations, its workers and 
clients, if they do not struggle against it, help to perpetuate it. .. Our 
struggle against it must be a continual one, ~hanging shape as the struggle 
itself, and the state's response to it, create new opportunities" 
(London-Edinburgh Weekend Return Group 1979, pp.48-49). 
But within these approaches, local elements remained reluctant 
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participants. They were in a sense residuals: when the structural 
arguments could not explain what happened, then local factors had to be 
taken into account. Little attempt was made to specify the local, or to 
assess its significance within the models. It was simply as if an arena 
was identified within which politics was possible, and very often the 
writers themselves were active in it. There remained a series of crucial 
difficulties with these formulations which were not resolved before many 
of the key theorists, in England and France, themselves became involved in 
the state about which they had previously written, or engaged with through 
various community and other campaigns. Saunders noted that Castells' 
.theory of the state failed" to relate structures to practices and the 
functional requirements of the sytem to the effects of class struggle" and 
this is a weakness which underlies much local state theory, even when the 
importance of political practice is acknowledged (Saunders 1981, p. 190). 
Although there were broad statements about 'counter-organisation' 
Somehow "prefiguring socialist organisation within the struggle itself" 
(London-Edinburgh Weekend Return Group 1979, p. 62), for example, it was 
never quite clear when this multitude of interventions would stop the 
state being a capitalist state. Nor was it clear how taking over the 
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'machine' of the state through local electoral success would fit into the 
analysis, since most of the theorising was based on the notion of continued 
oppositional practice within the state or communities. Cockburn had been 
particularly scathing of those who viewed the officer structure of local 
government as a neutral machine which could be steered in whatever 
direction the politicians chose - "obediently in the command of whoever 
sits in the electoral driver's seat" (Cockburn 1977, p.2). But this did not 
solve the problem of what to do when, in the early 1980s (to everybody's 
surprise), the left actually took over that seat, in some places at least. Nor 
was it clear from this debate what scope actually existed to carry through 
,fundamental change at local level: there was some understanding that 
there were constraints and opportunities but the limits of each remained 
to be determined. It was also understood that precisely because the state 
was a set of relations, rather than a 'machine' or 'institution', it was easy 
to be drawn into processes of decision-making whose terms were 
effectively determined by interests opposed to those of the left. It was 
less clear how this might be avoided. 
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2.3 In what sense local? 
This is one of the reasons why the need to identify the local - what 
makes local government, the local state or local government local· 
becomes so important (see also Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. xiv). It is 
necessary to provide some framework which makes it possible to avoid 
either simply listing a series of initiatives and labelling them 'local', or 
apparently deducing them from first principles in the ways that the 
theorists of the local state do. In doing this it is useful to draw on a 
different set of debates, in particular focusing on those drawn from 
geography, rather than political science or sociology. Here, at least, 
spatial differentiation is more than the unfortunate expression of 
empirical reality and it is explicitly recognised from the start .that ."the 
'spatial' is not just an outcome; it is also part of the explanation" (Allen 
and Massey 1984, p. 4), even if the precise implications of this recognition 
for political behaviour and organisation remain uncertain. 
So, what would it mean to take the local aspects of local government 
or the local state seriously? At its most basic, such an approach might 
simply acknowledge that there are differences between different places -
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that there is a degree of spatial variation. Such differences could exist for 
a number of reasons. Many centrally determined state policies, for 
example, wilrbe delivered differently in different places, although the 
rules under which the policies are delivered may be the same everywhere. 
It is likely to surprise no-one that more social security benefits are paid 
in areas whose population includes higher numbers of unemployed, or other 
Potential claimants, although the significance of concentrations of this 
sort is often missed in more generalised discussion of levels of welfare 
benefit. National industrial policies, too, are likely to affect different 
places in different ways (see, for example, Massey and Meegan 1978, 
.Cochrane and Dicker 1977 and COP 1977a, Section 4 which highlight the 
differential impact of the industrial policies of the 1960s and 1970s, 
particularly in the inner cities). Even those policies introduced with 
specific areas as targets - such as regional policy and policies for the 
inner cities - often have unpredicted (if not unpredictable) impacts inside 
and outside their target areas (see, e.g., COP 1977a, Section 2 and Hudson 
1986). But, however important it is to note these localised impacts of 
national policies, that does not yet tell us very much about the independent 
significance of local factors. 
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It is, of course, important to understand that the UK is not an 
isotropic surface, with activities and people evenly distributed about it, 
although that" often appears to be the assumption on which policies are 
made, or at least justified. Once the existence of spatial variation is 
accepted, then it must also be clear that no national policy is likely to 
have a spatially neutral impact. But that is not yet the same as suggesting 
that local factors may be of significance in themselves. The acceptance of 
difference might simply imply that by feeding in enough data and using the 
appropriate formulae it should be possible to identify the impact of any 
policy in each identifiable area. 
For initiatives to be understood as 'local' ones it becomes necessary 
to move beyond the simple identification of differences between places. 
They need in some way to reflect interaction between factors at local 
level which go towards the formation of particular political processes. In 
this sense one would also expect them to be more than mechanical 
responses or adjustments to the changing demands of capitalist 
enterprises in the face of (or in the process of) industrial restructuring. It 
is the ability to identify a process of interaction between broader national 
and international developments and local understandings which is 
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essential. For it to be useful to describe initiatives as 'local' (in however 
limited a way) one would expect them to relate to locally generated 
pressures and to be capable of translation into policies which can have 
some effect locally, even in the absence of shifts in national policy 
(although attempting to change the direction of national policy might 
itself be one of the aims of locally based political initiatives). In other 
Words, there needs to be scope for a degree of independent policy 
formulation and implementation at local level, whether understood purely 
as a level of government or as the political expression of 'locality'. 
According to Dickens et ai, "A local social process worthy of the name 
must refer to something active and specific to localities, although not 
necessarily unique to one locality, rather than local deviations to national 
level processes" (Dickens et al1985, p. 18), and the point is equally valid 
for local political processes. 
The importance of 'locality' as an issue is one which until recently it 
has been all too easy to ignore in the study ~f local government and the 
local state. It has been easy to accept, on the one hand, that all places are 
different and so to engage in a detailed listing of what is done in those 
different places, while at the same time believing that the important 
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factors which determine what happen locally are decided nationally or 
internationally, or that there is a permanent process of convergence at 
work which is making different places more alike. Dominant approaches to 
local government and the local state have tended to operate with a 
conveniently dualist view of the world, in which apparently sophisticated 
theories are used to deal with general tendencies of development and yet a 
highly differentiated (and largely untheorised and commonsense) view is 
taken of particular local states. At local level empirical detail may 
substitute for theoretical analysis. The notion of 'locality', in some 
formulations at least, should help to bring these two levels together by 
.showing how broad economic and social processes (e.g. economic 
restructuring) operate across localities, changing their nature, but also 
how the nature of local economies and social structures may also influence 
and feed back into those processes. 
Of course, this does not mean that researchers should concentrate on 
cataloguing an endless series of unique experiences. Certainly every place 
is unique, but each is also part of a wider system which helps to shape it, 
and many apparently 'local' phenomena relate equally directly to others at 
national or global levels. Allen and Massey (1984, pp. 8-10) use the the 
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terms "uniqueness and interdependence" to express these continuing 
relations and processes of interaction, although it remains difficult to 
translate such a broad statement, which is a useful starting point, into 
more developed theoretical terms. The difficulty of this task should not be 
allowed to discourage attempts to undertake it more systematically. 
These issues are at the heart of Massey's 'Spatial Divisions of Labour' 
(1984), which is particularly effective in showing the ways in which the 
same processes (e.g. of industrial decentralisation) find different 
expressions and have different implications in different places, 
particularly for structures of class and gender. These changing expressions 
of social structure are important in the consideration of local politics, at 
. 
least insofar as they help to set the parameters within which it operates. 
Here we can begin to see how the working class makes and remakes itself 
in different regions and localities in the face of economic restructuring, 
precisely because its members are forced to adjust to the changing 
imperatives of capital. It is possible to identify material reasons for 
differences between places which might also find a reflection in local 
political structures, and in the case studies in Ch.5 of her book, which 
start from the changing industrial bases of South Wales and Cornwall, 
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Massey brings some of these out. In South Wales traditional (male) working 
class trade union and political cultures are increasingly under challenge 
because of changes in the local employment structure, while in Cornwall 
the development of similar employment is being (unsuccessfully) resisted 
by local businesses eager to avoid competition for labour. 
Massey moves from changes in the geography of production to changes 
in social structure and local politics, but the underlying principle of her 
approach need not be restricted to the level of production, since it is 
essentially a historical focus which matters. She concentrates on rounds 
of investment, in which succeeding rounds in each area build on and are 
influenced by the results of previous ones - including political legacies, 
social legacies, and legacies in the form of fixed capital and existing or 
potential workforces - "the structure of local economies can be seen as a 
product of the combination of 'layers', of the successive imposition over 
the years of new rounds of investment, new rounds of activity" 
(pp.117-118) . A similar notion could presumably exist independently of 
new rounds of investment, solely at the political level - so that, for 
example, centrally determined political reforms would have to relate to 
existing local pOlitical cultures, even if the existing social and economic 
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structures remained unchanged. In practice, the different levels of 
economic, social and political change might be expected to interact and 
interrelate, without the same one necessarily always preceding and 
determining the other, even if one shares Massey's view of the central 
importance of production in shaping the available options (similar points 
are made by Halford 1989, p. 161, who is particularly concerned with the 
development of gender relations at local level and their interaction with 
local politics and the local state). 
Massey herself does not significantly develop this (not surprisingly 
since she is concerned principally with regional economic geography) but 
she does explicitly acknowledge some of the possibilities: "Broader social 
structures of community, changing patterns of consumption ... , changing 
national ideological and political climate and the marked patterns of 
geographical cultural differentiation - all of these will combine with 
changes in the social relations of production in determining both the 
overall pattern of class structure and the more detailed internal 
characteristics of classes" (Massey 1984, p. 195). Clarke usefully shows 
the implications of such an extension linking place, culture and class by 
indicating the ways in which local identities may help to condense "a 
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whole range of economic, social and political references into a place" and 
gOing on to identify ways in which 'new' cultures may be overlaid "on the 
geographical-pattern of old working class cultures" (Clarke 1984, pp. 56 
and 64). In the 1980s he suggests more positively that, "The geographical 
attachments of class cultures have been fractured, and new cultures of 
- -
class may emerge, attempting to solidify a new sense of place on the 
shifting sands of British society" (Clarke 1984, p. 66). 
In principle the arguments we have considered in this chapter suggest 
that it is important to consider the significance of locally based processes 
for the development of local politics. One of the weaknesses of dominant 
modes of political analysis is that they are unable to take such processes 
into account. The frameworks within which they operate implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly) exclude the possibility that differences between 
places matter much. It is, perhaps, not too difficult to conclude that this 
is unfortunate and that the bias against the local needs to be countered. 
But it is less easy to show how this may b~ done. The next chapter draws 
\ . 
on recent arguments developed within and around the discipline of. 
geography as a first step towards showing what is possible, not only 
confirming that locality matters, but highlighting some of the ways in 
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which it does. 
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Chapter 3. How locality matters 
3.1 Exploring localities 
According to Massey, "particular places are imbedded in wider social 
structures, are part of broader spatial divisions of labour - a fact that 
they share with other places - and ... each locality brings to that situation 
its own specific history and its own character ... the challenge is to hold on 
to both the general movement and the particularity of circumstance" 
(Massey 1984, p. 8). But achieving this is more difficult than accepting its 
necessity 1. The notion of 'locality' has been the centre of (not always very 
helpful) debate within geography through the 1980s. It has been used as a 
way of bringing together different levels of analysis, both seeking to make 
broad claims about global restructuring (whether informed by marxist 
political economy or theories of post-modernism), and attempting to 
explore the practical and detailed consequences of these in particular 
places, for identifiable social groups. 
Positions in the debate have not always been clear cut, since its 
boundaries have shifted over time, with substantial agreement at the 
beginning of the decade on the need to stress the importance of spatial 
43 
beginning of the decade on the need to stress the importance of spatial 
variation only leading to more clear cut disagreements at the end. Authors 
who have worked together at one time, have in other circumstances 
developed criticisms without always indicating how these relate to the 
results of earlier collaborative research. Nevertheless, at the risk of 
over-simplification, it is possible to divide contributions along lines 
which give more or less importance to structural forces and allow more or 
less autonomy at local level. 
The main lines of argument are already hinted at in criticisms of 
Massey's position developed by Warde in 1985. Although he promises to 
criticise what he describes as the 'geological' metaphor adopted by Massey, 
in practice he does not confront it directly, concentrating instead on the 
argument that local identities are not "reducible to class structure" and 
that, "Cumulative local, cultural effects cannot be ignored" (Warde 1985, p. 
201). Like Urry, he maintains that spatial divisions of consumption and the 
Spatial structuring of civil society need to be given explicit recognition 
(Urry 1981 and 1985b, pp. 29-34). In principle, perhaps such criticisms do 
not seem significant, since Massey, too, as we have seen, would accept the 
importance of culture. But underlying them seems to be a more significant 
difference in emphasis. Massey starts with uneven development as a 
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feature of the capitalist organisation of production, and the identification 
of localities as a consequence: whilst for Warde the existence of the local 
is the starting point (uneven development is taken for granted as a 'social 
fact' rather than a process) and the theorisation of uneven development 
does not seem particularly important. Although it is not always clear, 
there remains a theoretical difference between those (including Massey, 
Duncan, Goodwin, Halford and Savage) for whom the analysis of localities 
(or the local consequences of spatial variation) is part of a wider 
commitment to understanding the pOlitical economy of modern capitalism 
and those (including Cooke, Dickens, Urry and Warde) for whom it provides 
the possibility of identifying political processes which are no longer (or 
only loosely) related to the pressures of capitalist development2. 
The main thrust of Warde's criticism of Massey is one which runs 
through much of the debate surrounding the notion of locality. He 
interprets Massey's arguments as suggesting that the most important 
effects of spatial divisions of labour are 'class effects', and argues, on 
the contrary, that most local effects are 'non-class'. In part this 
disagreement may reflect a different understanding of class: for Massey, 
classes are not merely outcomes of production relationships, since they 
also define themselves in other ways in particular pl~ces - for example, 
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through political and cultural interaction - whilst for Warde and Urry 
(following Urry's theoretical distinction between production and civil 
SOCiety) they seem restricted to the field of production with all other 
processes, by definition, being non-class ones. Warde draws on Urry's 
arguments to highlight the importance of "popular struggles" over 
consumption at local level (within civil society and not necessarily merely 
expressed through the local state). He concludes that "by stressing the 
Combined importance of local differences in labour markets, household 
forms and industrial structure, distinctive spatial aspects of struggle are 
drawn into focus" (Warde 1985, p. 209. See also Urry 1985a). 
Urry takes matters further by beginning to suggest that local 
Variation itself offers a new basis for political activity (particularly 
around the cleavage between people and state) (Lash and Urry 1987, p. 
311). Lash and Urry identify a process of disorganisation within capitalist 
economies since the 1960s which, they argue, implies a break between 
paid employment, a decline of national bargaining between major interest 
groups and a growth in the importance of local politics, based on issues 
outside paid employment and often organised around 'new' social 
movements, including the peace movement, the women's movement and the 
green movement (Lash and Urry 1987, pp. 223-4). They argue that there has 
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been a growth of non-class collective action, which is increasingly 
fragmented even at local level (Lash and Urry 1987, p. 311). The evidence 
they provide for these shifts, however, remains limited. 
More important, perhaps, because they start with such tight 
conditions (nevertheless described as 'minimal') for the development of 
class based politics at local level, it is unlikely that it would ever have 
been possible for a class based analysis to be successful (even in the high 
days of modernity). The conditions they impose include: a closeness at 
work and home which makes it easy for workers to "minimize the costs of 
engaging in collective action"; that local 'civil societies' effectively 
mirror national class divisions; that few social groupings are 'non-class 
specific' at local level; that gains and benefits are thought only to be 
--
available through class-based activity; and a belief that such actions can 
be successful (even if they are not always successful) (Lash and Urry 
1987, p. 93). If these are presented as absolute requirements - as they 
seem to be by Lash and Urry - then their conclusions about the dominance 
of non-class relations are hardly surprising, but, equally, nor are they of 
much theoretical significance, since class is simply defined out of 
existence. Similarly, the definition of class politics favoured by Urry 
seems to assume that they must be anti-capitalist, so that if local 
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struggles are not "generally intended to abolish capitalist relations" but 
more often tQ encourage the capitalisation and hence the reproduction of 
particular localities, then they cannot (by definition) be the product of 
class politics (Urry 1985b, p. 26). But imposing such a condition for the 
discovery of class politics at local level seems a little unfair since most 
analysts would confirm that working class politics are more likely to be 
reformist than revolutionary (the reasons for this have, of course, been a 
matter for much debate within marxism from Lenin onwards) and 
frequently with the same aims in national politics as those which Urry 
identifies as non-class in the local context (see, e.g., Byrne 1982 on 
radical reformism at local level and Savage 1987 on the development of 
Working class politics in Preston). Again class politiCS is simply defined 
away. 
Underlying this argument, however, is the view that local experiences 
are now more important in developing political and cultural identities. The 
term 'locale' is used by Giddens in a similar fashion and his discussion of 
the concept is particularly useful in clarifying some of the ways in which 
locality might be used in the analysis of political processes. He stresses 
the ways in which social systems are situated and develop across time and 
space. They cannot merely be considered as abstract phenomena, but are 
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the products of interaction between people, groups and institutions in 
places over time. The contexts within which this interaction takes place 
are called 'locales' - particular places at specific times - and the 
interaction is influenced by legacies (even memories) from the past which 
have helped to produce the place, as well as the pressures of the present. A 
'locale' has no permanent or narrow boundaries: it is defined by the 
processes which take place within it, rather than any institutional 
framework. This means that Giddens is able to accept the inclusion of 
regions such as the North of England within his definition, because of its 
"Iong-establi~hed distinctive social traits" (Giddens 1984, p.122)3 as 
well as much more limited areas, below the local government level. 
The notion of 'locale' has fundamental weaknesses, not least a certain 
. . 
vagueness about its spatial reach which makes it difficult to define and 
delimit particular 'locales' with any clarity. Any site of social interaction 
may qualify as a 'locale'. But for our purposes, what matters is 
acknowledging the existence of interaction at local level which influences 
the behaviour and self perception of individuals and groups. These analyses 
do not imply a more or less unchanging local political culture which 
influences those who experience it. On the contrary, they assume a 
constant interaction between social classes, groups, political parties, 
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individuals, national and local government, local and global economic 
processes w~ich shapes and reshapes the nature of the locale. It confirms 
the importance of identifying and exploring the processes of interaction 
which generate different political patterns and practices in different 
places. 
Dickens develops a similar argument, suggesting that one of the 
reasons for political variation is that people vote "for local and national 
government strategies which they see as being most appropriate to deal 
with the particular combination of circumstances in their areas" (Dickens 
1988, p. 161), for example, in ways which may influence house prices, 
employment opportunities and income levels4. Dickens contrasts the 
example of a 'homeowners' in the South-East whose support for the 
Conservatives may reflect the view that market strategies will continue 
to encourage a rise in the value of their property, with that of 
'homeowners' in the Midlands who may conclude that the value of their 
property requires extensive state interventio'n to encourage regional 
economic revival. The statistical 'home-owner' in one place will, in effect, 
have different interests in another. Whilst rejecting the stronger 
formulations of Urry's position which imply too sharp a choice between 
class and non-class based structures in civil society (Dickens 1988, pp. 
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103-4), Dickens nevertheless believes that a focus on locality helps to 
show how "i'1dividuals form their own political positions" in ways which 
cut across class divisions (Dickens 1988, p. 140). Like Urry, he argues that 
new social movements organised at local level around issues of race and 
gender (and cutting across lines of class) are becoming more important and 
more difficult to incorporate into national party politics (Dickens 1988, 
pp. 168-174). 
Caste lis' approach to urban social movements in 'The City and the· 
Grassroots' is based on a similar interpretation, although in his 
formulation the urban (or city) replaces the local. He denies that class 
relationships are the main sources of social change in the city, identifying 
alternative sources as the "autonomous role of the state, gender 
relationships, ethnic and national movements, and movements that 
specifically define themselves as citizen movements" (Castells 1983, p. 
xviii). He explicitly contrasts his 'new' approach - giving legitimacy to the 
personal experience of actors - with those which start from "an 
economically determined structural logic", and argues that "only by 
analysing the relationship between people and urbanization will one be 
able to understand cities and citizens at the same time ... Every day in every 
context, people acting individually or collectively, produce or reproduce 
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the rules of their society, and translate them into their spatial expression 
and their instjtutional management" (Castells 1983, p. ,xvi). For Castells, 
urban politics becomes the politics of use value, rather than exchange 
value (or production), and an arena for defensive organisation and he argues 
that, "when people find themselves unable to control the world, they 
, 
simply shrink the world to the size of their community" (Castells, 1983 p. 
331). Thus Castells acknowledges the weakness of urban movements to 
deal adequately with the political challenges of an increasingly global 
political and economic order, but he also claims that they are more than 
merely defensive, because they "are the organizational forms, the live 
schools, where the new social movements are taking place, learning to 
breath, out of reach of the state apparatuses, and outside the closed doors 
of repressed family life ... [they] produce new historical meaning - in the 
twilight zone of pretending to build within the walls of a local community 
a new society they know to be unattainable ... by nurturing the embryos of 
tomorrow's social movements within the local Utopias that urban 
movements have constructed in order never to surrender to barbarism" 
(Castells 1983, p. 331). 
Cooke, too, seeks to identify and explore social processes which "have 
their source in the local sphere, most notably local or urban social 
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movements" (Cooke 1989d, p. 268). He sees locality as "one of the bases ... 
around whic~ people may mobilise" (Cooke 1989d, p. 269), in particular 
identifying "citizenship" as "the mechanism that enables locality to be the 
organizational base for some kinds of social agency" and stressing the 
importance of 'proactivity' at local level "as the activation of citizen 
rights" (Cooke 1989d, p~ 271). He acknowledges that mobilization around 
class, ethnic and gender lines is also important, but suggests that it is 
nevertheless possible to identify other forms of politics based on locality 
and citizenship but oriented to the national level. He increasingly defines 
proactivity in terms of the development of local economic policies, 
relating to the nation, but allowing scope for mobilization at local level. 
He suggests that the "existence of a local political culture which involves 
close political and administrative interaction with industry, and 
policy-making that is disposed to meet industry's needs, may under 
appropriate circumstances, cause restructuring to happen with more 
positive effect in A than B" (Cooke 1987a, p: 74). 
Cooke criticises Giddens' notion of locale for being too passive, 
merely identifying a site for interaction. He goes further to argue that a 
locality may also provide a basis on which to develop innovations. Cooke 
also criticises those who see spatial differences to be a product of 
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interaction between 'supra-local' structures, arguing that some of the 
differences b~tween places are the result of deliberate specialisation at 
local level (Cooke 1989c, pp. 10-11). He wants to explore the ways in 
which some geographical areas become "'spaces for themselves' as well as 
'spaces in themselves'" (Cooke 1987b, p. 412), arguing that, "Locality is the 
space within which the larger part of most citizens' daily working and 
consuming lives is lived. It is the base for a large measure of individual 
and social mobilization to activate, extend or defend those rights, not 
simply in the political sphere, but more generally in the areas of cultural, 
economic and social life. Locality is thus a base from which subjects can 
exercise their capacity for pro-activity by making effective individual and 
collective interventions within and beyond that base" (Cooke 1989c, p. 12. 
See also Cooke 1990). Although acknowledging that 'proactivityi may also 
find expression in other ways (e.g. developments in social care) in practice 
Cooke and the CURS project as a whole tend to focus on local economic 
policies as a surrogate measure of its existence (see Cooke 1989b, 
particularly Cooke 1989a, and Harloe et aI1990). 
These approaches seek to explain the role of local processes in terms 
which start with the local (or urban) level. They move beyond the 
straightforward 'geological' metaphor outlined earlier, because they 
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emphasise the importance of local responses (as well as capitalist 
enterprises) i.n shaping what is possible. They are useful because they 
highlight the possibility of more or less direct social interaction between 
people, within and across classes, effectively answering the scepticism of 
Dunleavy who argues that, "We cannot simply assume that political 
alignment brushes off on people by rubbing shoulders in the street" 
(Dunleavy 1979, p. 413). The mechanisms and assumptions are rather more 
sophisticated than that, helping to explain how individuals and groups 
define themselves in terms of class, gender and race. It is here that, as 
Johnston puts it, "people learn their politics - at home and beyond" 
(Johnston, 1986, p. 594). They learn "the political meanings of their class 
positions" (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988, p.269), and it is in this 
context that classes and other groups form themselves through their own 
activity, rather than the abstract categories of the statistician (or social 
theorist). 
According to Johnston et al this is reflected in the results of the 
1987 general election which, they suggest, confirm the existence of 
locality or 'neighbourhood' effects. They note a significant reinforcement 
of support for the locally dominant pOlitical party at constituency and 
regional levels which they argue cannot be explained in any other terms. 
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And at this level, too, occupational class does seem to playa major part in 
helping to determine political support, which is not apparent in the same 
way in national statistics. They conclude that people in all class 
categories were more likely to identify with the party closest to the 
, 
'dominant local ideology' in their area, which in turn was said to be a 
function of an area's occupational class composition, so that in those 
which had high concentrations of manual workers and the unemployed it 
would tend to be favour Labour. Where the one closest to Labour was 
dominant, a higher proportion of all classes was more likely to be 
sympathetic to Labour (although not necessarily Labour voters) than in an 
. 
area where the 'dominant local ideology' was closest to that of the 
Conservatives. So even among occupational classes whose members would 
normally be expected to support the Conservatives, a higher proportion 
would be sympathetic to Labour in the former areas. In the 1987 election, 
some areas - such as the coalfields - supported Labour to an even greater 
extent than might have been expected, while others did so to a lesser 
extent (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988, p.269). 
But it is not just voting patterns or understandings of class which are 
shaped and shape themselves at local level. Gilroy, for example, stresses 
the extent to which "Local factors, reflecting the class, ethnic and 'racial' 
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composition of any particular area, its political traditions, the local 
economy and residential structure may all playa part in shaping precisely 
what it means to be black" (Gilroy 1987, p. 231). And he goes beyond any 
worplace or labour market based definitions to emphasise the cultural 
aspects of these definitions (see also Solomos 1987, pp. 148-9). Despite 
the sharpness of her critique of the CURS projects, Rose, too, points to the 
Significance of local political formation based around home and community 
more than workplace (Rose 1989). And Mark-Lawson et al are able to show 
how differences between the nature and extent of women's organisation in 
apparently similar places in the North-West of England may have 
Significantly altered the extent to which welfare initiatives were 
developed in the inter War period (Mark-Lawson et al 1985). Definitions of 
gender, 'race' and class cannot simply be deduced from structural 
divisions, since they included the consequences of self-activity at local 
level (see also 8agguley et aI1990). 
But there is also a danger of moving away from those aspects of 
Massey's arguments which emphasise a material basis to uneven 
development within capitalist economies, and seek to link the dynamics of 
global and local economic, social and political change. Certainly Cooke, 
Dickens, Urry and Warde might acknowledge the significance of this (they 
57 
often start by making reference to Massey's work), but the research focus 
of each is ori~nted towards the (local) results of uneven development, 
rather than seeing it as a continuing process shaping and reshaping what is 
possible. 
A number of further problems also arise with their formulations. The 
first relates to the definition of locality. This has been a matter of 
extended debate among those using the term, particularly in identifying 
areas for research. In practice the definition increasingly used has been 
that of local labour markets (see, e.g., Cooke 1989d, and Warde 1989 for 
justifications). Since great emphasis is placed within locality research on 
. 
non-class (non-employment related) divisions starting with an 
employment based definition looks slightly peculiar. And, of course, as 
Duncan and Savage 1990 point out, identifying a labour market area is 
itself not a straightforward task. But, in a sense, these definitional 
discussions and the search for precise boundaries is less important than 
acknowledging the principle that there may be what Massey calls 
"place-specific" effects as the result of overlap and interaction between 
activity spaces. How these spaces are defined empirically is a secondary 
issue, and simple rules of thumb (such as the use of labour market areas) 
may be helpful starting points, as long as they are not used as determining 
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exclusive frameworks for interaction. In practice, in much of the writing 
associated w.ith the CURS project boundaries have been looser, and, 
sometimes (e.g. in discussions of local politics), they have come closer to 
those of local authorities (see, e.g., Harloe et aI1990). 
A more important set of criticisms around these arguments focuses 
on the extent to which they encourage a degree of spatial determinism, for 
example by constructing 'localities' as coherent and more or less 
consistent political actors in their own right. Cooke's writing about 
localities sometimes comes dangerously close to an almost evangelical 
anthropomorphism. "Localities are not simply places or even communities: 
they are the sum of social energy and agency resulting from the clustering 
of diverse interests individuals, groups and social interests in space. They 
are not passive or residual but, in varying ways and degrees, centres of 
collective consciousness" (Cooke 1989a, p. 296). It is the locality which 
becomes proactive and in the end the local authority can all too easily be 
constructed as a straightforward expression' of a 'locality' and its 
interests. So, in practice Urry suggests that, "the interests of 'locality' are 
best represented by democratically elected local authorities" (Urry, 1990a, 
p. 188). Despite the theoretical sophistication underlying the construction 
of 'locality', therefore, the conclusion comes very close to those· of the 
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most unsophisticated statements of local government orthodoxy from the 
1960s, with their unproblematic view of local government as an 
expression of local democracy (see, e.g., Hill, 1970). In practice, too, it 
must be acknowledged that at least some of the writing with a 'localities' 
label has often resulted in the publication of research material which 
catalogues the unique without always succeeding in relating it to wider 
processes of change, or, indeed, to outcomes of local social and political 
relations. Much of this material is rich and even fascinating in its own 
right, but nevertheless seems trapped by its own met~odological starting 
point (see, e.g., Bassett et al 1989 and Bassett and Harloe 1990 on politics 
in Swindon, Cowen et al 1989 and Cowen 1990 on politics in Cheltenham, 
and Urry 1990b on politics in Lancaster, all of which outline their 
particular cases with skill and attention to detail, but seem to find it 
difficult to move beyond the limit~ of the local areas on which they 
focus)5. 
3.2 The rejection of locality 
Some have criticised the new interest in locality rather more harshly, 
suggesting that it represents a retreat from marxism, in response to the 
60 
political pressures of the 1980s - and, in particular, the rise of the new 
right. Harvey has argued this most strongly, linking a critique of 'realist' 
philosophy, which he describes as "a convenient cover for or ... a 
transitional argument back to straight old fashioned and casual 
empiricism" (Harvey 1987, p. 368), with an attack on locality research. It 
is, he says, "surely irresponsible and counter revolutionary to turn our 
backs on the 'luminous summits' of Marxian theory and content ourselves 
with mere empiricism directed at purely parochial targets of enquiry" 
(Harvey 1987, p. 376) and he argues instead for a continued focus on 
"dialectical interaction within the 'totality' of capitalism" (Harvey 1987, 
.p. 368). Smith's earlier critique of the ESRC's Changing Urban and Regional 
System research programme follows a similar line. He criticises those 
who wish to emphasise the contingent and the unique, arguing instead that, 
"The essence of the intellectual enterprise we are engaged in is to 
construct sustainable generalizations and to judge when these 
generalizations are no longer sustainable" (Smith 1987, p. 67). 
Harvey identifies his own favoured method with that of Marx in 
'Capital', in seeking to lay bare the economic laws of motion of modern 
society. In particular, he refers to the way in which Marx uses abstraction, 
starting from detailed study, identifying internal relationships, to develop 
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abstractions which may then look as if they were pre-determined 
constructs, but in fact arise from the study. Harvey uses Marx's chapter on 
'The Working Day' (Marx 1965, Ch. 10) as an example of this process. Marx's 
method, he says elsewhere, follows a "path of descent from the complexity 
of everyday life to a simple set of concrete representations [or 
abstractions] of the way everyday life is reproduced" (Harvey 1989c, p. 9). 
He argues that, "Once the basic abstractions are set up, it is possible to 
explore them dialectically and so derive other kinds of necessities, other 
forms of constraint to human freedom, other tensions and contradictions 
that can become sources of uncertainty in social life" (Harvey 1987, p. 
'372). 
Harvey's restatement and defence of the Marxian position, both here 
and elsewhere (e.g. Harvey 1982 and 1989c, pp. 8-11), are powerful ones. 
And one aim of research and intellectual endeavour must indeed be to 
understand and explore these broad categories6. But that cannot be the end 
of the matter, particularly for marxists, for whom, at least according to 
Marx, changing the world is at least as important as interpreting it. One of 
the dangers of generalisation and abstraction at the level which Harvey 
defines as the sole justified theoretical and empirical project is that it 
leads to political conclusions which are almost completely disabling, 
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suggesting that a global political response is required, but noting that, 
"The problems of how to forge a more global politics to confront global 
problems are formidable indeed" (Harvey 1987, p. 376), or, apparently more 
positively, that, "The problem is to discover a centralized politics that 
matches the increasingly centralized power of flexible accumulation while 
remaining faithful to the grass-roots of local resistances" (Harvey 1989c, 
p. 276). Similarly, Swyngedouw criticises the 'self defeating' attempt by 
some U.K. local authorities in the 1980s to develop radical initiatives at 
local level because they failed to understand the increased international 
power of capital, and instead calls for "the formation of cross territorial 
and interregional alliances" without providing any assessment of the 
failur~ to construct these in the past, or offering any guidelines about how 
they might be constructed in the future (Swyngedouw 1989, p. 41 )" 
Harvey is eager to explain the 'retreat' into empiricism in terms 
which stress its material and political basis: it is perhaps unfortunate 
that he does not turn a similar spotlight on his own position. One 
explanation for the retreat of marxism into the universities and the great 
theoretical projects of the 1970s is precisely that it, too, was in retreat 
from the high point of the late 1960s, which left a number of marxist 
academics high and dry within institutions and increasingly divorced from 
63 
working class politics. Their writing, too, made less and less connection 
with such pol.itics - what Beauregard describes as "the inward turn of 
radical practice to radical theorizing" (Beauregard 1988, p. 53) - and was 
suitably insulated behind the walls of theoretical rigour (or, some would 
argue, obscurantism)7. Harvey explicitly contrasts (and dismisses) the 
actual expression of working class (and other oppositional) politics and 
movements with the 'success' of his own theoretical project: "While the 
recent period has been rather dismal with respect to political action (with 
working class movements everywhere on the defensive and in any case 
confused over issues occupation, gender, race, ethnicity and localism), I 
think it has been salutory from the standpoint of theory building, precisely 
because we have been forced to evaluate and reformulate our ways of 
thinking in the light of two decades of experience" (Harvey 1989b, p. 16). 
The basis of Anderson's critique of an earlier phase in the development of 
Western marxism is that it reflected and institutionalised a division 
between theory (and theorising) and working class practice (in large part 
because of the absence of a mass revolutionary movement). "Marxist 
theory ... acquires its proper contours only in direct relation to a mass 
revolutionary movement. When the latter is effectively absent or defeated, 
the former is inevitably deformed or eclipsed" (Anderson 1976, p. 110). He 
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hoped that the experience of '1968' might make it possible to overcome 
that division, but the experience since then has, if anything, reinforced it, 
with 'marxism' becoming an accepted (if increasingly marginalised) part of 
academic discourse, without sinking roots into working class politics. 
Anderson's own conclusions are problematic. Because they assume the 
requirement of a revolutionary movement before an adequate theory can be 
developed, it is unclear what should be done while we are waiting: too 
close involvement with a reformist working class movement will deliver 
inadequate theory, but so - in this model- will theorising divorced from 
the working class. This echoes some of the arguments made within the 
·'Iocality debate'. On the one hand some - notably Harvey - suggest that it is 
important to concentrate on the development of uncomtaminated theory, 
whilst the arguments of others (such as Massey) suggest that the risk of 
'contamination' is justified if theorisation is to make any connection with 
pOlitical practice (and the experience of daily life). Massey not only argues 
that the political origins of the CURS project cannot be seen as 
reactionary but also points to ways in which local initiatives may help 
provide a basis on which to build more universal campaigns, building on 
oppositional traditions at local level (Massey 1991 b, pp.267-270 and 
278-9). Beauregard, too, makes an impassioned plea for the linking of 
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theory and practice in locality research, suggesting that by emphasising a 
necessary division between those who espouse theory and those mired in 
empiricism, there is a danger of making it impossible for one to inform the 
other. He stresses that practice demands commitment, but also that 
"commitment neither requires the suspension of critical spirit nor the 
neglect of theory" (Beauregard 1988, 58)8. 
Harvey's dismissal of his academic opponents as potential counter 
revolutionaries may itself be a reflection of his distance from either the 
analysis or practice of politics. Not only does it draw sharp dividing lines 
across which debate becomes difficult, but, more important perhaps, it 
'suggests a rather idiosyncratic view of world politics and a careless use 
of terms: unless Harvey can point to a successful revolution (the USSR? 
Cuba?) which is currently under attack from the writers on locality, then 
it is not clear how anyone can be labelled counter revolutionary. Harvey's 
interpretation of the new direction taken at the start of the 1980s is, in 
any case, too narrow. It fails to grasp the ambiguity of the moves towards 
the identification of local experience as an important element in political 
and economic formation. They did not just take place in the context of 
retreat, but, at first at least, in the context of defence and even attack as 
the part of an attempt to construct a new radical alternative of more than 
66 
being used as a foundation on which to resist the new right and - equally 
important - to build alternatives to the negative experience of Labour in 
power at national level, and not merely as sites where accomodation was 
being sought. They were often even seen as providing a possible basis for 
more 'global' political initiatives (see Chapter 6). 
Harvey himself has (elsewhere) acknowledged the attempt to develop 
radical initiatives at local level, although he is sceptical about their 
potential for success (Harvey 1989b, pp.4-5). It is possible that the logic 
of the position into which the local left was forced meant that they were 
simply rationalizing defeat (although a different case will be argued in Ch. 
6) but that was certainly not how it was understood by them at the time, 
nor, indeed, how it was understood by government politicians or the 
popular press, whose attacks suggest a greater degree of uncertainty. It is 
more difficult to assess the motives of all those who sought to develop 
locality research but some at least saw it as a way of linking global and 
local concerns with theoretically informed research, perhaps identifying 
possibilities of political radicalization. Certainly, as Beauregard notes, 
locality research may turn out to be a conservative project, but there is 
nothing inherent within it which determines that it must be (Beauregard 
1988, p. 54). As with the attempts to develop radical politics at local (as 
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1988, p. 54). As with the attempts to develop radical politics at local (as 
well, incidentally, as national and international) levels that depends not 
only on the the existing balance of economic, political and social forces, 
but also on the strategies adopted by those seeking to influence or analyse 
those forces. 
Insofar as Harvey's emphasis on theory reminds us of the need to 
ensure that there is clarity about the framework within which any locally 
based research takes place, it strikes a valuable cautionary note. But, 
insofar as he dismisses the possibility of any such research, his 
conclusions are less helpful, and leave little scope for political 
intervention (or analysis). His method is capable of dismissing any 
political action but the successful revolution as somehow necessarily 
mistaken or doomed to failure (see Byrne 1982, p. 73, for a discussion of 
other forms of working-class politics, including "radical reformism", able 
to achieve partial victories, short of revolution, and themselves to 
contribute to the generation of capitalist crises). Harvey briefly refers to 
Marx's '18th Brumaire' as an example of one of the ways in which Marx 
allowed people into his theories (Harvey 1987, P 371) but he seems 
reluctant to follow the same route. This is precisely what the best of 
locally based research can achieve - in a sense the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' 
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making it possible to identify key economic, political and social forces 
interacting to produce particular political possibilities: and each such 
possibility is particular or unique. It is not general - not even a concrete 
abstraction. And it must remain a justifiable task for marxists to assess 
dynamics and possibilities in certain places at particular times. 
Harvey's own analysis of the Paris Commune develops an 
understanding of class relations and political debates within Paris, while 
placing them in the context of wider economic and political developments, 
although he might prefer to stress the extent to which it confirmed, 
developed or illustrated 'theory' or derived necessities (Harvey 1985b, Ch. 
3, and1989 Ch 6). And some of the theoretical insights he has developed, 
for example around notions of "structured coherence" (see Section 4.1) and 
"urban entrepeneurialism" (see Section 4.2), paradoxically perhaps, make it 
possible to develop a clearer understanding both of the ways in which 
notions of 'locality' may be given a more consistent theoretical basis and 
how notions of local 'pro activity' may be problematized and reinterpreted 
politically. The harsh division between 'theory' and 'empiricism' which 
Harvey appears to support is not only difficult to sustain, but potentially 
disabling for those trying to develop both an understanding of the operation 
of capitalism and the experience of politics. 
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of capitalism and the experience of politics. 
3.3 Localities, uneven development and spatial variation 
Harvey's solution to the problem of 'uneven developmenf, linking the 
laws of motion of capitalism to the existence of differentiated places, is 
to concentrate attention on the former, whilst acknowledging the 
significance of the latter as the equivalents of laboratories, within which 
the implications of those laws can be explored more fully, and the laws 
themselves can be specified more precisely. Others - including Massey-
have understood the task rather differently, seeking to use the notion of 
uneven development (or combined and uneven development, Morgan and 
. . 
Sayer 1988, pp. 19-20) to highlight the significance of interaction 
between levels and to allow a concern with localities a degree of academic 
(and political) legitimacy9. If much of the writing explicitly concerned 
with 'locality' (e.g., associated with the CURS project, Cooke, Urry and 
Warde) tends in practice to focus on the local side of uneven development, 
and Harvey concentrates on the 'global' side, then these authors seek more 
deliberately to integrate both elements in theorising and research. As 
Massey stresses: "localities are not internally introspective bounded 
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unities. They have to be constructed through sets of social relations which 
bind them inextricably to wider arenas, and other places" (Massey 1991, p. 
279). But attempting this task does not mean either that it is easy to 
achieve, or that these authors have yet been successful. On the contrary, 
although it is easy to state the broad ambitions, it is much more difficult 
to achieve them. 
80th the value of the attempt and the difficulties which surround it 
can best be illustrated in work associated with a group of researchers 
based at or associated with Sussex University, and particularly Duncan, 
Goodwin, Halford and Savage, but also often working with others 10. These 
'researchers have over the past decade been concerned to explore and 
identify what it means to talk of localities, and local social processes, 
whilst retaining a broader notion of capitalist development. They have not 
sought to present a unified and monolithic interpretation across this 
period, but in the process of research have changed, qualified and 
developed their positions. Their openness to theoretical debates, their 
stress on theoretically informed research and their readiness to respond to 
the results of empirical research makes their work particularly useful in 
understanding the implications of spatial differentiation for political 
development at local level. 
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In early formulations of the arguments, these authors started by 
stressing the "importance of local variations", something often missed in 
. 
more orthodox studies of society and politics. Local was defined as 
'sub-national'. A focus on the national level, they stressed, might miss 
"specifically local mechanisms, local social processes, which help produce 
social changes in particular places" (Dickens et a11985, p. 17). They used 
the term locality to mean "a socially defined unit, distinguished by active 
and specific differences in causal processes" (Dickens et a11985, p. 18). In 
this particular formulation of the arguments, there were few 
disagreements with others using the same term (such as Urry, see Dickens 
et al 1985, p. 21). Stress, however, was already placed on the uneven 
development of social relations (rather than space in its own right), and 
the orientation of research was said to be towards a study of the ways in 
which the "uneven development of social processes ... mediates processes 
generated in wider structural systems" (Dickens et ai, p. 23). 
Duncan and Goodwin (1988, Ch 2) explicitly relate notions of uneven 
development to debates about local government and the local state. Unlike 
others using the term, for them it is important that the local state is 
local. "The uneven development of societies," they argue, "also means that 
class structures and other social relations are constituted spatially, 
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sometimes in rather specific ways" (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. 73). And 
precisely because systems "are spatially constituted and differentiated, it 
-
is necessary for state systems to respond with the development of local 
states" (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. 69). They go beyond this to indicate 
ways in which local social processes may influence the local state, 
pointing out that "social relations including class relations are just that -
relations between people and formed socially" (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, 
p. 41. See also similar formulation in Dickens et al 1985, p. 19). In other 
words, classes and other social groups form themselves and define 
themselves through these forms of interaction, as well as in terms of 
.their 'structural positions'. And Duncan and Goodwin make claims to be able 
to identify 'causal local processes', that is "locally specific relations that 
are socially generative" (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. 58). They emphasise 
that "social mechanisms are not necessarily universal but can be derived 
locally" (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. 60). It is, they say, because local 
interests may take control of local states (reflecting local social 
relations) that conflict between national and local states is inevitable: in 
the first place, they argue that local states are necessary to reflect 
spatial divisions, but precisely because those divisions may begin to find 
expression in political terms then they also begin to challenge the more 
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universal claims of the state at national level. The contradictory role of 
the local state as agent of and obstacle to the centre means that conflict 
. 
is unavoidable (Duncan and Goodwin 1988, Chs 5 and 8). 
Duncan and Goodwin build on arguments developed by Harvey in his 
discussion of regional development to explain differences between local 
governments, stressing the significance of uneven development. Harvey 
writes of what he calls a 'structured coherence'. Duncan and Godwin draw 
on a paper whose main focus is on global regions but suggest that the 
points Harvey makes are also relevant at local level. Harvey argues that 
"There are processes at work .. that define regional spaces within which 
production and consumption, supply and demand (for commodities and 
labour power), production and realisation, class struggle and accumulation, 
culture and life style, hang together as some kind of structu~ed ~oherence 
within a totality of productive forces and social relations" (Harvey 1985a, 
P.146). Harvey himself has also applied the notion of 'structured 
coherences' to the local - or urban - level, s~ggesting that they may be 
generated within "loosely defined" urban regions based around urban labour 
markets and "defined around a dominant technology of both production and 
consumption and a dominant set of class relations" (Harvey 1989c, p. 126). 
These are very condensed statements, but the underlying argument is 
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nevertheless helpful. Harvey's analysis starts from an interpretation of the 
needs of capitalist development, in which regional specialisation is 
encouraged because it limits the costs of time and transport which are 
otherwise likely to reduce profitability. Such specialisation helps to 
construct an identity based around urban regions, and to become self 
reinforcing, as infrastructure, labour supply, and urban cultures come 
together to confirm existing forms of specialisation. So within such 
regions, one begins to get a 'structured coherence' with which people - and 
sometimes institutions, including enterprises - identify. Regional 
identification becomes an element in the the formation of classes and 
,other social groups. A regional consciousness is generated. 
Harvey's approach also allows a more independent role for the 
development of consciousness at regional and local (urban). lev~1 because 
once a 'structured coherence' exists, its different elements are able to 
interact with each other, at least as long as it is not undermined by 
external forces, or the system itself begins to break down, for example, 
because different groups define the 'region' differently. Duncan and 
Goodwin build on this possibility, moving beyond Harvey's formulation of a 
strictly limited relative autonomy for urban politics, to suggest that the 
development of regional and local cultures "will be partly formed by social 
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practices and relations autonomous to the logic of capital" (Duncan and 
Goodwin 1988, p. 65). Where Harvey stresses the instability of the 
'structured coherences' he identifies (because of continuing "competition, 
accumulation and technical change". Harvey 1989c, p. 126), Duncan and 
Goodwin suggest that they provide a continuing foundation for spatially 
based (local) state forms. Indeed, they argue that "state institutions playa 
major role in people's attempts to organize and control uneven 
development - to institutionalize structural coherence as a 'spatial fix'" 
(Duncan et al 1988, p. 110). 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what is being identified 
.here is a 'locality', defined in terms of 'structural coherence', 
distinguishable from other 'localities' and with a degree of political and 
social autonomy. Indeed, it is only on such a basis that Duncan and Goodwin 
are able to identify necessary contradictions between national and local 
state (see also Goodwin 1989, pp.157-9). But elsewhere Duncan also raises 
serious questions about assuming that all places are localities "in the 
sense of autonomous subnational social units" (Duncan 1989b, p. 247). On 
the contrary, he argues that localities in this sense are rare and that use 
of the term tends to be misleading, encouraging what he calls spatial 
determinism - that is the view that "spatial patterns cause social 
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behaviour" (Duncan 1989b, p. 221). Despite his distrust of 'locality', 
however, Duncan continues to stress the importance of spatial variation, 
noting both the importance of what he calls spatial contingency effects 
and local causal processes. All social processes are influenced by spatial 
contingency effects because they develop (are constituted) in particular 
places and are therefore influenced by their interaction with pre-existing 
spatially variant economic, social and political forms. But in some cases it 
is also possible to identify causal processes generated at local level, 
because "determining social systems are spatially variant, and because 
actors monitor and respond to their variable contexts" (Duncan 1989b, p. 
247). 
Duncan's concerns were initially spelled out in a working paper 
published in 1986 (Duncan 1986), but their full implications do not seem to 
have been explored until later in the decade - they are not, for example, 
taken up in Duncan and Goodwin 1988, in which the term locality is used in 
a relatively unproblematised fashion (but, see also Savage et aI1987). 
More recently Duncan and Savage have developed the position further, now 
arguing that locality was little more than a "conceptual gap-filler", 
utilised as a means of introducing spatial variation and moving away from 
the "aspatial structuralist work of the 1970s" (Duncan and Savage 1989, p. 
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205}. Now it is no longer needed, they suggest, and instead "we should 
construct abstractions appropriate to the causal chain under examination, 
including spatial specifications if and when relevant" (Duncan and Savage 
1989, p. 205. See also Duncan and Savage 1991, p. 157). 
In addition to stressing the importance of spatial contingency effects 
as objects for concrete research, they also identify what they call a 
spatial boundary effect, which seems to be a development of the notion of 
local causal processes referred to earlier. But now it is seen as a special 
case of the contingency effect, confirming that social systems have 
boundaries, which means that "originating, generative mechanisms will not 
be universally present or equally developed" (Duncan 1989a, p. 139. See 
also Savage and Duncan 1989, p. 182). They return to the notion of uneven 
development, arguing that different social processes may "possess - or not 
, 
possess - different forms of uneven development mechanisms" and call for 
research to investigate what these might be in different cases (Savage and 
Duncan 1989, p. 183). Goodwin has begun to explore what these might be in 
the sphere of civil society (Goodwin 1988) and Halford has developed an 
assessment of women's initiatives in local government, looking at gender 
relations as they find expression in the spatial divisions of labour and 
civil society (Halford 1989. See also Duncan et aI1988). 
78 
The arguments of these researchers provide a useful way of taking the 
'locality debate' further. Their rejection of the notion of localities as 
autonomous systems with their own 'interests' beyond those of the social 
groups which make them up is convincing. So too is their continued stress 
on the importance of spatial variation in explaining social relations and 
political behaviour. But scepticism about 'locality' as a proactive agent in 
its own right does not mean that the importance of the local element of 
the local state has to be neglected. On the contrary, setting it within the 
framework of uneven development emphasises that importance, stressing 
the need to explore the ways in which social processes interact at the 
'local level, but also ensuring that the non-local nature of some of the key 
processes is not forgotten. 
Warde criticises Duncan and Savage for failing to acknowledge the 
significance of context "as a constraining or empowering condition of 
action" (Warde1989, p. 279). Although they reply in terms which reject 
this charge (Duncan and Savage 1990, p. 71), Warde's formulation is, at 
least, a useful development of the position: "The point is that a 
configuration of institutions and forces comes to exist at a determinate 
pOint in space and time, and that provides the conditions in which people 
are obliged to make their own history" (Warde 1989, p. 280). Elsewhere 
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Warde's use of the term 'local political environment' is helpful in 
indicating the ways in which 'context' is important in the analysis of local 
politics, because "It implies a notion of incremental change, of one 
element affecting another ... the environment structures the agenda for all 
political actors, setting the agenda for interaction between all parties" 
(Mark-Lawson and Warde 1987, p. 229). Such a modest expression of the 
'locality' focus can hardly be charged with the sins identified by Duncan 
and Savage. 
Like Duncan and Goodwin, Cox and Mair also build on Harvey's notion of 
'structural coherence' but they do so to argue for a stronger notion of 
.'Iocality' than that allowed by Duncan, Savage and others. Cox and Mair 
suggest that even the distinction between the necessary and the 
contingent, may be misleading, because it fails to acknowledge the extent 
to which contingencies may become internalised as "structured internal 
elements of the encompassing social logic of capitalism" (Harvey and Scott 
1989, quoted in Cox and Mair 1989a, p. 126). And, similarly, although 
Harvey acknowledges that 'space' and 'time'.are socially constructed, he 
also argues that "the social definitions of space and time operate with the 
full force of objective facts to which all individuals and institutions 
necessarily respond" (Harvey 1990, p. 418). Lipietz' discussion of relations 
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between national regimes of accumulation has similar implications. The 
coherence of the world system, he stresses, "is simply the effect of the 
interaction between several relatively autonomous processes, of the 
provisionally stabilized complementarity and antagonism that exists 
between various national regimes of accumulation" (Lipietz 1987, p.25). 
Similarly, he argues that the "state is the institutional form which 
condenses the compromises which prevent the different groups making up 
the national (or at least territorial) com'munity from destroying one 
another in an endless struggle" (Lipietz 1987, p.19) 11. The key point then 
is to acknowledge the importance of interaction and the ways in which 
·'autonomous' developments come together to produce a 'system' which 
reproduces itself, but may also be undermined and replaced as a result of 
new pressures. 
Cox and Mair apply a similar argument to the notion of locality, 
suggesting that "locations that are initially contingent to each other may 
Come to assume a degree of necessity in their relations ... We have tried to 
capture this idea at the local scale through the concept of 'local 
dependence' of firms, governments and people" (Cox and Mair 1989a, p. 
126). They continue by attempting to identify the basis for such 
dependence: "Socio-spatial structures of immobility, in combination with 
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geographical delimuitations that effectively maintain social relations, are 
the material bases for the production of actual territories (at various 
. 
scales). It is through these socio-spatial structures that capitalists obtain 
profits, landlords gain rents, and workers earn wages. While certain 
generalized technological and social conditions may obtain, there will be 
particular socio-spatial structures, located around particular sites. 
necessary to their maintenance. If socio-spatial structures are limited to 
a particular scale, such as the local, various economic agents acquire 
interests that are defined at that scale" (Cox and Mair 1989a, pp 126-7). 
According to Cox and Mair, this produces localites which are "only 
semicoherent. but nonetheless recognisable" (Cox and Mair 1991, p. 201). 
Those dependent in this way (for example those involved in 
'information networks', such as property developers, estate age~ts and 
banks. or other local businesses and workers with particular skills) may, 
according to Cox and Mair, attempt to combine in territorially (possibly 
locally) based alliances or coalitions, thus eyen giving the impression that 
localities are somehow "active in their own right" (Cox and Mair 1989a, p. 
129. See also Cox and Mair 1988 and 1989b, and Section 3.6 below). It is in 
this sense that they remain sympathetic to Cooke's notions of local 
proactivity (Cox and Mair 1991, p. 198)12. Cox and Mair see themselves as 
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identifying abstractions (local dependence, local coalitions) appropriate to 
the level of localities, so that they are not just focusing on the contingent. 
And they stress that in their conception locality is "irreducibly political", 
in the sense that "it is not just produced, it is struggled over" (Cox and 
Mair 1989a, p. 129). 
This interpretation of the notion of 'locality' begins to make it clearer 
how different places are able to develop their own distinct political 
arrangements, so that their 'uniqueness' can be acknowledged, whilst still 
making it possible to relate that 'uniqueness' directly to wider theoretical 
understandings. It is helpful in identifying some of the potential bases for 
Jocal politics in different places. By developing a notion of layers of 
abstraction, Cox and Mair have made it easier to see what levels are likely 
to be most appropriate in the analysis of the local state. But the . 
Specification of locally dependent interests remains underdeveloped. There 
is a danger that the argument may become circular, so that those who are 
actually involved in local growth politics simply become defined as locally 
dependent. The notion of 'immobility' as a defining characteristic is also 
problematic, since it is likely to vary over time, and degrees of 
'immobility' may be influenced as much by political success as by any other 
factor - some firms, for example, may be 'immobile' because they have the 
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local state in their pocket instead of being interested in influencing the 
local state because of their inherent 'immobility'. There is, finally, a 
danger that by defining the scope for local politics (and, by implication, 
local autonomy) in this way it is possible to ignore or play down the local 
impact of non-locally dependent agencies, which in some cases may be 
more important for the local state. 
3.4 The limits of localities 
It will already be clear from the preceding argument that picking 
.one's way through the 'locality debate' is like picking one's way through a 
conceptual minefield. It may, however, by now be unclear quite what 
remains to be drawn from the debate which is likely to be of value in the 
analysis of local politics. It may also, therefore, be helpful briefly to 
summarise the key points which will inform the argument developed in the 
chapters which follow. 
Above all, the points made by Duncan and summarised above, are 
central to that argument. Following Massey, he stresses the importance of 
spatial variation arising out of the process of uneven development, even 
While rejecting the stronger claims which some have made for the notion 
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of 'locality'. The contexts within which political actors perform are, in 
Duncan's words, variable and this influences their behaviour. Warde's 
notion of local political environment or context may be stronger than that 
favoured by Duncan and his colleagues, but it, too, is a useful expression of 
the way in which locality might matter. Here the points made by Cox and 
Mair who stress the ways in which contingent processes may become 
internalised are particularly helpful, confirming that although shaped and 
influenced by global processes, the definitions with which people work 
may themselves, in Harvey's words, operate with the full force of 
objective facts. Cox and Mair usefully go on to describe the possibility of 
,socio-spatial structures based around notions of local dependency for 
particular economic interest groups. 
There may still be problems with some of these formulations - for 
example because local dependency is not always easy to specify - but they 
provide a useful starting point for further consideration. The danger of a 
too deliberate focus on locality is that it makes it difficult to see some of 
the ways in which local politics fits into a wider set of political 
arrangements. Although the importance of global and national economic 
change is acknowledged in these debates, they seem to find it more 
difficult to acknowledge the significance of state structures and the 
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pOlitics generated within and around them. In the next chapter, attention is 
shifted again to consider some of the ways in which the conclusions drawn 
from the 'locality debate' may be brought together with some of those 
developed within the literature of political science. 
Notes 
1. I have expressed my doubts about the success of Massey's own attempt 
to do so in Cochrane 1987b. 
2. Duncan and Savage draw a similar but not identical distinction between 
.those such as Cooke who see localities as having their own social power 
and themselves (and Gregson) who argue that "spatial variations should be 
incorporated into the analysis of social processes as appropriate to any 
particular research problem" (Duncan and Savage 1991, p. 157). They place 
Urry and Warde in an intermediate position between themselves and Cooke. 
3. It is, perhaps, a reflection of academic lif~ in the particular 'locale' of 
Cambridge that a sweeping conclusion of this sort can be drawn about such 
an internally differentiated 'place' as "the North of England". Despite the 
assumptions of Giddens, it is difficult to see how "the North" qualifies as a 
locale, except through the prism of stereotypes generated in the 
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South-East. 
4. Miller's analysis of voting in local elections is also of interest here. On 
the basis of a national survey, he concludes that there is some scope for 
variation from national party affiliations at local level, although it is 
limited, and among Conservative and Labour voters, more likely to express 
itself in shifts to the Alliance (the survey was conducted in 1985) or other 
parties or in differential abstention than in any direct shift in votes 
between the major parties. He concludes by agreeing cautiously with Jones 
and Stewart (1983) about the possibility of variation at local level, around 
a norm which is the product of national factors (Miller1986, p. 169). It is, 
,however, perhaps also worth pointing out that Miller's approach takes for 
granted the primacy of support for parties at national level, making little 
allowance for the possibility that identification with national parties 
may also be influenced local factors in the ways suggested by Johnston et 
al (1988). He includes education, class and age as 'national' factors, with 
only length of residence as a 'local' factor, y~t many 'national' factors find 
specific local expressions, and the argument of Massey and others would be 
that 'classes' themselves are, in part at least, formed at local level. 
Miller's focus on local elections means he does not have to explain 
variation in national voting patterns once allowance is made forthe 
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factors he identifies as 'national'. 
5. Others associated with the CURS project prove able to move beyond 
. 
these limits, for example, in the cases of Beynon et al (1989) and Hudson 
(1990) exploring forms of political accommodation at local level in the 
context of economic decline, in the case of Meegan (1989 and 1990) 
highlighting local (community, rather than 'locality') responses to 
economic decline and restructuring, and in the cases of Buck et al (1989) 
and Pickvance (1990) analysing tensions within forms of municipal 
conservatism. It is unclear whether the reasons for these differences 
within the broader project simply reflect the possibilities bequeathed by 
.the areas (or localities) on which the research focused, or the different 
theoretical starting points of the researchers, which are also apparent. 
6. Graham's critique of what she calls 'essentialist' marxism and her call 
for the development of a 'non-essentialisr marxism includes criticism of 
Harvey and Massey for their 'reductionism'. Her defence of Althusser may 
be justified, since she seeks to rescue him from the structuralist label, 
but her conclusions confirm one of the weaknesses of his approach, at 
least insofar as it seeks to locate itself within the marxist tradition. 
Because Althusser's definition of' science' leaves it floating free of 
Contamination by society and economics, it can be (and was) used to 
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justify almost any form of practice (from Stalinism to Eurocommunism). 
Similarly, her own conclusions seeking to justify the marxist focus on 
. 
class and production simply leave it looking like a rather idiosyncratic 
choice made because it was made. Her 'non-essentialist' marxism, 
whatever its other advantages, seems to have little linking it to the 
marxist tradition, except the label (Graham 1988, 1990). 
7. Redfern develops similar points rather more harshly, concluding with 
the rather peculiar exhortation to Harvey that he should "go canvassing for 
the Labour Party in Oxford at the next election" (Redfern 1987, p. 417). 
, 
8. To avoid potential confusion, it is perhaps necessary to point out that 
,this argument does not imply that active politics is only possible at local 
level - or in localities. On the contrary they could be developed at global, 
national, regional or local levels: and might, indeed, be exp~cte~ to attempt 
to link these apparently separate levels. In this case, however, the 
argument is both that local politics may be radical and that the arguments 
which suggest that they cannot be are them,selves politically disabling. 
9. The notion of combined and uneven development, at least in its earliest 
formulations, was used by Trotsky to explain the possibility of revolution 
in 'backward' countries (such as Russia, e.g. in 'Results and Prospects' first 
published in 1906. Trotsky 1978) by stressing the ways in which such 
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countries were a mixture of the most advanced and backward sectors of 
economic and social organisation. As Mandel has argued more recently, 
those countries which "comprise 'concrete' capitalism, reproduce in 
varying forms and proportions a combination of past and present modes of 
production. or more precisely. of varying past and present stages of the 
present mode of production" (Mandel 1975. p. 23). Two points arise from 
this which may need to be clarified here. First, the contemporary writers 
on uneven development would not accept the argument that capitalism 
moves through a series of necessary stages, which are then 'combined' in 
different ways in different places. They would argue both that interaction 
.in those places might produce new arrangements going beyond mere 
combination, and that there is, in any case, not a hierarchy of stages which 
can be identified from first principles. Great care would be taken. to avoid 
a language which utilised words such as 'backward' or 'advanced' as 
scientific terms. Secondly, their focus on regional and sub-regional areas 
makes a significant difference, since the bo~ndaries between places are 
less clear cut and the interaction between them is more extensive. It also 
means that no-one would argue that radical political change in one locality 
could survive - even in distorted or degenerate - form, without influencing 
wider (national) political. The constraints facing places within countries 
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are even greater than those facing Third world countries within the 
international division of labour. 
10. The identification of this group with the University of Sussex is 
convenient rather than exclusive: not all those working in related areas at 
Sussex should be seen as part of this group (I have, for example, discussed 
the rather different position of Dickens earlier); nor have all those I have 
placed in this group always taken such a distinctive position; nor have they 
always been based at Sussex (Savage was at Lancaster and is now at Keele; 
Duncan works at the London School of Economics; and Goodwin now works 
at St. Davids, Lampeter). But many of the'key publications discussed in this 
.section have found their first expression in working papers published by 
the Department of Urban and Regional Studies at the University of Sussex, 
and a joint statement of their position explicitly refers to a Sussex based 
programme of research (Savage et aI1987). 
11. Jessop makes a related theoretical point in his discussion of 
'contingent necessity' in pointing to the ways in which any particular event 
is "the overdetermined result of the interaction of different causal chains" 
(Jessop 1990b, p. 12). 
12. In practice, however, Cox and Mair develop the argument about 'locality 
as agent' in ways which seem to move away from Cooke's formulation, 
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since they are mainly concerned to identify the possibility of cross-class 
alliances at local level, and generally with the implication that such 
alliances will 'tend to be led by local business interests, often with the 
help of local states themselves requiring to justify their own positions 
(Cox and Mair 1991, pp. 204-211). 
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Chapter 4. Bringing politics back in: growth coalitions, urban 
corporatisrT'! and policy networks 
4.1 Local corporatism and growth coalitions 
Much of the writing about local politics has tended to take existing 
structures of government and definitions of politics for granted, but with 
a more explicitly local focus. In itself this has been valuable. The stress on 
the role of parties in constructing local political alliances highlights the 
existence of an active political sphere at local level (see, e.g., Duncan and 
Goodwin 1988, Savage 1989, Bassett et al1989, and Buck et aI1989). But 
it is increasingly the case that other forms of political accommodation are 
also apparent at that level, for example reflected in Bagguley et· a11989, 
and Beynon et a11989, particularly the latter with its stress on the 
reconstitution of corporatist arrangements at local level, when the old 
basis of them has disintegrated (see also Chapter 6, below). In developing 
their arguments about 'growth coalitions' and localities, Cox and Mair also 
point towards the possibility of non-electoral forms of political mediation 
at local level. 
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In the past writers such as Cawson have been sceptical about the 
possibility of :Iocal corporatism' because it implies too great a degree of 
independence or autonomy for economic actors and the state at local level. 
Cawson argued that whilst it might be possible to have 'corporatism at 
local level' through which national interests were represented and 
incorporated local interests or imposed national priorities at local level, 
it was more difficult to imagine what a strictly 'local' corporatism would 
look like, since neither 'capital' nor 'labour' could be seen as local 
phenomena. In most case, he argues, "the local dimension is the target for 
intervention rather than the basis for the organisation of the participating 
bOdies" (Cawson 1985a, p.144). There is, however, a danger that such a 
sharp distinction, based on the definition of corporatism as an ideal type 
with capital and labour as rather monolithic categories, will actually make 
it difficult to identify corporatist style structures and relationships at 
local level. This is something Cawson himself seems to have recognised in 
his discussion of micro-corporatism, with reference to the Greater London 
Council and its economic policy (Cawson 1986, pp.118-121 , and 1985c, p. 
17) and in the developing local economic policies of the late 1980s with 
their emphasis on public-private partnership, collaboration and the 
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interchange of ideas it looks still more appropriate. The identification of a 
growing sector of non-elected local government is only one example of this 
(Stoker 1988 Ch.3. See also Chapter 6 below). 
One of the problems with using 'corporatism' as a theoretical concept, 
is that, like locality, it has proved remarkably difficult to define with any 
degree of precision. Not only has it been taken up by writers from different 
traditions and developed to mean substantially different things, but some 
have presented corporatism as part of a positive political programme 
while others have seen it as a less positive aspect of political 
incorporation associated with modern capitalism (see, e.g., the surveys by 
. Cawson 1985c and 1986). The main features of corporatism, however, have 
been summarised frequently enough, at least in ideal typical terms. 
Cawson defines it as "a specific socio-political process in which 
organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in 
pOlitical exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which 
involves those organizations in a role that combines interest 
representation and policy implementation through delegated self-
enforcement" (Cawson 1985c, p. 8). As Schmitter notes, of course, in 
practice all of these features do not always cluster together, so it is never 
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possible to identify a 'perfect' corporatism, even if it is possible to 
recognise corporatist features, or tendencies (Schmitter 1989, p. 65). The 
importance of corporatist formulations is that they direct our attention to 
the extent to which, in Ofte's words, public status is accorded to 
particular interest groups going beyond the limits of class organizations 
(Ofte 1981). Offe also usefully points out that there may be two processes 
at work here: in the case of working class organisations corporatisation 
implies limitation, "restraint, discipline, responsibility" (albeit in return 
for potentially significant concessions. See also Esping-Andersen 1985), 
whereas in the case of 'private' or pluralist groups (such as doctors and 
'other welfare state professionals) it may rather imply a "'contracting out' 
of state power" (Offe 1981, pp.139-40). Offe concludes by suggesting that 
there is an asymmetry within corporatist arrangements under capitalism, 
which place greater limitations on labour than they do on capitalist 
interests (Ofte 1981, pp.146-150). As a result, he is more critical than 
either Cawson or Schmitter appear to be. . 
It has increasingly been recognised that formulations which focus 
solely on national level bargaining between capital, labour and the state 
(or other 'peak' organisations) may miss the significance of related 
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arrangements at other levels, whether sectorally or territorially divided 
(and, indeed, they may also miss supranational arrangements such as as 
those associated with the European Community). The narrowness of such 
definitions may make it more difficult to assess the significance of 
changes which have taken place. The use of terms such as meso- and 
micro-corporatism has been useful in highlighting this, with Cawson 
defining meso-corporatism as that which involves "political exchange 
between state agencies and more specialised interest associations" and 
micro-corporatism as that which involves "direct bargaining between 
state agencies and firms", although he is also careful to stress that for the 
'latter to be understood as any form of corporatism then the state agencies 
involved must at least have a degree of independence, so that they are not 
dependent on (or sponsored by) the groups with which they negotiate 
(Cawson 1985c, p. 16. See also Bonnet 1985 on micro-corporatism). 
Although, in practice, much of the writing on corporatism has focused 
on direct state-industry relations, such a focus is by no means essential. 
Cawson himself has analysed the structures of the welfare state with the 
help of corporatist theory (Cawson 1982) and Reade's analysis of the 
planning profession discusses town planners, in ways compatible with the 
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definition cited earlier, as representing a functional interest with special 
access to power (Reade 1987, pp. 120-131). Rhodes' approach to the 
analysis of central-local relations, too, may be compatible with notions of 
meso-corporatism, because of the way in which he stresses that, "the 
professions become institutionalised in policy networks and their unified 
view of the world - based on common ideas, values and knowledge - sets 
the parameters to local decision-making" (Rhodes 1986, p. 241) 1. But, the 
importance of links between industry and the state at local level have also 
increasingly been recognised, and analysis has begun to point to ways in 
which these links may be understood as both local and corporatist (see, 
'e.g., Flynn 1983, Hernes and Selvik 1981, King 1985); although others have 
been more reluctant to utilise such terms (see, e.g" Brindley et a11989, 
Moore and Richardson 1989). 
The nature and significance of the local politics of business has been 
debated more extensively in the US context where Logan and Molotch have 
developed the notion of an 'urban growth machine' as a useful starting 
point (Molotch 1976, Logan and Molotch 1987). They have identified a local 
pOlitics of growth focused on the role of property and development 
interests, which are said to be primarily concerned with the maximisation 
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of income from rent and property values. In structural terms, it is argued 
that these interests are oriented towards the realisation of exchange value 
from urban areas, whilst residents are primarily concerned with use 
values. This may result in conflicts (e.g. expressing themselves in the 
development of anti-growth coalitions), but it is suggested that the power 
of the 'growth machines' is such that opponents will finally be bought out 
and the imposition of strict planning policies avoided. Smith takes a 
similar view of the US experience, stressing the extent to which 
'public-private partnerships' have generally been oriented towards 
restoring or increasing "the property value of urban space" (Smith 1988, p. 
~3). 
This interpretation has, however, been sharply criticised by Cox and 
Mair for being so narrowly focused on property values, to the extent that 
Logan and Molotch themselves have to acknowledge the role of other groups 
through a sleight of hand, so that 'rentiers' seem to lose their initially 
central place in the theory because others also have an interest in 
exchange values (Cox and Mair 1989b, pp. 138-9). Instead, Cox and Mair 
suggest, building on their arguments about locality (Cox and Mair 1989a), 
that urban growth coalitions will be organised between groups and 
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organisations which are, in some sense, locally dependent. This implies not 
only that people and organisations cannot move very easily, but also that 
they define themselves by (and reproduce themselves in specific ways 
because of) their particular location (also reflected, for example, in the 
notion of a 'spatial fix'. Harvey 1989b, Ch. 5). There may be conflicts 
between different groups at this level (with the possibility of anti-growth 
coalitions developing over industrial restructuring, or over environmental 
issues) and it is because of these, according to Cox and Mair, that business 
coalitions develop. These are made up of local firms which "attempt to 
ward off opposition to their plans for local economic development by 
iorging a consensus based on the co-optation of their potential opponents, 
a Consensus in which the politics of restructuring is conceived of as a 
competition among 'localities' rather than as a struggle within them" (Cox 
and Mair 1988, pp. 307-308). 
Harvey takes this further by indicating how competition may move 
beyond the more obvious aspects of local economic development. He argues 
that, "The active production of places with special qualities becomes an 
important stake in spatial competition between localities, cities, regions 
and nations. Corporatist forms of governance can flourish in such spaces, 
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and themselves take on entrepeneurial roles in the production of 
favourable business climates and other special qualities. And it is in this 
context that we can better situate the striving ... for cities to forge a 
distincive image and to create an atmosphere of place and tradition that 
will act as a lure to both capital and people 'of the right sort'" (Harvey 
1989a, p.295). In the US context, Gottdiener concludes that this process 
means that we are seeing the death of local politics, with the local state 
losing its autonomy, but perhaps it is more accurate to say that we are 
seeing its transformation along different lines (Gottdiener 1987). Smith 
explicitly concludes that the growing numbers of 'public-private 
'partnerships' in the US are "forms of local corporatism" intended to 
"extract material resources from society and to build symbolic support for 
the goals of local networks of economic and political elites" (Smith 1988, 
P.209)2. 
Although the notion of an urban growth coalition (particularly as 
developed by Cox and Mair and modified in·the light of Harvey's arguments) 
may be a useful one it has barely been developed in the UK context 
(although Pickvance has written about spatial coalitions, mainly at 
regional level. Pickvance 1985). One recent attempt to do so makes little 
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direct reference to the U.S. theories, except by implication, suggesting 
instead that the key 'coalition' in the development of Swindon was between 
leading politicians and professionals (Bassett and Harloe 1990. p.S8). And 
this suggests a continuing problem for the theory in its more general 
forms: many of the features of growth coalitions seem to show themselves 
even where the active participation of a business coalition or property 
based coalition is more difficult to identify. 
In the case of the U.K. it has been necessary to construct business 
involvement from above (see, e.g., Cochrane 1991). It has not simply been 
generated as a result of local pressures. from existing business groups. It 
may. for example. be possible for a local political organisation (such as 
Swindon's Labour leadership) or professional group (such as Swindon's 
chief officers) to develop a politics of growth in which - to start with at 
least - the business interests have to be assumed instead of being an 
already existing and locally identifiable force. Cooke stresses the extent 
to which local authorities may lead coalitions based around negotiation 
and partnership with agents in the private sector and the community 
(Cooke 1988). And, even in the US context, it is necessary to acknowledge 
the importance of political entrepeneurs able to bring together widely 
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different actors and interests around the promise of growth, "by creating 
new governmental bases for exercising new powers which none of these 
actors and interests could otherwise have exercised on its own" 
(Mollenkopf 1983, p.4.). Cox and Mair also seem to acknowledge this in 
their discussion of the role of the state, but they are more reluctant to 
allow the state (or, more accurately, political actors within it) an 
initiating role (Cox and Mair 1991, pp. 208-210). Mollenkopf stresses the 
key role of public actors in taking the initiative, to the extent that it may 
even be possible to reshape the 'contours' of private sector interests. 
'4.2 Organisational politics and policy networks 
. An underlying problem with these theories (at least in the UK context) 
is that they tend to underestimate the significance of more extensive 
networks of national politics, organisational structures and professional 
relationships. So, if the possibility of local corporatism and urban growth 
coalitions is one aspect of local politics which needs to be explored, a 
second is their position within wider political networks. The model 
adopted by Duncan and Goodwin, suggests an inexorable struggle between 
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central and local government under capitalism, which can ultimately only 
be resolved by victory for the centre - "it is the political objective of 
removing local government's autonomy that is at issue" (Duncan and 
Goodwin 1988, p. 188). But, if this is the aim of central government, it is 
an unrealisable and unlikely one, since - as Duncan and Goodwin also note -
central government needs local government as much as local government 
needs the centre (and, of course, this is one implication of explaining the 
existence of local government in terms of uneven development) (see also 
Cochrane 1985). Jessop's discussion of the state as generator of strategies 
is useful in this context, since it points to some of the ways in which "the 
-role of state managers (both politicians and career officials) is crucial in 
understanding how a relative unity is imposed on the various (in)activities 
of the state and how these activities acquire a relative autonomy from the 
conflicting pressures emanating from civil society" (Jessop 1990b, p. 261). 
One way of developing this point in analysing the position of the local 
state is to understood it as part of a series o.f networks involving central 
government, and a range of other public and quasi-public organisations. 
This is essentially the argument developed and refined by Rhodes (1981, 
1985 and 1988). He identifies the post-war growth of sub-central (not 
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only local) government in the UK with the development of the welfare 
state. At least until the end of the 1970s, he argues that "financial 
relationships between central and local governments can also be 
characterised as a complex set of interactions involving a range of 
government institutions and placing a premium on networking skills ... The 
intricate pattern of linkages is both a constraint and a source of 
opportunities for local government" (Rhodes 1981, pp. 28 and 34). More 
recently, the constraints may have become tighter, and the opportunities 
less obvious, but the the pattern of relationships has not changed so 
dramatically. The starting point of Rhodes' argument is that the influence 
'of the centre "lies in its ability to cajole, bully and persuade (but not 
command), and even this ability may not call forth the desired degree of 
compliance" (Rhodes 1988, p. 1). And his concern with sub-central 
governments (in which he includes the decentralised structures of central 
departments, the nationalised industries and ad hoc bodies or quangos as 
well as elected local governments) is not an apologetic one. On the 
contrary, he "rejects a fixation on Westminster and Whitehall", believing 
that it does not help very much in answering the question: "who gets what 
public services when and how?" (Rhodes 1988, p. 1). Answering that 
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question adequately, he suggests, requires an analysis of sub-central 
governments as the deliverers of services as well as the complexity of 
relationships between them and with the central institutions of the state. 
Here, however, comes the first crucial point of his argument. There is, 
he says, no single centre. There are rather "multiple centres or policy 
networks", each of which is centralised but between which there is little 
coordination (Rhodes 1988, p.3). In other words, for Rhodes, it is, strictly, 
inappropriate to talk of 'central-local' relations as if there were a centre 
which could control local agencies. The system is more complex and 
fragmented than such a phrase suggests. For him, 'central-local' relations 
are a product of many such networks, linking centre and locality often 
apparently independently of each other, but also influencing each other in 
ways which are rarely clearly understood by those involved. 
Rhodes argues that there is a paradox at the heart of the UK state 
system between the tradition which assumes that the centre knows best 
and the reality of the centre's dependence o.n local and other forms of sub 
central government for the delivery of services. In other words, there is a 
tension at the heart of the system constructed in the post war period. And 
for him that tension can best be explored in terms of policy networks, 
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which link the centre and localities, rather than in terms which stress the 
importance of local (or indeed, national) party politics. These policy 
networks can be defined as the systems of (vertical) linkages between 
professionals (and associated councillors) and civil servants responsible 
for policy within departments of central government. There are separate 
networks in the fields of education, housing and social services which do 
not always interact with each other. 
The point Rhodes makes most strongly is that the interests of these 
policy networks and the civil servants within them may not coincide with 
the interests of the government more broadly defined. Policy networks are 
service based and cut across hierarchies (being represented at different 
levels of government) within what Rhodes describes as a 'differentiated 
polity'. Each side of the network is dependent on the other: at local level 
officers are dependent for finance from the centre, and at national level 
civil servants (and ministers) are dependent on local officers for 
implementation. At central level department~ (or parts of departments) 
may act as representatives of those they also manage. So, for example, the 
government may be arguing strongly for reductions in spending as part of 
an overall economic programme, while at the same time, civil servants 
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within the Department of Education and Science, or the Department of 
Health are arguing with their counterparts at local level for increased 
spending on particular schemes. The Department of the Environment is in a 
particularly uncertain position. In arguments with the Treasury, it is likely 
to support more spending in the areas for which it is responsible through 
local government, yet in its relations with local government it acts as the 
policer of budgets - indeed it effectively plays the Treasury role. And 
matters are made still more complex because, even in this context of 
departmental pressure for retrenchment, some parts of the Department -
those responsible for housing, planning and other spending areas - may also 
be encouraging increased spending. These internal conflicts of interest are 
reflected through policy networks. 
Rhodes' analysis stresses the continuity of central-local relations in 
the post-war period. He charts an unfolding if uncertain logic which goes 
back to the way in which the welfare state was put together, as pieces 
were tacked on in a rather haphazard way onto existing state institutions. 
Rhodes argues that the organisation of both central and local government 
was characterised by functional divisions (along service lines, such as 
education, social services or planning) so that links between levels were 
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also on functional rather than territorial lines, through policy networks 
which included professionals as well as politicians. This is another crucial 
difference between his approach and that of those who focus on local 
(territorial) politics, since they tend (with a few exceptions) to ignore or 
minimise the significance of professionals. Arguably, it is the 
professionals rather than (or perhaps as well as) the leading politicians 
who matter in policy making, particularly where it involves interaction 
with the departments of central government (Houlihan's analysis of 
housing policy and central-local relations tends to confirm this, Houlihan 
1988, pp. 209-216. See also Rosenberg 1989, Ch. 6, for a discussion of the 
·role of Treasurers in this context, and Laffin 1986 for a more general 
discussion of professionalism and central-local relations). Since much of 
the 'common sense' of local government and its operation is actually drawn 
from professional practices and the ways in which they define what is 
Possible, it is essential that the role of professionals is adequately 
acknowledged. 
The work of Duncan and Goodwin is effective in exploring local 
government as state form (Le. the social relations expressed through state 
apparatus). It is less effective in developing an analysis of the state 
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apparatus (Le. its physical institutions) (Duncan and Goodwin themselves 
develop this distinction. Duncan and Goodwin 1988, p. 39). But what goes on 
inside the apparatus is also important in determining the practice of local 
politics and influencing the allocation of resources between groups. Local 
state theory emphasised that the state was a form (or sometimes even a 
crystallisation) of social relations, rejecting the view that it was simply 
a 'machine', but one consequence of this was that there was little interest 
in the power of politics within the machine (within the apparatus) (see, 
e.g., Clarke and Cochrane 1989). Yet those politics are themselves an 
important expression of the social relations which constitute the local 
state. 
Rhodes' approach views central-local relations as a system, within 
which moves at one point have to be accompanied by moves elsewhere in 
the system if it is to survive in a reasonably stable form. He acknowledges 
that the territorial basis on which local government is organised has 
helped to make the system unstable in the 1,980s. According to him, central 
government tried to use the system of sub-central government to carry 
through its own policies, particularly in reducing spending on welfare, 
without "comprehending the differentiated nature of the system" (Rhodes 
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1985, p.55) - that is the range of policy networks within it and the 
pressures on. territorially based local governments to sustain just the 
same forms of spending which it was trying to cut. Whilst, therefore, 
Rhodes acknowledges that the localness of local government may be of 
importance at particular key points, he minimises its significance at other 
times. Although he acknowledges the relevance of territorial politics as 
one of the pressures which have helped to undermine the post war 
arrangements, Rhodes is less concerned to identify anything specifically 
local about local government, or indeed to argue that any specific policy 
areas are appropriately (or necessarily) handled at that level, in fact 
referring to sub-national or sub-central government rather than local 
government as an object of study and stressing the contingent nature of 
political outcomes (see. for example. Rhodes 1985). His writing· 
successfully highlights the significance of professionals within the 
political system, and is able to explain change and obstacles to it through 
the analysis of what is almost an enclosed political system, linking 
localities. and the departments of central government in a complicated 
web of negotiation and bargaining in which the various sides are not 
always clear, and there is often a high degree of confusion and uncertainty 
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(see Rhodes 1988, particularly Ch. 5, for the the most developed 
expression o! this approach). 
Rhodes approach is in many ways a persuasive one, but it also focuses 
too narrowly on the operation of a relatively enclosed system and on 
adjustments and bargaining within it. The major changes in UK politics 
seem to impinge on it from the outside, and even the pressures of local 
politics are somehow extraneous to it. In principle, perhaps it could be 
extended to include a wide range of different groups within policy 
networks, but the strength of the approach is also one of its weaknesses -
a stress on professional officers and existing political elites masks it 
difficult to acknowledge and incorporate analysis of the ways which the 
nature of these elites and access to them may change over time. His 
approach tends to emphasise the ways in which the system works and the 
inherent tensions within it, but make it more difficult to understand the 
significance of locally based politics. The partnership models we have 
discussed above imply the possibility of locally based policy networks 
developing which are not necessarily part of any wider national policy 
network of the sort Rhodes discusses. In general, he plays down the 
independent value of local politics, instead suggesting that a growth in 
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local or territorial politics tends to be a consequence of shifts elsewhere 
in the syste~. His explanation for the growth of local challenges to the 
centre in the 1980s is essentially that the centre did not understand how 
to manage the the system properly. Within his analysis, therefore, local 
politics is a product of the operation of the central-local government 
system, rather than a key element within it. Yet, this means his 
explanation of change in the 1980s loses some of its force. Some of the 
new departures at local level have to be introduced from outside the 
model, because they cannot be explained from inside. It increasingly looks 
as if local politics does have a life of its own, to the extent that changes 
at local level may have forced responses from the centre as much as 
central initiatives encouraged rebellion at local level. Despite their 
obvious value in the analysis of central-local relations network models 
like that of Rhodes have the potential disadvantage that it is difficult to 
introduce factors which are not initially represented as having key roles 
within the model, however important they later turn out to be. 
4.3 Conclusion: tying it all together 
If Duncan and Goodwin exaggerate the importance of local factors, and 
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local politicians in particular, Rhodes seems to underestimate them. More 
important, perhaps, if Duncan and Goodwin overemphasise the necessity of 
analysing local government as part of wider processes of capitalist 
development (and particularly of uneven development), Rhodes seems to 
underestimate the significance of these factors - they are external to his 
system, yet it clearly breaks down precisely under the impact of wider 
economic and political pressures, which encouraged the 'squalid' 
intervention from the centre which he describes (Rhodes 1985). Separately 
the approaches of both Duncan and Goodwin and of Rhodes have significant 
weaknesses. But their arguments may be complementary rather than 
necessarily contradictory and in what follows we hope to draw on both of 
them to provide an alternative way forward through the analysis of local 
politics in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Although not explicitly referring 
to this debate, Gurr and King usefully identify two different 'types' of 
potential autonomy for local government or local politics: the first is 
concerned with the extent to which it can act independently of local 
economic and social interests and the second with the extent to which it 
can act independently of pressures from the centre or the demands of key 
(national) professional groups (Gurr and King 1987, pp. 43-73, King and 
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Pierre 1990, pp. 2-12). Duncan and Goodwin tend to draw our attention to 
the second form of autonomy, and Rhodes to the first, but a more rounded 
approach demands that effective consideration is given to both. 
In the chapters which follow an attempt is made to explore both 
sides, by looking first at the wider contexts of political change at local 
level in the U.K., before narrowing the focus to the particular experience of 
Sheffield in the 1980s. Earlier (at the start of Chapter 3) Doreen Massey is 
quoted, setting herself and others the difficult challenge of "holding on to 
both the general movement and the particularity of circumstance" (Massey 
1984, p. 8). Although she is principally concerned with issues of economic 
restructuring, meeting this challenge is no less important for the 
development of an adequate understanding of the workings of local 
politics. The chapters which follow, therefore, seek to explore the 
implications of taking Massey's challenge seriously as part of the process 
of analysing political change at local level. 
Notes. 
1. Although Rhodes acknowledges the similarity of his approach to that of 
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Cawson, he is reluctant to accept the 'corporatist' label because he is 
unconvinced that it is sufficiently distinct from 'neo-pluralism', a label 
with which he professes to feel more at ease (Rhodes 1988, pp. 98-99). 
2. For an earlier discussion of the importance of 'private power' in U.S. 
urban politics, see Newton 1976a. Newton stresses the role of 'economic 
notables' in urban redevelopment programmes, in particular, those 
associated with "the building, real estate, banking and property 
development businesses" (Newton 1976a, p. 50). 
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Chapter 5. The political and institutional context 
Local government in the U.K. is an integral part of a wider political 
system, and this chapter sets out to identify the context in which it 
developed in the 1980s. The argument runs through two key aspects of this. 
It considers, first, the place of local government within a hierarchy of 
central-local relations and, secondly, its position within the welfare state 
constructed after the war. It considers some of the conflicts between 
central and local government in the 1970s and 1980s but questions 
whether they can simply be explained as reflecting an increased 
. centralisation of policy-making. 
Until the mid 1970s, local government was widely seen as a 
relatively unproblematic part of the British political system, despite 
attempts to 'modernise' it in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its task was 
to deliver a fairly clearly defined set of services (including primary and 
secondary education, council housing and personal social ~ervices) at local 
level, reasonably efficiently and with a degree of (local) democratic 
accountability. It was not a subject of high political (or academic) 
controversy. Much discussion of local government started by emphasising 
that it handled large budgets and was 'a multi-million pound' business, in 
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order to show that it was an important part of the U.K. state system, 
before going on to explain its especially democratic nature despite low 
levels of voting in local elections (see the summary in Dearlove 1979, p. 
28-50). A clutch of official reports and royal commissions at the end of 
the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s concentrated on suggesting ways 
of improving managerial efficiency and 'stream-lining' decision-making, 
within larger (more business-like) authorities (the reports were generally 
known by the names of those who chaired the relevant committees: Maud 
1967, Mallaby 1967, Redcliffe-Maude 1969, Wheatley 1969, Macrory 1970, 
Bains 1972, Paterson 1973). 
The principles underlying the division of labour between central and 
local government were never clearly stated, but this merely seemed to 
Confirm the lack of controversy surrounding them. The convenient fiction 
was maintained that local councils were responsible for the allocation of 
resources at local level, as long as in practice they did not seek to 
challenge the position of central government and the priorities of central 
government departments. Bulpitt confirms that, "Like children," local 
authorities "were expected to be 'good', respectable indoors and outdoors, 
and respectful to the centre. Misbehaviour was frowned upon, but its 
Consequences were conveniently left unclear" (Bulpitt 1989, p .. 66). 
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In England and Wales the 1972 Local Government Act created the 
system (of county councils, metropolitan counties, districts and 
metropolitan districts alongside the GLC and London boroughs which had 
already been created in the 1960s) which survived with little change until 
the mid 1980s, and similar reforms took place in Scotland a year earlier to 
produce that country's system of regional and district councils. In Northern 
Ireland local government was a matter of greater controversy, because it 
was more clearly associated with the distribution of resources (including 
jobs) based on politial and sectarian patronage. While reforms in the rest 
of the UK in the early 1970s created larger and, arguably, more powerful 
. forms of local government, in Northern Ireland at the same time councils 
were effectively marginalised, left with few mainstream responsibilities, 
and housing and social services were transferred to regional agencies and 
joint boards. Throughout the U.K., however, the fact that discussion of local 
government tended to focus on organisational questions, boundaries and the 
sharing out of service responsibilities rather than disagreements over 
POlitical programmes, merely confirmed the position of local government 
as a political backwater. 
But after the mid 1970s local government became the focus of major 
debate throughout the UK and had an increasingly high profile not only at 
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local level, but in the national newspapers, radio and television. There was 
a remarkable transformation, in which by the early 1980s 'excessive' 
council spending was blamed for the country's economic problems, 
councillors were heavily criticised for financial irresponsibility and local 
government officers attacked for inefficiency and constructing 
'bureaucratic empires' on the basis of self interest (see, e.g., Butler and 
Pirie 1981, Forsyth 1981, Pirie 1981, Walker 1983). Central governments 
increasingly set out to control and limit the spending of councils. A series 
of reform packages was introduced to achieve this, to redirect the 
priorities of service departments and to encourage the creation of 
. alternatives to local authority provision. A layer of councils (the 
metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council) was abolished in 
England in the mid 1980s, and 'ratecapping' was introduced in one form or 
another across the UK at around the same time. This gave departments of 
central government final say over levels of local taxation. At the end of 
the decade the community charge (or poll tax) was imposed as a 
replacement for the old rating system everywhere except Northern Ireland, 
and in England and Wales the old commercial rating system was replaced 
with a nationally levied business rate. Yet, despite all these upheavals, 
local government finance remained a matter of national controversy. The 
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failure of the community charge and the uniform business rate as 
alternatives to the old rating system was one of the factors which led to 
the resignation of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1990, and local 
government'reform' looks set to be a matter of continuing debate. 
5.1 Hierarchies of government: the power of the centre 
Institutional approaches to local government in the UK stress its 
position within a hierarchical structure, with initiative flowing from and 
rules being set by the centre. Byrne, for example, stresses that local 
government "is subordinated to the national authority which is Parliament" 
(Byrne1983, p. 19). Rose has also summarised the position briefly, 
concluding that, "the power to delegate or revoke delegated power remains 
in the hands of the central authority" (Rose 1982, p. 50). Similarly one 
implication of the local state theory of the 1970s was that the 
institutions of local government remained SUbordinate parts of the 
capitalist state (see Cockburn 1977, p. 46). Although some might have 
disagreed with his theoretical starting point, few from either tradition 
Would have disagreed with Miliband's emphasis on the weakness of local 
government, giving it a subordinate role within a wider capitalist state 
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system and stressing the extent to which local and regional governments 
have "become ever more markedly dependent on central power and 
sUbordinate to it" (Miliband 1969 pp 171-77). 
The whole of the U.K.'s post-war experience seems to confirm the 
force of these arguments. The formal (legal) structures of government in 
England and Wales are among the most centralised in Western Europe. 
Unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, for example - where article 28(2) 
of the Basic Law states that, "Local authorities are to be guaranteed the 
right to regulate all matters concerning the local community within the 
framework of law and on their own responsibility" - there is no 
. constitutionally guaranteed role for councils. In Britain local government 
is formally the creature of central government legislation, and has been 
delegated the task of undertaking various responsibilities laid down in 
successive general and specific statutes, from Local Government Acts to 
Housing Acts. Despite the arguments of the Bains and Paterson Reports at 
the start of the 1970s (which maintained that local authorities should be 
responsible for managing processes of social and economic change in their 
areas), local governments in England, Wales and Scotland1 have never been 
giVen a general competence for the areas covered by them, except in very 
limited terms, such as those laid down in Section 137 of the Local 
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Government Act 1972, which gave councils the power to spend up to a 
maximum of the product of a 2p rate on matters which were to the benefit 
of some or all of their local residents. The Local Government and Housing 
Act 1989 removed this general competence, but for the first time gave a 
specific power to councils to engage in economic development activity. 
This new power was itself severely restricted by explicitly penalising 
spending through local authority sponsored development companies and 
partnerships and by limiting overall spending on economic development. In 
one White Paper on local government taxation, it was claimed that Britain 
was a 'unitary' state, with the implication that central government could 
(and should) effectively control levels of spending by local councils 
(Department of the EnvironmentlWelsh Office 1983, para1.2) (see also 
Foster et a11980, which considers some of the problems of managing local 
government finance in a 'unitary' state, from the perspective of 
neo-classical economics). A further implication which could be drawn from 
these arguments was that central government also had the right (and 
possibly duty) to limit and even determine the activities on which it could 
be spent. In the 1980s this was confirmed most clearly in the decision 
simply to abolish one set of councils (the metropolitan counties, including 
Greater London, the West Midlands and South Yorkshire). As legal creations 
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of the centre, they could also be destroyed by the centre. 
The growth of local government in the years after 1945 as part of the 
post-war welfare state can be seen to have reinforced its subordinate 
position within a state hierarchy. One consequence of the initial post-war 
nationalisations was that previous powers - for the running of hospitals, 
electricity and gas supply - were removed. Water and sewage 
responsibilities went in the early 1970s. They were replaced with 
expanded responsibilities in the fields of education, housing and town 
planning, which were explicitly handed down from above. The personal 
social services also became local authority responsibilities, although it 
was not until after the Seebohm Commission reported (in 1968) that 
separately identifiable social services departments became the norm. In 
some areas - such as education and social services - there are· clearly 
identified central inspectorates which help to reinforce the subordinate 
Position of local government. And in town planning, the possibility of 
appeal to the relevant minister makes the formal position equally clear. 
Named officers and committees are delegated specific 
responsibilities within legislation. This is probably clearest in the case of 
the police where police committees only have limited control over chief 
constables and the committees include representatives of other groups 
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(such as magistrates) as well as elected councillors. In education, too, 
(the biggest spender within local government), responsibilities are clearly 
specified. The relevant councils are labelled local education authorities, 
the membership of education committees is statutorily defined to include 
a range of co-optees and directors of education are given responsibilities 
which make her/him responsible to the centre as well as to the council of 
which s/he is an officer. Similar responsibilities exist within the personal 
social services, particularly in the field of child protection. Finance 
officers, too, are given the responsibility of ensuring that the spending 
programmes of a council can be met by the income which the council can 
reasonably (and legally) expect to receive in the course of the year. In 
some circumstances (if councillors were ignoring this fiduciary 
responsibility) finance officers would be expected to take over the running 
of their councils. Legal and finance officers must ensure that no spending 
is 'ultra vires' (Le. outside the specified powers of local government). 
There is still a fairly uniform pattern of service provision and 
administrative organisation across the country (allowing for the separate 
legal frameworks of England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland). 
Local authorities throughout the country do similar things. Most spending 
on education, social services and housing goes on the sama sorts of 
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activities, and most local authority spending goes on these three areas. 
Most local authority service provision is statutorily based, and follows 
national guidelines of one sort or another, whether formally supervised by 
national inspectorates (in education and social services) or informally 
policed by professional organisations (such as the Royal Town Planning 
Institute or the Institute of Housing). In some cases, such as local 
authority accounting there is both a national system of supervision through 
a network of District Auditors and the Audit Commission and a strong 
professional organisation in the form of the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (see Rosenberg 1989, particularly Ch. 3, for a 
discussion of professionalism within the local government budgetary and 
financial control systems). 
Much of the debate within the professions of local government 
continues to stress that the aims of spending are similar in different 
places, even if the levels are different. A commentary on spending patterns . 
prepared for the Chartered Institute of Pubric Finance in 1988, for 
example, stresses that the main explanation for different levels of 
spending seems to lie in differences in population density between 
councils (Ashley-Smith 1988, pp12-14). The Audit Commission focuses on 
perceived differences in efficiency between councils, and even the replies 
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from local authorities to the strictures of the Commission are generally 
couched in terms which stress the different needs of different areas, 
rather than different political priorities (see, for example, Audit 
Commission 1987 and the reply from the Association of London Authorities 
1987). Ken Livingstone (leader of the GLC from 1981 until its abolition in 
1986) has pOinted out that even at the height of the council's radicalism, 
the bulk of its spending continued to go on traditional activities, such as 
the fire service. Even if the most costly of its 'new' activities (Le. 
industry and employment) had been cut, he stressed, the average ratepayer 
would still only have been saved some 15p a week (Livingstone 1983 p. 
334). 
District auditors - who are independent of the councils and employed 
by a separate agency (in England and Wales, the Audit Commission) - also 
have the role of ensuring that councils behave with propriety in their 
financial dealings. In particular, they have the power to penalise 
Councillors and officers for "wilful misconduct". In the mid 1980s Lambeth 
and Liverpool councils were prosecuted for "wilful misconduct" over the 
way in which they conducted the setting of their local taxation in 1985. It 
was argued that they "wilfully" delayed setting the rate in such a way that 
significant income was lost to the council and councillors were· 
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individually and collectively surcharged to repay the sums of money 
allegedly lost as we" as the costs of the court cases - amounting to about 
£1/4m in the case of Lambeth and over £1/2m in the case of Liverpool. 
The financial position of local government also suggests a 
subordinate role in other ways. Until the late 1980s councils in England, 
Scotland and Wales did, of course, have access to significant locally 
generated taxation whose levels they could set (albeit within increasingly 
tight limitations). But even then, most local authority spending (over sixty 
per cent) was funded by central government grant. This was emphasised 
the reforms of the late 1980s because the collection and distribution of 
. bUsiness taxes (the uniform business rate) in England and Wales, too, 
became a central responsibility, so that a little over twenty per cent of 
local authority income was locally determined. The decision made in 1991 
to fund still more local government expenditure from VAT simply 
reinforced this general trend. Meanwhile legislation in the mid 1980s 
enabled the Secretary of State for the Environment (the department 
responsible for local government in England and Wales) and the Secretary 
of State for Scotland (where new legislation was first introduced) to fix 
the levels of spending by named local authorities, which went outside 
certain centrally determined guidelines. This effectively meant that levels 
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of local taxation were also determined centrally (hence the process was 
labelled ratecapping in England and Wales, while in Scotland concern was 
expressed about the ways in which a 'hit-list' of local authorities was 
chosen for attention by the Scottish Office). Despite the moves at the end 
of the decade to new forms of local taxation (the community charge or poll 
tax) which were intended to increase local accountability and reduce the 
need for direct central intervention, these powers were retained. 
The programme of the third Thatcher government elected in 1987 was 
open about its ambitions to reorganise and restructure Britain's local 
government system. No area of local government responsibility escaped 
. scrutiny: in education proposals included the introduction of a national 
curriculum, encouragement to schools to opt out of local authority control 
making them more directly responsible to the Department of Education and 
Science, support for city technology colleges also outside the local 
authority system, and a move towards local management of schools within 
tight financial guidelines; in housing, limitations on council house building 
were reinforced, while existing council estates were encouraged to leave 
local authority control, and move into the housing association sector, or to 
be taken directly into central control in housing action trusts; the existing 
rules requiring some local government sevices and maintenance activities 
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to be provided on the basis of competitive tendering between independent 
bidders was extended to cover more areas; and, yet another set of changes 
was introduced for the finance of local government, which ensured that 
councils had still less control of the amount of revenue they could raise at 
local level, since although the new business rate was to be collected by 
local authorities, it was ultimately paid to the centre and subsequently to 
be redistributed between councils on the basis of a centrally determined 
formula. 
So, it looks as if the legal framework within which local government 
has to operate is highly restrictive and hierarchical. The various grant 
. regimes a~d methods of calculating GREAs (Grant Related Expenditure 
Assessments) and SSAs (Standard Spending Assessments), coupled with 
powers to cap first rates and more recently community charge levels, 
Suggest a significant increase in central political power, and the 
bureaucratic power of the Department of the Environment and its officers, 
at least as far as individual local governme(lts are concerned. Power is 
delegated from above, and the centre retains the ability to delegate 
responsibility, to limit spending and to police what is being done. The legal 
formalities of British local government remain highly restrictive and since 
the mid 19705, the control mechanisms introduced to reinforce these have 
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become more and more extensive (see, e.g. among many others, Burgess and 
Travers 1980, Duncan and Goodwin 1988 Ch.5, Jones and Stewart 1983, 
Newton and Karran 1986, Travers1989). 
According to Stewart, "in place of local choice will be the decision of 
the Secretary of State who is seeking ... remarkably unrestrained power" 
(Stewart, J. 1984, p.9). It was claimed by some that the, in retrospect 
rather limited, provisions of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 
marked "the beginnings of the wholly centralized state" (Burgess and 
Travers 1980, p.188). Others commented that, "the British system of 
government was already highly centralised in in 1979, and subsequent 
. legislation has produced a quantum jump towards a more powerful and 
centralised state," and went on to suggest that, "Britain stands in sight of 
a form of government which is more highly centralised tha~ anything this 
side of East Germany" (Newton and Karran 1985, pp.121 and 129). Authors 
influenced by neo-marxist approaches took a similar line. For them, local 
government - or the local state - represent~d a potential base for 
oPposition to the policies of the Thatcher governments in their attempts to 
restructure the welfare state, so the legislation represented a major 
attempt to curb "the potential of local authorities to initiate and 
demonstrate change", encouraging the erosion of local autonomy (Duncan 
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and Goodwin 1988, p. 277). Whatever the label it was agreed that councils 
seemed to be losing their scope for independent action in the early 1980s. 
Most actors within local government agreed with writers from the School 
for Advanced Urban Studies when they commented that government 
legislation to limit levels of local taxation as well as expenditure were "a 
major threat" to local democracy (SAUS, 1983. Conclusion). 
But there are also fundamental flaws in this picture of a centralised 
hierarchical system, some of which come out clearly even in the high 
period of centralisation in the 1980s. Most obviously, of course, if the 
system already were as hierarchical as suggested, it is not clear why 
. there was such a high degree of controversy and conflict in the period. The 
experience of the 1980s suggests that, even if one accepts that the centre 
was successful in the end, it faced serious problems in imposing its will. 
local authorities of all political stripes seem to have resisted the 
imposition of authority from above (see, e.g., Audit Commission 1984 
which modestly notes the ways in which local authority treasurers sought 
to evade the clearly stated intentions of the centre). The 1980s were 
characterised by the introduction of a vast amount of legislation directed 
towards local government, which suggests - at the very least - that 
imposing central control was not an easy process. 
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Nor is it clear that attempts at centralisation have been successful. 
In some respects they may have been - for example, in reducing capital 
expenditure 'on housing by local authorities to a trickle, encouraging a shift 
to private sector provision and, incidentally, effectively encouraging an 
increase in levels of homelessness. In real terms, capital spending by local 
authorities on new house construction fell by 830/0 from 1976n to 1987/8 
(Hills and Mullings, p. 158). But even in those areas, the problem has 
sometimes simply been shifted to the management of other agencies, 
themselves resistant to pressure from above. Central government now has 
to manage housing associations, training agencies, schools and 
. polytechnics whose activities were previously imbedded within elected 
local government. It is not yet clear that fragmenting these 
responsibilities and encouraging different forms of accountability has 
increased central control. Intuitively, at least, it seems possible that it 
may decrease the ability of the centre to control or manage its new 
creations - particularly as in most cases their legal position is more 
ambiguous because they straddle the public, private and voluntary sectors. 
Even in the sphere of elected local government, the results of the 
reforms of the 1980s were less clear cut than might have been expected. 
Neither levels of spending nor employment (particularly white collar 
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employment) decreased significantly over the decade. Despite a decline in 
capital expenditure (that is spending on equipment, buildings and 
infrastructure financed by long term loans), Stoker notes that current 
expenditure (that is spending on services, mainly financed by tax and grant 
income and short-term loans) actually rose in real terms up to the end of 
the 1980s (Stoker 1988, p.171) and numbers employed also rose, although 
there was a decline in the employment of manual workers and a growth in 
part-time working (Fleming 1989). Local authority current spending on 
personal social services rose throughout the decade even as capiital 
spending fell (Evandrou et a11990, p. 219). 
Despite the pressures for uniformity, there remained some scope for 
variation. The amount spent per head of the population clearly did vary 
significantly from place to place, and does so more in some areas of 
spending than others. Duncan and Goodwin point to the extent of variation 
in subsidies to council house rents between councils in the mid 1980s 
(Duncan and Goodwin 1988, pp. 6-9). Glennerster and Low note that 
differences in spending per pupil in primary and secondary education 
actually increased between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s (Glennerster 
and Low 1990, p. 69). The variation in expenditure growth on personal 
social services also increased between the early and mid 1980s (Evandrou 
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et al1990, p. 225). In the early 1990s there were still substantial 
variations in spending between different councils, reflected both in the 
SSAs (Standard Spending Assessments) estimated by central government 
and in the levels of community charge (or poll tax) levied in different 
places. It is shifts at the margins in terms of spending which often capture 
attention and help to differentiate authorities from one another. 
But, in any case, some differences may not be so easily expressed in 
terms of budgets and levels of expenditure. There are also increasingly 
differences in the ways in which services are delivered: for example, some 
Councils (such as Kent and East Sussex) have encouraged the use of 
. voluntary sector and private sector provision (see, e.g. Holliday 1990, 
Young and Hadley 1990); others (such as Islington, Tower Hamlets, and 
Walsall) have developed forms of decentralised provision and 
accountability (see, e.g., Hoggett and Hambleton 1987, Lowndes 1990, 
Seabrook 1984). Some authorities have chosen to develop 'new' initiatives 
- e.g. in economic development, or the recycling of waste - while others 
have concentrated on more traditional activities. 
The development of new initiatives at local level did not suggest an 
area whose significance was withering, despite the defeats for the local 
authority left, first in Scotland and then England and Wales in the 
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campaigns over ratecapping in 1985-6 and in the abolition of the Greater 
London Council (GLC) and the metropolitan county councils in 1986. The 
attempt finafly to resolve the conflict through the imposition of the 
community charge (or poll tax) in 1989 (in Scotland) and 1990 (in England 
and Wales) also had ambivalent results - both forcing many local 
authorities into making sharp reductions in their budgets and, finally, 
forcing central government to retreat by promising to fund more local 
government services through an increase in levels of centrally collected 
VAT. Paradoxically that retreat may result in greater centralisation than 
any of the earlier reforms because it implies a still greater shift away 
. from the raiSing of finance at local level, leaving ninety per cent of local 
government finance in the hands of central government. 
5.2 Local government and the welfare state: profeSSionals and 
policy networks 
Despite the widely acknowledged importance of central power, it is 
misleading to believe that the centre can effectively control local 
government, at least as long as it exists as a separately elected and area 
based system. Starting from the notion of a unitary state, and focusing on 
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the legal framework misses the importance of territorially based political 
power (such as that suggested by Duncan and Goodwin 1988), as well as. 
underestimating the extent of political independence available to non 
central institutions in making decisions and allocating resources (see, e.g., 
Gurr and King 1987). 
It is also profoundly ahistorical, refusing to acknowledge the 
incremental way in which local government developed, from below as much 
as by legislation from above, particularly as urban areas expanded in the 
nineteenth century, incorporating more and more land, and undermining the 
cosy (and often corrupt) arrangements of the past (see, e.g., Fraser 1976 
. Conclusion, Lee 1963, pp. 21-43, Smith 1982, pp. 7-19). Indeed, in the mid 
nineteenth century, Fraser argues that the "natural location of politics" 
was the city, suggesting that it was only with the involvement of the 
working class that political activity in the UK became dominated by a 
national agenda (Fraser 1976, p. 283). In other words, the construction of a 
national hierarchy was always a political process, rather than the product 
of legal or constitutional necessity. 
Although the underlying hierarchical structure of central-local 
relations cannot be ignored, the need to move beyond hierarchical models 
is emphasised by looking at the history of local government since 1945 
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from a rather different perspective - one which does not start from formal 
structures, but seeks to set the local government system within wider 
pOlitical and"economic processes affecting the UK. Four main periods of 
development can be identified over this period. The first, which stretches 
roughly from 1945 until the mid 1960s, saw local government consolidated 
as part of the welfare state. 
In the 1930s and 1940s elected local authorities lost many of the 
powers they had previously enjoyed. In 1934 councils lost control over 
poor relief; in 1936 local responsibility for trunk roads was removed; in 
1940 it was the administration of supplementary benefits which was 
removed; responsibility for hospitals was lost in 1946; powers to provide 
electricity supply in 1947, and gas in 1948 (this process is charted clearly 
in Dearlove and Saunders 1984, p. 381). But the conclusions sometimes 
drawn from this are misleading. Dearlove and Saunders conclude that "the 
clear trend was one of erosion of their responsibilities, and this has 
Continued ever since" (Dearlove and Saunders 1984, p.381). Dunleavy, too, 
stresses "massive losses of local service control" as a result of the 
POlicies of the 1945-51 Labour government (Dunleavy 1984, p. 54). As 
description these comments may be perfectly accurate, but the implication 
that local government was less important as an element in the state sytem 
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of the immediate post war period is highly inappropriate. 
This is the case for two main reasons. First, it misreads the 
significance 'of the changes which took place, by implicitly assuming that 
it was existing local government services which were effectively 
'nationalised,2. The main arguments about welfare and industrial issues 
during and immediately after the Second World War were focused on rather 
different issues than local versus central control. On welfare the issue 
was whether and how to construct a system of universal benefits. 
Whatever the conflict between centre and some localities in the 1930s, 
no-one would argue that the social security system proposed by Beveridge 
was principally aimed at undermining troublesome local authorities, since, 
whatever its other faults, its stress was clearly on the provision of 
universal benefits coupled with a commitment to full employment (see 
Beveridge 1942). For the electricity and gas industries the issue was how 
to construct efficient industries capable of providing cheap fuel to 
industry (see Addison 1977, for a discussion of some of these debates). 
Certainly, there was a move away from localism in some areas as a result 
of this, but it was largely the consequence of seeking to introduce and 
develop a more universal set of policies, building on the experience of 
municipal collectivism, and operating on a much larger scale than had 
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previously been possible, for e,:,ample in the formation of the nationalised 
industries as public corporations along the lines of Morrison's London 
Transport. And the local provision of welfare was simply overtaken by 
attempts to generalise provision, instead of leaving it as a permissive 
patchwork. To focus on the ways in which local councils lost 
responsibilities, therefore, is to miss the point. In almost all the cases 
listed by Dearlove and Saunders (certainly after 1945) the issue was not 
how to restrict spending in these fields, but, rather, how it might more 
effectively be extended and institutionalised. 
It would also be a mistake to try to identify any clear logic underlying 
. the decisions made about which responsibilities were to stay with local 
authorities and which were to be removed from them. In principle, there is 
no reason to suppose that local authorities could not have retained 
responsibility for the distribution of supplementary benefit or social 
assistance (as is the case in the Federal Republic of Germany), nor that 
central government could not have taken on responsibility for the primary 
and secondary education system (as is the case in France, whilst in the 
Federal Republic of Germany it is handled through the U:inderS). Until quite 
late in the day, it was still a matter of debate whether the National Health 
Service should be largely left to senior medical professionals to run, under 
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the nominal control of appointed area boards, or be the responsibility of 
elected councils in joint boards (see, e.g., Foot 1973, pp. 118-119, 
131-133). But the process of reorganisation at this time also suggested a 
substantial expansion of all the activities concerned - for example, taking 
over the voluntary sector as well as local authority run hospitals in the 
case of the NHS, the private as well as the local authority run electricity 
suppliers in the case of those industries, and launching a far larger system 
of social security, national insurance and unemployment benefit in the 
case of what had previously been poor relief. Those who continued to 
favour local or municipal control were generally also those opposed to the 
scale of reform involved. Although there remained a few determined 
localists (see, e.g. Robson 1948, Ch 1), their views found little room for 
eXpression in the context of massive support for the new initiatives. 
There is little contemporary evidence that the changes were 
introduced to undermine the power of elected local governments, although 
in the case of some municipal enterprise concern was expressed, not about 
lOcal democratic control, but about the scope for excessively close 
relationships between councillors, contractors and business (see, e.g., 
Bulpitt 1983, p. 148). Bulpitt's interpretation of relations between central 
and local government in the 1920s and 1930s stresses the extent to which, 
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particularly within the Conservative Party, but also more generally, local 
and national politics were divorced from each other, on the assumption 
that 'real' politics took place at national level, while local politics was a 
necessary evil through which welfare services were delivered with the 
help of central grants. He argues that "Popular culture was either 
indifferent to, suspicious of, or directly antagonistic towards, elected 
local government" (Bulpitt 1989, p. 66. See also Bulpitt 1983, pp. 
147-155). 
A possible exception to this broad conclusion is to be found in the 
restructuring of poor relief in the early 1930s, where the conflicts 
between local and central authorities are well recorded. There is 
substantial evidence from the inter-war period that local pressures were 
important in the generation of welfare provision at local level, with 
substantial variation between local authorities (see Branson 1979, 
Macintyre 1980, Mark-Lawson et aI1985). Even here, however, caution 
may be advisable since the extent of conflict is easy to exaggerate. From 
the perspective of the Labour Party, the 1930s can also be seen as a period 
of steady consolidation of what Gyford describes as municipal labourism, 
which implies a negotiated settlement between central and local 
government rather than a process of conflict and centralisation (Gyford 
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1985, pp. 4-13). One plausible interpretation of the post war reforms is 
that they built on and generalised some - although not a" - of the 
initiatives pursued by the most active local authorities in the inter-war 
period. 
The second reason why focusing on the removal of powers is 
misleading, is that it was accompanied by a massive expansion of 
responsibilities for local government within the welfare state which 
dwarfed previous levels of activity. In the twenty years after 1945, 
education and housing spending came overwhelmingly to dominate local 
authority budgets. By the 1950s, these together accounted for around 600/0 
of council spending, whereas in the 1940s, the figures were closer 350/0 
(Dunleavy 1984, Table 3.2). And it is also important to note that the sums 
of money involved had also risen dramatically in real terms. Overall 
spending by local authorities as a proportion of national income and the 
share of local spending as a proportion of government spending were also 
rising over the post-war period. Local authority spending as a proportion of 
national income rose from around 90/0 in 1950 to over 130/0 by the end of the 
1960s, and as a proportion of public expenditure from around 260/0 to nearly 
31% over the same period (Newton and Karran 1985, Table 1.7). Levels of 
lOcal authority revenue spending almost quadrupled in real terms between 
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1940 and 1970 (Keith-Lucas and Richards 1978, Table 7.3). This suggests 
- intuitively at least - that local government was not fading into 
insignificance over the first part of post-war period. 
Equally important, perhaps, local government and its agencies became 
an increaSingly important part of the everyday lives of most people in the 
post war period. The 1944 Education Act ensured that most children 
attended local authority schools until the age of 15. And, following the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1947, all new development had to pass 
through a planning system based at local authority level. Increasingly large 
numbers of people lived in council housing, particularly in the wake of 
. large scale slum clearance programmes in the UK's major cities. Although 
they were only brought together in specialist departments for the first 
time in the early 1970s, in practice there was a continuous growth of local 
authority based personal social services, which were a practical 
eXpression of the 'cradle to the grave' supervision promised by the welfare 
state. The Children Act 1948, for example, significantly increased local 
authority responsibilities, beyond the poor law's provision for 'pauper 
children', moving away from the existing patchwork of of voluntary and 
charitable provision (Keith-Lucas and Richards 1978, p. 48). 
Focusing on a supposed reduction in the significance of local 
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government after 1945, makes it difficult to grasp the extent and 
direction of its post war growth. Implicit within Saunders' (and to a lesser 
. 
extent Cawson's) development of the 'dual state' thesis, for example, 
appears to be the assumption that direct involvement by the state in 
productive activities is somehow more 'important' than an involvement in 
social consumption or social control: thus a withdrawal from those areas 
seems to confirm a more secondary status for local government, as well as 
a greater scope for pluralist politics at local level, precisely because 
developments at that level cannot "easily be integrated into a nationally 
organised class-based movement centred on the politics of production ... the 
. attempt to fight national issues through local government reflects a 
failure to understand this distinction" (Saunders 1984, p.45). 
Yet, Saunders' own stress on the 'specificity' of local consumption 
politics also fails to connect with its linkage into the wider structures of 
the welfare state, which are crucial parts of national politics. As Rhodes 
POints out, what he calls sub-central goverryment (in practice mainly local 
government) "was the prime vehicle for building the welfare state up to 
the 1970s" (Rhodes 1985, p. 40). Such a conclusion is vital in categorising 
the first phase of post war development, because it places local 
government at the heart of the post war political compromise which has 
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been called the Keynesian welfare state (see, for example, Mishra 1984, 
Offe 1984), and also provides a crucial context for understanding the 
restructuring of local government in the UK since the 1960s. 
The period up to the mid 1960s, then, was one of expansion and 
consolidation. The second period, between the mid 1960s and the mid 
1970s, was largely characterised by attempts to modernise local 
government, as part of more extensive strategy of state backed social and 
economic modernisation, fostered first by the Wilson governments of 
1964-70, and then by the Heath government of 1970-74. In the case of 
local government stress was placed on the perceived inefficiency of local 
. government and the low calibre of its councillors and officers. It was 
argued strongly that the old structures bequeathed from the nineteenth 
century were inadequate for the mid twentieth century, when, as John 
Benington (1976) suggested and many politicians confirmed, local 
government had become big business. Modernisation meant that larger units 
were required and new forms of management (particularly corporate 
management) had to be introduced. This was the era of strategic planning, 
the creation of metropolitan county councils and the GLC in England, and 
the formation of large generic social services departments. In the most 
'progressive' authorities, there was a move away from departments to 
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much larger directorates, and everywhere new chief officer management 
teams were set up and chief executives appointed (Dearlove 1979 Part 2 
provides a valuable summary of debates current in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. See also Benington 1976, Cochrane 1989b, pp. 98-102, Cockburn 
1977 Chs 1 and 4). 
In retrospect, the period of attempted modernisation looks like the 
last gasp of a social democratic political order whose leaders assumed 
that it would go on forever. By the middle of the 1970s it was already 
clear that the favoured strategy could not succeed in a number of areas, 
particularly in the context of continued relative economic decline for the 
UK. The clearest expression of this was to be found in the need for the 
Labour government in 1976 to draw on financial support from foreign banks 
and the International Monetary Fund, and - as a consequence - to accept 
the imposition of a strong deflationary package (as well as the first 
rumblings of monetarism). The commitment to the 'regeneration of British 
industry' through a strong industrial policy and the National Enterprise 
Board did not survive into the late 1970s (see, e.g., Leys 1989, Ch 6 and 
Joint Trades Councils 1980). Mishra's comments about the crisis of the 
welfare state are also apposite for the particular case of local 
government: "The state's ability to manage the mixed economy, of which 
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the social welfare sector is an integral part, is in serious doubt. In many 
ways it is this loss of confidence which is at the heart of the crisis ... The 
legitimacy of the welfare state is in serious doubt" (Mishra 1984, pp. 
xiii-xiv. See also Beer 1982). 
Local government was among the earliest areas to be hit by the new 
financial restrictions. As early as 1975, Tony Crosland, then Secretary of 
State for the Environment, announced that cuts were needed in local 
government spending: "We have to come to terms with the harsh reality of 
the situation which we inherited. The party's over" (quoted in Crosland 
1983, p. 295). It was the start of a period (stretching into the mid 1980s) 
. characterised largely by attempts to increase central control over local 
government finance. There is substantial doubt about the extent to which 
this centralisation has been successful, since, as argued above, it has also 
encouraged an organisational culture at local level which reinforces 
attempts at evasion (see, e.g., Stoker 1988, Ch.7). Whatever the results in 
terms of spending and staffing levels, however, there can be no doubt that 
the end result has been an increased involvement of the departments of 
central government (in England, particularly the Department of the 
Environment) in the details of local government finance. Rhodes points to 
the "pre-eminence of the Treasury and the treatment of local expenditure 
148 
as a matter for national decision" (Rhodes 1986, p.239). 
Despite the attempts to increase central control, however, it is the 
difficulty central government has had in achieving these ends, even in the 
high period of centralisation as a strategy, which is most striking. This 
tends to support Rhodes' argument that there are overlapping networks of 
bargaining linking different levels of government, with each level 
dependent on the other to achieve its own ends, in ways which sometimes 
encourage inconsistency between different parts at each level. According 
to him, there is an inherent conflict between the assumption within the UK 
state system that the centre makes the final or authoritative decisions 
. and a practice which implies a high degree of interdependence and a 
complex process of interaction, organised through policy networks which 
are frequently dominated by professionals (Rhodes 1981, 1988. See also 
Laffin 1986). The dominant level of government in the British system -
particularly in England and Wales - is always likely to be the centre, since 
it is able substantially to influence the level.of resources allocated and 
available to local government as a whole, and, now increasingly, to 
particular councils. But, as the Conservative governments of the 1980s 
discovered, it is not easy to control spending by edict. 
The implications of Rhodes' model can be seen clearly in the lessons 
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he draws from the experience of the 1980s, when conflicts between 
central and local government were at their most marked. He argues that: 
1. Changes in the central~local government system were not the product of 
anyone process (such as economic decline) but of interaction between a 
number of processes. Among others, which he identifies as important, was 
the tension between the UK's economic decline and the institutionalisation 
of interests within policy networks, which made it difficult to translate 
economic priorities into changes within the spending arms of the welfare 
state; 
2. He stresses that the conflicts of the 1980s were not simply the product 
• of Conservative government policies, but of the longer term piecemeal 
accretion of responsibilities at local level, which encouraged a fragmented 
system at national level, alongside centralisation within policy networks; 
3. Relations between different levels of government became entangled 
with processes of economic management by central government, which 
came to dominate over the initial bases for·co~operation between them 
(Le. the delivery of particular services); 
4. The introduction of the new political agenda of Thatcherism also helped 
to Undermine the old arrangements, as proposals for privatisation 
challenged the assumptions of continued growth on which they were based 
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- as Rhodes puts it: "Party ideology has been the grit in the well oiled 
machinery of the policy networks"; 
5. Because the policy networks are represented within the departments of 
central government as well as outside it, the policies of the centre were 
often characterised by confusion and uncertainty - the centre failed to 
speak with one voice; 
6. Government actions helped to undermine the longer term insulation of 
local and national policy elites from each other. Local elites were under 
challenge and responded with an increased politicisation and readiness 
themselves to challenge the centre, instead of using the policy networks to 
• negotiate; 
7. The hierarchical 'command operating code' taken up by the central 
government in this period was at variance with the differentiated polity 
(or form of political life) with which it had to deal. "The command code," 
says Rhodes, "represents a failure to comprehend that British government 
is a multi-form maze of interdependence. To operate a code at variance 
with this reality is to build failure into the initial policy design". (This 
summary is based on Rhodes 1985, Section 4). 
Within policy networks it could be argued that there were identifiable 
centres, even if their interests were not always consistent with the 
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stated ambitions of the 'centre' as defined by Prime Minister or Cabinet. 
But some of the new areas of policy development taken up by the left 
councils in the early 1980s still less susceptible to control from the 
centre, precisely because they were not statutorily based, and, in effect, 
outside existing policy networks. This was particularly true of spending 
on economic development. Even in the 1970s, central government was 
concerned that spending in this area was taking directions which might not 
be in line with its priorities, and a committee was set up within the 
Department of the Environment to assess its importance, although the final 
report tended to minimise it (Burns 1980). 
One of the difficulties associated with the local government system 
in the U.K. - at least for those trying to control or direct it from above - is 
that its institutional and legal arrangements appear to require a delegation 
of specific powers from above, but in practice what local governments do 
helps to determine what is possible (and legal). A great deal of the day to 
day activity of councils and their employees exists in the cracks within 
the system, which allow action to be taken, unless it is specifically 
prOhibited. Local economic development activity has survived and 
developed since 1945 on the basis of a number of legislative silences 
rather than a series of clear powers. Some activity has drawn its 
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legitimacy from planning legislation (for example, finding alternative 
premises for non-conforming uses, taking the general planning interests of 
an area into account), whilst others has been a consequence of housing 
legislation, as land for development has become available. Councils have 
often had, or taken, responsibility for managing their land holdings with a 
view to economic development (for example with powers under the Local 
Authorities (Land) Act 1963). Since the late 1970s, powers relating 
specifically to inner city development have been extensively used, and the 
definition of the inner city has often been very widely defined. And, of 
course, until the late 1980s Section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972 
• was used extensively to justify expenditure defined (by the council) as 
being in the interests of the residents of their area, even if it did not bring 
additional resources4. 
5.3 From centralisation to fragmentation? 
Since the mid 1980s, the direction of change within local government 
has been less easy to characterise, but it has certainly moved beyond 
centralisation. It can perhaps best be summed up as a process of 
fragmentation. Government legislation has encouraged a proliferation of 
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agencies and organisations, breaking up the old multi-functional 
structures of local government. The earliest examples of change involved 
the privatisation of various direct labour services, particularly those 
activities involving manual work, ranging from refuse collection and waste 
disposal to cleaning and catering. The extent of this can be exaggerated (as 
Stoker 1988, p. 186, points out, drawing attention to the limited value of 
contracts actually awarded in 198617), but the direction of change is clear 
enough and has encouraged many local authorities themselves to set up 
independent or semi independent agencies to bid for contracts, thus 
keeping them 'in-house'. More recently there have been moves towards local 
. management of schools and some encouragement has been given towards 
the opting out of schools from local authority control. Again the 
significance of 'opting out' lies not so much in the number of schools which 
take up the 'option' - at first, in any case, likely to be small - but rather in 
the model it confirms. In this, schools will be nominally under the control 
of governors, with their own budgets, buying in (sometimes privatised) 
services from councils. In practice, power at school level is likely t.o lie 
mainly in the hands of the headteacher and, in larger schools, senior staff 
with increased emphasis placed on financial control. In social services, 
similar processes have been underway. Over time it is clear that most 
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residential provision - for the old and young - has been shifted from direct 
provision to provision in the private or voluntary sector and to care at 
home, whether in the form of foster care and adoption at one end of the age 
scale, or 'community care' at the other. There has been a significant growth 
. in privatised care and the voluntary sector, which also (e.g. in the case of 
the NSPCC) increasingly seems to be taking on statutury responsibility 
(see, e.g. Hadley and Hatch 1981, for a discussion of early moves in this 
direction, and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987). Similarly in housing, 
there was first a move to the sale of council houses, accompanied by a 
centrally imposed virtual freeze on new building, and now a growth of 
. voluntary sector,housing in the form of housing asociations, sometimes 
directly sponsored by local authorities with the involvenment of 
councillors and officers in senior positions (see Houlihan 1988). 
The new context for local policy-making at the end of the 19805 and 
into the 19905 is by no means clear. On the one hand, the constraints 
imposed by the centre seem tighter, partiCL~larly in financial terms, where 
the local scope for raising funds is more restricted than ever. Austerity 
has come to dominate ~udgetary discussions. On the 'other hand, there are 
signs that smaller units may be able to take new initiatives, within a 
tighter framework of financial control. At local level, this is reflected in 
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moves towards decentralisation, and institutional fragmentation, as well 
as renewed emphases on service provision, of individuals as customers, 
rather than clients. The moves are not only taking place as a result of 
pressure from above, but also on the initiative of councils themselves, as 
they have tried to adjust to the changed political realities of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Some of the leading (strategic) officers in local government 
have been keen to take up the notion of 'enabling' authority first suggested 
by Nicholas Ridley when Secretary of State at the Department of the 
Environment, and to reinterpret it to give them a more important role at 
the centre of a network of providers (see, e.g., Brooke 1989a and b). Indeed, 
. it is possible to view both the centrally imposed changes and those 
developed from below as responses to similar pressure, from different 
starting points and, possibly with different conclusions. In considering the 
particular case study of Sheffield, we shall be focusing directly on these 
issues with a view to investigating processes of interaction between 
centre and locality, as well as within the loc,ality. It will be possible to 
follow the development and expansion of a new policy area during a key 
transitional period of political change. 
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Notes. 
1. In Northern Ireland the responsibilities of elected local government are 
still more tightly circumscribed, with many key functions (including 
housing, education and social services) being the responsibility of 
appointed quangos or area boards. After 1973, overall local authority 
budgets were 100/0 of what they had been before the reforms of the early 
1970s. Tomlinson comments in this context that for local politicians 
(particularly the anti-unionists, for whom the local government reforms 
made election and control of councils more achievable), "it is a hollow 
. victory to be in command of a minimal budget and relatively 
inconsequential services, such as street cleaning, managing cemeteries 
and leisure centres" (Tomlinson 1980, p. 117). See also O'Dowd 1989, 
pp.129-133. 
2. A similar misreading appears in a number of publications produced by 
groups eager to encourage an expansion of responsibilities for local 
government in the 1980s. Although there may be some justification for 
I 
using inappropriate historical examples in the course of political polemic, 
such an exercise remains unconvincing whoever does it {see, e.g., Blunkett 
and Jackson, K. 1987 Chs 2 and 3, which provides one of the strongest and 
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most persuasive developments of the localist case, commenting that 
Labour's post war focus on national rather than local administration was a 
"tragic mistake". See also Blunkett and Green 1983). 
3. In the early 1990s (following from the Education Reform Act 1988) 
responsibility for education in the UK also began to shift from local 
authority to central government, with emphasis on the 'opting out' of some 
schools from local education authorities, the moving of polytechnics to 
independent status, and proposals to move further education away from 
council control. 
4. Only since the passing of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
. have councils had specific powers to undertake economic development, and 
the main reason for such power being given to them seems to be to restrict 
rather than encourage such activity, since it specifically limits the 
revenue which can be used for these purposes and introduces a series of 
new rules which make it much more difficult to set up local authority 
companies (particularly where those may generate financial returns). 
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Chapter 6. Political restructuring In the 1980s 
The previous chapter focused on the context provided for local 
politics by constraints and structures imposed from above. It was 
primarily concerned with issues usually discussed under the umbrella of 
central-local relations. This chapter goes further to consider the some of 
the ways in which the practice of local politics began to change during the 
1980s. In particular it looks, first, at ,the relationship between local 
politics and the wider political debates of the decade, before turning to 
consider the restructuring of local government and the local state as part 
of wider processes of restructuring within the U.K .. 
6.1 The importance of politics: Thatcherism and the growth of 
local socialism 
There is no doubt that in the early 1980s, local authorities became 
more ideologically differentiated across the political spectrum, 
particularly in urban areas. No longer were disputes solely, or mainly, 
about which party might be better at administering a set of agreed 
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services. The nature of the services themselves and their modes of 
delivery were genuine political issues. Because of their key role in the 
development of the Keynesian welfare state through the post-war period, 
once the old certainties of social democracy began to be called into 
question - as they were in the context of economic problems through the 
1970s - local authorities were increasingly forced to redefine their own 
positions as well (see Cochrane 1989a for a discussion of the political 
crisis of the1970s). Privatisation, value for money and council house sales 
were the main issues for the right, while for the left, local authorities 
became a battle ground for the defence and extension of collective 
provision. At the same time, some elements of the left sought to develop 
policies at local level which challenged the logic of 'Thatcherism' and 
began to show new alternatives for Labour. 
Although the growth of politicisation within local government was 
probably more noticeable - and certainly more noticed in the press and in 
academic literature - on the left, it was also significant on the right. 
There were identifiable Thatcherite urban citadels in Dudley (until 1986), 
Wandsworth, Westminster and (briefly) Bradford, which played major parts 
in developing aspects of 'new right' politics at local level (see Mather· 
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1989 for a discussion of what such a politics might mean). Over a longer 
period new initiatives in line with such thinking were developed in 
counties, such as Kent and East Sussex, particularly in social services (see 
Hadley and Hatch 1981, Young and Hadley 1990). In the late 1980s, there 
have been substantial changes within many Conservative controlled county 
and district councils in the South of England, with private sector models of 
organisation being brought in for many service areas (Smith 1989 suggests 
ways in which this might develop on the basis of his experience as Housing 
Director of one such district. See also Geeson and Haward 1990). Butcher 
et al identify three possible 'types' of post Thatcherism Conservative local 
authority: 
• the contract authority which is committed to the delivery of existing 
services through private or voluntary agencies the issuing of contracts to 
them. This type of authority is likely to seek to reduce costs by limiting 
services and will have little interest in notions of community: "the link 
between the voter and the councillor will be' confined to holding down 
expenditure and the level of the community charge"; 
• the enterprising authority which remains committed to notions of public 
service, but does not accept that this implies support for local state 
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provision, instead seeking to work with voluntary and private sector 
agencies. Such an authority retains an interest in developing new services, 
rather than merely being a 'passive' provider of services, in part in order to 
attract new residents who see a role for municipal spending in sustaining 
the 'quality of life'; 
- the business corporatist authority, which sees itself as serving the 
wider interest by developing closer relations with the business and 
commercial sectors. Such an authority might remain rooted in collectivism 
(and direct service provision) but its ambitions would be defined in terms 
of those with which it develops partnership arrangements (Butcher et al 
'1989, pp. 161-165). 
But, through most of the 1980s, with a Conservative government in 
power, the realities of electoral arithmetic have tended to mean that few 
Conservative councils have survived in urban areas, and even in the shires 
there was a dramatic rise in support for the Alliance parties in the mid 
1980s, which left many councils under no overall control. Many of those 
councils which have remained under Conservative control have continued to 
be dominated in practice by their chief officers rather than any party 
political pressures. The growth of three party politics in the 1980s, left 
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Labour marginalised and irrelevant in some areas, but much stronger in 
others - in its traditional and more recent heartlands, in the urban 
. 
authorities, inner London, the North of England, South Wales and Central 
Scotland (see Green, G. 1987, pp. 203-4). 
The left faced particular difficulties in coming to terms with the 
political crisis of the late 1970s. It was tied closely in popular 
consciousness to the postwar experience of the welfare state, the state 
built by Labour after 1945. The challenge represented by the rise of the 
'new right', the apparent failure of Keynesianism to deliver economic 
prosperity and the electoral success of 'Thatcherism' was not an easy one 
to deal with. As Stuart Ha" pointed out in a series of influential articles, 
in this context the 'new right' developed and was developing a genuine 
social base. Margaret Thatcher had, he said, 'won the battle for hearts and 
minds' (Hall 1983, p.9. See also Hall 1988, particularly Part 1 where these 
arguments are more fully deve"loped). Leys, too, charts the political 
success of Thatcherism in the early 19805 (Leys 1989, Ch 7. See also 
Gamble 1985, pp.136-153, and a critical response to Ha"'s analysis from 
Jessop et al 1988, which nevertheless acknowledged the power of 
Thatcherism. For more sympathetic accounts of Thatcher's project see 
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Johnson 1987, pp.155-159 and Green, 0.1987, Part 2). 
It was this realization which gradually pushed some in the Labour 
Party to reconsider previously unchallenged political assumptions. 
Although there was little hope of Labour's recapturing power at national 
level, the party continued to control many urban local authorities. The left 
at local level had to adjust to the reality of Conservative control at the 
centre and, licking its wounds, also had the task of rebuilding its bases of 
support after the electoral defeats of 1979 and 1983. From a political 
backwater through the 1950s and 1960s, local government became an 
important area of political development for Labour. It was one of the few 
. fields in which the left still had access to power and it was also the 
terrain on which many of the most vital battles over the welfare state 
took place in the 1980s. Even in the late 1980s it was still possible to 
argue that "the alliance around radicallabourism has changed the contours 
of local and national politics, it set the new left agenda of the 1980s" 
(Campbell 1987, p.1 0) 1. 
The left came to power in several councils at a time of crisis in urban 
government, particularly in the inner cities and other older industrial 
areas. The selective impact of Britain's economic crisis left the inner 
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cities with major concentrations of unemployment and devastated the 
country's industrial heartlands (see, e.g., Robson 1988, Ch.1 and Martin 
1988). Poverty, too, was increasingly concentrated in Labour controlled 
authorities. In most areas, housing stock left from the 1950s and 1960s 
was falling apart, in need of major repair and renovation (and sometimes 
demolition). In 1980/81 and then in 1985, major riots (or uprisings, see 
Gilroy 1987, pp 236-44) took place in many of Britain's cities. Somehow 
local authorities had to respond to these problems with the increasingly 
limited resources at their disposal. 
The development of left politics at local level was also a reflection 
. of changes taking place nationally within the Labour Party. The political 
turmoil experienced by the Labour Party at the end of the 1970s 
undermined some of its most basic assumptions. Attempts to construct 
compromises through state level bargaining between unions, employers and 
the state in the 'social contract' had failed. At the same time as a left 
Current was developing at local level, there were also major conflicts 
nationally - expressed, for example, in campaigns to increase internal 
democracy within the Party and to to elect Tony Benn as Deputy Leader, as 
well as in the dramatic departure of the 'Gang of Four' (Roy Jenkins, David 
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Owen, Bill Rogers and Shirley Williams) in 1981 (see Seyd 1987, Ch. 2 for 
a discussion of some of the roots of these conflicts, and Ch. 4 for an 
outline of some of the battles in which the Labour Party left was engaged 
in the the early 1980s). Many of the councillors and activists who came to 
be decribed as local socialists were as interested in contributing to and 
influencing national debates through their local initiatives as they were in 
developing them at local level. 
Not all Labour councils moved to the left in this period, although most 
were influenced by ideas generally associated with the left of the Labour 
Party. As well as Sheffield, in the early 1980s councils such as the 
. Greater London Council, Hackney, Islington, Lambeth, South Yorkshire, 
Stirling and Walsall among others had reputions for being 'socialist'2. But 
it is misleading to imagine that there was any single ideology which can be 
labelled 'local socialism' or 'municipal socialism'. There was no 
identifiable municipal socialist programme which was implemented up and 
down the country between 1981 and 1986. The differences of emphasis 
between the policies adopted by the different councils were often as 
striking as any ambitions which they shared. 
In developing local enterprise boards, for example, some (like the 
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West Midlands County Council) aimed to set up regional versions of 
Labour's National Enterprise Board, whilst others (such as West Yorkshire) 
wanted to create regionally based merchant banks; some (like Lancashire) 
were looking to the model of a regional development agency, while others 
(such as the Greater London Council) were concerned to use planning 
agreements to influence decisions made in the private sector (see 
Cochrane and Clarke 1989). In developing social policy initiatives, some 
were principally concerned to maintain spending and avoid cuts, while 
others stressed the need for new initiatives through decentralisation and 
the setting up of neighbourhood offices. Some emphasised the need to 
develop equal opportunities pOlicies within their organisations, whilst 
others suggested that this was self indulgent given the problems faced by 
those the councils were supposed to be serving. Some (like the GLC) 
started from the belief that it was necessary to build new sets of political 
alliances, moving beyond traditional labour concerns with the industrial 
working class, whilst others (such as Sheffield) tended to stress the need 
to return to this base, which it was argued leading Labour politicians 
frequently ignored (see Chapter 10 and Wainwright 1987, Chapter 3). 
In som.e cases the reputation and the labelling seem to have reflected 
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Conservative government hostility, rather than any explicit commitment to 
socialist initi~tives. South Yorkshire, for example, was given the title of 
'People's Republic' largely on the basis of its consistent resistance to 
increasing public transport fares, under Labour as well as Conservative 
governments. But in other policy areas it remained resolutely tradionalist 
- its members and officers showed little interest, for example, in 
developing new approaches to economic policy. A brief experiment in 
encouraging equity investment in local firms from the local authority 
pension fund through the County Regional Investment Scheme resulted in 
only one investment, although the idea was noticed outside the county and 
played some part in the development of proposals for municipal enterprise 
boards, taken up at the end of the 1970s (see, e.g., Minns 1980, pp98-99, 
Minns and Thornley 1977, Minns and Thornley 1978, p.68f. The county 
council remained committed to policies of economic development through 
advertising, property development and the provision of serviced premises. 
And its members and officers remained suspicious of more radical 
proposals (see Alcock et al 1981 and the 'official' post-abolition history of 
the council, which confirms this wider traditionalism, Clarke 1987). 
Although it is important to avoid exaggerating the trend towards 
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'local socialism' at the start of the 1980s, it is nevertheless possible to 
identify simil?lr policy developments across a range of councils at this 
time which deserve to be acknowledged (and this is reflected in a number 
of publications, including Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, Boddy and Fudge 
1984b, Cochrane 1986b, Gyford 1985, Lansley et a11989, Green, G. 1987, 
Wainwright 1987 as well as more ephemeral texts, such as Labour 
Co-ordinating Committee 1981, 1984 and 1988). Gyford effectively sums 
up the position: 
"The nature of this local socialism is best understood not in 
terms of a single coherent ideology but as a syndrome or a set of 
associated characteristics. These characteristics would include: a 
concern for issues hitherto absent from or marginal to conventional 
local government, such as local economic planning, monitoring the 
police, women's rights, and racial equality; a disdain for many of the 
traditional ways of conducting local authority business; a view of 
local government as an arena both fo'r combating the policies of a 
Conservative government and for displaying by example the potential 
of grass roots socialism; and, perhaps most fundamentally, a 
commitment to notions of mass politics based upon strategies of 
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decentralization and/or political mobilization at the local level" 
(Gyforc:l1985, p.18). 
Gyford goes on to acknowledge that not all local socialist councils 
were committed to all of these policy areas, and that some of them were 
taken up with enthusiasm by councils not normally considered particularly 
left-wing. 
Three main features united the local socialist councils. First, their 
leaders wanted to present an effective alternative to the policies of the 
Conservative government. They wanted to show in practice that there was 
an alternative which worked. Where the Thatcher government and the 'new 
right' stressed the role of the market, the left authorities stressed the 
value of state intervention - of collective rather than individual solutions. 
Secondly, they wanted to present an alternative to the experience of 
Labour in power in the 1970s. Many activists first developed their 
radicalism as part of the process of fighting cuts in service provision and 
financial support imposed by the Callaghari government in the late 1970s. 
They rejected the corporatist policies which had involved the striking of 
bargains between union leaders, big business and the state behind closed 
doors, and stressed the need for wider democratic involvement and the 
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POlitical mobilisation of ordinary people. Thirdly, they were committed to 
a path which valued local initiative in its own right, as an alternative 
model to centralisation and the market, offering new opportunities for 
democratic control. Although they had few illusions about local 
government as it existed, many of the activists (whom Gyford labelled the 
'new urban left') shared the ambitions of David Blunkett and Keith Jackson 
Who emphasise, "the need to build democracy; since democracy is more 
than the mere right to cast a vote at elections. Active politics of this kind 
has commonly only been available to privileged elites and powerful 
interests. Local politics is about its extension so that people can run their 
Own affair, adopting an increasingly broad perspective as confidence in 
democracy grows" (Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987 p.5). Wainwright 
distinguishes between two 'Labour Parties', one of which has a "vision of 
socialism based on power built up from below" (Wainwright 1987 p 266), 
but the other of which (represented by the Parliamentary leadership) is 
still more pragmatic and committed to managing change from above. Her 
case studies of varying local experiences ( Wainwright 1987, Ch. 3) 
confirm the strength of the first vision among the local socialists, 
although they also suggest that there may be rather more than two 'parties' 
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within the Labour Party at local level. 
Although each council only picked up some of the elements of the 
local socialist package, its main elements can be listed very simply (if not 
exhaustively) under three main headings, building on the summary provided 
by Gyford: 
a) The development of a new economic policy 
Traditionally councils have taken little or no direct responsibility for 
their local economies. The local socialist councils deliberately took on 
such responsibilities, partly as a counter to 'new right' arguments against 
state involvement in the economy. They wanted to prove that such 
. intervention could create jobs in a way that 'laissez faire' policies did not. 
Ideed, the objective was to show that the policies of central government 
actually increased unemployment, whilst appropriately targeted public 
sector intervention could reduce it. 
But the left's local economic strategies were also intended to offer 
an alternative to traditional Labour policies~ which had usually been 
centralist and concerned with planning from above, with little concern 
either about the local impacts of national decisions or about the position 
of workers in state supported enterprises. The new strategies were 
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intended to create jobs, but also to encourage new - more democratic -
forms of work, the development of socially useful products, and the 
increased employment of systematically disadvantaged groups, such as 
women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, gay men and lesbians. Central 
elements of the economic policies were to be led by social, rather than 
narrowly defined economic priorities (see Blazyca 1983, particularly Ch. 5 
for an early discussion of the left initiatives and the ideas ~ehind them. 
See also Boddy 1984, Cochrane 1986a) (These initiatives are discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter). 
b) The development of a new social policy 
The left councils were concerned to defend their parts of the welfare 
state from centrally imposed cuts in spending. Indeed, it was the pressures 
for these cuts which first encouraged the growth of activisfgroups at 
local level and led some councils into conflict with central government 
(Gyf,ord 1985, pp28-33). But they were also aware that the normal 
operation of the welfare state by local authorities did not make it very 
easy to defend. So they wanted to open it up - to democratise and ~ 
decentralise service provision (see, e.g. Beuret and Stoker 1985, Hambleton 
and Hoggett 1984, Hoggett 1987b, Hoggett and Hambleton 1987, Seabrook 
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1984}. Undermining the power of the professionals by making them more 
accessible and accountable to those they were supposed to serve was an 
important element of this. And alongside it went an understanding that the 
authority itself was a major employer, capable of implementing reforms 
both for their own sake and as an example to others. This was particularly 
important in the development of equal opportunity, anti-sexist and 
anti-racist policies within some authorities. 
c} The mobilisation of local communities 
It was argued that service delivery within the British welfare state 
had typically been characterised by a top down paternalism, frequently 
. coupled with significant elements of social control. And the provision of 
services by local government had been no exception to this general rule. 
Services had been provided to the individual, household or client group, 
often on the assumption of 'good behaviour' as defined by a set of 
professionals. In the 1980s, the municipal socialists tried to challenge 
this. They attempted to encourage active involvement from the 
communities they 'served', both as a means of strengthening resistance to 
the policies of central government and as a symbol of socialist 
development. For them, socialism was about this involvement as much as -
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or even more than - the provision of services and without it they felt that 
existing services could probably not be defended, and certainly not 
extended. David Blunkett argued that 'to mobilise the community in defence 
of itself and positively in favour of a new way forward, sustained 
campaigning is required' (Blunkett 1981 b, p.33)3. 
The development of initiatives at local level by particular councils 
and activists cannot be divorced from these broader political debates. They 
provide an important part of the context within which pressures for change 
developed and new initiatives became possible. But it is not possible 
simply to predict which councils would be influenced by notions of local 
socialism, nor to describe its particular features in each place on the 
basis of these wider pOlitical debates. Sheffield's version of 'local 
socialism' was unique, as well as being part of a wider political movement. 
6.2 From Fordist to post-Fordist local government?4 
It is increaSingly clear that approaching the analysis of change within 
the local government system as if it were independent of wider social and 
economic shifts is fundamentally misleading. At the very least, changing 
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economic and social structures may restrict or open up opportunities. And 
they may also be providing the foundations for more extensive 
adjustments; Setting change in the wider context of post-war 
restructuring is a necessary step in the identification of more significant 
changes in the operation of urban politics. 
It is widely acknowled that the position of local government within 
the U.K. state system changed significantly over the 1980s but the nature 
and direction of change was less clear. Similar points could be made about 
attempts to analyse the nature of wider changes in economy, society and 
politics over the same period. One set of arguments has clustered around 
moves towards fragmentation and flexibility in the labour process, away 
from models based on the mass production and consumption of relatively 
standardised products and away from Keynesian welfare states. Some of 
these arguments have been set within theoretical frameworks which 
suggest a move from modernism to post-modernism (see, for example, Lash 
and Urry 1987), whilst others have stressed the growing importance of 
'flexible specialisation' yet explicitly rejected the use of wider systemic 
labels (see, for example, Hirst 1989a). Approaches which use the terms 
Fordism and post-Fordism (or neo-Fordism) as the axes around which to 
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construct their arguments seem to be the most developed of the positions 
with respect.to UK local government5. 
Hoggett and Stoker, in particular, have used these theories to analyse 
. the changing structures of local government. Hoggett was one of the first 
to pull the discussion of local government into debates about state 
restructuring and the crisis of Fordism. His work has been taken up and 
used by others in developing their arguments about notions of local 
government in the post Fordist era (for example, it is acknowledged as a 
crucial base by Geddes 1988 and, rather more cautiously, by Stoker 1989). 
Hoggett's contribution is significant, therefore, not only in its own right, 
but as a crucial marker on which others have been able to build and 
generalise. 
Hoggett's arguments draw largely on what Elam (1990) describes as a 
neo-Schumpeterian approach the debates about Fordism and post-Fordism. 
This explains the history of capitalism as a series of technological 
. . 
revolutions, following a pattern of long waves of economic development 
associated with a succession of technological or techno-economic 
paradigms in which the driving force of wider social and economic change 
is a rooted in technological change. Post-Fordism is associated with the 
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rise of a new paradigm organised around information technology. Within 
this model, F:0rdism was largely characterised by assembly line mass 
production, while post-Fordism means the rise of flexible manufacturing 
and networking between agencies, with the help of information technology. 
The new 'technological style' based around the extensive introduction of 
information technology is said to encourage (possibly require) the spread 
of more decentralised production methods, and more participative working 
practices (Hoggett 1987a, p 221). 
Hoggett's argument proceeds by a process of analogy from a broad 
statement of what has happened and can be (more or less) noted in the 
production sphere to what has happened or is happening in the welfare 
state and local government within that. The analogy is based on the notion 
that 'professionals' operate as 'people processors' in the 'assembly line' 
through which the Keynesian welfare state produces and delivers its 
services. Hoggett argues that. like production in the private sector, 
production in the Keynesian welfare state has been inflexibly geared 
towards the output of a few standardised products with economies of 
scale constantly emphasised. He suggests that the system resembled 
Fordism without Ford - "a kind of mongrel paradigm based on an uneasy 
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marriage between a pre-Fordist craft (professional) productive system and 
a Taylorised.(rational-bureaucratic) system" (Hoggett 1987a, p.223). 
Local government, able to resist the logic of the previous 
technological revolution, is, according to this argument, ripe for the shifts 
promised by the present one. Within this model the old sites for resistance 
become the seedbeds in which the new technological revolution will 
flourish, and Hoggett predicts the development of "new organisational and 
managerial forms strikingly reminiscent of the newer 'hi-tech' companies 
of the M4 corridor: leaner and flatter managerial structures, decentralised 
'cost and innovation centres' (Le. district or neighbourhood offices with 
their own devolved budgets, powers over recruitment, performance 
indicators etc.), enlarged and more generic roles, team working, flexibility 
and informality, responsive back line support to the front line staff and so 
on" (Hoggett 1987, p.22S). 
There are a number of problems with this version of the post-Fordist 
model, particularly as it applies to local government and the local state. 
One is simply the implied determinism: it appears that these changes are 
bound to take place, although local governments are offered some choice in 
the ways in which they are taken up. As Elam notes, within this model, "the 
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history of capitalism remains one where 'new' techno-economic forces 
always do th.e initial acting and 'old' socio-institutional frameworks the 
eventual reacting" (Elam 1990, p.12). This emphasis is carried over by 
Hoggett into his discussion of local government in the UK, which means 
that political processes tend to be relegated to secondary status. This 
makes it difficult to explain why particular technological opportunities 
are taken up at one time rather than another, and also tends to understate 
the extent to which the direction of change remains contested. 
The second major weakness of Hoggett's argument is the way in which 
it draws an analogy between the spheres of production and the local 
welfare state. Superficially this may be quite attractive, but it does not 
hold up very well under sustained scrutiny. Hoggett's acknowledgement of a 
'mongrel paradigm' itself undermines it. A key point about 'street level 
bureaucrats' - to borrow Lipsky's eloquent phrase (Lipsky 1979) - such as 
teachers and social workers is precisly that they are expected to make 
decisions based on individual discretion wh'ere bureaucratic rules do not 
apply very well. They are trapped between their 'clients' and their 
'employers', with only their 'professionalism' to pull them through. So, the 
people processors become elusive at local level. Even in housing offices it 
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is the discretion and its arbitrary use rather than rational-bureaucratic 
decision-making which is perceived to create the problems. The detailed 
differences and discretion make it difficult to process people en masse. 
Instead of pointing up a similarity, in effect the arguments are most 
successful indicating a sharp set of differences. Yet clearly the welfare 
state professionals are products of Fordism in any definition of the term, 
since without the (Fordist) welfare state they could not exist. 
Not all of these criticisms of Hoggett's approach can be applied to all 
those using the terms Fordism and post-Fordism. There are many Fordisms 
and, consequently, also many post-Fordisms. Lipietz, for example, would be 
highly critical of a generalising theory of this type and explicitly 
distances himself from long wave and systemic analysis commenting that 
-the emergence of a new regime of accumulation is not a pre-ordained part 
of capitalism's destiny, even though it may correspond to certain 
identifiable 'tendencies'" (Lipietz 1987, p.1S). There is a fundamental 
difference of emphasis between those who focus largely on the production 
process (as Hoggett does) and those who are more concerned to focus on 
the interaction between regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation 
(such as Lipietz and others within the regulation school)S. Even while each 
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is apparently discussing the same phenomena, and using what looks like 
the same ter.minology, they have quite different theoretical starting 
points. Lipietz stresses that "regimes of accumulation and modes of 
regulation are chance discoveries made in the course of human struggles 
and if they are for a while successful, it is only because they are able to 
ensure a certain regularity and a certain permanence in social 
reproduction" (Lipietz 1987, p.15). Lipietz is by no means clear that a neo-
(or post-) Fordism is currently being constructed. Certainly it is an open 
question rather than a necessary process. Nor is he convinced of the form 
which will be taken by any resolutio·n to the crisis of Fordism. One option 
might even be a more centralised and authoritarian form of Taylorism 
(Amin 1989, p.14). 
Stoker sets out to explore recent changes in UK local government 
within the broad framework of the 'regulation theories' associated with 
Lipietz and Aglietta among others. His arguments are qualified, pointing to 
the possibility of counter tendencies developing, and stressing that he 
"does not see the reform programme as rising automatically from the 
processes of social and economic change. Rather .. .it is part of the Thatcher 
Government's response to these processes. The aim is to create a local 
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government compatible with the flexible economic structures, two-tier 
welfare system and enterprise culture which in the Thatcher vision 
constitute the key to a successful future" (Stoker 1989, p.159). 
Although he refers to Hoggett and Geddes, the conclusions he draws 
from them are modest. He returns to many of the familiar examples of 
change, in particular marketisation, contracting out, and a new emphasis 
on consumers. But he approaches them from a rather different angle, 
stressing the extent to which they may parallel shifts in the private 
sector, going so far as to suggest that with information technology it is 
not too difficult to see local government as a sort of public sector 
Benetton, through which information may pass out to a set of service 
providing contractors (p.166). His stress is on the development of a dual 
welfare system within which the weak (and the poor) will have to rely on 
increasingly minimal local welfare while the better off may gain access to 
private (or better public) welfare, by topping up with their own resources. 
He is less concerned than others to identify' possible strategies of 
resistance (although he does refer to the possible development of a wider 
public service orientation and community government, which, of course, he 
discusses more fully elsewhere). His post-Fordism is a rather more bleak 
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(and overall more convincing) vision than that of Hoggett. 
But some of the weaknesses of the model utilised by Hoggett are also 
apparent in Stoker's arguments. Most important, the nature of Fordist local 
government remains elusive. It is in this context that Hoggett's arguments 
are introduced, and even as qualified by Stoker, they do not quite fit. The 
allegedly Fordist model stressing functionalism, uniformity and hierarchy 
listed by Stoker (1989, p.151 and borrowed from Stewart) may be an 
accurate enough reflection of the formal structures of U.K. local 
government, building as they do on a legislative framework bequeathed 
from the nineteenth century or expressed in the ideal types of Weber, but 
they bear little relationship to what actually happened in the UK after 
1945. Elsewhere Stewart has acknowleged both the lack of uniformity and 
the importance of internal bargaining within authorities, noting the 
importance of competing professional ideologies (Stewart 1983, p.102) 
and, of course many of the detailed decisions of those allocating resources 
in housing departments, social services departments and 'delivering 
services' in schools have involved significant variation. Stoker, too, in 
another context himself seems to argue for a rather more complicated 
picture of organizational politics within local authorities (Stoker and 
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Wilson 1986). 
Nor can one be sure of the direction of change predicted in the UK. One 
consequence of the new arrangements may be an increase in formal 
hierarchy for some groups leaving still less scope for practical initiative 
at the level of delivery (for example because of the imposition of tighter 
financial control systems, see, e.g. Flynn 1987). The spread of compulsory 
competitive tendering seems to have had the effect of imposing financial 
discipline on key agencies within the council, offering senior managers a 
way to increase labour discipline. As Dunleavy points out, it offers a way 
for the chief officers to undermine the position of a troublesome set of -
. blue collar - subordinates (Dunleavy 1986, p.21). Evidence from the first 
rounds of compulsory competitive tendering suggests that between 61% (in 
building cleaning) and 97% (in catering for education and welfare) of 
contracts have been awarded to councils' own direct service organisations, 
with a higher proportion of higher value contracts also being awarded to 
those organisations (LACSAB 1990). 
Nor is it clear that privatisation of this type - based on the issuing of 
contracts - necessarily encourages flexibility, even when contracts are 
awarded to private suppliers. Stewart argues that government by contract 
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may reduce the scope for flexibility by fixing arrangements for relatively 
long periods and making renegotiation difficult (Stewart 1989). Close sets 
of relationships between favoured suppliers and particular local 
governments may also be encouraged. Some of the dangers here have been 
highlighted in the experience of 'management buyouts' from new town 
development corporations (which are some way further down the line than 
most councils). The National Audit Office has expressed concerns about the 
ways in which a number of new town corporations privatised many of their 
professional activities, while, in effect, continuing to issue contracts to 
their previous employees (Comptroller and Auditor General 1990). 
It is also unclear who will have the effective power in the new 
arrangements in the issuing of contracts. Here the comparison with 
Benetton and Marks and Spencer may be helpful since such purchasers 
clearly have power over suppliers dependent on them for large orders. It is 
not so clear that local councils are in a similar position. The experience of 
the GLC's economic policies, on which Murray draws to argue for the 
opportunities offered by flexible specialisation, suggest that may be 
possible to intervene effectively in those areas where the authority is 
dominant, but they also show how difficult it is be effective in sectors 
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dominated by other agencies (Murray 1987). 
Another set of questions arises from considering the rather equivocal 
position of the voluntary sector. In some cases, such as the larger housing 
associations, voluntary organisations become equal partners in 
negotiations with councils, and - more important - central agencies 
(Houlihan 1988, pp. 48-54). In others - at community level - the 
relationship may involve the construction of new forms of control, since 
voluntary organisations are highly dependent on their financial backers and 
may find themselves under far more extensive forms of inspection (see, 
Hadley and Hatch 1981, pp157-159). As dependent - almost client -
. organisations they are likely to exercise a high degree of self censorShip, 
instead of surviving as independent and autonomous organisations working 
alongside local governments. 
One of the central problems with arguments which start from the 
identification of a wider move from Fordism to post-Fordism, is that it is 
possible to acknowledge the existence many of the changes, without yet 
being convinced that they have taken place as part of that shift. There is a 
danger of constructing a model of change to justify the development of a 
favoured strategy and give it the gloss of inevitability. The cost of 
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acknowledging that a wider structural shift is taking place and locating 
local government within it, is that the whole process becomes a 
'necessary' one, however that 'necessity' is qualified, There is a danger 
that every piece of evidence for fragmentation and every claim for 
flexibility is accepted at face value because it fits into the model. At its 
worst, the approach seems to reduce marxism to a series of binary 
oppositions which can be listed and catalogued without being questioned, 
and into which reality then has to fit. Its theoretical basis relies on 
identifying the replacement of Fordist systems by their opposites: so, 
instead of mass production, flexible specialisation; instead of 
. centralisation, decentralisation; instead of hierarchy, participation; 
instead of unity, fragmentation; and so on (see, e.g. Murray, R. 1989, Harvey 
1989, Ch 9, Rustin 1989, pp.56-57, Stoker 1990). But this does not amount 
to a convincing theory of social change. 
Regulation theory is such a protean beast, however, that in some 
versions at least these criticisms may find little purchase. Jessop 
identifies seven regulationist 'schools' which he manages to boil down to 
four types of approach (Jessop 1990a, pp. 155-162). Some argue that the 
strength of regulation theory is precisely that it is open ended - Elam, for 
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example, emphasises that it encourages an "enhanced interest in the 
peculiarities of historical/cultural contexts and greater attention to 
'ethnographic detail'" (Elam 1990, p. 33) and stresses the point that for its 
French originators, even if Fordism can be identified, the shape of its 
likely replacement remains open. Jessop et al argue that the UK was never 
fully Fordist and is, therefore, unlikely to become fully post-Fordist 
(Jessop et al1989, p.99). They identify features which look more like pre 
and post-Fordism in the post-war period, and point to some elements of 
Fordism likely to survive and even expand into the 1990s. Unlike Stoker, 
they argue that Thatcher obstructed, rather than assisting with, the UK's 
. shift to post-Fordism (p.83). As the qualifications accumulate the problem 
then becomes identifying what the theory has to offer that is 
fundamentally distinctive. 
If the model is transmuted - as Stoker has now suggested it should be 
(e.g. Stoker 1990, p. 249) - to an ideal type, then it becomes little more 
than the juxtaposition of two typologies with little to say about the 
dynamics of change. It begins to look as if the theorists want to have it 
both ways: on the one hand the theoretical approach implies a structural 
shift, whose key features can be identified from first principles; but as 
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soon as its proponents are accused of determinism, or it is suggested that 
some of the changes it appears to predict are not taking place, then it 
becomes increasingly slippery. As a result, it is difficult not to agree with 
Sayer when he suggests that, "the trouble with concepts like fordism, 
postfordism and flexible specialisation is that they are overly flexible and 
insufficiently specialized" (Sayer 1989, p.666). 
6.3 From welfare state to enterprise state: towards a local 
corporatism 
It remains important to locate local government within the wider 
post-war settlement - a vital part of the Keynesian welfare state - as the 
theorists of post-Fordism do, because it confirms that it is not a free 
floating institution but part of the wider UK pOlity, set within the 
framework of a changing political economy. But the theoretical model they 
adopt makes it difficult to acknowledge the -significance of the welfare 
state and the local state as part of a political settlement rather than one 
which simply flows from economic arrangements. Once the independent 
weight of politics is acknowledged, the form and implications of the break 
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up of the post-war settlement have to be looked at rather differently. 
Viewed from this perspective, the settlement itself always looked 
rather less stable than anything labelled 'Fordism' might be expected to be 
- in the U.K., "it was a political contract built on an unsustainable 
economic basis, requiring the pursuit of impossible economic objectives" 
(Schwarz, 1987 p. 115). One of its key elements was the expansion of local 
government as part of the welfare state. It is in this context that it 
became common to refer to local - or urban - politics as the politics of 
social or collective consumption (Dunleavy 1980, Saunders 1984). Some of 
the ways in which local government was integrated uneasily into the 
'welfare state through a series of overlapping policy networks are explored 
by Rhodes (1988), and the restructuring of local government in the 1980s 
can plausibly be explained as part of the wider break up of that state. 
Some have argued that democratically elected local government 
reasonably open to pluralist pressures was a key element in the post war 
welfare state, and there is some evidence for this (Duncan and Goodwin 
1982, p. 93, Saunders 1984). Dearlove argues that the reorganisation of the 
early 1970s took place to undermine working class and democratic access 
while improving it for business interests (Dearlove 1979, pp 104-5). But it 
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is not necessary to identify a 'golden' past which has been replaced by a 
less democratic present: to construct the past mainly in order to provide a 
contrast for the present. That simply reverses the implications of the 
post-Fordist model, which presents a negative image of the past and points 
to the possibilities of a more golden future. 
Even sympathetic accounts confirm that post-war municipal 
labourism was associated with political and professional elitism as much 
as democratic involvement or pluralist openness (see, e.g., Goss 1988, Ch. 
2, Gyford 1985, pp.6-1 0). And the extent of links between some council 
officers and members and sections of the business community, particularly 
. those concerned with the construction industry and office development, is 
also well recorded (whether in the form of corruption associated with 
scandals like that around the Poulson case or in more subtle ways, see, 
e.g., Marriott 1967, particularly Chs 9 and 14, Dunleavy 1981). Dearlove 
successfully explores the concerns about working class involvement buried 
the coded language used in discussions of .councillor and officer calibre in 
a series of official publications around the turn of the 1970s. But he is not 
so successful in providing positive evidence of the impact of working class 
politics at local level before 1974. It is unclear quite why the writers on 
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calibre were so worried (Dearlove 1979). The political differentiation of 
the 1970s and 1980s suggests that the reorganisation of local government 
made matters worse rather than better. 
Despite lingering doubts about their interpretation of the past, 
however, the arguments of Dearlove and Saunders are more helpful in 
suggesting ways of analysing the present and suggesting possibilities for 
the future. One does not have to be convinced by the dual state model to 
acknowledge the increased significance of 'corporatist' modes of mediation 
at local level, particularly in the extent of representation of business 
interests, but possibly also in a decline of representation for traditional 
. welfare state professionals (Saunders 1984, p.35). And, in retrospect, 
Dearlove seems remarkably prescient in identifying a concern about the 
lack of a formal relationship between "economic power, social status and 
the political control of local government," and the extent to which 
political power was "almost totally divorced from economic power" 
(Dearlove 1979, pp.104-105). 
It is not difficult to see the period since the late 1970s as one in 
which the links between business and government have begun to be forged 
rather more effectively than in the past, as part of the process of moving 
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towards an 'enterprise state'. The language of welfare has been replaced by 
a language of growth, regeneration and public/private partnership, 
particularly in urban areas. At the same time the organisation of local 
welfare provision is also being extensively restructured to reflect new 
priorities. The direction of change is clear enough: if the post-war 
settlement was one which sought to incorporate the working class and its 
organisations, that of the 1980s, arising from the crisis of social 
democracy which characterised the 1970s, is one which starts from the 
needs of business and its organisations. At local level it implies the 
arrival (or possibly the return) of business as an active participant in the 
. political process. 
For most of the period since 1945 business people in the UK have been 
markedly reluctant to become involved with local government. Chambers of 
Commerce have been notoriously weak compared to their counterparts in 
continental Europe (where they have public law status), and have generally 
had little to say about most local government matters, except that 
planning rules were too tight, rates too high and that some sponsorship of 
overseas promotional trips might be helpful (see, e.g., Stewart, M. 1984). 
The increased involvement of business in the processes of local 
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government has been carefully constructed over the past decade, with help 
from central government, elected local governments and initiatives from 
the private sector. An early and rather modest expression of this can be 
seen in the requirement of local authorities to consult local businesses 
over rate levels and urban aid applications in the early 1980s, but the 
process has moved on apace since then (Grant 1987, p. 163). 
Central government has increasingly encouraged business leaders to 
take positions within more 'civic' arenas. It has done so in a number of 
ways. In some cases, it has simply set up local organisations whose 
structures involve such 'leaders'. Urban development corporations have 
. principally drawn on those concerned with property development as board 
members (particularly in the case of London Docklands), although 
representatives of other sectors have also been appointed. More recently 
the creation of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and Local 
Enterprise Companies (in Scotland), whose operation is largely to be 
delegated to business agencies, has taken .the process further. The running 
of state funded training programmes is already the main source of income 
for many Chambers of Commerce. According to one report, "never before 
has government been willing to hand to employers the executive authority, 
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executive responsibility, and most importantly, the resources for public 
programmes. And never before have employers responded so rapidly and 
with such enthusiasm to the vision and the opportunity" (Bennett and 
Business in the Community 1990, p. 8). 
But the process is not restricted to these specialist agencies. In 
education, business is now expected to make a far more extensive 
contribution to the development of syllabuses and provision within schools 
and further education. In higher education the privatisation of Polytechnics 
has brought higher salaries to senior management, and increased 
importance for business representation on boards of governors. There has 
. been a marked blurring of the distinction between the public and the 
private, in terms of policy responsibility as much as service provision. 
This is, perhaps, clearest in the planning field, where there has been an 
endorsement of private sector led development planning, also helping to 
shape patterns of housing provision. Large scale proposals prepared by 
development consortia tend to be called in by the Secretary of State, thus 
avoiding detailed local scrutiny (see, e.g., the discussion of proposals for 
the development of 1500 acres in Swindon, Bassett et al 1990, pp. 54-55). 
The operation of the London Docklands Development Corporation seems to 
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lead in similar directions (see, e.g., the discussion of leverage planning in 
Brindley et a11989, Ch. 6) and in more traditional new towns, such as 
. 
Milton Keynes, development consortia also have significant influence, 
preparing plans for residential areas, within broad guidelines. The 
Significance of such developments has been recognised wihin the planning 
profession, to the extent that some have argued for the new power 
relations to be given formal recognition. Lock, for example, suggests that 
effective planning in the South East will only be possible if regional 
planning agencies can be set up linking state, developers and other 
business interests (Lock 1989). 
As well as the undoubtedly deliberate process of restructuring from 
above, initiatives from the private sector have also been endorsed by the 
centre. The Thatcher government was able to claim the expansion of 
enterprise agencies in the 1980s as a measure of the dynamism of the 
private sector and its commitment to the regeneration of of Britain's urban 
economies. Business in the Community (Bi9) has acted as a major focus for 
business involvement in the development of inner city policies and in 
wider involvement across a range of 'community' programmes (see, e.g., 
Fogarty and Christie 1990), and a more 'neutral' arena through which 
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collaboration between business and local government could be developed 
without a hig.h level of political controversy. Jacobs notes the way in 
which BiC has tried to create new forms of business leadership in the 
process of urban economic regeneration, for example, through the 
formation of Business leadership Teams (Bl Ts), involving senior local 
businessmen alongside representatives from local government, the trade 
unions, education and the voluntary sector (Jacobs 1990). Business in the 
Cities (a joint initiative organised by the CBI and BiC) has pointed to the 
need for business to take on a leadership role in urban areas, with BlTs and 
TECs interlocking to develop common strategies. It argues for business to 
develop a vision starting at community level, based around "co-ordination 
and partnership" with other local agencies: "The vision must be optimistic, 
yet practically anchored on the past legacy and a practical future ... And, to 
retain community confidence, it must be achievable (Bennett and Business 
in the Community 1990, p. 12). 
Here, too, new structures, new political forms, possibly even new 
state forms, are identified. The report argues that, "the division of 
responsibilities among stake-holders· ... requires a business plan. A city 
often needs a partnership to function as 'Board of Directors' to co-ordinate 
198 
its 'staff', 'line' and area activities, just as a business does. The local 
council cannot bear this responsibility alone" (Bennett and Business in the 
Community 1990, pp. 12-13). The nature of 'partnership' implies the need 
to set up an identifiable "executive power and agency" (p.23) separate from 
elected local governments. The language of business - the jargon of the 
new management - is used as a focus of policy development. Stress is 
placed on the need to develop 'mission' statements, and business plans, 
based on SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats/competition). The new teams are advised to aim for flagship 
projects, rather than integrated programmes like those which elected local 
government is expected to develop. They are exhorted to act like 
businesses (Bennett and Business in the Community 1990, pp. 26-29). 
It is, perhaps, easy to dismiss these claims as exaggerated and, 
certainly, the hopes expressed in this document are just that. It remains 
unclear the extent to which active business involvement can be expected 
even in key areas. Many councils would still confirm the difficulties they 
have in involving business leaders in partnerships and joint ventures. And 
it is misleading to imagine that 'business' is a unified pOlitical force. 
Reports such as these and other publications of BiC are as much about 
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constructing an atmosphere of legitimacy for business involvement (and 
consciousness of the demands of business) at local level as they are about 
actual involvement. But this does not mean that these arguments should 
simply be dismissed. They may be important in other ways, changing 
attitudes as much as structures. Moore and Richardson conclude 
convincingly that in the medium term the move towards partnership is 
more important for the way in which it encourages "changes in culture, 
ideas and the balance of political power between public and private 
sectors and between central and local government" than it is in achieving 
any economic benefits (Moore and Richardson 1989, p. 154). 
Elected local government has not been pushed completely to one side 
by new organisations. On the contrary, most of the business initiatives 
have themselves explicitly sought to involve local councils, whether as a 
token of representation for the 'local community' or because it is, in 
effect, council officers who have played an initiating role. Even the Audit 
Commission has stressed the need to encourage active cooperation 
between local government and business in the process of economic 
development (Audit Commission 1989). There has been a substantial 
growth in partnership models rather than ones which imply the possibility 
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of purely private sector initiative. Local authorities have themselves 
played a major part in helping to create the hybrid organisations which 
draw business into key areas of local decision-making, offering finance, 
staff and other support (see, e.g., Moore and Richardson 1989). 
Links to the European Community, too, have helped to encourage the 
growth of hybrid organisations. The European Commission has stressed the 
need for co-operation between different levels of government and business 
at regional level. It now allocates its main structural funds (apart from 
those related to agriculture) through Integrated Development Operations 
(lOOPs) which are regionally based (recent schemes in the UK were based 
in Strathclyde and Yorkshire and Humberside) and made up of 
representatives of central government departments, local governments and 
business. lOOPs not only effectively produce regional (and sub regional) 
plans, but are able to call on state resources for infrastructure and the 
provision of training in ways which suggest they can actively influence 
development, by encouraging co-ordinated operations within broad 
programmes (Lowe 1988, p.518, Preston and Hogg 1990). 
The changes identified so far are in areas which have been marginal to 
local authority activity since 1945, and their increased salience in recent 
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years suggests new bases for urban politics. But the importance of 
business in policy-making at local level goes beyond direct involvement, 
which is strongest in the fields most directly relevant to business 
interests (such as economic development, education and training). It has 
substantially influenced the more traditional responsibilities of the local 
welfare state, too, confirming the move away from the local state as 
provider of collective consumption, to local state as defender of 
enterprise. Some traditional welfare concerns (for example inner city 
policy) have simply been reinterpreted as problems of economic growth, so 
that urban regeneration has been defined as business confidence and new 
construction. The business model has also (as in the late 1960s) been taken 
as appropriate for the organisation of other forms of local provision. 
The importance of popular management texts has been widely noted 
(e.g. Stoker 1989 p.147 and Lowndes 1990). Although it may be dangerous 
to exaggerate the practical significance of the new management rhetoric, 
many key professionals seek legitimacy not from the electoral process, but 
from their ability to fit in with the latest management language, 
particularly reflected in the shift of usage (admittedly still tentative) 
from 'client' to 'consumer', as well as a new interest in marketing. Finance 
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professionals have been eager to take up the message of the Audit 
Commission.with its stress on the 'competitive council' and a greater role 
for them (see, e.g., Clarke and Cochrane 1989), and some housing 
professionals have been keen to take up possibilities of running their 
agencies on business lines (see, e.g., Smith 1989, who also refers to the 
literature of the new management). 
While business has become more directly involved as part of the U.K. 
local government system and has influenced management practices within 
it, restructuring has also taken place at lower levels of the hierarchy of 
the local welfare state. In particular there have been significant moves 
towards more decentralised delivery systems, and towards the 
encouragement of more direct involvement and participation by groups 
which in the past have largely been excluded from political influence. In a 
sense these changes may be seen as the other side of the coin of greater 
business involvement at local level. These initiatives have usually been 
analysed in terms of their stated aims of increasing democratic 
involvement in service delivery, and increasing the efficiency of service 
delivery (see, for example, Hoggett and Hambleton 1987). 
But if they are considered as part of a wider process of political 
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restructuring, then their role may be rather more equivocal. They offer 
ways of integrating and better managing the troublesome classes left in 
the residual welfare state noted by Stoker, as well as the staff who 
manage them. It is accepted that these groups need to be given 
representation within the system, but their position within the hierarchy 
is clear. The key decisions about resources are taken elsewhere, by the 
strategists, the budget setters and the representatives of other interests. 
In a two-tier system, there may also be a two-tier corporatism. Many of 
the features of decentralisation policies within local government are 
familiar from earlier attempts at 'community development', encouraging 
incorporation rather than autonomous action (which were so heavily 
criticised by Cockburn 1977). The fragmentation of the local welfare state 
helps to confirm these shifts, moving decision-making into increasingly 
enclosed arenas, such as the joint committees bequeathed by the abolition 
of the metropolitan counties and the inter-agency bodies demanded by 
child protection work (see, e.g., DHSS 1988). In this context what looks 
like decentralisation may be closer to what Hudson and Plum (in another 
context) refer to as deconcentration, since in practice it is likely to give 
more power to those setting the rules centrally (Hudson and Plum 1986). 
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The supporters of the enabling authority and of post-Fordism tend to 
place stress on flexibility or fragmentation, with local government 
becoming one (perhaps the first) among many providers or becoming the 
regulator of a wider range of provision offered by others. In a sense each 
accepts the definition of local government as elected local government 
and seeks to find a key role for it in the new world of the 1990s. If we 
start from a broader definition of local government - closer to that of the 
local state - to include non-elected local governments and other sets of 
power relations, then the picture begins to change and it becomes possible 
to operate with a more complex picture of urban politics. In this context, 
too, it is still possible to acknowledge the significance of market 
mechanisms and of the 'enabling' authority, setting them within a wider 
. . 
context of change, as well as incorporating some of the insights offered by 
theories of post-Fordism. 
It would be possible to conclude this survey of the changing nature of 
urban politics associated with them by pointing to the wide variety of 
possibilities open to local government in the 1990s. This is the conclusion 
drawn by Brindley et al (1989) who reject the possibility of characterising 
the new politics with anyone overarching label - although one of them has 
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since suggested that post-Fordism might be appropriate (Stoker 1989, 
1990). They .are justified in highlighting the complexity of the processes 
of restructuring which are taking place and in confirming that they are not 
yet complete. But it is possible to go a little further, to attempt to 
identify directions of change, even if they are not yet fully developed. The 
overall context for local government and urban politics has begun to 
change, and some of the features of the new arrangements are becoming 
clearer. 
Tentative conclusions can be drawn which point towards corporatist 
structures set within the broader framework of a capitalist pOlitical 
economy - with the functional representation of different groups at local 
level through a variety of organisations, including, but not exclusively, 
elected local governments7. Elected local governments may continue to 
play an active role as mediators between different interests, managing 
those otherwise excluded, but more clearly than ever will do so in an 
overall context which acknowledges the role of business. It is also likely 
to have to share that role with other state bodies, which may (following 
Stoker) be characterised as non elected local government. Proposals for 
the shift of some existing responsibilities (e.g. police, education and child 
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protection) to specialist agencies, in the context of moves towards unitary 
authorities, are likely to reinforce this, by undermining the centrality of 
elected local governments. Local politics in the 1990s will increasingly 
need to be analysed in terms which acknowledge a new set of power 
relations, reflected in an increased emphasis on public/private 
partnership: which partner is dominant in particular cases may still be an 
open question, but that will be the question which matters. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Four main features provided the context for initiative at local level in 
the early 1980s. First, a set of continuing and changing legal constraints 
which limited scope for manoeuvre, but did not necessarily"remove it all 
together. The rules of the game kept changing, but they were defined by 
local as well as central government, and some of the more important 
aspects might flow from professional structures as much as 
straightforward legal limitations. Secondly, local government was under 
severe and increaSing financial pressures in this period, generally imposed 
from above. Again, however, it was not the case that local government 
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spending was determined from above. On the contrary significant scope for 
variation remained, and the battle over spending levels continued through 
the decade and into the 1990s. Thirdly, the pOlitical context at the start of 
the 1980s encouraged a widespread search for political alternatives on the 
left of the Labour Party, and local government was a crucial site for 
attempts to develop these, both in emphasising the importance of local 
(decentralised) initiatives and in providing examples suitable for further 
development at national level under a (hoped for) Labour government. 
Finally, the changes taking place within particular local authorities need 
to be understood in the context of wider processes of restructuring, 
beginning to encourage a more active role for business. 
Assessing the extent to which it was possible to develop local 
socialist initiatives in this period, particularly in the development of local 
economic policies, offers one way of judging the meaning of local 
autonomy across a number of key axes, including the ability of councils to 
act independently of the centre; their ability'to make decisions 
independently of the pressures of capitalist development at local level; 
and the extent to which they can escape from the influence of professional 
power at local level and through policy networks (see, e.g., Gurr and King 
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1987, pp. 43-73 and Goldsmith 1990, pp. 48-9). The next chapter looks 
more closely at the policy area of locally authority economic development 
whose growth in the 1980s owed little to the priorities of central 
government, but may have been more in line with pressures from locally 
(and nationally) based economic interest groups. 
Notes 
1. Much of the discussion on local socialism draws on material previously 
published in Cochrane, A. (1988) Municipal Socialism in the 19805. Open 
University, pp. 47-49. 
2. Later in the decade, Liverpool, too, attracted the label, and certainly the 
councils leaders played an important part in developing carrying out the 
strategy adopted by the 'left' councils over rate capping. But Liverpool has 
not been included in this list because the council leadership's orientation 
(influenced by the 'Militant' group within the Labour Party) was 
fundamentally towards the national stage and it explicitly rejected the 
possibility of taking substantial independent initiative at local level 
(except perhaps in housing). See Hatton 1988 Chs 5-8, Parkinson 1985, 
Taaffe and Mulhearn 1988, Chs 6-13. 
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3. The implications of political mobilisation could be contradictory: one 
aspect was the desire to mobilise communities in favour of some existing 
programme which the left wanted to see implemented (such as 
anti-racism, anti-sexism or support for gay and lesbian organisations); 
whilst another was oriented towards the empowerment of local 
communities. Sometimes the commitment to one made the other 
unachievable, as councils seemed to act as moral and political consciences 
to the people they represented. Campbell quotes one gay councillor in a 
London borough who argues that "what we've got to worry about is how to 
help people convince themselves. We can't guilt trip people any more" and 
. criticises those among the local socialists who have taken a different 
path, attempting to use state power to impose change without having won 
wide support for it: "where administrative methods are used in the name of 
a new politics; the problem arises where administrations use the power of 
the town hall to short-circuit the toil of creating a new consciousness" 
(Campbell 1987, p.13). Similar concerns arise in Gyford's argument that 
here is a danger of encouraging the development of a new preceptoralism in 
which the 'correct' line is fed into the community by activists and the 
council machine (Gyford 1985, pp. 87-8). 
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4. The material in sections 6.2 and 6.3 draws extensively on and develops 
an already published article by me: Cochrane 1991 in references. 
5. Some authors, including Hoggett and Lipietz, use the term neo-Fordism 
in preference to post-Fordism. Lipietz refers to a potential neo-Fordism 
to indicate that the crisis of Fordism is not yet resolved. In this chapter 
the term post-Fordism is used deliberately because most of the arguments 
under discussion (including those of Hoggett) seem to proceed from an 
assumption that a fundamentally new set of arrangements is being 
introduced. 
6. Jessop neatly summarises the underlying argument of the regulationists 
. as follows: "They asked how capitalism could survive even though the 
capital relation itself inevitably generated antagonisms and crises which 
made continuing accumulation improbable. They found an answer in 
specific institutional forms, societal norms, and patterns of strategic 
conduct which both expressed and regulated these conflicts until the 
inevitable tensions and divergencies among these various regulatory forms 
reached crisis point" (Jessop 1988, p.149). 
7. Dunleavy and O'Leary use neo-pluralism to describe arrangements which 
are similar, but the interaction of state and functional interests, with a 
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continuing (independent) role for the state suggests that corporatism is a 
more appropriate term (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, Ch 5). 
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Chapter 7. Developing new local economic policies 
7.1 Economic policies and local government 
Although local authorities had no specific powers to undertake 
intitiatives in the area of economic development there was a general and 
significant expansion of such activity in the 1980s 1 (see, for example, 
Martinos 1988, Chandler and Lawless 1985, Mills and Young 1986 and 
Morison 1987). This is one of the features which makes local economic 
policy such an important topic in the context of our study. Its growth was 
neither intended nor encouraged by central government, which suggests 
that councils still had significant scope for developing independent 
initiative at local level, and also makes it possible to consider the nature 
. . 
of relationships between councils and local businesses (in particular, the 
extent to which councils can develop policies independently of pressures 
from them). At the same time as central government was stressing the 
need for a change of direction at nationalle~el, away from forms of state 
intervention, at local level the argument for the state to become involved 
in influencing the economy was becoming more widely accepted. There was 
also a contrast between the explicit rejection of geographically based 
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(regional) policies by national government and the espousal of spatially 
specific policies at local level. As the 1980s progressed this contrast 
become less. sharp as central governments became more involved in 
developing of new policies for urban areas (enterprise zones and 
development corporations) but - at first at least - these were intended to 
operate as models (of free market initiative) of wider relevance for the UK 
economy as a whole than as spatially based initiatives (see, e.g., Anderson 
1983 and 1990). By the mid 1980s it was local councils which had taken 
the lead in the development of spatially oriented industrial policies which 
were usually justified in terms of the specific problems faced they faced, 
in implicit recognition of the processes of uneven development which 
affected different regions and urban areas differently in the period of 
deindustrialisation which characterised the 1980s (see, e.g., Massey 1988, 
Martin 1988). Urban unemployment was recognised as a particular problem 
and urban authorities took the lead in seeking to develop policies aimed at 
reducing levels of unemployment (Hasluck 1987). 
In England and Wales by the mid 1980s spending on local economic 
development rivalled the level of central government spending on regional 
policy and most councils had officers and units responsible for the activity 
(Mills and Young1986, Martinos1988 and Sellgren 1987). By this time, 
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according to Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
estimates, over £250m was being spent annually out of revenue budgets on 
economic development and promotion by local authorities in England and 
Wales and their capital spending was around £150m p.a .. In Scotland, too, 
councils were playing an increasingly active role, working alongside the 
semi-autonomous development agencies which had been set up from the 
centre taking their own initiatives (see, e.g, Moore and Booth1986b, 
Donnison and Middleton 1987 and Keating 1988 particularly on relations 
between local authorities and the Scottish Development Agency in 
developing policies for urban regeneration in Glasgow). And even in 
Northern Ireland, where budgets were much lower, new initiatives were 
being developed (see, e.g., O'Dowd et aI1989). 
Most official estimates also almost certainly substantially 
underrepresent actual spending on economic development, since some is 
buried under other (mainstream) budget heads in the accounts of many 
councils. It may, for example be justified as part of the management of 
corporate estates or the refurbishment of inner cities, as well as arising 
from the implementation of planning policies, which sometimes require 
the relocation of non-conforming industries from residential areas. The 
financial rules imposed by the centre did not encourage councils to 
215 
separately identify economic development aS,a substantial area of 
activity, on the contrary encouraging them to spread it between budgets to 
avoid the limitations implied by their use of Section 137 of the 1972 Local 
Government Act, under which only a relatively small amount could be spent 
on activities not otherwise identified as statutorily required or permitted. 
There has, of course, been a long tradition of local authority economic 
policy-making, particularly in the older industrial regions whose politics 
have been dominated by the Labour Party, and where Gyford's 'municipal 
labourism' was at its strongest in the 1950s and 1960s. This economic 
policy often combined broad visions of regional and local change, with a 
detailed practice centred on the provision of land and premises to firms 
'and developers as well as promotional activity to attract potential 
employers from elsewhere (for the early history of local economic 
development initiatives, see, e.g., Buck 1981 and Ward 1984a). In the 
1930s individual councils in the North-East (such as Jarrow) took the lead 
in seeking additional private act powers for economic development and 
initially successful attempts were made to extend these to the whole of 
the Tyne and Wear County Council area in the 1970s, although they were 
withdrawn in the early 1980s (Camina 1974, Rogers and Smith 1977). 
During the 'long boom' after 1945 councils in the North - and particularly 
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the North-East - of England were in the forefont of attempts to change 
their image, to construct a new infrastructure, to produce a region of the 
twentieth century (see, e.g, Hudson 1990, Massey 1984, p.203). A whole 
new world was to be created which could challenge the dominance of 
London, with the help of new towns, industrial estates, ring roads, 
motorways, city centre redevelopment and the provision of other urban 
infrastructure. 
But there was always a sharp contrast between the scale of the. 
ambitions and the nature of the policy instruments utilised by local 
authorities. Until the 1970s the dominant forms of local authority 
economic development activity ( described as 'traditional' by Cochrane 
·1983 and 'mainstream' by Boddy 1984) were the provision of land and 
premises to developers and businesses, and of related information about 
the availability of land and premises in the private sector, coupled with 
extensive promotional campaigns to attract industry from elsewhere. In a 
few cases small amounts of financial assistance were offered, usually in 
the form of grants, sometimes loans and mortgages. Close relationships 
often existed between property agencies and industrial development 
officers. At local level small firms were the main targets for assistance 
and success was measured in terms of factory units constructed and 
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enquiries from potential customers. Little serious attention was paid to 
the numbers or nature of jobs created. 
Industrial development officers were frequently employed as 'experts' 
who understood and, in a sense, were expected to act as representatives of 
the private sector in a way that orthodox local government officers could 
not (for discussions of this period, see Boddy 1982, Johnson and Cochrane 
1981, particularly Ch. 3). Although they have begun to carve out their own 
professional niche (with the formation of their own professional 
association) industrial development officers tended to be externally 
oriented, rather than a natural part of the local government bureaucracy. 
Their principal orientation was towards two groups outside the council - a 
·potential 'client' group which consisted of private sector employers and 
major developers and a 'peer' group made up of commercial estate agents 
and local businesses (Johnson and Cochrane 1981 pp.93-94). The practice 
of the traditional councils and their industrial development officers could 
best be described as 'opportunist', rather than planned, in the sense that 
their skills lay in identifying and responding to the needs of their 'clients', 
putting together the best possible packages to make particular sites 
attractive to the commercial or industrial concerns at which they were 
aiming. 
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Over the period since 1975, the general expansion of local economic 
development activity can be missed if one focuses on a few key innovators 
in the field. Yet one of the clearest trends right through the late 1970s and 
1980s has been the continued growth in importance of industrial 
development officers, following relatively mainstream policies. It is this 
which is expressed in surveys, such as those undertaken by Mills and 
Young1986 and Sellgren 1987 (see also Chandler and Lawless 1985, Part 
II, which charts the continued development of this policy area in the early 
1980s). Such has been the growth of their significance, within local 
government that in the late 1980s the Local Government Training Board 
-was considering whether specific professional training programmes were 
required (Local Government Training Board 1986). The expansion of activity 
in the late 1970s in response to rising unemployment was not at first 
accompanied by any change in policy direction. The consensual aims seemed 
to be the maximisation of local employment or securing a stable and 
expanding industrial base. And a great deal. of academic and policy research 
has focused on a concern to assess the effectiveness of local economic 
policies which sometimes leads to attempts to identify 'best practice' 
suitable for replication elsewhere. A significant proportion of work 
produced within this framework results in a careful description of 
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practice as much as any serious attempt at evaluation. (See Bovaird et al 
1988, for a discussion of some of the difficulties of assessing 
effectiveness; evaluations of particular initiatives include Armstrong 
1988, Robinson and Wren 1987, Davies et a11986; numerous case studies 
of individual councils have been produced, including a series prepared by 
the Centre of Urban and Regional Studies at the University of Birmingham 
for the West Midlands County Council in the early 1980s; other examples of 
broad surveys include Boddy 1982, Campbell 1990, Chandler and Lawless 
19S5, Coulson 1986, Johnson and Cochrane 1981, Mills and Young 1986, 
Sellgren 1987; a number of publications have gone beyond this to argue 
. strongly for the development of local economic initiatives, including 
Cambell et al 1987 and 1988, and Local Government Training Board 1986; 
organisations such as the Centre for Local Economic Strategies have 
sponsored research to promote initiatives of this sort, LEDIS manages an 
extensive database of local economic initiatives and the journal 'Local 
Economy' is also committed to encouraging their development). . 
Blunkett and Jackson note that at the start of the 1980s local 
councils "were adapting the traditional economic role of British local 
government which offered inducements in the form of grants, free loans, 
and publicly subsidised infrastructure, and no request for reciprocal 
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involvement with the community, in order to attract industrial and 
commercial concerns which were looking for suitable sites for investment 
and trading""(Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987 p.11 0). Even in the authorities 
later identified with the left, therefore, the initial move was towards 
more of the same, although there were already increasing signs that 
different policies were being taken up in some places. 
7.2 The new pOlicies 
One factor encouraging the growth of new approaches to economic 
. policy seems to have been the widespread impact of the slump and 
economic restructuring beyond the traditional regions. The West Midlands 
went from being a prosperous region to one with levels of unemployment 
far above the national average; the inner city areas of London and its 
western manufacturing belt were also hit hard; and Sheffield which had 
done much better than the national average because of its base in special 
steels and engineering in the 1970s, suddenly faced collapse in the early 
1980s. In general, it is hardly surprising that change was slower in the 
more traditional 'distressed areas', where the attachment of the Labour 
hierarchies to the regional deals of the past was deeper. The emphasis of 
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lobbying had been on gaining bigger slices of regional policies, often in 
alliance with major national and multinational firms. Councils had been 
part of a reg"ionalist consensus and of the economic welfarism it 
represented (Massey 1984 Ch. 4, Beynon et aI1989). The immediate 
response to the undermining of the base for that consensus was likely to 
be an attempt to reconstruct it. The arrival of economic slump was not a 
new experience - not a shock - in the same way as it was in some of the 
other areas, nor was there a political shock in the form of changing 
political control. The methods of the past were largely continued by the 
politicans of the past. 
But the development of new economic policies at local level was a key 
feature of the approach adopted by many of the most active local socialist 
authorities in the early 1980s and was intended to provide an alternative 
not only to the policies being developed by the Thatcher government, but 
also to the policies of Labour in power in the 1970s and to the 
'mainstream' policies which dominated in local government. The best 
known of the authorities which took up local economic initiatives as a 
central part of a wider socialist strategy were the GLC, Sheffield and the 
West Midlands County Council, although they were also included as 
elements in the programmes of other left councils at the start of the 
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1980s (including some London Boroughs) and were seen (or accepted) as 
symbols of socialist intent for a number of other councils which were less 
. 
wholeheartedly committed to wider local socialist initiatives (such as 
Leeds, West Yorkshire and Lancashire County Council). Discussions of the 
new initiatives which contrast them with other approaches are to be found 
in Benington 1986, Blazyca 1983, Boddy 1984, Cochrane 1986, Green, G. 
1987, Mawson and Miller 1986, Mole and Elliott 1986 and Moore and Booth 
1986a. More critical discussion takes place in Cochrane 1983, 1987a and 
1988, Duncan and Goodwin 1985a and b, Eisenschitz and North 1986, 
Geddes 1988, Gough 1986, Nolan and O'Donnell 1987 and Totterdill 1989 . 
. Interesting debates have also been generated from among those politicians 
and officers directly involved with the left initiatives, reflected, for 
example, in Alcock et a11984, Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, Critical 
Social Policy 1983, Gunnell 1990, Mackintosh and Wainwright 1987, Murray 
1984 and and1987, as well as in the publications of some of the councils 
involved, particularly GLC 1983, 1985, 198,6 a and b, but also some of the 
jobs plans produced in the run up to the 1987 General Election such as 
London Borough of Southwark 1986, and City of Sheffield 1987. 
The range of different approaches reflected in the pOlicies adopted by 
different left councils makes it difficult to come up with a comprehensive 
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listing of all those adopted and the rationales behind them. It is possible 
to run through a series of new initiatives which were developed by the 
interventionist authorities in the early 1980s, and some of these are 
listed, for example, in Mawson and Miller 1986, Cochrane 1986b, Campbell 
et a11987b, Marks 1987 and Totte rd ill 1989. The initiatives included the 
setting up of autonomous local enterprise boards which were able to invest 
directly in the private sector, and to collaborate with the private financial 
institutions in raising funds for. investment; an increased commitment to 
co-operative style enterprise and other forms of social ownership and 
democratic control by employees; assistance to ethnic minority businesses 
. and a greater sympathy for equal opportunity issues, for example through 
the use of contract compliance; the sponsorship of research on local 
economies and particular economic sectors to make it possible to develop 
some overall strategic view; a move away from giving grants to small 
businesses without a degree of control and feedback - in the case of 
enterprise boards the need for some financial return; an interest in the 
possibilities of product development and of technology transfer, from 
research to workplace; a broad definition of economic activity to include, 
for example, cultural initiatives and the employment and training 
(sometimes redefined as labour market) pOlicies of the authority; a 
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commitment to the maintenance and development of municipal employment 
and municipal enterprise. These initiatives were to be handled through 
specialist officers, often expected to be politically sympathetic and 
usually organised in specialist units of one sort or another, with the 
overall aim of influencing decision making in the private sector (through 
various forms of what came to be called 'leverage'). 
But, listing the activities in this way may be misleading for three 
main reasons. First, no such list can be comprehensive so it will not 
include every relevant activity yet, secondly, producing a list may also 
imply that all the authorities engaged in all the activities listed when in 
. practice different approaches were adopted in different places. Thirdly, 
many councils not identified with the new initiatives - whether labelled 
as 'local socialists' (Gyford 1985) or 'interventionists' (Mawson and Miller 
1986) - can justifiably claim to have been undertaking similar activities. 
It is possible, however, to identify some features which influenced 
the attempts to develop new initiatives and Which served to set a policy 
context, within which local pOliticians, officers and activists operated. 
The first key element represented a Significant move away from the 
policies of the past, since it sought to integrate measures of job creation 
with policies which sought to meet social needs (and frequently to extend 
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democratic control over production). The old implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, division between economic and social policies was under 
challenge. Secondly, it was argued that councils should have the right (and 
sometimes the responsibility) to influence decision-making within the 
private sector to achieve these ends (whether through targetted 
investment, negotiation over particular developments or through its 
ordering practices). Above all, it was argued that the policies and 
priorities of the City of London and its financial institutions tended to 
discourage investment in manufacturing industry, in the older regions and 
in the inner cities, so that local government could encourage investment in 
. (and possibly help to channel investment to) these areas (see Minns 1982, 
Ch. 4). And thirdly, it was suggested that local government should be able 
to show others best practice in its own operation (e.g. through equal 
opportunties pOlicies), and should expand and defend municipal services to 
meet social need, as well as restructuring them to reflect community 
pressures more accurately. In general local initiatives were to show how 
socialist initiatives might be developed at national level, but the 
continued importance of the local level even within a sympathetic national 
framework was also frequently stressed. Centralised models of planning 
were explicitly rejected2. 
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Murray, for example, draws conclusions from the experience of the 
GLC and GLEB, to argue for detailed surgical intervention in the process of 
production and distribution, to encourage the development of wider 
industrial strategies (Murray 1984, 1987). Although he does not develop 
the argument here, he points towards a different form of local government, 
which requires more autonomy, within a national and regional system of 
planning, able to escape from existing bureaucratic structures. Mackintosh 
and Wainwright (1987), survey a number of areas of the GLC's economic 
policy, and although the book's conclusions are not always clear cut, in 
part perhaps because there is not full agreement among its various 
. authors, it is possible to identify arguments within it which suggest that 
the internal bargaining and negotiating processes of the local state have an 
important part to play in determining outcomes, and may, even, be of more 
importance than any stated aims and ambitions. The process of 
implementation is acknowleged to be a vital part of the political process, 
and one which is often ignored in more traditional analysis of 
policy-making. The chapters which focus on public transport, internal 
working practices and intervention into the furniture industry suggest that 
decisions by politicians are not enough, if there are n9t also active 
political campaigns at other levels of the system, inside and outside the 
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council. 
Some of the policy developments in the early 1980s suggested a key 
role for local· authorities in influencing the process of economic 
restructuring through intervention in the process of production itself. This 
was probably put at its strongest in the arguments of the Greater London 
Council (GLC). In one publication it was argued that, "Profit is no longer an 
accurate guide to the way out of economic crisis. It is like a compass 
which has lost its bearings and points in the opposite direction to the way 
in which we need to go" (GLC 1983, p.17). It was suggested that changing 
economic structures made it possible for councils to intervene on the side 
. of labour in the process of restructuring which was taking place. Drawing 
on analogies from the retail sector it was said to be possible to identify 
strategic points of intervention. Just as major retailers such as Marks and 
Spencer, Benetton and Next could place conditions on suppliers, so local 
authorities (or enterprise boards) should be able to place conditions on 
firms they assisted, ar firms which supplied them. The aim was to shift 
the balance of forces between capital and labour and encourage change 
which not only generated and protected jobs, but would also open 
employment to previously excluded or disadvantaged groups, and encourage 
democratic planning within enterprises and in ways which involved the 
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wider community (see also GLC 1985, Introduction, Murray 1987). 
The GLC's approach was controversial, arousing criticism not only 
from the predictably hostile Conservative government, but also within the 
labour Party and from other councils trying to develop their own economic 
policies. But its experience also illustrated in a very sharp form the way in 
which local authority economic policies became politically important, 
and thus impossible to reduce solely to technical and professional 
questions, even if the need for the economic and financial viability of 
projects was always stressed. The range of publications produced by the 
GLC (including its massive strategy documents, GLC 1985, 1986 a and b) 
. far exceeds those produced by other councils and local agencies, but they 
were part of a more general move towards the publication of economic 
policy documents by a range of authorities - including, for example, the 
various local jobs plans prepared in 1987, discussed and summarised by 
Campbell et al (1987a and b). 
In retrospect it is easy to feel that the heat of the debate generated 
by these initiatives may have been exaggerated, since many of the methods 
initially associated with the rise of 'local socialism' (Gyford 1985, Boddy 
and Fudge 1984) or a 'new municipal socialism' (Cochrane 1986a and 1988) 
have now been taken up more widely by councils with quite different 
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political ambitions. As Chandler and Lawless comment, "Although left wing 
authorities undertake a number of distinctive employment creation 
policies which imply a critical view of the prevailing economic system 
they also carry out, and in several cases have initiated, strategies that are 
widely adopted by more conservative councils" (Chandler and Lawless 
1985, p. 258). It may be that the more neutral terms 'interventionist' 
(which is used by Miller and Mawson,1986) or 'radical-interventionist' 
(used by Martinos, 1988) are more appropriate because they make no 
claims to link quite disparate political initiatives into a single movement 
(or 'syndrome' to use Gyford's term). 
Chandler and Lawless go so far as to suggest that the practice of the 
left authorities has tended to be, "like Gaitskell and Crosland rejecting 
Clause IV in favour of the Swedish approach of controlling private capital 
through redistributive taxation and close regulation of capital investment 
and working conditions" (Chandler and Lawless 1985, p. 260). But this 
conclusion is a superficial one, which fails to take into account the radical 
nature of many of the new initiatives and - above all - the arguments 
which underlay them. It implies a simple contrast between the policies of 
nationalisation, identified with the traditional left, and those which look 
for other methods of control, identified with the Labour Party right. But 
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these were not the alternatives for the supporters of socialist local 
economic strategies. On the contrary, they rejected existing forms of 
nationalisation as bureaucratic, undemocratic, hierarchical and, 
essentially, part of the dominant economic organisation of British 
capitalism. This is reflected in a wide range of material, including 
Blunkett and Green, for example, who argue for structures which develop 
"the innovatory process of building from the bottom" (Blunkett and 
Green1983 p. 7). Blazyca also offers a fierce critique of centralised 
planning and the practice of nationalisation in the UK since 1945, before 
gOing on to explore some of the local alternatives (Blazyca 1983 
. Chs 3 and 5) (see also Mackintosh and Wainwright 1987 and Murray 1987). 
What was required, they argued was a more decentralised and more 
democratic process of economic planning. This is clear from the way in 
which the GLC discussed the development of its industrial strategy: 
"A plan implied a blueprint, drawn up from above. The 
London economy was too complex, the powers of the GLC 
too limited ... Strategy on the other hand was a concept 
with military rather than architectural origins, meaning 
literally the choice of ground on which to conflict, with 
limited resources and a ground level perspective which 
was always having to guess at what was over the horizon. 
What it implied was a view of the London economy as 
composed of innumerable battle grounds, involving a 
struggle for jobs against the pressures of the market, of 
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particular employers and in some cases the direct 
opposition of the government itself. Each case was fought 
over a particular terrain, with its specific balance of 
forces ... Each case required its own strategy, geared at 
first to the immediate terrain, but then broadening out to 
the dev"eloping contours and prospects of the industry as a 
whole ... 
In each case the strategy for anyone plant always 
involves wider questions and suggests wider links ... " (GLC 
1985, pp2/3). 
This is certainly not the language of Gaitskell and Crosland. On the 
contrary, instead of stressing the importance of macroeconomic economic 
management and policies of regulation, it implies a direct intervention and 
involvement at the level of individual enterprises (,enterprise planning' in 
the early language of the GLC and GLEB, see, e.g. GLEB 1983a and b, and 
. 1985a). Nor is it just the language which was different. The London 
Industrial Strategy (GLC 1985) catalogues a number of interventions which 
confirm that activist intent was translated into practice, and further case 
studies are to be found in Mackintosh and Wainwright 1987. Nor was the 
GLC unique in this. A range of related (if not identical) initiatives can be 
identified across the country (see, e.g, Campbell et al 1987a and b, 
Cochrane 1988, Marks 1987, Mawson and Miller 1986 for surveys). 
Whilst a degree of caution is advisable in assessing the impact of the 
left's economic initiatives, it would be equally misleading to ignore the 
importance of debates about 'local socialism' for some of the policies 
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which were developed at this time. The wider ambitions of councils such 
as the Greater London Council and Sheffield in the first half of the 1980s 
must be ackhowledged, not only because they have influenced contemporary 
development, but also because the policies which flowed from them did 
suggest a more radical alternative than any others which were on offer at 
national or local level. By the end of the decade, there is evidence that the 
local experiments were being taken up and developed in ways which dulled 
their radical edge, for example as summarised for Labour Party 
consumption in Gilhespy et ai, 1986 pp. 55-68, and in the arguments of 
Hirst and Zeitlin 1989, Ch. 1 or the programme for a national technology 
. policy outlined by Blackburn and Sharpe 1988, but the interpretation 
remains a matter of political contention (reflected in the alternative 
views expressed by Mackintosh and Wainwright 1987 and Murray 1987, for 
example). The ambiguity of the formulations of the early 1980s and the 
politics which lay behind them is an important element in understanding 
the ways in which the local authority left's economic policies developed 
through the 1980s3. 
Even if one accepts that some radical claims may need to be 
reassessed the comparison with Gaitskell and Crosland is highly 
inappropriate, since whatever conclusions are drawn from the local 
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authority experience, they point directly towards proposals for the 
development of an industrial policy some distance away from the 
arguments of the 1950s, when the stress was on welfare and 'social 
equality' (Crosland 1956, Ch. 8). Even in his later speeches, Crosland tended 
to stress the role of macroeconomic policy and incomes policy and to 
underplay the value (although not discount the possibility) of direct 
intervention, since he argued that neither politicians nor civil servants 
were well equipped for the task (Crosland 1974, p. 252). Maybe he would 
have been persuaded by the arguments of the GLC, but their approach owed 
little to him. 
In some ways the differences between the interventionist or 
radical authorities were almost as important as the similarities between 
them. Among the local enterprise boards, for example, the Greater London 
Enterprise Board attracted the greatest media attention and through its 
links to the GLC's industrial strategy was probably also the most radical. 
Its system of enterprise planning was intended to bring together workers, 
employers and state in restructuring production for labour, rather than 
capital. Its ambitions were the most extensive (as expressed not only in 
the GLC's publications, including GLC 1985, 1986 a and b, but also in its 
own, including GLEB 1985b and 1986), aiming for the production of socially 
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useful products, more democratic decision-making within enterprises, and 
the extension of equal opportunities, both in terms of employment and 
grades of employmment. In the West Midlands, by contrast, more stress 
was placed on an industrial strategy which directed resources towards 
industrial sectors and enterprises which were often dismissed by more 
traditional financial institutions, particularly those based in the City of 
London, including middle-sized firms and those in the manufacturing 
sector. The West Midlands strategy looked more like a local version of 
national industrial strategy which had been promised in Labour's 1973 
programme. Similar issues were raised by Lancashire Enterprises and West 
. Yorkshire Enterprise Board but they stressed their closeness to the private 
sector right from the start - LEL presented itself as a regional 
development agency and WYEB as a regionally based (and at first, at least, 
publicly supported) merchant bank (see Cochrane and Clarke, 1990, for a 
more extensive survey of the enterprise board experience. See also Clarke 
and Cochrane 1987 and Cochrane 1988) .. 
Running through the differences and similarities and trying to weigh 
them against each other is, however, ultimately likely to be a fruitless 
task. These initiatives can instead more usefully be seen as part of a more 
general set of changes and pressures at local level, particularly among a 
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relatively small group of councils associated with the local authority left. 
They all suggest a more active role for local government, which finds a 
different expression in the different authorities. They suggest a more 
strategic and independent, less 'opportunistic', starting point than those of 
'mainstream' approaches. They place more emphasis on the possibility of 
generating growth from indigenous industry and initiative. More important, 
they are claiming - or perhaps reclaiming - economic policy as a justified 
sphere of activity for local government, not simply in the sense that 
councils are providers of necessary infrastructure, land and premises 
(although they continue to perform that role) but in the sense that they 
. have an interest in shaping and managing processes of economic change. In 
practice, what can be achieved at local level may not always be 
dramatically different, but the initiatives of the early 1980s open up the 
possibility of discussion and debate around restructuring, which is lost in 
the more detailed bargaining of industrial development officers with their 
'clients'. 
The high tide of the left's local authority economic strategies began 
to recede in the mid 1980s, with the abolition of the GLC and the 
metropolitan county councils in 1986 and the defeat of the campaigns 
against rate-capping in 1985-6. The enterprise boards were left to survive 
236 
in a much more hostile environment and with little hope of continued 
significant financial support from local authorities. They were forced to 
find new ways of surviving which encouraged an increasing redefinition of 
policy objectives, moving towards a more acceptable role as regionally 
based investment banks or development agencies. Increasingly the pursuit 
of 'social' objectives came to rely on subsidy from other government 
agencies, usually local government. Similar pressures affected other 
authorities which had not followed the enterprise board route, as they had 
to adjust to increaSingly limited budgets, and, perhaps more important, a 
retreat from perspectives which suggested that councils could effectively 
. challenge central government and capitalism at local level (see Lansley et 
al1989 Chs 10 and 11). 
7.3 The legacy of the 1980s 
At the end of the 1980s, it is possible to look back rather more 
dispassionately and identify general trends instead of concentrating on 
ideological differences. Totterdill stresses the need to place the new 
initiatives in their wider institutional and policy context, noting that they 
did not represent as great a break with the past as was sometimes 
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suggested at the time. More important, perhaps, he notes that "much of the 
promise of the manifestos published during the early eighties was 
. 
underwritten by the assumption of an early General Election victory for the 
Labour Party. Without this victory, the new wave of interventionist 
initiatives may gradually become assimilated within the mainstream of 
traditional local authority policy. Interventionist strategy could become 
subsumed within the more traditional activities of fragmented project 
management and a subservient relationship with the private sector" 
(Totterdill1989, p. 479). 
More positively, in retrospect, and building on the arguments 
. developed in Chapter 6, the local authority left's initiatives can be seen as 
ways of setting up new forms of negotiation, bargaining and 'partnership' 
with the private sector. This was always clearest with the enterprise 
boards, at least outside London. All of them stressed their commitment to 
jOint activity with private sector financial institutions, whether - as was 
the case with WYEB (now Yorkshire Enterprise) - through borrowing or - as 
in the case of the West Midlands - through jOint schemes and investment in 
regional funds. The stress on 'leverage' ratios, that is the proportion of 
private sector finance attracted for every pound of enterprise board 
finance, which was made by all the boards (including GLEB) shows the 
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importance attached to such collaboration (see Cochrane 1987a, 1988). The 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989 will make it difficult for councils 
to benefit fro'm the enterprise board model or any shareholding in firms in 
the private sector, but even before this legislation was introduced, the 
enterprise boards were already moving away from local government 
control and towards greater independence, partly because in most cases 
their parent authorities (the GLC and the metropolitan counties) were 
abolished in 1986. Greater London Enterprise (as GLEB was renamed) has 
moved away from local authority control, Yorkshire Enterprise is largely 
independent and self-financing, and in another case there has been a 
. management buyout. 
These changes could be interpreted as a defeat for the high hopes of 
the early 1980s, and perhaps they are. But they also suggest an integration 
of some of the policies of the boards into the financial mainstream, for 
example in terms of the creation of financial institutions oriented towards 
previously unfashionable areas, at least as far as the City of London has 
been concerned. The degree of 'partnership' running through the boards is 
crucial in other ways, too, because it suggests the need to generate a more 
institutionalised and formal set of relations with key agencies in the 
private sector. GLEB's initial approach to enterprise planning with its 
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stress on supporting the workers in enterprises may have made it difficult 
to achieve the partnerships it was looking for between state, employers 
and workers' - Cawson's 'micro-corporatism' - but all the boards have been 
involved in more modest moves towards 'partnership' in a range of 
schemes, and this has generally been defined more modestly in terms of 
'partnership' with the private sector (see Cochrane and Clarke 1990). 
The new initiatives developed in local government have done so 
alongside another process of change, which has been supported by central 
government. One aspect of this change, discussed in the previous chapter, 
has been a move towards greater involvement by some firms in wider 
. issues of urban economic development, reflected, for example, in the 
growth of Business in the Community. Although Business in the Community 
was a private sector initiative (see Pelling 1984) and although the 
enterprise agency movement has been supported and encouraged by central 
government, the commitment of local authorities of both 'left' and 'right' 
to the development of 'partnerships' has been crucially important for their 
expansion. All the enterprise boards are members of Business in the 
Community, and most councils are actively involved with their local 
enterprise agencies. There has been a dramatic growth of 'partnership' at 
local level, whether interpreted as an attempt by local government to 
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influence the private sector or as a take over of local government 
institutions by the private sector (see Moore 1990, Harding 1990a and b). 
In this sense the most significant changes in the field of local 
economic development have been those of attitude and involvement. Instead 
of the relatively passive and potentially responsive role, which was 
reflected in strategies which focused on the marketing of land and 
premises, there has been a shift towards closer and more consistent links 
between business and local authorities. Many of the activities have 
remained the same and expanded, but the context of policy-making has 
begun to change, and there has been a growth of various types of agency 
. intended to make those links more effective reflected in the growth of non 
elected local state agencies - more or less autonomous bodies including 
enterprise boards, economic development companies, enterprise agencies, 
training and enterprise councils and even urban development corporations -
which may provide opportunities for private sector agencies to influence, 
and even direct, the process of public policymaking (see also Stoker 1988, 
Ch.3). 
Although many of these initiatives may have been encouraged by the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s in the hope that local employers 
will take the lead in decision-making within them (in particular the 
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Training and Enterprise Councils, see e.g., Peck and Emmerich 1990 and 
1991, Peck and Shutt 1990), it has also been argued that similar forms 
might also be used to increase the possiblity of councils influencing the 
operation of the market and mobilising additional financial support. This is 
an ambition which underpinned many of the initial arguments for the 
setting up of enterprise boards and justifies the involvement of many 
councils in enterprise agencies. Moore argues strongly that the enterprise 
agency model offers scope for councils to influence the process of 
economic development, rather than being a Trojan horse through which 
business can influence local government, and this certainly seems to be 
the interpretation favoured by most councils (Moore 1988). 
Traditionally economic development work, as an identifiable policy 
area within local government, has concentrated on a relatively narrow 
range of activities, perhaps better expressed in the term 'industrial 
development'. The orientation has been towards the expansion and 
attraction of firms and investment. In many ways, this has been just as 
true of the more recent (and 'radical') approaches as it has of the older 
ones. Most of the activities referred to so far can loosely be placed under 
the heading of 'industrial' policy. They are concerned to support and sustain 
existing industry, identify and attempt to overcome weaknesses, and, 
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possibly to encourage development in new areas to replace the decline of 
traditional employment. Although they can be seen as extensions of past 
policies, however, their extent and nature begins to hint at more 
substantial change. Claims are beginning to be made for local authority 
contributions to restructuring their local economies which go beyond the 
ambition of property related activities and attracting a bit more high 
technology industry than their neighbours. It is in this sense that it 
becomes possible to identify, in embryoniC terms at least, some wider 
commitment to the development of local economic strategies. 
The move towards a redefined and more strategic view of economic 
development in some local authorities is also expressed in an increased 
interest in labour market policy. Instead of focusing attention on 
activities which may be productive in terms of new factory units or 
additional local investment, they have begun to approach the problem from 
a different angle. There has been a growing concern about the nature of 
jobs in the local labour market and about access to them. Many councils 
now have officers responsible for encouraging the growth of ethnic 
minority bUSinesses and, in some cases, there is a specific interest in 
encouraging the growth of women's employment. It has even been suggested 
that the only form of economic intervention which can be successful at 
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local level lies in attempting to influence the labour market (Lovering 
1988, pp 153-156). Policies which may be relevant here, for example, 
include the t~rgetting of specialist training in areas where there are skill 
shortages and, if equal opportunities is one aim of policy, then various 
forms of positive discrimination could direct resources towards 
disadvantaged groups. Attempts have also been made through the process 
of contract compliance to ensure that those who supply goods to councils 
will agree to improve their own employment practices. Although this 
process has been made more difficult as a result of central government 
legislation, there is some possibility of applying informal pressure, and it 
seems widely agreed now that construction schemes in the inner cities 
should take on a substantial proportion of local labour. Moreover, it is still 
possible to lay down some conditions about the employment of ethnic 
minorities. Employment policies within local authorities may themselves 
also provide examples which can actively be pursued with employers in the 
private sector. This has been a matter of some controversy in many 
councils, but there has been a growing commitment to equal opportunity 
policies of one sort or another throughout the local government system. It 
is no longer merely a concern of 'radical' or Labour councils, but has 
increasingly been taken up within the officer structure, to the extent that, 
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formally, at least, it has become almost taken for granted as an ambition 
of good personnel management. 
The p~eparation of local jobs plans, although initiated in 1987 as 
part of the Labour Party's preparation for the General Election, seemed to 
confirm a potentially important shift of emphasis, because the focus of 
debate was on jobs and the nature of employment rather than local 
industrial policies focused on investment and patterns of restructuring 
(Campbell et aI1987b). They began to make it possible to approach a much 
wider range of local authority activities - e.g. including education - in 
terms of their significance for employment, as well as to make it possible 
to relate these to a wider vision of the local economy. The experiment of 
the jobs plans themselves does not seem to heve been developed further 
with local authorities since 1987, but their significance in pointing to the 
value of developing a more systematic approach to labour market 
intervention and their linking of social policy objectives to employment 
ones do not deserve to be forgotten (see Murray, U. 1989, which argues for 
the development of explicit links between p'ublic sector employment and . 
community needs). At the end of the 1980s a report produced for the Centre 
for Local Economic Strategies stressed the potential of a local authority 
related employment programme in meeting local needs, generating 
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employment and reducing spatial divisions (Campbell et al 1988). 
The importance of local initiatives as a base for wider economic 
revival has been noted more widely, in the context of a move away from 
mass production industries in the process of economic restructuring (see, 
for example, Hirst and Zeitlin 1989, particularly the summary of the 
argument in Chapter 1, and the cases discussed in Chapters 7 and 8). The 
1980s ended with economic development becoming an accepted (if 
underfunded) activity for local government, given formal recognition in the 
local Government and Housing Act. Although arguably, by identifying 
specific powers and responsibilities the Act limits freedom for manoeuvre 
at local level more than the old system ever did, it may also give it added 
legitimacy and encourage further development. 
It has been forcibly argued that "local economic policies can only 
have minor effects on economic regeneration" (Duncan and Goodwin 1985a, 
p. 253) and this seems to be widely accepted. The records of the GLC, 
which claimed to have created ten thousand jobs between 1981 and 1985, 
or of Sheffield which claimed a record of one thousand jobs created 
between 1981 and 1984, may be impressive in their own right, but they 
pale into insignificance in the face of the overall job losses experienced 
over the same periods (in both cases the total number of jobs generated 
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was around the annual rate for net job losses. GLC 1985, Duncan and 
Goodwin 1985b, p. 20). But in a sense focusing on numbers of jobs created 
may be to miss the point, and is in any case simply liable to encourage 
economic development agencies to exaggerate the figures. 
In their analysis of the growth of enterprise agencies Moore and 
Richardson suggest that the key point is the extent to which they were 
encouraging significant shifts in culture and the balance of political power 
(Moore and Richardson 1989, p.154). Asking similar questions about the 
effect of the left initiatives of the early 1980s is similarly instructive, 
although the conclusions may suggest that the changes were less radical 
. than their initial supporters may have hoped. Indeed it could be argued 
that they led the way in a wider process of political restructuring by 
giving such a high profile to the local economy in the early 1980s. The 
enterprise boards which they set up have easily fitted into the enterprise 
agency model, themselves suggesting partnership and a new closeness 
between private and public sectors at local level, and even those 
authorities such as Sheffield, which avoided the enterprise board model 
have increasingly emphasised the importance of public-private . 
partnership, with the implication that greater attention needed to be given 
to the needs of the private sector (see Cochrane 1988, Cochrane and Clarke 
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1990, and Totterdill1989 pp. 514-516). 
The importance of differentiation between places in the competitive 
battle for employment, is now widely accepted, and goes far beyond a 
narrow focus on economic development, fitting in with wider ambitions to 
strategic decision-making reflected in the literature of the 'enabling 
authority'. A leading US management 'guru' sums this up in the argument 
that the "idea of 'what's special' about" a place "is decisive in determining 
the city's future" (Peters 1988, p. 143). The identification of special 
features has been a major feature of advertising campaigns in the late 
1980s - picking up on the highly influential 'Glasgow's miles better' 
. campaign. These have universally stressed the 'greenness' of the places 
being promoted, their receptiveness to high tech and service employers, 
and, where possible, their access to water based sport facilities, which 
seems to have become a symbol of high status. Cultural differentiation, 
too, has become an increaSing measure of activism, with Glasgow scooping 
the pool by winning designation as European City of Culture in 1990, but 
with Birmingham (attracting the Royal Ballet from Sadlers Wells) and 
Liverpool (with the Tate Gallery of the North) also heavily in contention. 
Even the corporate logos of many local authorities have been drawn into 
the battle. Only the more 'conservative' (such as many inner London 
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Boroughs) have been stuck with the modernist corporate symbolism of the 
early 1970s - the rest have moved on to historical skylines, or symbols 
which sugge'st that even the most industrial of cities nestles gently in the 
midst of rolling countryside, or at the heart of a scenic valley. Harvey 
comments pointedly that "Corporatist forms of governance can ... take on 
entrepeneurial roles in the production of favourable business climates and 
other special qualities" constructing "an atmosphere of place and tradition 
that will act as a lure to both capital and people 'of the right sort'" (Harvey 
1989a, p.295). 
It is possible to chart a highly negative vision of the future, in which 
elected local government becomes a largely residual category, dependent 
on the centre for finance and overshadowed by other agencies dominated by 
business interests. This seems to be the message of U.S. debates about 
local growth coalitions, between those who identify the dominant forces in 
local politics as developers and other property interests (Molotch 1976, 
Logan and Molotch 1987) and those who identify wider coalitions of 
business as dominant (Cox and Mair 1988, 1989). Whatever the basis of the 
coalition, both sides of the debate seem agreed that more democratic, 
citizen based activism is doomed to defeat on most issues. A pessimist 
might conclude that similar developments within the U.K. are likely to 
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mean that political debate at local level will in the future mainly focus on 
disagreements between property developers and other business interests 
(such as retailers, manufacturers, service industries). But, as was argued 
earlier (in Ch. 6), the extent to which the local state in the U.K. has itself 
had to construct and organise growth politics means that there is little 
evidence of 'growth coalitions' of the U.S. type in the U.K., but may also 
mean - as Cooke suggests - that there is scope for local authority led 
coalitions based around negotiation and more equal partnership with 
agents in the private sector and the community (Cooke 1988). Cooke argues 
that new opportunities exist for taking the lead in influencing the private 
sector through joint ventures of one kind and another (Cooke 1989). Hirst 
builds on similar arguments to construct a developed model of corporate 
policy-making, which draws together central, local and regional 
governments with business, employees and communities, to produce 
appropriate forms of economic policy for the new world he he hopes to see, 
built around the possibilities offered by 'flexible specialisation' (Hirst 
1989b). The role of the local state suggested by these arguments is an 
active one, rather than one in which business or a particular fraction of 
local business is dominant in any straightforward fashion. The developing 
arrangements are closer to neo-corporatism, like that discussed at the end 
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of the previous chapter, in which the local state still matters, rather than 
a neo-pluralism dominated by business (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, Ch. 5). 
Notes. 
1. The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 for the first time gives 
local authorities in England and Wales an explicit power to spend money on 
economic development, but within strict financial limits. It also severely 
limits the potential value of setting up local authority backed companies 
(including enterprise boards) by imposing rules which mean that any 
. income received by those companies is counted against the parent council's 
capital allocations (although at the time of writing these clausess have 
not been implemented, apparently because they may conflict with the 
provisions of the Company Acts). 
2. These arguments fitted in with a number of other debates around the 
appropriate form which should be taken by socialist economic initiatives 
in the wake of the perceived failures of the left both in the U.K. and in the 
state socialist countries of the Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe. 
Stress was increasingly being placed on the need for alternatives to forms 
of central and bureaucratic planning. See, e.g., Gilhespy et a11986, Nolan 
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and Paine1986, Nove 1983. 
3. I am grateful to Jamie Gough for reminding me of the importance of this 
ambiguity whenever I am in danger of forgetting it. 
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Chapter 8. Looking at Sheffield: developing a case study 
So far the emphasis of our argument has been on broader theoretical 
questions and wider processes of restructuring. In the next four chapters 
the focus is shifted towards looking in more detail at the ways in which 
the local politics of economic development changed over the course of the 
1980s in one particular place. This chapter sets out to explain both why 
such a shift is necessary and why Sheffield has been utilied as a case 
study, before going on to outline the main features of the research process . 
. 8.1 Why a case study? 
Many of the most instructive discussions of local government and the 
local state draw on detailed empirical case studies. This is hardly 
surprising, since without such studies the practice of politics -
particularly professional politics - is likely to· remain hidden behind 
closed doors, finding only a distorted expression in the offical speeches of 
politicians or committee minutes. Although in doing so he undermines some 
of the more ambitious claims of the ESRC's Changing Urban and Regional 
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System research programme, Warde effectively justifies locality research 
as a particular example of the case study method, pointing out that it is as 
case studies that such research is most valuable, as long as the aims of 
the studies are clear, they are informed by appropriate theoretical 
frameworks, and the cases to be studied are appropriate to the issues 
under investigation (Warde 1989). 
There are four principal justifications for the case study method. The 
first is that made by Dunleavy, and referred to above (in Ch. 2), namely its 
use as a form of explication of already constructed wider theory, 
effectively showing how the theory works, and confirming its validity not 
. as an empirical example but as a working out of the theory (Dunleavy 1981, 
p. 199). But Williams forcefully criticises this approach, suggesting that 
in practice it is all to easily reduced to little more than "a search for 
illustrative instances" (Williams 1981, p. 34). Harvey has been accused of 
adopting this method but protests vigorously against those who criticise 
him (and other marxists) for 'reading off the particular from general 
theories (Harvey 1987, p. 373). As he presents the argument he is innocent 
of such charges. But, just as realist research can be caricatured as 
collapsing "scientific understandings into a mass of contingencies 
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exhibiting relations and processes special to each unique event" (Harvey 
1987, p. 373) in order to highlight some of the dangers of using it 
uncritically (and thoughtlessly), so the caricature expressed in the notion 
of 'reading off from grand theories provides a useful warning to those of 
us (including the author) who utilise overarching theories (or 
meta-theories) of society. Perhaps Marx was always able to avoid the sin 
of imposing a priori constructs on actual social relations; it is less clear 
that all of those who claim to follow his lead have always been so 
successful. 
Harvey himself argues for a second model, based on choosing some 
. relatively 'pure' case (e.g. Marx's choice of British capitalism in the 
nineteenth century) and using such a study to construct first 'concrete' and 
then more 'abstract' abstractions (such as value and surplus value in Marx's 
case). Similarly, in the case of the CURS projects, Smith stresses the need 
for a theoretically informed 'comparability' between the localities being 
researched (Smith 1987, p. 62). But one ofthe implication of this method 
is, of course, that it is necessary to choose the cases on the basis of some 
. 
already existing theoretical model (in Marx's case, a model of capitalism) 
(see also Bhaskar 1987, p.71). It is, perhaps, relatively easy to see why 
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Marx chose Britain for his analysis, although even in that case Cooke points 
out that the justification is not always well developed, but is assumed to 
be unchallengeable ("Why not choose the USA?" he asks. Cooke 1987b, p. 
411). In the second half of the twentieth century, however, it is even more 
difficult to identify the appropriate cases, perhaps that is why Harvey 
himself has sometimes used nineteenth century Paris. In practice choices 
are too often taken for granted with little serious attempt at detailed 
justification, as the frequent reappearance of a few regions (of 
Emilia-Romagna, Baden-WOrttemburg and Silicon Valley) in the literature 
of post-Fordist restructuring suggests (see, e.g. Sabel 1982, pp. 220-223 
. and 1989). Williams et al comment sharply that "The Italian regions are 
like Samuel Smiles heroes; they show us all that, with the right kind of 
effort, it is possible to rise above the disadvantage of humble origins" 
(Williams et a11987, p. 437). 
A third possibility is the highly criticised one of an ideographic 
approach, simply seeking to catalogue an endless series of uniquenesses, 
each of which might be interesting as a piece of local history but from 
which no more general conclusions can be drawn. As Warde points out, none 
of the researchers involved in the CURS projects saw themselves as 
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following this path although "some might unintentionally produce that kind 
of work" (Warde 1989, p. 275). Cooke's defence of Geertz' notion of 
·clinical inference" (and, by implication, "thick description") is, however, 
perhaps a more acceptable variant of this, encouraging generalisation 
within rather than across cases, in ways which then allow for a wider 
process of comparison between cases, as part of a process of 
·understanding the constitution of 'locality'" (Cooke, 1987a, p. 77). Geertz 
himself argues of his method that the "aim is to draw large conclusions 
from small, but very densely textured facts; to support broad assertions 
about the role of culture in the construction of collective life by engaging 
. them exactly with complex specifics" (Geertz1975, p.28). Whilst such an 
approach may be justifiable in the cultural and ethnographic studies with 
which Geertz engages and may, by analogy, also deliver important insights 
in the study of localities, it is difficult to see how it can provide an 
adequate basis for the exploration of more structured relationships 
(processes of political and economic restructuring) within a wider 
political economy. 
A fourth justification is a rather different one, rather closer to the 
arguments of Massey outlined earlier (in Chapter 3), and offering a more 
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realistic possibility of understanding political processes at local level. 
The search for 'generalisation' is likely to be a hopeless one: however many 
cases one investigates, they can always be disproved by a single counter 
example. A more modest suggestion may be that by focussing on the local 
• 
(and, of necessity, on individual cases) one can begin to explore the 
interaction of social processes otherwise identified in theories. Up to a 
point, such interaction can be seen as exemplifying generalisations and 
theories - or, in some cases, as undermining them - but its study is also 
important in its own right because it offers the possibility of political 
intervention and/or policy analysis. It will always be more messy and less 
certain than the grand theories, but that should not invalidate it. Such an 
approach does not imply a rejection of theory. Nor does it even imply 
agreement with Caste lis' formulation that: "we need humble but effective 
strategies of theory-building that can lead us away from short-sighted 
empiricism without becoming lost in the artificial paradises of the grand 
theory- (Castells 1983, p. xx). This may initially seem very attractive, but 
tends to underestimate the need for preliminary theorising, without which 
the choice of cases is likely to be arbitrary - or, worse, made on the basis 
of unstated assumptions. A concern to explore the interaction between 
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social and pOlitical processes at local level should not undermine the value 
of or need for theoretical development. The two go side by side and should 
not be divorced, as they have been rather too easily, both in the debates 
about locality and sometimes in the practice of research. Local research 
needs to be theoretically informed, just as global analysis needs to be 
empirically rooted and has no particularly privileged access to the holy 
grail of theory. 
The value of this approach and the way in which it influences what 
follows can be illustrated with the help of Figure 1 (below) 'which 
emphasises the processes of interaction to be explored in the case study of 
·Sheffield. Figure 1 offers a highly schematic picture of some of the key 
relationships which need to be explored in the analysis of the local 
politics of economic development. It highlights the complexity with which 
different processes interact to produce distinctive sets of policy 
initiatives and political arrangements at local level. Most of the arrows 
point in both directions to highlight the extent of interaction. 
The wider context is set by the operation of global politics and the 
global economy, which clearly set limits to and may even effectively 
determine what is possible at national level. But it is important to 
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Global Politics ~ ~ Local Politics 
Natilronom~catTial Relations L- ~ 
Global Economy ~ > Local Economy 
... Local Politics 
..... of Economic 
_ - Development 
Figure 1. A Schematic Picture of Some of the Relationships 
underlying the Local Politics of Economic Development 
acknowledge that local politics and the local economy have direct 
relationships with the global level: everything is not mediated through the 
national level. Such a conclusion would, of course, be readily accepted in 
the field of economics, since the U.K. has particularly open economy. The 
importance of international trade, the operations of the Citiof London and 
the impact of inward investment from overseas for particular localities is 
widely acknowledged. Indeed, it might be argued that, as far as the 
economic well-being of localities is concerned, it is their relationship 
with the global rather than the national economy which matters most. The 
significance of political interaction may perhaps still need to be shown 
rather more directly. In this context the example of the European 
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Commission (EC) and its structural funds is probably the clearest. The 
local politics of economic development increasingly also involve the 
maintenance and development of extensive relationships with the 
institutions of the EC and with local and regional authorities in other 
European countries. New sets of policy networks are being developed which 
link the local and global levels. 
The contention that the operation of local politics is influenced by 
national politics is not one which is likely to be seriously challenged from 
any source, but it is perhaps worth stressing three points for our purposes 
in this context. First, here we are talking not only of party politics and 
·ideologies - although the experience of the 1980s suggests that the 
importance of these should not be underestimated - but also of 
intraorganisational and professional politics. In other words, policy 
networks matter. Secondly, here above all perhaps, it is important to note 
the interaction implied by the arrows pointing in both directions. Just as 
the national political context sets limits to wt:lat can be done at local 
level, so apparently unconnected decisions taken in different places may 
come together to shape and change the ways in which politics have to be 
developed at national level. The saga of the 'poll tax' in the late 1980s is 
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one of the clearest reminders of that. Thirdly, following Dunleavy, it is 
important to recognise the existence of a national local government 
system, and to build on this to recognise the way in which a series of local 
initiatives can come together to produce a national movement (like 'local 
socialism'). 
At local level, an attempt has been made to indicate a complex series 
of linkages between local economy, local social relations, local political 
traditions and local politics. The intention is to highlight a degree of local 
autonomy resulting from the process of uneven development, but also to 
show how that autonomy fits into wider sets of relationships. It is not 
.absolute, and it is hoped that presenting the relationships in this way will 
make it easier to explore what makes the autonomy 'relative'. It is perhaps 
worth noting the absence of national political traditions and of national 
(or global) social relations in this figure. Their absence is one of the 
prices which has to be paid for the figure'S relative Simplicity. Clearly the 
political traditions which dominate in any particular place will 
themselves be the product of more complex processes of interaction over 
time and will almost certainly be linked to broader national traditions 
(such as those of the Conservative or Labour Parties), but our concern here 
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is to note the importance of the form that the tradition takes in a 
particular locality. Similarly, as should be clear from arguments developed 
. 
earlier - in Chapter 3 - there is no suggestion that there are localities in 
the U.K. which have somehow managed to escape from capitalist 
(patriarchal and racialised) social relations. But the concern here is to 
focus on what is distinctive, rather than what is shared. 
It may seem obvious that local politics effectively shapes the local 
politics of economic development as the figure suggests, but again it is 
worth spelling out quite what is meant here a little more clearly. There is 
certainly no straightforward equation between what is said in manifestos 
.and in the speeches of councillors and the practice of economic 
development at local level. The local political system includes a range of 
actors whose interaction produces policy outcomes refelected in the local 
politics of economic development. In particular, in addition to the open 
politics of committees, council meetings and official minutes, it includes 
introrganisational negotiation involving offici.al, professionals as well as 
councillors. It also includes party political organisations outside the 
council itself, and the representation of key interests at local level (most 
obviously in the context of this argument business and trade union 
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interests, but in principle other interests - e.g. reflected through single 
issue campaigns - might also be important). The institutional expressions 
of local politics may also have their own weight as they help to structure 
what is possible and what may legitimately be included on local political 
agendas. 
The figure suggests that the local politics of economic development 
is the resultant of the complex processes of interaction outlined above, 
particularly as reflected through the operations of the local economy and 
local politics. Again, some qualifications may be in order, if only to 
highlight the complexity, simplified in the figure. The representations of 
.both local politics and the local economy may also be important. For 
example, an understanding of local politics as dominated by the 'loony left' 
may influence both what is possible and what is attempted. SimIlarly, an 
understanding of the local economy as dominated by traditional 
manufacturing may encourage the development of policies intended to 
revive manufacturing industry. Equally important, it may be necessary to 
confirm the point made above that the linkages between the local politics 
of economic development and national and global politics and economy are 
not always mediated through the local level. The potential impact of global 
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(and national) economic restructuring is clear enough and at particular 
moments is likely to create and restrict opportunities for bargaining with 
. 
potential developers and investors. 
The operation of the local politics of economic development may 
itself also help to reshape the wider processes of local politics, for 
example by encouraging the questioning of old ways of doing things, and by 
encouraging the legitimation of particular political interests. It may help 
to change the political culture underlying the local system. The extent to 
which it can Significantly change or positively restructure the operations 
of the local economy is rather more open to question, and doubts about this 
.are expressed in the use of a dotted line feeding back from the politics of 
economic development to the local economy. It may be possible to identify 
some impact (and as we have seen in Chapter 7) a great deal of research 
time has been oriented towards discovering what it might be. But the most 
obvious changes so far seem to be in the field of politics rather than the 
economy. The local politics of economic de~elopment may also feed back 
into local political traditions and even into local social relations (for 
example, by helping to change the staus of particular forms of 
employment) but any such changes are more likely to be apparent in the 
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long rather than the short term. 
It is only by focusing in some detail the experience of a particular 
case that it is possible to explore the full complexity and subtlety of the 
interrelationships which we are trying to understand. But it is also 
necessary to have an understanding of the broader processes which 
influence and the context within which local developments take place. It is 
this which justifies the simplification expressed in Figure 1. The 
relationships which it identifies are those which need to be analysed more 
specifically at local level. They provide a starting point for, not the 
conclusion of, the necessary analysis. 
8.2 Why Sheffield? 
Here, we have chosen to concentrate on the development of new 
economic policies in Sheffield in the 1980s, with some reflection back to 
the 1970s and some forward to the beginning of the 1990s, as well as 
across to other councils with similar ambitions at the same time. The 
choice of Sheffield can pe justified on a number of grounds. It was a 
widely acknowledged leader in developing new initiatives at that time, 
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with a high national profile also reflected in the academic literature. Many 
of the issues identified earlier in terms of academic debates - particularly 
. 
as they relate to local autonomy and the scope for action - were actively 
discussed within the council at this time. If any local authority in the UK 
can be defined as a 'locality', Sheffield can. For Cooke, one of the aims (and 
results) of the ESRC's Changing Urban and Regional System research 
initiative was to make it possible to identify 'proactive' localities (Cooke 
1989, 1991). Sheffield probably has a greater claim to being 'proactive' 
than any of those studied within the project (with the possible exceptions 
of Swindon and Teesside). 
Not only has Sheffield been economically quite distinctive and 
self-contained, with its historic industrial bases, first in cutlery and then 
in steel and heavy engineering, but it has a local reputationfor social and 
political coheSion, as "The largest village in England" (Child and Paddon 
1984, p. 18 and Johnson and Cochrane 1981, p.34). Duncan and Goodwin use 
it as an example of a 'red island' in which "Iqcal causal relations" can be 
identified as important elements in the explanation of specifically local 
policy developments (both in housing and in economic policy) (Duncan and 
Goodwin 1988, pp. 58-9. See also Dickens et a11985, pp161-178). More 
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recently, it has been in the forefont of moves to public-private partnership 
and presented as a case by those seeking to encourage the spread of such 
initiatives (se'e, e,g" Field 1990 and Fogarty and Christie 1990, Ch. 4) 
Sheffield's new economic initiatives of the early 1980s represented 
one of the main elements of Sheffield's commitment to a form of local 
socialism. They were not part of any nationally agreed and determined 
strategy. Looking at their development more closely will also make it 
easier for us to assess the usefulness of the theoretical approaches 
discussed earlier. There are likely to be two principal constraints faced by 
any council seeking to develop socialist local economic policies: first, 
,those engendered by local government's position within a national system 
of government, or national state system; and secondly, those which stem 
from its relationship with the capitalist economy into which it is seeking 
to intervene (Gurr and King 1987). The local state may be autonomous in 
the sense that it has a degree of independence of the national state, while 
still being unable to escape from its role within the organisation of 
capitalism (e.g., following Harvey, because it is trapped within a process 
of competition for growth). These initiatives encourage a focus on the 
development of relations between the local state and industry, which will 
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be helpful in assessing the extent to which theories of corporatism have 
any purchase at local level, as well as making it possible to ask just how 
'local' its local socialism was, looking on the roles of professionals as 
well as politicians. The process of policy development in Sheffield 
illustrates the extent and importance of the constraints and limitations 
faced by local authorities in developing their independent programmes, but 
also suggests that there is still significant scope for local initiative. 
8.3 Researching Sheffield 
Although the bulk of the fieldwork took place in the 1980s, it built on 
earlier work undertaken in the late 1970s in connection with another 
project which was concerned with a comparison between local economic 
policy-making in the U.K. and the Federal Republic of Germany (published as 
Cochrane 1980, Johnson and Cochrane 1981). Sheffield was one of the case 
studies on which the U.K. side of the project was based. At that time 
interviews were conducted with a range of relevant council officers and 
politicians, as well as officers of the local trades council and chamber of 
commerce. Published and unpublished documents were. also studied (the 
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results of the Sheffield case study were summarised in Cochrane 1979). 
The importance of this work was both that it helped ensure access for the 
later research and that it made it possible to reflect back on and assess 
the significance of the changes at the start of the 1980s. It was not 
necessary to rely on the retrospective justifications of those who 
developed the new initiatives - or, at least, it was possible to set them 
alongside other assessments made when the council was still committed 
to the older policies. 
The core of the fieldwork took place in the early 1980s (1983-84), 
when the ambitions of the 'local socialists' were greatest, and the impact 
. of the changes was being felt most clearly. It was based around a lengthy 
and extensive series of interviews with politicians and officers (new and 
old) 1. Further interviews were conducted with representatives of the 
District Labour Party, the Trades Council and the Chamber of Commerce2. A 
range of published and unpublished documents produced within the 
Council's departments and by its politicians was considered, alongside 
other relevant local material (including local newspapers, reports and 
other documentary material prepared by the Labour Party, Trades Council 
and Chamber of Commerce)3. 
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In addition the research involved participation in work intended to 
prepare proposals for the Lower Don Valley. The Employment Department's 
initial proposals had been dismissed by the Labour Group and my 
involvement was part of an attempt to put together a more acceptable set 
of proposals. It resulted in the production of a report (Sheffield City 
Council Central Policy Unit 1984) which set the scene for later policy 
developments in the field. This participation ensured access to a series of 
interdepartmental meetings, and to internal documents associated with 
the Lower Don Valley. It also meant that it was possible (and necessary) to 
focus attention on one particular set of initiatives in discussion with a 
. range of officers and politicians, which made it easier to identify 
differences, tensions, power relations and areas of agreement between 
different groups, professionals and politicians. It not only highlighted 
differences between the Employment and Planning Department, but also 
differences in emphasis between politicians and the Employment 
Department, and differences within the department. Research also 
sometimes relies on chance and in this case proposals for the Lower Don 
Valley, which seemed rather marginal in the early 1980s, became far more 
central to the council's initiatives later in the decade, as well as providing 
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the basis for developed partnership initiatives and the setting up of the 
Sheffield Development Corporation. 
Contacts were sustained over the rest of the decade, and concerns 
raised in the first phase of fieldwork were followed up, often through 
more informal contact and discussion, particularly with senior officers of 
the Department of Employment and Economic Development. It was clear 
that changes were taking place and it became necessary to undertake more 
consistent follow up interviews and a more extensive review of 
documentary evidence which reflected these changes. Again, therefore, 
interviews were conducted with officers and councillors, but on a smaller 
. scale than in the first round, since it was possible to focus more narrowly 
on a limited range of concerns around particular initiatives and apparent 
shifts in emphases (the initiatives on which attention was focused were 
the Red Tape Studios and the Lower Don Valley - see Chapter 13 - and the 
significance of 'partnership' was a clear area of concern, alongside an 
interest in developing relationships with the European Commission)4. 
Stretching the research process out across the 1980s has had some 
clear disadvantages, in terms of sustaining interest, maintaining contact 
and making systematic links. But it has also had very clear advantages, 
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making it possible to pursue the development of a new set of iniatives 
from beginning to end and to intervene with a clearer understanding of. 
what matters at the end of the decade, based on analysis undertaken 
earlier. The Employment Committee and Employment Department set up in 
1981 ceased to exist in 1991, when they were absorbed by an expanded 
planning committee and planning department. Superficially it looked as if 
the process had turned full circle, drawing a relatively brief radical 
interlude to a close. But the research on which this thesis is based 
suggests that the changes which took place were more significant than 
that, even if they did not help to produce an alternative socialist model 
. capable of challenging Thatcherism . 
One danger of interview based research, particularly when supported 
by more informal forms of research (including what could be described as 
participant observation) is that the researcher becomes sucked into and 
begins to share the outlook of the group being researched. The interview 
format encourages this because the interviewer has to gain the confidence 
of the interviewee and gratitude at gaining access may also easily be 
transferred into sympathy for those who have granted it. These are points 
made forcibly and convincingly by Rosenberg, who points to the extent to 
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which he began to feel "a genuine sympathy and even respect for the elite 
professionals" (mainly treasurers and directors of social services 
departments) whom he was interviewing, despite an initial distance from 
them (and a political predeliction to distrust them) (Rosenberg 1989, p. 
244). How much easier it is to be drawn into such a position when the 
group being interviewed is already viewed more sympathetically by the 
researcher, as was the case here. Escaping from this potential captivity 
(as Rosenberg describes it) is partly a matter of understanding that it is a 
danger and partly a matter of drawing in evidence from a wide range of 
sources. These sources may be within the fieldwork, for example ensuring 
. that a range of different individuals (with potentially different ways of 
understanding the same events) are interviewed, or ensuring that wide 
range of other forms of evidence (from attendance at meetings,_ informal 
discussion, published and unpublished documentation) is considered. 
But other sources outside the fieldwork may also be important, for 
example reflected in the debates around 'Io,cality' which are discussed in 
Chapter 3 and which encourage a different way of cutting through the 
evidence. In this case an important aspect of gaining some distance from 
the detailed fieldwork was also simply one of time. At first, it was too 
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easy to get into the detailed agreements and disagreements of 
professionals and politicians, to record it and to give it a higher status 
than it deserved. Privileged access encouraged the researcher to feel that 
his grasp of detail meant he knew more about political processes than 
those with less access, but.it also effectively meant that it was too easy 
to get buried in the mass of detail with no clear lines coming through it. To 
a large extent those lines became clearer over time (partly because other 
researchers were also writing about Sheffield - e.g., in particular, Seyd 
and Lawless), and as a result it was easier to return to the detail and 
interrogate it once more. 
Notes 
1. Those interviewed at this time (sometimes more than once) included: 
John Benington (Employment Coordinator), Rab Bird (Municipal Enterprise, 
Employment Department), David Blunkett (Leader of Sheffield City Council, 
later M.P.), David Bradley (Planning Department), Andrew Coulson 
(Economic Development and Major Investments, Employment Department), 
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Peter Cromar (Aids to Enterprises, Employment Department), John Darwin 
(New Technology, Employment Department, later Deputy Director and 
Director), David George (Estates Surveyor), Chris Freegard (Planning 
Department, later Director of Planning, Sheffield Development 
Corporation), Geoff Green (Principal Strategy Officer), G. Jennings 
(Treasurer's Department), Ron Knowles (Chief Personnel Officer), Alan 
McGauley (Sheffield Co-operative Development Group), Bill Michie (Chair of 
Employment Committee, later M.P.), David Morgan (Councillor, member of 
Employment Committee), Mick Paddon (Employment Resources and Research 
Unit, Employment Department), Ian Podmore (Chief Executive), Jude 
. Stoddart (Women's Officer, Employment Department), Arroll Winning 
(Director of Recreation Department), and Peter Wigley (Head of Publicity 
Department). 
2. These included interviews with Dan Sequerra, then Chair of the District 
Labour Party and member of Employment Working Party, later Director of 
the Employment Department (and the renamed Department of Employment 
and Economic Development). 
3. Where quoted or used directly, these documents are listed in the 
references, but many of those studied are not listed there because they 
276 
have not been used in that way. All of them have, however, helped to shape 
the assessments made in this thesis. The references are listed as far as 
possible in the form in which they were published. No attempt has been 
made to impose a universal system on them: this means that in some cases 
they will appear as publications of City of Sheffield, in others as City of 
Sheffiled MDC and in others as Sheffield City Council, as well as under the 
names of the departments which produced them. 
4. The main interviews conducted in 1989 were undertaken with Helen 
Jackson (Chair of the Employment Committee), Paul Skelton (Principal 
Strategy Officer seconded to Municipal Enterprise, Employment 
. Department), Moira Sutton (Manager of Red Tape Studios), Ursula Edmonds 
(European Officer, Treasurer's Department). Interviews were also 
conducted with Dan Sequerra (Director of Employment and Economic 
Development) between 1988-1989, with Eric Wright, the Regional Director 
of the Department of Trade and Industry and with David Blunkett (by then 
an M.P). 
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Chapter 9. Sheffield: background and context 
Sheffield was one of a small number of authorities in the early 1980s 
which was identified with, and whose political leadership explicitly 
identified it with, various experiments in the development of local 
socialism (see, e.g. Alcock and Lee 1981, Blunkett 1981 a, c and 1984b, 
Blunkett and Green 1983, and Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, Green, G. 
1987). Outside London, it was the council most closely associated with the 
development of socialist local economic strategies, and in 1981 was the 
first to set up a separate and identifiable Employment Department (see, 
e.g., Alcock et a11984, Blunkett and Green 1983, pp.7-20, Coulson and 
Baker 1984, Goodwin 1986, Grayson 1983). For our purposes, the 
development of Sheffield's employment initiatives is of interest, not only 
for its own sake (for example, because the initiatives themselves may 
illustrate alternatives to standard or traditional forms of economic 
intervention by the state) but also because of the light it casts on wider 
debates about the nature of the local state and local politics. 
As the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested, there are two 
particular debates on which we intend to reflect with the help of a 
consideration of the Sheffield experience: the first concerns itself with 
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the nature of the local state, and the second with the notions of locality, 
local social relations and local pOlitics. In principle, one might expect 
these two debates to overlap and interrelate to a significant extent, but in 
practice they tend to exist in separate conceptual boxes which makes it 
difficult for either of them adequately to explain the operation of local 
political systems. The need to break out of the conceptual restraints of the 
two debates can be seen in a discussion of Sheffield, and the value of 
bringing them together can be illustrated from a consideration of the 
Sheffield experience. Understanding and exploring policy change at local 
level implies both a need to locate it within the structures of a wider 
political and economic system, and a need to locate it precisely within a 
particular place at a particular time. 
9.1 Location and economic structure 
Sheffield has traditionally been a rather self-contained city. It is not 
surrounded by a 'Greater Sheffield' of the type familiar from some of 
Britain's other metropolitan areas - South Yorkshire was never centred on 
one city, but is made up of four relatively independent and quite distinct 
urban centres, in terms of economic structure, social and political 
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structures (Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham and Sheffield). This is 
stressed by Smith in his analysis of Sheffield's political development 
through the nineteenth century, and contrasted sharply with Birmingham's 
position at the centre of a regional communications network (Smith 1982, 
pp. 255-256). An official report commented as long ago as 1889 that 
Sheffield was more like a village than a town, "for over wide areas each 
person appears to be acqainted with every other, and to be interested with 
that other's concern" (quoted in Smith 1982, p. 31). And this comment was 
. . 
still echoed in popular consciousness in the 1980s. Hampton notes of the 
Sheffield's reputation as 'the largest village' in England, adding that "the 
phrase has much accuracy; but the implied sneer has little relevance to the 
attractive city of the 1970s" (Hampton 1978, p. 155). 
Sheffield's growth has not been based on large scale in-migration 
from outside its region. On the contrary, compared with other industrial 
cities in the U.K., it has always drawn less on the waves of international 
migration whether from Ireland in the nineteenth century or from the U.K.'s 
old colonies in the post War period. Even after the immigration of the 
1950s and 1960s, the proportion of residents who had been born in the 
U.K.'s 'Commonwealth, colonies and protectorates' was well below the 
national average (Hampton 1970, Table 2.2). At the beginning of the 1970s 
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Hampton summed up Sheffield's position: "The general impression remains, 
therefore, of a city which is homogeneous in its population, relatively 
static in its composition and comparatively unaffected by the outside 
influences that affect a major centre of commerce and communications" 
(Hampton 1970, p. 38) 1. 
Sheffield's employment structure has historically been dominated by 
a limited number of industries. It is well known as 'Steel City' (see Beattie 
1986) and until the end of the 1970s, the dominant employment for men in 
Sheffield was in specialist engineering (including hand tools) and in the 
manufacture of steel, particularly special steels. In the mid 1970s, nearly 
30% of Sheffield's working population was employed in metal 
manufacturing and metal goods n.e.s., compared with around 5% for the 
country as a whole (South Yorkshire County Council 1976). In 197745% of 
male employment was in steel and engineering (Sheffield Trades Council 
1982, p. 7). Although the city's cutlery industry is famous, its importance 
in terms of employment has declined dramatically since the late 1950s 
(fron 11700 in 1959 to less than 4000 in the mid 1980s). Until the 19805, 
the proportion of employees in the service sector was significantly below 
the national average, in part because of its strong manufacturing base, and 
in part because Leeds has traditionally been the region's main office and 
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administrative centre. 
Sheffield's steel industry has always been rather unusual within the 
British industry, since "it unites the 'upstream' activities of melting and 
mining with the 'downstream' activities of metal manufacturing and 
engineering. The specific nature of Sheffield's steel making and its close 
links with the user industries locally, makes any clear distinction between 
steel and engineering in the city virtually meaningless" (Child and Paddon 
1984, p. 19). Although Sheffield did have a low-cost quantity steel sector, 
its industrial structure was not dominated by basic steel production, but 
characterised by a wide range of steel related products. Historically, the 
cutlery, machine tool and engineering industries relied on and encouraged 
an emphasis on the production of high-quality steels (Coates 1976, p. 19). 
Even within the region there was a division of labour between Rotherham -
which concentrated more on basic steel production - and Sheffield. 
Although the British Steel Corporation owned several large plants in 
Sheffield, the private sector was more significant in Sheffield than in 
most other 'steel towns', largely because of the importance of special 
steels in the city. Whilst they were producing relatively low volumes of 
steel - and thus escaped nationalisation in 1967 - the private producers 
were mainly in high value special steels so that firms such as Hadfield's 
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retained a larger proportion of the market in value terms. Even Sheffield's 
SSC plants ~ere specialist, producing almost all the corporation's 
stainless steel. Unlike most of SSC's divisions, the Sheffield division was 
profitable through most of the 19705, and attracted new investment in arc 
furnaces. 
In the 1960s it was widely feared within the city that Sheffield 
would lose, or already had lost, a large number of its main sources of 
employment. A number of pressures were identified as potential sources of 
problems. The smaller firms - which had provided and important base in 
subcontracting, cutlery and hand tools - were being absorbed by larger 
concerns or finding it difficult to compete and being forced to close. They 
were also coming under pressure as the result of the council's 
redevelopment policies and the stricter application of environmental 
standards. The cutlery industry was being damaged by foreign competition, 
and it was predicted that the larger steel companies would also face 
difficulties and a run-down in employment. At least one major steel works 
was expected to close. These fears found formal expression in the city 
council's submission to the Hunt Committee on Intermediate Areas (Hunt 
1969) and Sheffield was included in an Intermediate Area for the purposes 
of regional policy in 1972. 
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Table 1. Percentage of workforce unemployed. 1966-75 and 1979 . 
Average unemployment 
rates, 1966-75. 
Unemployment rate, 
Feb., 1979. 
South Yorkshire 3.4 6.3 
South Yorkshire, 
excluding Sheffield 4.4 
Sheffield 2.4 4.8 
Great Britain 2.8 5.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: South Yorkshire County Council 1975; Department of Employment 
Gazette. 
Although the fears seemed to find little justification in the 
. . 
unemployment statistics of the 1960s and 1970s, when the city's levels of 
unemployment remained at or below the national average, and significantly 
below those of South Yorkshire as a whole (see Table 1), there were 
already some signs of change. Reference has already been made to the 
continuing decline of the cutlery industry, which has had a high political 
profile as a symbol of Sheffield's prosperity, and over the decade 
1961-1971, 25,000 jobs were lost in manufacturing industry as a whole. 
Between 1971 and 1983 it has been estimated that there was a reduction 
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of nearly 60% in employment in the steel industry, amounting to around 
17,000 jobs. The decline was sharpest after 1979. Between 1971 and 1976 
employment in steel only fell by around 18% and it actually rose between 
1976 and 1979 to around 87% of its 1971 level, before falling dramatically 
(City of Sheffield Employment Department 1984, p. 2). In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, Sheffield's apparent strength in the private sector and in 
special steels became its Achilles' heel, as that sector was hit by a major 
slump and restructuring across Europe. By 1981 Sheffield's private 
producers were making substantial losses (City of Sheffield Employment 
Department 1984, p. 12). 
During the 1970s, the rate of change was relatively slow. And the 
gradual decline in manufacturing was masked by gradual increases in other 
sectors of the economy, although these also tended to employ different 
people. Although levels of service employment in Sheffield remaine:d below 
the national average, the share of service employment began to increase 
through the 1970s, and to grow at a faster ~ate than in Great Britain as 
whole. Between 1971 and 1975 employment in services and distribution 
rose from 42.8 to 48.3% in Sheffield, while rising from·S4.2 to 56.3% in 
Great Britain as a whole (South Yorkshire County Council 1976). Between 
1971 and 1984 manufacturing employment in the Sheffield Travel to Work 
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Area fell from 48 to 27% of employees in employment, while employment 
in services rose from 44 to 64% (Gibbon 1989, p. 6). By the late 1980s over 
70% of the workforce was employed in services and distribution (City of 
Sheffield 1987) and numbers employed in steel were down to 13000 
(Lawless and Ramsden 1990, p. 3). 
Probably the biggest area of growth has been in public services, which 
account for nearly one third of all jobs in the city. The City Council was 
the largest single employer throughout the decade, directly employing 
about 17% of the workforce in the mid 1980s (Child and Paddon 1984, p. 
19). Other major public service employers include the Area Health 
Authority, the University (third largest employer in 1988) and the 
Polytechnic (Gibbon 1989, p. 7). But there has also been a marked growth in 
employment in private sector services (accounting for 43% of the 
workforce2), in part encouraged by the commercial and office development, 
fuelled at the start of the 1970s by Sheffield's position as the closest 
Intermediate Area to London, which meant that it was not subject to 
Office Development Permits. The best known moves to Sheffield have been 
the Midland Bank's International Office, the Manpower Services 
Commission (now the Training Agency) and, in the early 1980s, the 
National Union of Mineworkers. 
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An important shift associated with the changing industrial structure 
over the last few decades has been in the nature of the workforce. 
Sheffield's traditional industries were heavily dominated by male 
employment. Around 90% of those employed in the steel industry were men, 
and steel and engineering accounted for around 45% of male employment in 
the late 19705 (Child and Paddon 1984, p. 19, Sheffield Trades Council 
1982, p. 7). According to Hampton, in the 1960s some commentators 
described it as the most proletarian city in Europe "in which manual 
occupations, and especially skilled manual occupations form[ed] a large 
proportion of the job opportunities" (Hampton 1970, p. 47). In the mid 
1970s, the proportion of women in paid employment was still significantly 
lower than in the rest of Great Britain, and much lower than in 
neighbouring cities such as Nottingham, where women have traditionally 
been employed in manufacturing industry. That has changed with the 
changes in industrial structure, since women have been employed in 
greater numbers in the service sector, and 'levels of female employment 
are much closer to the national average (Child and Paddon 1984, p.19). 
Throughout the 1970s the most important changes were taking place 
beneath the surface in shifts from manufacturing to services, from male to 
female employment, to the extent that past assumptions about the 
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importance of traditional proletarians - men of steel - were becoming 
increasingly unconvinci!1g. 
The significance of this, however, was easily missed in the context of 
the sudden whirlwind of slump which hit at the start of the 198053. The 
sharpness of the change is difficult to exaggerate. Until then, it looked as 
if Sheffield might escape the impact of recession which had already hit 
regions such as the West Midlands so hard. The extent of the shock provides 
an important backdrop to the development of new policies within local 
government. In 1981 unemployment rose above the national average for the 
first time and resolutely stayed there throughout the 19805 (between 2.5 -
·4% higher at the end of the decade. Gibbon 1989, p. 4). "Sheffield began 
1987 with the DHSS as the major 'paymaster' in the City. 50,000 people of 
working age draw benefit rather than earn a wage - and almost one in three 
have not had work for over two years. Some have yet to experience work at 
all - Sheffield has one of the highest unemployment rates in the nation" 
(City of Sheffield 1987, p. 2). The city's major industrial areas which once 
looked so indestructible as they belched out fire and smoke had been razed 
to the ground as a potent visual symbol of the change, and this was 
reflected in the language of local politics, which reached back to its old 
traditions for support. 
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According to David Blunkett, who was leader of the Council, and Geoff 
Green, who was a senior policy officer, "Sheffield's major industrial area, 
the Lower Don Valley, has been devastated. Only five years ago its 
factories employed 40,000 people in steelmaking and the downstream 
processes of stamping, forging and engineering. Now only half that number 
are empoyed. Factories have been closed, some have been demolished, and 
the new half empty factory units are beleagured in a great new wasteland" 
(Blunkett and Green 1983, p. 7). A council document argued that, "The 
causes of this massive decline are structural, but the consequences 
manifest themselves spatially in the Lower Don Valley ... We see the effect 
in Attercliffe - empty land, silent factories, derelict buildings, shabby 
housing, boarded up shops unemployment and poverty ... Factory closures 
have left large tracts of vacant and despoiled land, millions of square feet 
of empty, often semi-derelict buildings" (Sheffield City Council Central 
Policy Unit 1984, pp. 5 and 7). Symbolically, the Lower Don Valley was at 
the heart of the city's economy and acted as the base to which its Labour 
leaders have frequently referred back. When Sheffield's mayor proudly 
celebrated the city as the most proletarian in Europe alongside Lille in 
France, it was this tradition of heavy industry and the community of 
Attercliffe that he was recalling (quoted in Alcock a~d Lee 1981, p. 74) .. 
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The jobs which were lost, then, were in the traditional sectors which 
in the past not only provided the base for Sheffield's prosperity, but were 
also vitally important in the political formation of the local Labour 
leadership. It was against this background of decline and restructuring 
that the City Council attempted to intervene in the local economy to 
influence the direction of change. But the appropriate forms of 
intervention and the direction in which change should be encouraged have 
not always been clear. Decisions have been made within contexts 
bequeathed from the past, not only in terms of economic prospects and 
problems, but also in terms of political programme. The complex 
interrelationship between the city's economic base, its political formation 
and its position within a wider economic and political framework helped to 
ensure that local economic policy was a site of major debate during the 
1980s. 
9.2 Politics and the unions 
The roots of Sheffield's particular form of Labour politics are to be 
found in the industrial development which made the city grow in the 
second part of the nineteenth century. Building on ~n already existing base 
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of skilled metal manufacture and cutlery, the heavy steel and engineering 
industries began to transform Sheffield's 'East End' (the Lower Don and 
Sheaf Valleys) from the 1860s on. "During the nineteenth century the steel 
industry of Sheffield was transformed from a collection of some hundreds 
of small craft workshops concentrated mainly on cutlery to a group of 
mammoth companies involved in the manufacture of such products as steel 
plate, rails and girders. The small men continued in the cutlery and light 
engineering trades, but the emphasis had shifted to the giants" (Singleton 
1970, p. 45). Not only did they create massive new industrial plants, but 
whole new communities were thrown up around them, in areas such as 
. Attercliffe, Handsworth and Brightside. By the turn of the century, 
"Sheffield was divided so that the mansions were in the west end, while 
north, south and east were full to overflowing with slums and rows of 
barrack-like houses, crowding right to the gates of its factories and 
workshops, black with the filth of industry" (Murphy 1941, p. 33). 
The arrival of the new industries also prought changes in the local 
politics of labour. Previously, this had been dominated by craftsmen, who 
were either employed in or owned small workshops, arld were not 
necessariy committed to one employer for any length of time. The most 
active workers were "skilled organised, almost guild-proud craftsmen" 
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(Hobsbawm 1969, p. 72). Their politics tended to be radical or liberal, 
rather than ~ocialist or collectivist in orientation, although they might 
also lead to dramatic 'terrorist' acts such as those associated with the 
'Sheffield Outrages' of the 1860s, when the craft societies responded 
violently to what they saw as threats to their security and independence 
(see, e.g. Pollard 1971). Smith contrasts the neighbourhood based 
'particularism' of the skilled working class of Sheffield with the higher 
levels of participation in political and welfare organisations common 
among members of the same class in Birmingham, and notes that this made 
it more difficult for employers to influence these workers in Sheffield, 
but also made it more difficult for the workers to organise wider political 
campaigns (Smith 1982, p. 256). This tradition survived, at least as an 
undercurrent, for some time and there was even an identifiable 'anarchist 
movement in the city in the last decade of the century (Quail 1982, p. 101, 
and Rowbotham 1976, pp159-172). It has helped to provide an often 
romanticised past to which Sheffield's left can appeal, without worrying 
too much about its historical basis. So, for example, Pollard identifies a 
pedigree, stressing the region's continued "independence of spirit, its 
rebelliousness" (Pollard 1976, p. 5). 
Despite this search for roots in the more distant past, it is not until 
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the growth of the steel and heavy engineering industries that it becomes 
possible to i~entify the development of a more coherent local politics. 
Although Blunkett and Jackson, K. (1987, pp. 47-48) suggest a longer 
tradition of municipal activism as part of their case for the importance of 
local politics, Smith argues that until the last decade of the nineteenth 
century even Sheffield's bourgeois politics were very weak, with few of 
the ambitions of 'gas and water socialism' which characterised cities such 
as Birmingham. There was a heavy reliance on charitable donations with 
little support from the town council. It was only with the beginnings of 
pressure from below (following the formation of a local Labour 
Representation Committee in 1903) that local government began to take a 
significantly active form (Smith 1982, pp. 241-242). Smith comments that 
"In local government...the decisive pressures emanated from the 
development of class conflicts in the industrial sphere" (Smith 1982, p. 
242) and these developed as the craft industries (or light trades) began to 
be superseded in importance by heavier industry . 
The new industries ensured that large numbers of workers were 
drawn together in big factories, but at first the labour process in steel 
was based on the contract system, so that workers were employed through 
foremen rather than directly by the main employers. Contrary to the 
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arguments of Goodwin (1986, pp. 22-23) this seems to have meant that 
unionisation in the steel industry was relatively slow until the first years 
of the twentieth century. Even then the employers were reluctant to give 
recognition to the unions seeking to represent the production workers in 
the steel industry, who were often still casually employed. Until the First 
World War the steel trades unions were not fully recognised in the main 
plants, but the War itself ensured trade union recognition as the pressures 
for increased production from military demand meant that the employers 
were prepared to make concessions to maintain production and increase 
profits (Howard 1976, pp. 59-73). The steel firms effectively became arms 
. manufacturers for the duration of the war. 
Engineering workers were organised at an earlier stage and the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers had developed a strong base ,in the city 
by the turn of the century, in part because it included members in the older 
('light') trades. IncreaSingly, however, its membership was concentrated in 
the new industries, with 13 out of 15 ASE branches being based in 
Sheffield's East End by 1914 (Hinton 1969, p. 218). In these industries, the 
engineers were in the more skilled and more secure positions, representing 
about 13% of the workforce in the 'heavy' trades in 1911 (Hinton 1969, p. 
217). They provided an underpinning on the basis of which the others - in 
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less skilled trades - could organise, and their centrality to munitions 
production (e.g. in the great Vickers plant in Brightside) gave them 
additional strength as suppliers first to the naval armaments race of first 
decade of the twentieth century and then for the First World War. 
The experience of the steel and engineering unions in their fight for 
organisation brought different attitudes from those which dominated in 
the more traditional trades. Because the new unions were used to having to 
fight for recognition they tended to see the employers more explicitly as 
their enemies. Even before they were fully recognised by the employers, 
the steel and engineering unions began to stamp their mark on the local 
. labour movement, partly through their superior organisation and partly 
simply by force of numbers as their membership grew. They set out 
successfully to influence the Labour Representation Committee and in 
1908 took the initiative in setting up the Trades and Labour Council which 
explicitly linked the unions and the electoral politics of labour. The Trades 
and Labour Council effectively excluded representatives of the 'lighter' 
trades, which continued to organise through their own separate trades 
council, until 1919, when their council was absorbed by the Trades and 
Labour Council (Goodwin 1986, pp. 22-23, and Smith 1982, p. 246. The 
history of the Sheffield Trades Council is recorded in Pollard 1959). 
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Sheffield's engineering industry was one of the centres of the 
unofficial shop stewards' movement during the First World War, and the 
successes of this movement helped to confirm the dominance of socialist 
ideas within local labour politics. The shop stewards succeeded in gaining 
exemptions from conscription for skilled men and for a time seemed to 
threaten more radical - even revolutionary - change. They were in a 
position to negotiate directly with the state, something which more 
respectable methods had not achieved in a generation (see Moore 1960). J.T. 
Murphy, who became a founder member of the Communist Party, was one of 
the unofficial leaders in Sheffield, and a theorist of revolutionary 
syndicalism (Murphy 1918). Even at the height of the agitation in Sheffield, 
however, there was no equivalent political movement to the one which 
developed within industry, although a Sheffield Worker's Committee was 
set up briefly in 1917 and some attempts were made to move beyond the 
base of skilled workers, for example, by seeking to involve the new women 
workers. But the tensions between the more radical leadership and their 
supporters was apparent in strikes in favour of craft privileges which also 
took place in 1917 (Hinton 1969, p. 284. See Hinton 1973 for a discussion 
of the wider political significance of the shop stewards' movement)4, An 
informal division between industrial and electoral politics was 
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inaugurated and sustained. The Communist Party was to develop an 
important role within Sheffield's trade unions, dominating the industrial 
side of local1abour politics, but in electoral politics support for the 
Labour Party was maintained. In 1926 Labour took control of the City 
Council, only losing it twice since then - for short periods, in 1932 and 
1968. 
Labour's initial success in Sheffield was based on its roots in the 
unions, which also found expression in the development of tight knit 
communities around the steel plants, where the Labour vote remained high 
from the 1920s onwards. This base in the trade unions and related 
communities was to remain important for fifty years and was reinforced 
both by continued industrial centralisation in large units in Sheffield's 
narrow industrial belt, and by the apparent success of the alliance between 
the trade unions and the Labour Party in power at local level. Because of 
the existing weakness of urban politics, and the lack of a strong and active 
involvement by the local employers in the running of the local state, labour 
was able to take a leading role much earlier than was the case in some 
other major industrial cities (such as Birmingham) (Smith 1982). Although 
areas such as Attercliffe and Brightside changed dramatically after 1945 
as redevelopment moved people away from their close proximity to the 
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steel plants, and their sometimes poisonous pollution, the new council 
estates sustained an equally secure electoral base for Sheffield's Labour 
councillors (Hampton 1970, p. 155). Attercliffe became more important as 
a reference point than as a living political entity - it represented a golden 
past of working class community within Labour's local mythology5. 
The local pOlitics of Labour which dominated in Sheffield were by no 
means exceptional. No doubt it would be possible to identify detailed 
differences between Sheffield and other Labour controlled councils in 
Yorkshire, but it is more accurate to see the Council as part of the 
mainstream of municipallabourism, within which, according to Gyford, 
Labour groups tended to provide a "political climate" within which officers 
could initiate a range of welfare and education services. By the 1930s, 
Sheffield was like most other Labour councils "in providing more generous 
public assistance benefits, more extensive maternity and child welfare 
services and more spending per child on education" than those controlled by 
other parties (Gyford 1985, pp. 5-6). A summary of the first six years of 
Labour control, prepared by the Council leadership as part of their election 
campaign, stressed the financial responsibility of the council, its 
commitment to welfare and muniCipal provision (Rowlinson 1982). 
According to David Blunkett's introduction, these were "the pioneers who 
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laid the foundations for the magnificent Socialist City of which we are all 
so proud". Elsewhere Blunkett drew on the history of Labour control in 
Sheffield to stress that Labour had always been committed to "collective 
community provision" (Blunkett 1984, p. 7), and this tradition of well 
managed service provision was the basis of Labour's programme while in 
office - in parks and refuse disposal, as well as council housing, social 
services and education (see Savage 1987 for a discussion of the similar 
ways in which Labour's programme developed in Preston). 
There were continuing close relationships between activists in the 
unions and in the Labour Party. Wainwright stresses the importance of this 
"intimacy" and notes the extent to which it was carried on through 
generations - "often quite literally different generations of the same 
families, like the Caborns, Flannerys and Bartons" (Wainwright 1987, p. 
106). She might have added the Hattersleys. For much of the post 1945 
period there was an unwritten, but nevertheless widely acknowledged, 
agreement in Sheffield which assumed that the industrial side of local 
politics would be dominated by the Communist Party, whilst the local 
state was left to the Labour Party. Until 1974 this division of 
responsibility found its institutional expression in the meetings of the 
Trades and Labour Council. Councils of this sort were not unusual in 
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Britain's major cities until the national Labour Party and the Trades Union 
Congress agreed that it was necessary formally to separate industrial 
activity and electoral politics. These councils brought together delegates 
from trade unions and the Labour Party to discuss both local government 
issues and issues which affected people at work, community and industrial 
issues. And they also meant that members of parties other than the Labour 
Party could discuss Labour Party issues and directly influence Party 
decisions. In the case of Sheffield, the Trades and Labour Council offered a 
forum in which the leading figures in the trade unions (including officials) 
could meet and discuss issues with leading local councillors. It was, for 
example, the Trades and Labour Council which took the first steps in 
leading to the development of comprehensive education in Sheffield 
(Hampton 1970, pp. 235-6). 
Since 1974, those links have been more informal, but the legacy 
survives in the form of a joint Secretary who serves both the Trades 
Council and the District Labour Party, created after the dissolution of the 
Trades and Labour Council. Throughout the 1980s the person in this post 
was also one of the leading Labour councillors. Nevertheless the breaking 
up of the old joint council does seem to have heralded (but probably not 
caused) the gradual decline of the old political arrangements more broadly. 
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As we have seen Sheffield's trade union movement was largely based on 
the steel and engineering industries and the unions associated with them. 
And in the 1970s, those unions continued to play an important role in local 
politics, being regularly consulted by councillors on most major issues 
(such as the setting up of a new Employment Department in 1980), 
particularly through the local Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions. But with the decline of those industries the importance 
of such consultations declined, and the District Labour Party became a 
more significant forum for debate and political legitimation. The 
traditional trade unions are still sometimes given a higher profile in 
political debate than their membership might suggest, but their position is 
no longer taken for granted. The Trades Council remains an active force, 
still with a significant membership in the traditional industries, but 
increasingly also reflecting pressures from new unions, such as NALGO, to 
the extent that at the end of the 1980s the majority of delegates came 
from public sector unions (Child and Paddon 1984, Wainwright 1987, p. 
108). In some ways, this makes the hoped for division between industrial 
and electoral politics difficult to sustain because the Trades Council is 
also frequently used as a platform for debates over council policy, 
particularly when there are disputes between the council and its 
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employees. But in practice it may also reinforce the significance of the 
division between the Trades Council and the District Labour Labour Party, 
since the former becomes identified as the place in which industrial 
disputes may legitimately be discussed (even with the local Council), 
whilst the latter is seen as the appropriate place for policy discussion 
(rather than the discussion of industrial disputes). 
9.3 Politics within the Council 
The politics of the City Council were changing before 1980, when 
David Blunkett became leader and Sheffield became one of the 'local 
socialist' councils identified by Gyford. But the shifts taking place were 
not always apparent from the outside, in part because one legacy of trade 
union involvement in local politics was a stress on internal discipline and 
a distrust of public argument. Even in the late 1970s, few would have 
predicted that Sheffield City Council was likely to develop a reputation for 
its 'radical' or 'Ieft'-wing policies in the 1980s. The way in which change 
was achieved, almost incrementally, provides a good example of the 
structures of council politics within which the wider changes of the early 
1980s were achieved. 
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Ron Ironmonger (later Sir Ron) was elected leader of the Labour Group 
in 1966 and was seen seen to be a more democratic and open leader than 
those who had preceeded him (Goodwin 1986, p. 29). In practice, however, 
he retained effective control over a Labour Group which remained highly 
disciplined. Ironmonger was a strong leader well known in the city and the 
wider national local government system, although he never took on a 
leading position in the Association of Municipal Corporations. Despite some 
involvement with the left of the Labour Party early in his council career 
(in the 1940s) few would have placed him on the left in the 1960s. 
Hampton describes one major issue of conflict over the introduction of a 
. rent-rebate scheme in the late 1960s, when the left in the Trades and 
Labour Council and in various tenants' groups campaigned for a greater 
contribution from the rates against Ironmonger and other leaders of the 
Labour Group (Hampton 1970, pp 258ff). 
Elsewhere, Hampton outlines both Ironmonger's strengths and his 
position in the political spectrum (Hampton .1976, pp. 153-156). In 
retrospect Ironmonger can be seen as attempting to manage important 
changes in Sheffield's local pOlitics, which gathered pace after his 
departure for the newly created South Yorkshire County Council in 1974. 
The membership of the City Council had traditionally been dominated by 
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men, predominantly drawn from the ranks of the trade unions. According to 
Hampton, "tl}e virtues they honoured were those of loyalty and 
self-improvement" (Hampton 1978, p. 153). By the early 1960s the average 
age of sitting councillors was such that many of this generation were 
retir~ng to be replaced by younger people, the products of the post-war 
educational system and "frequently .. .from middle class occupations" 
(Hampton 1978, p. 159). In this respect, Sheffield was reflecting shifts 
which were taking place throughout the country (Gordon and Whitely 1979) 
as Labour Party activists were being drawn less and less from the working 
class and more from the middle class and party membership was declining 
(see, e.g., Hindess 1971 and Whitely 1983). According to Hampton, the new 
councillors tended to have a higher degree of ideological commitment to 
particular pOlicies, such as the introduction of comprehensive education, 
which had not previously had a high profile within the council. They were 
prepared to challenge conventions which emphasised the prime importance 
of the effective management and distributio'n of existing services. More 
important, perhaps, they were not prepared to accept the very tight party 
discipline handed down from above which had characterised Sheffield's 
Labour Group in the post-war period (Hampton 1978, p. 154). 
Ron Ironmonger was the leadership candidate accepted both by the old 
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and new breeds of councillor. According to Hampton, "he represented the 
younger element while sharing the background and long council experience 
of the older members" ( Hampton 1978, p.154). And his management of the 
council reflected this position, attempting to achieve consensus within the 
Labour Group, but ready to "give a firm lead towards his interpretation of 
consensus" (Hampton 1978, p. 159). In his period as leader, it became 
possible for differences to develop within the group and to be settled 
without dramatic splits taking place. In practice this meant that his role 
as leader was a central one, with much debate handled through him, and the 
main emphasis of politics remaining on the Labour Group, rather than Party 
organisations or community based organisations. As the influence of 
traditional trade unionism faded, Ironmonger's position as leader appeared 
to leave him with a high degree of individual power because he was able to 
manage coflict (and achieve consensus) within the Labour Group, with the 
authority of Council organisation behind him. Although groups outside the 
- . 
Council were consulted, Ironmonger's main focus was on the Council and 
the Labour Group within it. He was able to develop a form of discipline 
within the Group based not on diktat from aboye, but wide agreement and 
acceptance that divisions would weaken the Labour's position in what 
remained a hostile anti-socialist external environment. 
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Despite the changes heralded by his election, Ironmonger can also be 
seen as one of the more positive examples of a wider British tradition of 
municipallabourism, described by Gyford (1985, pp. 2-13. See also Goss 
1988, particularly Ch. 2). After 1945 it was Labour authorities of this type 
which most enthusiastically took up the possibilities of developing the 
local welfare state, particularly through expenditure on housing, education 
and social services (see, e.g., Sharpe and Newton 1984 on differences 
between Labour and Conservative controlled county boroughs in the 1960s). 
Within this tradition local government is seen as the local expression of 
the welfare state, attempting to 'get things done', rather than being a site 
. for political debate. In practice this model tended to imply a disciplined 
Party at local level, in which the main decisions were taken by Group 
leaders and the Group as a whole was expected to endorse them. In 
Sheffield after 1966, as we have seen, the relationship was one of 
management - or coordination - rather than dictatorship, but, even so, in 
the fifteen years between 1962 and 1977, the recommendations of the 
Labour Group executive to the Group as a whole were only reversed on one 
occasion. The main role of backbench councillors was still to deal with 
local issues and casework for those they represented. For most councillors 
this meant dealing with housing cases and - overwhelmingly - tenants 
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wanted to be transferred. In retrospect this division of labour, even in its 
Ironmonger variant, has been sharply criticised (by David Blunkett among 
others) for being authoritarian and leaving insufficient scope for 
backbench initiative or wider backbench discussion. 
But the criticisms have been taken further, to suggest that municipal 
labourism also implied a passive role for those receiving services. The 
accepted view was that it was Labour's task efficiently and caringly to 
deliver the services which the professionals (under political guidance) had 
decided the people ought to have. A Fabian belief in the value of 
professional expertise was the dominant one. Drawing on the Sheffield 
. experience, David Blunkett was highly critical of that approach, which he 
argued "tended to be authoritarian: doing the right things for the people 
rather than with them. That's not how socialism should grow. It is 
oppressive at worst and paternalist at best" (Blunkett 1982c, p. 56). 
Gyford sums up the ambiguous experience of municipallabourism in 
practice in ways which are highly appropriate to the case of Sheffield: 
"For all its faults municipallabourism, like the 
postwar welfare state of which it formed a part, 
secured considerable real improvements in the material 
conditions of working-class life. On occasion, however, 
it was prone to two weaknesses. It could deploy a 
certain heavy-handed paternalism, leading to an 
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insensitivity to the self-expressed interests of 
ordinary people when these seemed to conflict with the 
plans or enthusiasms of senior councillors or of 
professionals and other experts; and a certain 
intrQverted emphasis on pOlitical solidarity and 
discipline could sometimes blind local councillors to 
legitimate outside criticism ... At its best municipal 
labourism matched Herbert Morrison's aspirations to 
create in local government 'an efficient machine for a 
high moral purpose' and it delivered with competence 
and compassion a wide range of services to those in 
need. Usually it did the right things for people; but 
sometimes it could do the wrong things to people; and 
only rarely had it previously discussed either of those 
things with people" (Gyford 1985, p. 10). 
When Ron Ironmonger left the City Council. there was no obvious 
'leader' with similar authority over the group (or the local Labour Party) to 
replace him. George Wilson. the Council leader in the late 1970s was 
generally identified with the right (although he had challenged the previous 
leadership over the rent rebate issue at the end of the 1960s) and was less 
o o. 
well able to manage the different wings of the Party. He retained some of 
the symbols of formal linkages between the unions and the Party, since he 
was a member of the Trades Council executive, but his trade union 
involvement can hardly be seen as pOliticaliy significant, since Wilson was 
the owner of a small family upholstery business. rather than a worker in 
steel or engineering. It was clear from interviews undertaken with 
officers and councillors while he was leader that he did not have a 
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dominant position even within the Labour Group. In retrospect it is easy to 
see him as a transitional figure with little active support in the Labour 
Party or the wider labour movement, although for a time the structures of 
council power and the traditions of Party loyalty' made him look virtually 
unchallengeable. 
In the event, he resigned and was replaced by David Blunkett in the 
annual leadership elections in May 1980. This change reflected a wide 
degree of unhappiness with the way that Wilson ran the group and also 
reflected a gradual process of political change within Sheffield's Labour 
Parties, which is considered more fully in the next chapter, since the 
. transfer of power from Ironmonger to Blunkett via Wilson also reflected 
wider shifts within the local Labour Party. 
9.4 Organisational politics 
It is easy to underestimate the signifioance of intra-organisational 
politics, because open politics takes place at elections and in council 
meetings. And the analysis of local politics frequently tends to focus on 
the ways in which changing patterns of occupational class, changing 
economic structures or debates within political parties influence and 
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shape it. This is also reflected in the previous sections. But the case of 
Sheffield confirms the importance of exploring the internal life of the 
state rather more thoroughly. Hoggett makes the case for such an 
investigation particularly well. Unless it is undertaken, he argues, "the 
state itself is placed outside politics. It becomes the site for the 
administration of things rather than a place where power relations are 
contested or where values and needs collide" (Hoggett 1987b, p. 32; see 
also Hoggett 1984). Vet this is precisely the context within which many of 
the taken for granted realities of political power are translated into 
practice, and in which many of the key decisions about the daily experience 
. of urban life are made. 
Municipallabourism assumed a local government structure with a 
strong officer hierarchy in which decisions taken by committee chairs 
were implemented directly and efficiently. So the intra-organisational 
politics of municipallabourism were part of a much wider political 
system imbedded in the structures of the UK's post-war welfare state 
(also often linking into national policy networks. Rhodes 1988, Chs 4 and 
5) • And in local government practice this generally seemed to imply the 
creation of a powerful network of chief officers served by major (service) 
departments. It was these departments which actually came to to 
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represent the council, whilst councillors dealt with the problems 
generated by their individual case loads or set the broad parameters (or 
corporate objectives) within which chief officers and their departments 
were able to operate. In Sheffield in the 1960s and early 1970s, the power 
of the chief officers was such that councillors - even committee chairs -
were not expected to visit departments of the Councilor their chief 
officers without making appointments and making it clear in advance what 
issues they wanted to cover. There was an unspoken partnership between 
leading councillors and chief officers which meant that as long as the 
service departments delivered the goods, the committee chairs would fight 
. for and defend their budgets in internal political meetings. 
The most powerful departments and service committees in the 1960s 
and 1970s were Corporate Estates, Education, Housing and Social Services. 
Their committee chairs and chief officers made up the policy elite, to the 
extent that even the finance function was separate - annual budgeting was 
based on an assumption of incremental growth. Departmental boundaries 
were sharply drawn (Johnson and Cochrane 1981, p. 72) with committees 
and departments existing as semi-autonomous bodies within the authority, 
concerned only with carrying out activities for which they had been given 
responSibility, and with little direct 'interference' (as one chief officer 
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put it in interview) from elected politicians. It was often difficult to 
organise activity across departmental boundaries and there was frequently 
duplication of resources and activities between departments. 
Decision-making was fragmented, with major officers and committee 
chairs dealing with their own areas in a manner reminiscent of competing 
feudal barons. 
The extent of the problem was recognised within Sheffield at a fairly 
early stage, in principle at least. Ron Ironmonger was the first Leader of 
the Council only to take on the position of Chair of Policy Committee and 
not of a major service committee as well, and this was intended to 
. encourage the development of a more 'corporate' view of the Council's 
activities, at least on the councillor side. But in practice it seems rather 
to have allowed the Leader to act in a role closer to the primus inter pares 
of the feudal monarchies, than to have allowed him to develop broader 
strategies for the Council. Another attempt to encourage change was 
initiated by the Conservatives, in their brief moment of postwar political 
control, when they contracted a firm of management consultants (Urwicks, 
Orr and Partners) to prepare a report on the council's organisation and 
management (Hampton 1970, p. 56). Despite initial opposition to the report 
from the Labour Group, the need for some change was accepted by both 
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parties, and several of the proposals were taken up by Labour when they 
regained control. 
But the broad ~ommitment to some sort of reorganisation intended to 
make the unwieldy machinery of the Council more responsive to policy 
shifts did not result in any dramatic reforms, despite a formal shift to 
Bains Style management with a chief executive and management team 
after 1974. In practice the corporate system was very weak. Management 
Team was, at best, the site at which final bargaining between key chief 
officers took place and at worst a rather irrelevant body which was likely 
to be attended not by the chief officers themselves, but by their deputies 
. or other senior staff. And even when defeated in management team, chief 
officers would often turn to their committee chairs for support in the hope 
of winning arguments elsewhere in the system. It was strongly argued by 
those in the service departments that major changes would only weaken 
important professional special isms, undermining service delivery by 
burying it under the weight of corporate paperwork (Johnson and Cochrane 
1981, pp. 74-75). In practice, however it was justified in debates about 
maintaining efficient and responsive services, the power of existing 
departments and chief officers within them was not easily undermined by 
the rather thin layer of corporate icing introduced from above. The 
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Corporate Management Unit remained marginal throughout the 1970s. 
The attempts which were made to produce corporate, authority wide 
policy statements (for example in the form of a ninety-eight page 
statement of 'objectives' prepared on a programme rather than a 
departmental basis, City of Sheffield MOC 1977b) had little impact 
precisely because they ignored the power bases in the departments. The 
reaction to the 'Objectives' document confirmed the lack of a corporate 
approach, rather than marking its arrival. The document summarises 
disparate departmental and committee priorities without being able to 
offer any unified strategy for the future. At best its authors can be seen to 
have identified issues and interests which crossed departmental 
boundaries, but doing something about them would have required not 
agreement at corporate level, but detailed negotiation between the 
particular departments concerned. In some cases such negotiation did take 
place, and in some cases it did not. Whether it did depended not on the 
corporate planners in the Central Management Unit under the Chief 
Executive, but on the priorities of the departments concerned. These often 
owed as much to the priorities being developed within national policy 
networks (for example within professional groups, or relating to pressures 
from central government departments) as they did to any strategic 
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discussions within the Council. Despite a slight tendency towards a more 
corporate approach by the end of the 1970s, with more interdepartmental 
groups and a grudging acceptance that the Chief Executive might have some 
- probably small, and preferably subsidiary - role to play in the running of 
the CounCil, the dominant ethos remained departmental, fragmented, 
hierarchical and managerially conservative (Cochrane 1979). 
Green's analysis of Labour local politics in Newcastle can perhaps be 
seen as an extreme version of municipallabourism, in which even senior 
members of the Labour Group seem to have had little influence on 
policy-making (Green, D. 1981). Matters were not quite so extreme in 
Sheffield. Nor were Sheffield's leading councillors bemused by the process 
of policy-making as a "complex and esoteric activity" although Gyford, 
drawing on Dunleavy 1981 , implies that this was a common feature of 
local Labour politics in the 1960s and 1970s (Gyford 1985, p. 9). The 
division of responsibility between Labour and its officers still allowed for 
some interaction between committee chairs and departmental politics. Ron 
Ironmonger had a reputation for strong political leadership (Hampton 1978) 
and in retrospect the rather different experience of George Wilson's 
leadership looks like an interregnum between periods of strong leadership 
rather than the norm. Hampton's discussion of local politics in the 19605 
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suggests a livelier process than is implied by some of the other case 
studies of municipallabourism (Hampton 1970). In the Sheffield of the 
1970s, the Council's Policy Committee (all Labour and effectively the 
executive of the Labour Group) was an important political forum and 
capable of taking decisions on major issues which then had to be followed 
up through the authority. There was an implicit partnership, albeit one 
which assumed a high degree of officer initiative in policy-making. 
This was the context into which the new political leadership had to 
make an impact. And they were in many ways part of or at least inheritors 
of the old system. They cut their political teeth within it through the 
1970s, serving as chairs of major committees (such as Family and 
Community Services in the case of David Blunkett, and Planning in the case 
of Bill Michie). So not surprisingly, their rejection of it was sometimes 
uncertain. And in the following chapter we shall begin to consider some of 
the ways in which they were able to challenge the past, as well as some of 
the ways in which they built on it and - to some extent - were trapped by 
it. 
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Notes 
1. It is, however, perhaps worth pointing out that the perception of 
homogeneity may also mask the divisions which do exist. Not only does 
Sheffield now include significant Afro-Caribbean and South Asian 
populations, but it also has a substantial Somali population initially 
attracted to work in the steel mills which is still further marginalised 
because not included in the usually accepted categories of the U.K.'s race 
relations professionals or the ideology of Sheffield's labourism. In part the 
'largest village' appellation provides a way of continuing to exclude these 
groups from political life. Although the Somalis suffered worse than most 
with the closures of the steel mills (according to one person interviewed, 
in the early 1980s male unemployment among them was almost 100%) 
their problems were not reflected in the official concerns about the 'men 
of steel'. 
2. And, of course, by that time including the newly privatised companies of 
British Gas and British Telecom. 
3 The slump in the steel industry which hit Sheffield with such ferocity at 
the start of the 1980s was, of course, not restricted to that city. The 
world steel industry and the European steel industry, in particular, faced 
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major problems at this time. In Europe falling demand for steel, combined 
with trans European plans for restructuring, encouraged rationalisation 
within the British steel industry which led to a fall in employment within 
the British Steel Corporation from 186,000 in 1979 to 54,000 in 1986. In 
Sheffield the numbers employed by British Steel fell from 45,000 to 
around 13,000. The impact of world recession also meant that demand from 
major users of special steels (such as aerospace, vehicles and 
petrochemicals) fell particularly sharply. And, since Sheffield's firms had 
been unable to invest effectively in the 1970s (partly because of the 
difficulty of raising the necessary funds), they were uncompetitive in the 
harsher economic environment. The late 1970s were marked by mergers; 
and the early 1980s by closures. Restructuring in the 1980s helped create 
a new private sector by hiving off parts of British Steel and linking them 
with existing private companies. But the numbers employed after the 
restructuring remained low (see, e.g. Lawless and Ramsden 1990b, pp. 3-16 
for a summary of this period. See also Gibbon 1989 pp. 15-17 on mergers 
and changes in ownership in the 1980s). 
4. Hinton draws a contrast between Sheffield and Glasgow, where he 
suggests the possibility of revolutionary polities was more apparent, 
organised around the Clyde Workers' Committee, the Socialist Labour Party 
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and John McLean (Hinton 1969, p. 231). 
5. Seabrook powerfully evokes similar images of working class community 
in England's old industrial towns, from Northampton to Walsall (Seabrook 
1978 and 1984). 
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Chapter 10. The new policies: polities and politicians 
10.1 The left comes to power 
The apparent lack of controversy surrounding David Blunkett's 
election as council leader in 1980 seems to contrast sharply with similar 
shifts to the left in other authorities, such as the Greater London Council, 
Manchester, Lambeth and Liverpool. Child and Paddon comment that, "It was 
an uncharacteristically smooth transition - from the outside at least, a 
bloodless palace coup" (Child and Paddon 1984, p. 18). Blunkett himself 
'commented that Sheffield experienced "a much more gradual shift to 
democracy" (quoted in Lansley et al1989, p. 13) and Green argues that the 
transition "was impossible to pinpoint, as the old guard was gradually 
eclipsed and incorporated rather than defeated, though the election of a 
radical administration in 1980 was a clear finale" (Green, G. 1987, p. 206). 
The shift between political generations, to which reference is made 
in Ch. 9, gathered pace in the 1970s, and was encouraged by local 
government reorganisation which removed a whole layer of the older 
generation with the abolition of aldermen (Goodwin 1986, p. 30). Sixty-two 
per cent of councillors serving in 1980 had been elected since 1970 and 
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the average age of councillors also fell through the decade (Seyd 1987, p. 
144). The decline of direct working class involvement in the Party also 
continued - with two thirds of Labour ward secretaries in Sheffield in the 
mid 1970s being in non-manual occupations and eighty-five per cent of 
those being employed by local authorities (Chandler et ai, quoted in Seyd 
1987, p. 45). But this was not a straightforward process, with a growth in . 
'middle class' membership and public sector membership encouraging a 
shift to the left, while the working class drifted away from the Party. It is 
important to remember that some of the shift simply paralleled similar 
shifts in Sheffield's workforce. There was - as has been argued earlier - a 
'gradual decline in traditional employment and an equivalent increase in 
employment in other sectors, in particular public services. 
The new leadership did not emerge from opposition on the 
backbenches of the Labour Group. Its members already had experience of 
senior positions within the group and council. This was not generally the 
case in other councils in which the left came to power in this period (see, 
e.g. Gyford 1985 pp. 25-26 Lansley et a11989, pp. 9-15, and Wainwright 
1987 pp. 94-136). In Lambeth in 1977, Ted Knight came to the leadership 
from the backbenches, and many of the leading council positions, including 
the Chair of Housing, were taken by newly elected councillors. Ken 
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Livingstone came to power in London after a period of factional 
organisation within the Party, to ensure that left candidates were selected 
in winnable council seats. His success in gaining election as leader owed a 
great deal to skilful manoeuvring within the Labour Group of the GLC, but 
did not follow the experience of senior positions within the Council or 
Group (see Carvel 1984 Chs 1 and 4, and Livingstone 1987 Chs 3 and 4 for 
detailed discussions of Livingstone's rise to power within the GLC). In 
Islington, a left leadership only came to power in 1982 after the majority 
of the old Labour Group had defected to the Social Democratic Party and 
subsequently been defeated in local elections. In Manchester, the belated 
'leadership changeover (in 1985) also followed local elections which 
changed the composition of the Labour Group. The new majority had until 
then not only been excluded from office within the council, but had been 
disciplined regularly - even having the whip withdrawn on occasion - for 
not voting with the previous majority on a wide range of issues (see 
Wainwright 1987, pp. 114-122). 
The impression of an undramatic changeover reflected the extent to 
which Sheffield's Labour Group avoided serious splits and infighting, and 
the extent to which councillors who might have felt more at home under 
the old regime retained important pOSitions under the new leadership. 
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Alcock and Lee quote one councillor who suggested that his colleagues 
were not "really very left at all, and certainly not as left as those on some 
other councils such as Camden and Lambeth" and that thirty per cent of 
Labour councillors did not understand or care about the new "socialist 
economic and social policy initiatives" (Alcock and Lee 1981, p.79). 
Without attempting to make judgements on the relative 'Ieftness' of 
particular councillors, it is clear that there were important elements of 
continuity between the old and the new. The setting up of an Employment 
Department and an Employment Committee, for example, were key symbols 
of change in the local politics of the early 1980s, but the new Committee's 
'membership included several councillors who had played a central role in 
the old system of economic promotion and industrial development (one 
member, Cllr. Lambert, had been Chair of the City Promotion Committee, 
whilst another, Cllr. Roy Munn, had been Chair of the Industrial 
Development Advisory Committee). 
In Sheffield, key members of the new leadership had already served as 
chairs of major service committees - David Blunkett had been Chair of 
Family and Community Services, and Bill Michie, who became first chair of 
the new Employment Committee, was Chair of Planning, and both had also 
been members of the Policy Committee and active in the wider local 
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government community, e.g. through the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities. In the late 1970s it was already widely acknowledged (even by 
. 
normally cautious officers) that Blunkett was a potential leader 1, 
There may, however, be a danger in exaggerating the smoothness of 
the transition, particularly when it is part of an attempt to distinguish it 
from those authorities which came to be labelled 'loony left' (e.g, in 
Lansley et a11989, p. 13). In Sheffield's case, for example, it is important 
to note that at least one of the factors which seems to have encouraged 
increased sympathy for radical ideas within the Labour Party was a 
significant influx in the early 1970s of younger trade union activists 
-disappointed with the record of Harold Wilson's Governments of the 1960s, 
as well as a number of tenant activists who joined the Party after having 
been involved in campaigns against the raising of council house rents in 
the late 1960s. Seyd suggests that it was changes in the attitudes of 
traditional communities of Labour supporters which led to radicalisation. 
Those communities, he concludes, were "becoming less deferential and 
demanding more action to defend their living standards. An aggressive 
political and economic militancy was beginning to make itself felt" (Seyd 
1987, p. 60). 
The left-right battles within Sheffield's Labour Group and Labour 
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Party were sharp throughout the 1970s. One of the first campaigns to 
deselect a sitting Labour MP took place in Sheffield, with Eddie Griffiths 
being replaced by Joan Maynard in Sheffield Brightside. Although this 
deselection did not attract the same media attention as the attempt to 
unseat Reg Prentice in Newham North East which took place at the same, 
time it was equally hard fought and bitter at local level. Seyd suggests 
that the recruitment of tenant activists to the Labour Party, following 
increases in council house rents at the end and dissatisfaction among trade 
unionists about the wages policies of the Wilson Governments of the 1960s 
helped to generate opposition to Griffiths: "The local Party wanted an MP 
.who would identify with issues which were affecting working class 
people, and who would adopt a very different style from that which had 
prevailed in the past. He or she would have to be an active local 
campaigner, working with the trade unions to defend workers' rights rather 
than being the London MP rather distant and aloof from the immediate 
political struggles" (Seyd 1987, p. 59). Simil,arly, Wainwright describes 
the conflict as "a clash between youngish, mainly working-class activists 
radicalised through their union, the AUEW, or through the impact of a local 
tenant's campaign and rent strike and an ineffectual, conservative M P" 
(Wainwright 1987, p. 108). The leaders of the Brightside Constituency 
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Labour Party who were involved in this deselection were later to hold key 
positions in the Council, and included David Blunkett, Roger Barton, Clive 
Betts, Bill Michie and Peter Price (see, e.g., Seyd 1987, p. 206 and 
Wainwright 1987, p. 109). 
Even the moment of transition should not be understood as entirely 
unproblematic. Although the previous leader, George Wilson, resigned and 
David Blunkett was elected to replace him with little opposition, Wilson 
did so at a politically embarrassing time for the Labour Party - just before 
the 1980 local elections - in protest at the Labour Group's decision to 
impose a rate increase higher than he thought advisable (Alcock and Lee 
1981, p. 79)2. 
Sheffield's move to the left was the product of a series of changes 
within the Labour Party at local level, which interacted with the more 
general changes identified earlier, particularly in opposing the political 
direction taken by the Labour governments of the 1970s (see Ch. 5). Unlike 
those elements of the 'new urban left' elsewhere which emphasised their 
base outside the Labour Party and outside electoral politics, in autonomous 
campaigns and movements, the new politics in Sheffield was firmly rooted 
in the traditions of Labour (Wainwright 1987, p. 96). Seyd stresses that 
the initiative for change was taken by a relatively "small group of men" 
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within the Council's Labour Group. He describes their politics as 
"workerist" and emphasises their "local, working class background", 
although he also notes that several of them had received higher education 
and were in professional employment (Seyd 1990, p. 337). Wainwright's 
analysis is similar, although she emphasises that, whilst men may have 
been dominant in this leading group, a number of what she calls "strong, 
independent women" were also involved (Wainwright 1987, p. 109). Both 
Seyd and Wainwright confirm the importance of links with traditional 
working class organisations, noting, in particular, the links between 
labour politicians and trade unions organising in the traditional industries 
(such as the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers) (Wainwright 1987, p. 107). 
Seyd outlines the initial programme of the new leaders as follows: 
"their Labour Party should defend the working-class's living standards by 
maintaining the trade unionists' right of free collective bargaining and by 
subsidizing council house rents; their Labour Party should also curb the 
power of capital by extending public ownership. In addition they distrusted 
the elite parliamentary leadership which appeared out of touch and 
unsympathetic to working-class interests. Therefore they wanted a Labour 
Party in which rank-and-file workers could playa more prominent role. 
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This workerism ... was rooted in the very powerful manual worker tradition 
which remained the significant force within the local labour movement at 
that time. It was militant both industrially and politically but also 
practical as a consequence of its deep roots within both community and 
work experiences" (Seyd 1990, p. 337). 
Goodwin draws rather different conclusions about the nature of the 
new politics, suggesting that they were rooted in an attempt to sustain a 
past which had already begun to disappear. Like Seyd, he acknowledges the 
power of a local political discourse dominated by appeals to manual labour, 
'workerism' and an almost utopian vision of working class Attercliffe and 
its community. But he stresses that the material basis for such an 
interpretation of Sheffield no longer existed. By the end of the 1970s, he 
argues, Sheffield could no longer justifiably be portrayed as 'steel city'. He 
suggests that the political programme of the early 1980s reflected utopian 
fantasies about the past, implying the attempt to forge alliances with 
social groups which no longer existed in practice (see also Child and 
Paddon 1984). But he goes beyond this to point to the possibility of a more 
coherent programme. The new policies, he says, can be understood as "an 
attempt to hold together the different interest groups which the Labour 
council now represents, in place of its former relatively unified and 
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homogeneous constituency of skilled, male trade unionists. It also helps to 
recreate, or r~compose, a particular type of working class culture from 
above" (Goodwin 1986, p. 31). In other words, within this analysis, the task 
which the council leadership set itself was to construct a vision of the 
present consistent with that of the past, rather than to adjust to and 
acknowledge the changes which had taken place. Goodwin's approach is 
consistent with the incremental process of change which has been 
identified with Sheffield's move to the left, although it seems to 
underestimate the influence of political ideas drawn from national 
debates, as well as overestimating the ambitions and power of the 
. 
councillors involved. There is not enough evidence to support the 
conclusion that the leadership had a clear programme along the lines he 
identifies, and, even at their high point, few of the local sociaiists would 
have argued that local initiatives could reshape classes in this way. They 
had few illusions about the resources and legal powers on which they could 
draw. The claims they made were always rather more modest, and 
ambiguous, whatever the rhetoric which sometimes surrounded them. 
A clear feature of the politics of the new ·Ieadership was to 
emphasise continuities with the past as much as (often more than) breaks 
with it. Despite some criticisms of past practice, usually buried in general 
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comments about Labour councils as a whole, or particular authoritarian 
leaderships ~f the past (see, e.g., Blunkett 1982c), the new leadership 
presented itself as the latest in a line of Labour councils in Sheffield 
determined to carry on the struggle to defend the interests of local people. 
As Alcock and Lee argue "the commitment to manage the local politics of 
the area is written deep into the practice of Labour polities in South 
Yorkshire. The Labour Party is truly integrated - incorporated - into the 
running of the local state. The 'Socialist Republic' slogan is as much a 
proud proclamation of this record of the Sheffield labour movement as it is 
of anything else" (Alcock and Lee 1981, p.80). More positively, they argued 
that Sheffield provided consistent examples of positive intervention 
providing gains for the community as a whole, particularly as working 
class representation increased (see, e.g., Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, pp. 
44-48, 52-55, 66). The new leadership was keen to place itself within a 
longer tradition of Labour Party politics at local level, also expressed, for 
\ 
example in the Introduction prepared for the republication of a pamphlet 
outlining the experience of Labour's first years of power in Sheffield (in 
the 1920s) (Rowlinson 1982). Many of the initial statements setting out 
the Council's new agenda were made not in radical journals, or even 
political manifestos, but in the official or semi-official publications of 
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the local government community, including a discussion paper presented to 
a conference of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (Blunkett 
1981a) and an article in Local Government Policy-Making (Blunkett 1981c). 
10.2 Change from above 
Although the political changeover in 1980 took place without any 
major upheaval, it nevertheless represented a major change of direction 
for the council, the initiative for which came from leading figures within 
the Labour Group. The change of direction did not come from within the 
'council bureaucracy, as a product of debates between professional 
officers, whether in service departments or through the corporate planning 
system. But nor was it the product of challenge from within the local party 
organisation outside the council. Unlike many of the other 'local socialist' 
authorities, Sheffi~ld's new political leadership came to power without 
having made extensive promises to local activists through the District 
Labour Party or to the electorate through local manifestos. Although it 
could be argued that the decision of the majority of Councillors and the 
District Labour Party to increase rates, maintain services and avoid cuts 
in spending precipitated Wilson's resignation as leader, the Party's 
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. 
involvement in policy-making before 1980 had been insignificant. There 
was no tradit!on of preparing detailed manifestos for local elections, like 
that with which the Greater London Labour Party fought the GLC election in 
1981. 
The new leadership did not have a clear political programme or 
manifesto which it wanted to see implemented. Nor did it have an agreed 
programme for implementation which had been generated by the District 
Party, despite claims made by one leading councillor that "people elected 
the party to power on a programme and the councillors are merely 
representatives of the elected party" (Mobbs 1981, p.1 09). The formal 
relationship sometimes favoured by the left in which the District Labour 
Party (or Local Government Committee in London) was expected to set 
policy for implementation by the Labour Group was almost reversed in 
Sheffield. The ideas and policy debate came from the Council leadership, 
and effectively helped to shape the programme of the District Party. It was 
only when they opened up the possibilities, tndeed demanded that such 
programmes be developed, that the District Labour Party moved in that 
direction. Goodwin reports on a "cynical interpretation" (apparently held by 
some councillors and officers), according to which the manifesto working 
groups "have been set up to ensure the smooth passage of controversial 
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policies through the labour movement. They are able to diffuse open 
dissent, by regulating when, where, and how much discussion takes place" 
(Goodwin 1986, p. 31). It was only after the change of leadership that a 
network of manifesto working parties was set up with the District Labour 
Party to cover key policy areas. From 1982 (there were no District 
elections in 1981) detailed manifestos based on the work of these groups 
began to appear, and the Council itself issued leaflets after the election, 
first to report that action would be taken and secondly to confirm that it 
had (City of Sheffield Corporate Management Unit 1982). For the first time 
the District Labour Party's manifesto was endorsed as a whole by the 
Policy Committee, becoming Council policy. 
Blunkett himself took the initial responsibility of preparing policy 
statements on key areas (Blunkett 1980, 1981 a and 1981 c). The production 
of policy statements was a significant break with past approaches to 
managing the machinery of the council. And Blunkett's collaboration with 
Keith Jackson - a lecturer at Northern College - in preparing the 
statements (referred to in City of Sheffield 1983) also marked a change 
which was to be important in the new leadership's approach to 
organisational matters. From the start - as in the GLC and other local 
socialist authorities - Blunkett and his colleagues drew in people from 
333 
outside the council, and from outside traditional local government 
professions, to undermine and challenge the old ways of operating. 
The importance of preparing local manifestos was also that they 
confirmed the shifts which had taken place within the Council. They made 
it clear that local government was a political arena, rather than a site for 
the operation of impartial administration. This reflected a concern of 
councillors about the power of council officers, more than any pressures 
from below within the local Labour Party, although, of course, they did fit 
in well with wider concerns for democratisation inside the party. By 
streSSing the political nature of local government, the new leadership 
'was also stressing its own claims to power. It was rejecting the old 
Sheffield - and county borough - model with its reliance on strong 
departmental empires guarded by chief officers rather than councillors. 
Within the official machinery of the Council, the manifestos were 
used as tools of control for the political leadership, policed by the 
Corporate Management Unit, with the help of politically sensitive officers. 
They were used as corporate documents to help shift an apparently 
immovable council bureaucracy. Manifestos were not used as means of 
mobiliSing support more widely, or produced in numbers which would have 
made their popular distribution likely. In 1982 the manifesto was 24 
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closely typed pages long with some 47 detailed promises in the 
employment section alone. It was made up of separate sections of quite 
different styles, reflecting the different working parties (Sheffield 
District Labour Party 1982). In 1983 the format was similar, but the 
length had risen to 59 pages (Sheffield District Labour Party 1983). 
The formal relationship implied by these documents, the various 
manifesto and (later) monitoring groups, which shadowed council 
committees, suggests a political subordination of councillors to District 
Labour Party. But the practice was rather different, in large part because 
some councillors effectively took the lead in developing policy. and were • 
. themselves, active partiCipants in the local Party organisations. There 
were examples of conflict - for example over the sale of council houses in 
1982 and over the appropriate response to ratecapping in 1984-5 - but 
these conflicts were also important within the Labour Group. And, in the 
end, they were resolved by decisions within the Group, not the Party. In 
1984, the Council leadership, with the support of the District Labour 
Party. began its resistance to the Rates Act 1984 by refusing to set a rate. 
A meeting of the District Labour Party in April 1985 rejected a Labour 
Group proposal to move towards setting a defecit budget and confirmed the 
position that the Council should refuse to set a rate. But a rate was finally 
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set before the deadline, because the Labour Group split with some voting 
for a legal rate (alongside opposition parties) while others (including the 
formal leadership of the Group) continued to vote against. Not only was the 
District Labour Party unable effectively to challenge this decision, but the 
labour Group leadership was quick to move away from talk of discipline, 
instead seeing the rate setting as a fait accompli, not only working with 
it, but ensuring that there was no danger of a similar conflict in future 
years. Creative accounting was to be used to avoid making major cuts (the 
story of the anti ratecapping campaign in Sheffield is told in Blunkett and 
Jackson, K. 1987, pp. 176-181). 
10.3 The new pOlicies 
The new leadership started from the position that the continuation of 
past policies was not enough in itself, not least because it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain spending through rate increases and 
because central government was preparing itself to undermine the power 
of councils to raise and spend money. Blunkett asked "why local 
government is not popular to the extent that when there is a threat to the 
cutting of essential services people are not willing to fight vigorously in 
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many areas for the things we take for granted" (initially circulated as a 
discussion paper, later published in Local Government Policy-Making, 
Blunkett 1981 c, p. 97). One conclusion he drew was simply that Labour's 
leaders had in the past been too unprepared to defend public services, 
because they had tended to accept the argument that production in the 
private sector was somehow always more productive than anything 
produced in the public sector - i.e. it was too easily accepted that the 
market determined what was and what was not productive. This is an issue 
to which we shall return later in the detailed consideration of Sheffield's 
employment policy. But he also went on to suggest that one reason for the 
'political weakness of local government had been its reluctance to open 
itself up to wider participation and democratic control. 
The new leadership was aware that it wanted change, and it was also 
clear of the general direction in which it wanted to move, at least in terms 
of of overall slogans. It was opposed to spending cuts; in favour of 
increased community involvement in education, housing, planning and 
social services; and in favour of developing an economic policy which 
would create employment and improve conditions at work. Blunkett 
emphasised the need to look back to radical visions of local government in 
which councils were "organs for change, as important as national level 
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activity .. .looking at ways in which there could be activity from the bottom" 
and stressed that this meant industry and employment matters should be 
as important to local authorities as the provision of services (Interview, 
12th April 1983). But there was less clarity on specific policies to be 
adopted, to the extent that early initiatives involved looking for ways of 
developing policies as much as specific policy proposals. 
In November 1980 two policy advisors were appointed to service 
strategy groups on economic and social policy. The individuals appointed 
were drawn from outside the local authority system and - perhaps just as 
significant - from outside the usual labour movement and Labour Party 
,tradition. Both had worked for Community Development Projects in the 
1970s (one in Coventry, the other in Birmingham). Both had also remained 
involved in community based politics, although one was a researcher at the 
University of Birmingham at the time of his appointment. Neither was a 
member of the Labour Party at when appointed, and their politics owed 
more community radicalism than to the traditions of Labour Party leftism 
which dominated in Sheffield. One (Geoff Green) had stood as 'Socialist 
Unity' candidate (against Labour) in Birmingham in the late 1970s, as well 
as standing as a tenants' candidate against Labour while a student at 
Sheffield University in 1969 (this election is discussed in Hampton 1970, 
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pp 290-294). 
The search for new ideas, having come to power, was a genuine one. 
The candidates appointed had past records which suggested they would not 
simply act as the creatures of those who appointed them. They were not 
straightforward 'political' appointments, who might be expected to act as 
agents of the Labour Party within the Council machinery - although 
certainly one reason for their appointment was a desire to shake up that 
machinery. Alcock and Lee summarise an interview with the two new 
officers soon after their appointment as follows: "80th were quite clear 
that their job was not to change the local authority from the inside but 'to 
organise groups - trade unionists, tenants - in the city, to put pressure on 
the authority from the outside'''. They saw no real insurmountable problems 
in engaging in such activity against the local state whilst effectively 
operating as policy advisors inside the same local state. Indeed, they 
stressed that their own experience of the negative aspects of local 
bureaucracy and paternalism gave them a crucial 'cutting edge' in 
criticising existing policies and practices ... They were quite adamant that 
the leadership of the Labour Group saw the limitations of the old 
paternalist social democratic practices. Social democracy is over as it has 
been practised at a local level in the past. We think many of them 
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recognise that, if they do not we can't help that'" (Alcock and Lee 1981, p. 
90). However accurate this diagnosis of the Labour Group, and our earlier 
discussion suggests that it fails to acknowledge the important 
continuities with the past, these comments confirm that the appointments 
were intended to challenge past practices, even if it was still not clear 
how they would do so. Strategy was to be built up around "live political 
issues, being built up block by block, developing a clear set of connections 
between political principle and local organisation, a balance of 
contradictory.forces rather than a single solution, a resolution of 
priorities" (Sheffield City Council 1983, p. 2). 
It was in collaboration with Green that Blunkett prepared his first 
developed statement of what the Council was trying to achieve under his 
leadership, presenting it as a model of wider relevance to local 
government and the Labour Party (Blunkett and Green 1983). This pamphlet 
(entitled 'Building from the Bottom: The Sheffield Experience' and 
published by the Fabian Society), stressed ~he need to change the focus of 
Labour Party policies to encourage initiative from below. rather than the 
imposition of programmes from above. Its athors argued that economic and 
social policies could not be divorced, and suggested that economic policies 
needed to be developed at local level which could help to challenge 
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dominant forms of economic organisation, as well as helping to generate 
and defend jobs. In welfare they stressed the need to develop a strong and 
active community base, which meant that people would be encouraged to 
identify with services, moving away from the provision of services for 
people to the provision of services with people (see also Blunkett 1981 c, 
p. 98). Not only does this suggest the need for greater participation and 
involvement, it also confirms a desire to move away from neutral 
administration by officers towards an active commitment by them to new 
approaches and an openness to organisations outside the Council and the 
labour Party - in the 'community'. 
It is, perhaps, important to identify some of the features of 
Sheffield's package of 'local socialism' which differentiate it from the 
programmes of some other authorities which attracted the label. Leading 
councillors in Sheffield seem to have been more reluctant to break fully 
with the structures of the past. So, for example, Sheffield was reluctant 
to set up committees or departments with explicit responsibility for 
women, equal opportunities or ethnic minorities. Until 1986 there was no 
Women's Unit within the council (although there was a Women's Officer 
within the Employment Department) and even when the Unit was set up, it 
was not independent, but placed within the Personnel Department (Seyd 
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1987, p. 151). Similarly the council was slow to accept the need to give 
separate recognition to the needs of the city's Asian and Afro-Caribbean 
communities; and at the end of the 1980s its main expression was within 
the Education Department, where the Sheffield Unified Multicultural 
Education Service was based (Sheffield City Council 1989, see also 
Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, p. 92). Although Sheffield did begin to 
develop some decentralisation initiatives in the early 1980s (particularly 
in housing) it was not one of the leading councils in doing so. On the 
contrary, outside the field of economic policy, the new leadership tended 
to stick with existing structures. Despite Blunkett's enthusiasm for it, 
there were certainly no moves towards the 'radical' decentralisation 
associated with Walsall or Islington (Hoggett 1987a and b, Seabrook 1984). 
There were moves towards the appointment of more sympathetic officers 
to leading positions in a range of departments, and some departments were 
reorganised (e.g. with the absorption of the Estate's Surveyor's Department 
into the Planning Department) but it was a gradual process, rather than a 
radical break (Interview with David Blunkett 12th April 1983). 
The policies developed by the council in the early 19805 covered a 
range of areas, emphasising the links between the local economy and the 
operation of the welfare state at local level. The area in which new 
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initiatives were taken up most extensively, however, was that of economic 
policy and the next chapters look more closely at the changes which took 
place there (see Blunkett and Green 1983, Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987 pp. 
90, 92, 94, 96-103 and Seyd 1987 pp 154-158 for a consideration of other 
aspects of Sheffield's policies at this time). Duncan and Goodwin have 
argued that the council's economic policies were central to the process of 
political change because they were to be "used as a means of recomposing 
a political culture of radicallabourism" which had previously been an 
integral part of the city's political life. The changing structures of 
economy and society (around white collar and public sector employment) 
,made this more difficult to achieve, so the development of a local 
economic policy was required "as one means of halting cultural and 
economic decomposition or, more realistically, slowing it down until 
acceptable replacements could be organised" (Duncan and Goodwin 1985a, 
p. 88). A consideration of Sheffield's economic policies makes it easier to 
determine the extent to which it proved possible to develop distinctively 
different approaches, moving from general ambitions to effective policies, 
focusing particularly on the constraints imposed by the structures of local 
government (including intraorganisational politics) and those imposed by 
the policy area itself (which requires interaction between the public and 
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private sectors). 
Notes 
1. This was confirmed in rather unusual fashion in 1978, when I was 
undertaking research on local economic policy-making in Sheffield and was 
taken to interview David Blunkett (then Chair of Family and Community 
Services). Although Blunkett's involvement with local economic policy at 
this stage was slight, the officer who arranged the interview wanted to 
show that there were councillors at senior levels who were concerned 
,with and could discuss broader strategic issues. 
2. The high point of controversy around local government in Sheffield 
seems to have been in the earlier period (1967-68) when council rents 
were raised following attempts to introduce a rebate scheme. Labour lost 
control of the Council in 1968, and the Borough Labour Party (now District 
Labour Party) began to make demands to influence the decisions of the 
Labour Group rather more effectively. David Blunkett has argued that the 
dispute of 1967 and loss of control was "traumatic" for the Party and that 
it began "a shift in attitudes as well as in politics" (Blunkett 1982c, p. 56, 
also quoted in Seyd 1987, p. 144). This shift seems to represent the first 
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step in the process of changes which led to the election of a new 
leadership in 1980. 
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Chapter 11. Sheffield: looking for a new politics of economic 
development 
Approaching the analysis of Sheffield's local politics in the 1980s 
through its economic policy-making is helpful both because it offers a 
discrete area of research where change can be seen most clearly and 
because it was given a high priority by the Council's political leadership. 
Until the early 1980s economic development was a policy area in which 
changes could be achieved rather more easily than in some others. It was 
not one in which major departments had highly entrenched positions, 
because it had not been the responsibility of anyone department. Despite 
the widespread (cross-party) support for economic initiatives. economic 
development was not a core activity of the council, nor the' power base for 
any leading local politicians. Yet it was also an area capable of 
symbolising a new approach to local politics, precisely because its 
expansion implicitly (and often explicitly) suggested a move away from a 
narrow focus on service provision. Here local government could be seen to 
be making claims to policy innovation in areas which had traditionally 
remained the responsibility of central government (see Cochrane 1986b). In 
Sheffield. from being a relative backwater whose committee was chaired 
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by a councillor close to retirement, it became of central importance, 
chaired by a leading politician (who went on to become an MP). The 
contrast with the past is instructive, for the elements of continuity which 
can be identified as well as the (possibly more obvious) elements of 
change. 
11.1 Industrial development pOlicies in the 1970s 1 
Sheffield's industrial development policies before 1980 fitted into 
and reflected the political and organisational background discussed in 
Chapter 9, as well as the dominant approach to local authority economic 
development since 1945 discussed in Chapter 7. The two principal planks 
of the council's policies were the provision of serviced land and small 
industrial units and the attraction of inward investment through 
promotional campaigns and advertising. Goodwin has described the policy 
as one of "municipal property development" (Goodwin 1986, p.5) This may 
exaggerate the extent of property development in which the council could 
actually engage - it was never a dominant developer in the city (except, of 
course, in the field of housing, encouraged by the process of slum 
clearance), but was more concerned to make land available for development 
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by others, while itself engaging in a relatively modest programme of the 
development of small units. At the end of the 1970s, the council had plans 
to build around 30000 sq ft of factory space per annum (in addition to any 
work undertaken within the inner city programme), which was high by the 
standards of local authorities in England and Wales, but not in the same 
league as major development companies (Johnson and Cochrane 1981, p.47). 
The City Council was in rather an unusual position compared to many 
others. It had a substantial corporate estate, mainly as result of plant 
closures, industrial dereliction and, above all, housing redevelopment. In 
the 'east end' of the city, the narrow industrial terraces left by nineteenth 
century industrialisation were demolished in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
sites were generally viewed as unsuitable for for housing because of the 
close proximity of heavy industry. They were scheduled for industrial use 
in successive plans for the area, despite romantic attempts by some 
Labour politicians to argue for the reconstruction of traditional working 
class communities on them. In the 1970s there was no question that this 
land was earmarked for industrial development, and even in the 1980s 
when plans began to include reference to the possibility of housing on its 
edges, there was still concern about levels of pollution in the soil (see, 
e.g., Sheffield City Council Central Policy Unit 1984, para 4). The 
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development of Mosborough (from 197213) as a form of local authority new 
town on the edge of the city also assumed the development of parts of the 
allocated land for industrial development to provide jobs for the new 
residents. In the late 1970s the City Council was one of Sheffield's three 
largest industrial land owners, alongside the British Steel Corporation and 
the Duke of Norfolk's estate. Between them they controlled two thirds of 
available industrial land (Johnson and Cochrane 1981, p. 45; see also 
Dickens and Goodwin 1981). 
The council had a policy of positive intervention into the land market, 
but largely on a commercial basis, oriented towards achieving good rates 
of financial return. The Estates Surveyor's Department was one of the 
strongest and most autonomous in the authority. Not only did it have the 
specialist professional functions of land valuation, purchase and sale, but 
it was generating non-rate income, which could be re-invested by the 
Department without the pressures generally faced by rate-borne 
expenditure. Its independent role in the land market also meant that the 
Department's officers were able to develop close relations with the 
private sector property sector in the city. One practical result of this 
rather specialist position was the authority's emphasis on the provision of 
serviced land rather than the construction and refurbishment of industrial 
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premises. Since there was effective demand from the private sector and -
until the end of the decade - Sheffield seemed reasonably prosperous, the 
officers of the Estates Surveyor's Department saw "no reason to become 
heavily involved in factory-building already being carried out effectively 
by private developers" (Johnson and Cochrane 1981, p. 46). 
The Estates Surveyor's Department was the mainstream department 
with specific responsibility for the council's economic development work, 
and the professional values (or prejudices) of the Department helped to 
shape that work. As valuers, the dominant view which the Department's 
officers took of their land development work was a commercial one. Their 
training encouraged them to assess market values of property, to purchase 
land cheaply and dispose of it at higher cost. Their task, as they saw it, 
was to build up a portfOlio of land for the council which was capable of 
generating income and making capital gains, as well as ensuring that the 
council had the land it needed for its own purposes, although few other 
departments were making significant demands for additional space or 
premises. In all their work, considerations of employme'nt growth remained 
secondary. In the late 1970s one of the Department's main concerns was to 
find ways around the Community Land Act (introduced by a Labour 
government) and, although Sheffield was Labour controlled, it was 
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encouraged to do so by an equally commercially oriented Corporate Estates 
Committee. 
Within the council's organisational hierarchy, Sheffield's Industrial 
Development Officer (100) was based within the Estates Surveyor's 
Department, and responsible to the Corporate Estates Committee. But his 
office location was physically separate from the bulk of council offices, 
even if only across the road, above some shops and other offices in 
Palatine Chambers (where a much expanded Department of Employment and 
Economic Development was still located at the start of the 1990s). This 
was part of an attempt still further to emphasise the commercial nature 
of his activities and their separation from the normal work of the local 
authority. It is possible to see this separation as largely cosmetic, 
intended to obscure the relationship between 100 and council and present a 
sympathetic front to potential developers. But it was suggested by senior 
officers of the counCil, that the significance of the separation was greater 
than this, to the extent that the 100 was felt to have a rather unusual 
position. He had been given a budget, information about available land and 
premises and a brief from the CounCil, but was then expected largely to get 
on with his job, without referring to others in the officer hierarchy. 
According to this argument, an 100 needed to be able to respond quickly to 
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the enquiries and demands of industrialists and developers, without 
extensive involvement with council bureaucracy, which was likely to slow 
down decision-making. 
In the late 1970s the 100 then in post saw one of his tasks to be the 
representation of commercial interests within what they (and he) thought 
was a largely unsympathetic local authority. On the basis of interviews 
with the 100 and others within the authority at this time, it was possible 
to summarise the position as follows: "To a large extent the 100 attempts 
to distance himself from the rest of the local authority and puts the case 
for developers within the authority. In so doing, he may antagonise the 
. Planning Section. The Estates' Surveyor sees one of his jobs as the 
. protection of the 100 from the rest of the authority so that he can continue 
to take an independent approach without being hidebound by the usual 
caution of local authorities" (Cochrane 1979). The organisational position 
of the IDO confirmed the ambiguity of the industrial development role 
within the council, since it implied the need to have an officer whose role 
was to (independently) advise his 'clients' (essentially defined as 
commercial and property interests) on ways of evading rules imposed by 
other parts of the council. In this context the main responsibility of the 
100 was accepted as being to engender close links with developers and the 
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private sector in order to generate employment, prosperity and and 
diversification (George 1981). 
No one council committee had responsibility for economic 
development work. Althought the 100 was reponsible through the Estates 
Surveyor's Department to the Corporate Estates Committee, industrial 
development was a relatively small part of the Department's 
responsibilities and, therefore, also marginal to the Committee's concerns. 
In addition, the council's promotional activities - including those handled 
by the IDO - came under the City Promotion Committee. For this 
committee, too, the work of the 100 was only a part of its interests, and 
its members were more concerned with the campaigns themselves than 
with their results in terms of employment or investment. Finally, there 
was a third more specialist committee - the Industrial Development 
Advisory Committee - which reported back to the Promotion committee. 
But as its name implies, this was purely an advisory committee, made up 
not only of councillors from the Promotion Committee, but also of local 
MPs, regional departments of government, representatives of local 
employers and trade unions. Reports were made to this committee, but it 
was explicitly intended to be a forum for discussion, gathering information 
and ideas from actors in the local economy. It was not a deciSion-making 
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body. 
The practice of the 100 was largely opportunistic and commercially 
oriented (in line with the dominant style identified by Boddy 1982. See 
also Cochrane 1983). He saw his role as marketing the land and premises 
on offer, passing on enquiries to other estate agencies if there was no 
suitable council owned property, and encouraging almost any potential, 
development. The role of the 100, however, was not solely a responsive one. 
On the contrary it included the responsibility of actively seeking out 
enquiries and encouraging inward investment. In that sense, at least, 
Sheffield's economic policy was already 'proactive' in the ways which 
Cooke sees as characteristic of local government in the post Fordist period 
(Cooke 1989; see also Hirst and Zeitlin 1989). The 100 worked closely with 
the publicity department (organisationally within the Chief Executive's 
department) in developing promotional and advertising campaigns. In the 
late 1970s, the 1D0's own budget for promotion (excluding staff, 
administrative costs and capital spending) was £36,000 and a similar sum 
was spent on related activity by the publicity department. The main stated 
aims of the various campaigns were to encourage inward investment 
(particularly by 'modern' industry and offices) and to encourage orders for 
existing Sheffield industry. The council published its own quarterly journal 
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intended for potential developers ('Development Sheffield'), as well as 
advertising in journals such as 'Trade and Industry' and organising touring 
exhibitions to the South-East of England, West Germany 
(Baden-WOrttemburg) and even the West Coast of the USA. 
Promotion and advertising sought to change the image of Sheffield as 
a grimy industrial city. It emphasised the success of the Clean Air 
campaign launched by Ron Iron monger in the 1960s and stressed the ease 
of access to the surrounding countryside -Sheffield's 'golden frame' - both 
for residents of the city and for commuters who might chose to Iive.in the 
countryside and work in the city. One promotional pamphlet eulogised : 
"Where once its reputation rested fairly and squarely on steel and cutlery 
alone, today it enjoys a fine reputation as a thriving conference and tourist 
centre, a booming regional office centre, and a clean and beautiful city 
with many acres of fine parks and gardens ... Gone are the dark, industrial 
skies of yesteryear, swept away by a ruthless 13 year clean air programme 
that turned one of the dirtiest industrial cities in the world into one of the 
cleanest industrial cities in Europe" (Sheffield City Promotion Committee, 
undated, p.5). This approach was central to the strategy of attracting 
white collar service employment to the city, and was directed particularly 
towards persuading white collar workers and executives of the benefits of 
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such a move. Its appropriateness seemed confirmed in the mid 1970s when 
first the Midland Bank's International Office and then the Manpower 
Services Commission moved to Sheffield. Sheffield was promoted as 
·Office Centre of the North" (Sheffield City Promotion Committee 1977). 
Despite a reputation for rigidity, the city's planning department continued 
to permit speculative office development, even as other authorities were 
imposing new restrictions. 
The politics underlying these policies were uncertain. As expressed in 
the official language of the Council (see, e.g., City of Sheffield MDC 1977b) 
they were based on a desire to reduce unemployment and create jobs - a 
powerful discourse difficult to challenge in an industrial city such as 
Sheffield. But there was little serious attempt to assess the success of 
the poliCies in achieving such ambitions. In 1977 the council's publicity 
officer described the promotional activities as "casting bread on the water 
and hoping it comes back as buttered toast", but it was unclear how that 
'buttered toast' was to be identified. Instead, the measures which were 
adopted in committee reports concentrated on noting a high degree of 
frenetic activity, with statistics about contacts made, industrial sites let 
or sold and numbers employed in them. The councils's own glossy publicity 
material was accepted as an indicator of success. It mayor may not have 
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persuaded developers but it certainly seemed to convince councillors. And 
until the late 1970s, such an interpretation was easy to accept, in part 
because the .fears of large scale decline were not realised until the turn of 
the decade. Sheffield's economy remained strong, and, not surprisingly, the 
council's economic development work was given credit. It was widely 
believed that it was "large and successful" (Chandler and Templeton 1981, 
p. 11). 
But it may be more appropriate to view the politics of economic 
development at this time as largely symbolic: the problem of industrial 
decline having been identified, the council had to be seen to be responding 
to it. The publicity material and the high level of activity appears to have 
been more important than anything which was achieved in terms of 
investment or employment, since little attempt was made to measure 
these. 
The symbolic importance of the politics was also apparent in other 
ways. It highlighted the attempt to build relationships with the local 
business community. The trip to the U.S.A. (in 1977) was undertaken in 
collaboration with the local Chamber of Commerce, and was also intended 
to encourage U.S. orders for Sheffield products. It was followed up with 
seminars for local businessmen, and the Industrial Development Office 
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retained consultants in Japan and California whose task was to seek out 
potential investors and to advise Sheffield based firms on market 
potential. The council also participated in special exhibitions highlighting 
the value of goods produced in Sheffield (e.g. at Interidex in Basle in 1978) 
and helping firms to exhibit at trade fairs. The Industrial Development 
Advisory Committee was the institutional expression of this politics, 
allowing access to business interests but with little direct power or 
influence. The Promotion Committee too had a largely symbolic role, with 
little effective political power. It was one to which less active yet 
respected - usually older - councillors were allocated. It generated a high 
level of ceremonial activity, with frequent attendance by its members at 
ceremonial functions, but, as with the position of Lord Mayor, the emphasis 
on ceremony effectively confirmed a lack of political power. 
Despite the symbolism, however, there was little direct involvement 
of business with local government, even in this policy area. Instead 
officers and elected politicians were largely left to make their own 
assessment of what private developers and local employers wanted and 
then seek to provide them. That helps to explain the role of the 100 in 
speaking for commercial interest within the authority. In a sense it was 
necessary for the council to generate its own pressures to show externally 
358 
that it was sympathetic to development. Whilst the local Chamber of 
Commerce was prepared to work alongside the council on specific issues, 
its main response to the council remained one which stressed the need to 
reduce rate levels and planning restrictions. The main relationships 
between the 100 and industry were with individual 'clients'. There was 
little perceived need from business for continuing relationships with 
business interests, through the Chamber of Commerce or other agency (see, 
e.g., Johnson and Cochrane 1981, pp 93-4). The symbols of co-operation 
were enough from the council's point of view, particularly for the officers 
most directly involved, who were able to use their links with the private 
sector to justify initiatives which moved outside of the usual rules of 
hierarchical decision-making. 
Despite generalised support for it, economic development was not at 
the centre of municipallabourist politics with their emphasis on the 
delivery of the local services of the welfare state. In practice the work of 
industrial development was left to the expert officers, and on the officer 
side it was largely managed through a relationship between professionals 
in the 100 and the Publicity department. This was not extensively 
formalised, but partly the result of individual negotiations between 
officers and partly the result of informed calculations by the officers 
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concerned about which budgets they could draw on to cover the costs of 
their activities. They were able to manipulate the rather confusing 
organisational and financial structure to maximise their own budgets. 
Although economic development work was the product of 
cross-departmental co-operation, it was not an explicitly corporate 
activity. There was no clear-cut authority wide policy bringing the 
departments together. Its operation and development were largely left to 
the decision-making of a small group of (three) key officers. The council's 
economic development work fitted well into the dominant structures 
bequeathed by the past (these relationships are summarised in Cochrane 
1979). 
Towards the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s the old methods 
were beginning to be undermined, although not yet in any dramatic way. 
Other officers began to be involved, and there were hints of a wider focus 
for economic policy-making. An early example of this is to be found in the 
attempt - in cooperation with the South Yorkshire County Council and 
representatives of the industry - to support the city's cutlery industry, 
which was felt to be under pressure from foreign imports. Joint 
delegations were organised to London to put pressure on the Labour 
government for the imposition of import controls. Although the initiative 
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faded in the wake of the election of a Conservative government in 1979 
(because it was assumed that the council would not be able to influence 
the Thatcher. government) the significance of the campaign for the council 
went beyond this. It drew in officers outside the usual limited range -
particularly from the planning department and the Corporate Management 
Unit (CMU) within the Chief Executive's Office. There were signs of a 
greater corporate interest in the area, and leading politicians were also 
involved for the first time. 
A different understanding of what intervention in the local economy 
might mean was beginning to develop. A sectoral analysis of the cutlery 
industry and its role in the local economy was prepared (City of Sheffield 
MOC 1977a) and the council was becoming directly involved with local 
employers and trade unionists in developing industrial policy. Indeed the 
main drive for council involvement came from the Trades Council, rather 
than the council machinery. At the same time, however, changes were also 
taking place within the the city council. The vice chair of the Promotion 
Committee was one of the new breed of councillors - Clive Betts, later 
Chair of Housing, and, by the late 1980s, Leader of the Council - then also a 
white collar employee of South Yorkshire County Council. He worked in 
close cooperation with officers in the CMU and was prepared to become 
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more involved in the day to to day work of the authority, moving away from 
the model which stressed delegation from councillor (and chair) to 
officers (see. Chandler and Templetion 1981 for a detailed discussion of 
Sheffield's involvement in the campaign). Because the existing structure of 
economic development work in Sheffield did not encourage intervention of 
this sort, Betts and the CMU effectively had to bypass them. 
The move towards wider definitions of economic development work 
continued, appearing in discussions of other policy areas, since it was 
becoming increasingly clear that success in some of these relied on 
economic prosperity. For example, an attempt was made to raise questions 
about the local economy in a corporately organised report arising from the 
Council's bid for Inner City Partnership status in 1978-9 (City of Sheffield 
MDC, undated). Within the Industrial Development Office, the main 
practical change was the creation of a small section to offer direct 
assistance to smalI firms, through small loans and grants. An Employment 
Forum was set up to bring together employers, unions and council in 
developing new employment poliCies. The council also supported the 
setting up and funding of an independent Co-operative Development Group. 
intended to generate new enterprises in the form of worker co-operatives. 
The costs involved were modest, and the changes were not dramatic, but 
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they began to challenge the view that the supply of land and sympathy 
towards developers would themselves generate growth and create jobs. 
Instead they. implied that some rather more direct form of intervention 
was required. Previously the council had set its face against any forms of 
subsidy to industry or development: it was concerned to manage its 
portfolio of property in a commercially successful way and, almost 
incidentally, to create jobs. Now it was being acknowledged that such an 
approach was inadequate. 
11.2 The new economics 
When the new political leadership came to power in 1980 change was 
already underway, but the existing structures of the council and of 
economic development, in particular, remained virtually intact. The 
development of new policies meant challenging these structures, in the 
context of dramatic economic change at local level, upheavals in the 
Labour Party and the power of the 'new right' in national government. Local 
pressures for change were also strong, particularly from organisations 
such as the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and the 
Trades Council, which employed its own researcher in the early 1980s to 
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highlight the problems of local industry (see, e.g., Sheffield Trades Council 
1982). 
If there was a general lack of clarity about the programmatic details 
of the socialism which had been espoused by Sheffield's leading 
councillors at the start of the 1980s (see Ch. 10), that was particulary so 
in the economic policy field. David Blunkett had made it clear early on 
what he did nQ! want, namely Sheffield's past practice, which he described 
in 1981, in a speech to the Trades Council's Employment Sub-committee as 
"grovelling on our knees' to any industrialist who is prepared to come to 
Sheffield to provide jobs, whatever the product" (quoted in Green 1981, 
p.3). But it was less clear what the alternative might be, which was one of 
the reasons for the setting up of the strategy group referred to earlier, and 
the appointment of strategy officers. In a review of the first year's work 
of these officers, it was acknowledged that: "From the start the 
councillors recognised that there was no clear path to an agreed set of 
objectives; indeed there was some confusion on how to translate political 
principles into effective action" (City of Sheffield 1983, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, it was also clear that the development of a 'socialist' 
economic policy was a high priority for the council, and that this was to be 
one of the key elements of the new politics, essential if, "a truly socialist 
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society is to be created by the people rather than the long held 
paternalistic pretence that it can be done for them" (Blunkett 1981 a, p. 1, 
based on an. internal Council discussion document on 'Implementing a local 
economic strategy for Sheffield' prepared in 1980). Here the link between 
local and national debates for the 'soul' of the Labour Party are well 
articulated. Blunkett stresses the need for a reorientation of Labour's 
national policy in a "battle to talk about the genuine democratic control of 
total national resources", but also looks to the development of local 
programmes able to point in this direction, through "genuine alternative 
economic policies fostered and supported by the resources available at 
local level and bridging the gap between the provision of services and the 
industrial manufacturing sector in local communities" (Blunkett 1981 a, p. 
1). The arguments were developed not only as suitable for Sheffield but of 
wider relevance to left controlled councils, and with this in mind were 
presented to a conference of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(see also Blunkett 1982b). 
The connection with the policies of other authorities, being developed 
at the same time is clear from this discussion document. Many of the ideas 
expressed and policies proposed are familiar from those raised elsewhere 
(see, e.g., Cochrane 1986b). First, the direct influence of councils is 
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identified, not only in terms of employment and purchasing power, but 
also of community and other infrastructure (including education, training 
and public transport); secondly, support is expressed for intervention into 
processes of industrial and economic regeneration in order to achieve a 
"wide ranging programme for industrial democracy" (p.2), and to encourage 
the development of "socially and economically worth-while" ventures, on 
the basis of community and worker involvement. A range of methods of 
intervention is briefly considered, although without attempt to prioritise 
or choose between them. The need for new products and resources to 
produce them may, it is suggested, be identified by local workers and 
residents. The confident embracing of municipal enterprise is perhaps 
unusual. Again Sheffield's new initiatives are firmly linked back to past 
traditions of local government munipal enterprise: "The examples of 
municipal enterprise of the past could now become updated to the 
community enterprises of the present day. Major national undertakings now 
taken for granted, were the innovatory child of 19th and early 20th century 
Local Government. That pioneering spirit, driving force and genuine 
foresight, have been blanketed and pigeon-holed in a world where energy 
and enthusiasm is suspected as a threat to stability, and the radical lifting 
of horizons is dubbed as extremist divergence from the consensus" (p. 3). 
366 
But co-operative development is also supported, as is the need for 
partnership between the public and private sectors (and between different 
parts of the public sector). Blunkett points to the opportunities which 
might arise from the setting up of local enterprise boards, with "planning 
agreements and the full involvement of Trade Unions, community and 
Central Government itself" (p. 3). With a socialist government at national 
level, Blunkett offers the hope of an integrated and decentralised system 
of economic planning and development. 
The search for ways of translating these general hopes for change 
into some sort of practice continued through 1980 and 1981. The continued 
,lack of certainty was reflected in the decision, despite some misgivings, 
to proceed with a bid to central government for the allocation of an 
Enterprise Zone to be sited in the Lower Don Valley. The council leadership 
was unable to persuade the majority of the Labour Group that such a bid 
would not be worthwhile. However, conditions were attached to the bid -
on planning controls and a continued role for the local authority within the 
zone - which were widely believed to make its rejection a foregone 
conclusion, particularly within the business community (this was 
confirmed in interview with the director of the Sheffield Chamber of 
Commerce and others in 1983). The bid was duly dismissed by the 
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Secretary of State for the Environment in February, 1981. It looked as if 
the council leadership's political position meant it was clear what it did 
not want, but less clear about the possibility of positive initiatives. 
A visit by a group of councillors and officers (as well as Keith 
Jackson, from Northern College) to the Mondragon Co-operatives in 
Northern Spain was influential at this stage, because of their commitment 
to local initiatives, linking production, demand and investment. Mondragon 
appeared to combine the main features which underlay the leadership's 
hopes for an economic policy, both as the basis of a wider model and as an 
immediate guide for Sheffield: it was rooted in a particular community and 
. allowed the feeding back of profits into that community, as well as 
encouraging successful job creation in productive rather than retail or 
distributive industries (17000 jobs over 25 years), and implying more 
democratic work organisation and possibilities of socially useful 
production. It offered a successful morality, which combined self-help 
with the maintenance of a strong local community (Blunkett and Green 
1983, p. 17). Some doubts were expressed about the appropriateness of a 
model which prospered through the Franco period (see, for example, 
arguments quoted by Alcock and Lee 1981, p. 91) and questions were raised 
about the extent to which co-operatives could "survive in a sea of 
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capitalism, coalesce to help build a viable alternative economic system" 
(Green, G. 1981, p. 3). But one of the first initiatives of the new leadership 
was to support the setting up of the (autonomous, but council supported 
and largely council financed) Sheffield Co-operative Development Group 
(SCDG). Co-operatives were seen as being central parts of an alternative to 
'capitalist-oriented' economic development policies, such as those adopted 
by Birmingham while under Conservative control in the early 1980s (see 
Green, G. 1981). 
At first the process of change seemed piecemeal and modest. The 
Estates Surveyor's Department continued to market industrial land. In April 
. 1981 a unit (Sheffield Enterprises) was set up to allow financial aid to be 
given to firms seeking support or investment, on the basis of what was 
called an 'open door' policy, that is applications were invited and each was 
considered on its merits. Sheffield Enterprises can be seen as a 
half-hearted move towards new policies, but still consistent with the 
attitudes of the past, so that finance was seen as another form of 
infrastructural support to the private sector, in much the same way as 
land and premises had been in the past. The main break with the policies of 
the past did not take place until the setting up of first an Employment 
Committee (May 1981) and then an Employment Department in 1981/2. It 
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was at that pOint that choices began to be made about policy direction, 
largely expressed in the choice made for the new Employment Coordinator, 
in September 1981. In a paradoxical echo of past traditions, it was to be 
the officers who were to develop policy, with the support of politicians. 
Sheffield's new initiatives found their main initial expression not in clear 
policy proposals, but in organisational changes. It was these which were 
proudly identified as innovative by the council - "Sheffield is one of the 
first local authorities to set up an Employment Committee and 
Department", began the advertisement for posts to staff the Department 
(City of Sheffield 1982a). And many outside commentators also identified 
this as Sheffield's distinguishing feature. Grayson began an article in 
similar vein: "Sheffield City Council is the first local authority in the UK 
(perhaps in Europe) to create an Employment Committee and an Employment 
Department" (Grayson 1983, p. 22). 
The significance of setting up an independent department with 
associated committee was a measure of the political priority given to the 
policy area, and an indication that leading councillors felt that existing 
structures were not appropriate for launching new initiatives. 
Organisational changes were needed if new possibilities were to be 
realised. Past experience had shown that locating economic development 
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within the Estates Surveyor's department had reinforced a property led 
approach, and links to the Publicity Department had encouraged crude 
forms of external marketing. But locating economic development within 
the Chief Executive's area of responsibility was also rejected, largely 
because the Chief Executive was weak within a strong departmental 
system. David Blunkett argued that the creation of a new department was 
intended to undermine existing bureaucratic structures, and avoid creating 
new ones: "in the past bureaucracy has tended to dominate decisions. What 
we are talking about is possible ways of doing things, not just a creation 
of jobs but rather how you could do it differently"' He argued that another 
of the tasks of the department was to challenge how local government 
officers saw themselves, and, in particular, to question the view that their 
task was to explain why certain actions cannot be taken, which he 
described as part of the local government tradition of professions. One of 
the department's tasks, he said, was to help shift officers away from the 
notion that they were servicing the council and its committees to one in 
which they saw themselves as "servicing the community" (Interview 12th 
April 1983). 
The Employment Committee's overall responsibilities remained very 
broadly focused and allowed significant scope for policy development. They 
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were to "co-ordinate everything that the city Council can do: 
a) to prevent further loss of jobs in the city; 
b) to alleviate the worst effects of unemployment, and to encourage 
effective training for new skills and jobs; 
c) to stimulate new investment, to create new kinds of employment, and to 
diversify job opportunities in the city; 
d) to explore new forms of industrial democracy and co-operative control 
over work" (City of Sheffield Employment Department 1983, p. 1). The gaps 
still needed to be filled in, and that was to be the task of the new officers, 
supervised by the committee. It was hoped that strategy would emerge 
. from a package of activities covering all potential aspects of local 
authority intervention. 
Applicants for the post of Employment Coordinator were expected to 
produce answers to four questions in no more than one thousand words 
each: how to promote the prosperity of the city without enriching one 
section at the expense of another; how the council could constructively 
respond to conflict between the owners and workers in the engineering and 
steel industries in response to slim down and closure; whether the council 
could create new jobs on a scale to compensate for the effect of recession 
and how much effort it would take to stop redundancies in the short term; 
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how traditional economic development could best be integrated into the 
new initiatives and what new relationships, units and resources would be 
required. Each was also sent a copy of David Blunkett's paper on alternative 
economic policies to which reference has already been made (Blunkett 
1981a). 
It will be clear from this that the person apPointed to the post was 
expected to be largely in sympathy with the ambitions of the council 
leadership. Applicants were expected to be "committed to the Council's 
approach and policies". The Conservative group on the Council included this 
post among those defined as 'political' which would be under threat if they 
took control of the council (,The Star' 20/6/81). This was not a traditional 
local authority chief officer appointment, in which the chief officer was 
expected to work within guidelines (and statutory responsibilities) 
developed over many years. Nor was there an existing clearly defined 
department to manage. The dominant policies of the past were effectively 
being rejected, and a new path chosen. But the significance of this went 
beyond the search for a politically sympathetic officer. The hope was that 
the person appointed would effectively develop the new policies, to 
produce a coherent strategy for intervention into the local economy. 
The job description was wide enough to allow for the development of 
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policy in many different directions. It included the following duties and 
responsibilities: to attract and promote new industrial and commercial 
development and to take action to ensure the stability and success of 
existing industry and commerce; to "assist the Employment Committee" on 
approaches for advice and financial assistance from enterprises and 
potential enterprises; to encourage the development of cooperatives and to 
work towards setting up a local enterprise board with a system of planning 
agreements; to develop municipal enterprise (although without 
responsibility for running it on a day to day basis) and to secure 
employment in the public sector; to ensure adequate training for skilled 
workers, to meet the future needs of industry and commerce; to coordinate 
measures to alleviate unemployment, including Manpower Services 
Commission schemes. It did not include any commitment to the 
development of equal opportunity policies either inside the council or in 
those areas in which it intervened (Sheffield City Council 1981 a). 
The initiative of councillors succeeded in raising the profile of 
economic policy, by creating a 'separate department and making it the 
responsibility of a full council committee with a chair on the Policy 
Committee, but it was the appointment of a chief officer and the operation 
of the new department which was effectively to shape the direction of 
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Sheffield's new local economic policies in its early years. Sheffield's 
employment policy was driven as much by the officers appointed to the 
new department as by the local Labour Party or the councillors on the 
Employment Committee. The key decision was made in the appointment of 
the first Employment Coordinator. Here the choice was relatively clear: 
between appointing someone with experience inside the council, and within 
Sheffield Enterprises, or appointing someone from outside, with a record 
in community organisation who had made a critical contribution to debates 
about local government organisation and past industrial policies. It was a 
choice between a candidate likely to develop existing work in the direction 
. favoured by councillors, starting from an existing economic development 
base, expanding financial provision to the private sector, and being able to 
show success in terms of buildings, jobs created etc., and a candidate 
whose political commitment was clear and who stressed the need to 
challenge existing council procedures and hierarchies. It was the choice 
between a practitioner, produced by the local government system, and a 
visionary, committed to challenging it. The decision was a close one, and-
according to one senior Labour pOlitician - the chair of the Employment 
Committee (Bill Michie) was in a minority on the appointment panel. But 
the person finally appointed was the visionary, John Benington, who had 
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previously written a critique of corporate planning in local government 
(Benington 1976), had been involved in the preparation of critiques of past 
industrial policies (Joint Trades Councils 1980) and in attempts to present 
and develop the ideas of popular planning arising out of the Lucas 
experience (Wainwright and Elliott 1982). 
He came from a similar background to and had previously worked with 
the two strategy officers appointed earlier. Like them, his role was not to 
be restricted to the work of one department, but was to influence the 
operation of the council as a whole. It might not have been possible to 
challenge the existing structures of the council head on, but it was 
possible to use new officers and a new department to begin to undermine 
their position. The Employment Coordinator was expected to work closely 
with other chief officers and to be able to call on the resources of their 
departments. He and the new officers appointed by him were expected to 
carry politics into the heart of the Town Hall bureaucracy to shake up 
existing arrangements, even if it was not always clear what the effect of 
that shake up was likely to be. The tensions of developing a new policy 
area were reflected in the splits, divisions and arguments within the new 
department: that was where the main debates on economic policy took 
place, as organisational divisions were translated into policy distinctions. 
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The obstacles to the developing policy existed not only in the harsh 
economic realities of the world into which the department sought to 
intervene, but also within the council machinery - in relationships with 
other departments and officers in other departments as much as with 
councillors and alternative political perspectives within the council or 
represented in local parties. It is to these issues of professional and 
organisational politics that we shall turn in the next chapter. 
Notes 
1. Most of the material in section 11.1 is drawn from a series of 
interviews undertaken in 1977-79 and summarised in a case study, whose 
empirical content was discussed and agreed with relevant officers of 
Sheffield City Council. 
2. Interview with David Blunkett, 1214/83. 
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Chapter 12. Sheffield: developing a new pOlitics of economic 
development 
12.1 The role of the new professionals 
As indicated in previous chapters, the initiative for political change 
came from within the Labour group of the City Council, but was also 
influenced by their links into the local Labour Party and trade union 
movement. The context for change at the start of the 1980s was set by the 
wider economic experience of deindustrialisation and recession and by the 
,political crisis of social democracy which left the Labour Party sharply 
divided over its future direction, encouraging the development of 
challenges to old orthodoxies and leaderships (see Chapter 6 above). In 
some respects, Sheffield's new political leadership can be seen as the 
local expression of these more general shifts, but it was clearly also the 
expression of specific local processes of interaction, between economy 
and politics, and within the local political system. The importance of 
understanding the independent (one hesitates to use the te'rm 'relatively 
autonomous', if only because it has been devalued in debates in which it 
has been sprayed on as an afterthought to avoid accusations of economic 
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determinism) weight of politics is emphasised by considering the next 
stage of development. 
The initiative for change may have come from local political leaders, 
rooted in the official institutions of local government and linked to those 
of the trade union movement, but at the start of the 1980s the politics of 
economic development in Sheffield were increasingly dominated in 
practice by a new set of professionals. The council leadership consciously 
used existing structures to insert more sympathetic officers into the 
system. The model adopted for achieving this insertion was the relatively 
straightforward one of imitating those structures. The use of a 
,departmental model reflected the traditional view that only a department 
with its own committee would have the necessary status to initiate 
change. It also meant that there was no need to rely on existing officers or 
departments whose support might be equivocal. Existing chief officers also 
supported this approach because setting up a new department made it 
possible to avoid squabbling between existing departments for 
responsibility, and avoided the danger that additional power would be 
placed in the hands of the Chief Executive. Existing structures remained 
intact. In interviews several chief officers expressed scepticism about the 
likely sucess of the new initiatives and were reluctant to be too closely 
379 
associated with them. And there was a marked reluctance to take on an 
activity with such a high political profile because one consequence might 
also be increased political interference (this was a particular concern of 
the Estates Surveyor, who had previously had the main responsibility for 
economic development work). 
By the end of March 1982 the new department had taken on many of 
the features of most departments within local government: it had its own 
chief officer (albeit with the title Employment Coordinator rather than 
Director) with a seat on Management Team, its own committee, its own 
budget and now also its own staff. Although still small by the standards of 
.other departments (with a budget 'of less than 1 % of the council's overall 
expenditure) it had a high political profile because its new staff were 
concerned with policy development rather than service delivery. The 
influence of the newly appointed professionals was clear from the start, 
and soon helped to shape the programmes of the politicians. 
An important feature of this early peri~d of 'local socialism' in 
Sheffield was the extent to which the new politics became the property of 
a particular set of officers, rather than any locally based groups. John 
Benington has stressed the extent to which he was able to change the 
priorities of the council. Any lingering ambitions to recreate a working 
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class in the image of Attercliffe by assisting industrial investment were 
soon left behind. He later described the situation which faced him on 
arrival as follows: "the first aim [of the councillors] was to use their 
powers under Section 137 of the Local Government Act to back up 
initiatives by local people who were facing employment problems. By the 
time I arrived there was a queue of 300 local enterprises waiting for 
grants, loans or other kinds of practical help. In my interview I argued 
strongly that such a strategy could very easily produce a kind of 
bottomless pit as they could get completely overwhelmed with emergency 
firefighting and industrial casework. Consequently, there had to be a 
,different kind of strategy - a longer term strategy ... They originally saw 
the department as being a very small unit of people to analyse the 
applications for finance and get the money out. From the beginning I argued 
that if the department was to have this wider programme of work 
including vital dimensions like equal opportunities for women it would 
need to be much larger and would need a staff of about 40. At the time that 
wasn't agreed, but my predictions have proved about right. We have got the 
range of work that I wanted and about 50 staff have been struggling for the 
first few years to see if it is possible to shift away from fire-fighting 
casework to something more strategic" (Alcock et al1984, p.71). The 
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gradual move away from the 'open door' policy which characterised the 
early development of Sheffield Enterprises was led by the officers and 
later endorsed by the Employment Committee in 1983. 
The division of labour between elected politicians and new officers 
was never explicitly stated, but sometimes resulted in significant 
conflicts. The most important of these clustered around forms of direct 
intervention into the private sector. Here officers tended to be more 
sceptical about the possibilities of success than did elected pOliticians. 
As Chandler and Lawless noted at the time, although the Employment 
Department did "provide funds for co-operatives and conventionally owned 
private businesses many of its members are far from convinced that they 
should be involved in subsidising the private sector" (Chandler and Lawless 
1985, p. 259). In practice the arguments of the officers tended to be 
successful in particular cases - for example, over potential investments in 
firms such as Viners, GP Wincott and Manganese Steel - but they were not 
always accepted with good grace, since there was frequently a concern 
that the conditions being imposed by the Department in negotiation were 
too hard, leading firms to withdraw for one reason or another. 
In the case of Viners (a struggling cutlery company), for example, the 
Department supported proposals for a buy back from its parent company on 
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the basis of a planning and employment agreement, but was accused of 
dragging its feet and looking for guarantees to the extent that banks 
withdrew their support, forcing the company into liquidation in 1983 (see 
also discussion in Goodwin 1986). Although the officially stated position 
was that nothing else could have been done - because the company was too 
weak to save - some councillors were concerned that whenever a major 
scheme to save jobs seemed possible, the officers were too reluctant to 
become involved (whether from a belief that becoming too close to the 
private sector would be politically compromising, or because it was felt 
that investment in failing companies was unlikely to bring worthwhile 
.returns in terms of employment or continued production). In the case of 
Manganese Steel these concerns came out rather more clearly. In 1982, 
Manganese Steel was faced with closure, and, as a result the City Council 
waived the rent which was due and asked Hadfields to act as guarantor. In 
1983, Hadfields itself faced threat of closure and withdrew support for 
Manganese Steel. A liquidator was brought,in, and the company's workers 
formulated a rescue plan, dependent on Council support. The Employment 
Department and the Employment Committee both decided that they could 
not support the plan. A full meeting of the Labour Group, however, 
overturned this decision, arguing for support. Only after pressure from 
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officers and politicians associated with the Department was this change 
of position first postponed and later rejected. Manganese Steel closed. 
Again, the economic logic of the Department's position was reluctantly 
accepted, but at some cost to the Department's political credibility (again, 
see also Goodwin 1986). These concerns among elected Labour politiCians 
also found a practical expression in their attitudes to policies developed 
for the Lower Don Valley, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 13. 
Sheffield's political leadership remained a strong and centralised one, 
even after the council's move to the left at the start of the 1980s. Leading 
councillors continued to see themselves as directing the work of the 
'authority, and in terms of economic policy that meant that they saw 
themselves as laying out the broad policy direction and being involved in 
detailed decisions on finance for particular projects. But, it was also 
recognised that developing the new economic strategy was a task for the 
new officers: that was one of the reasons for the political sensitivity of 
the appointments, particularly that of Employment Coordinator. The extent 
to which the Employment Coordinator made political statements outside 
the confines of papers presented to council committees (e.g. Alcock et al 
1984) was a measure of the change, in the sense that his political role was 
acknowledged, however uneasily, within the council system (Benington 
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later confirmed that the interview, published as Alcock et al 1984, had 
generated concern from some - unnamed - senior councillors although he 
had already amended the original interview transcript to avoid the 
criticism that he was making policy without consulting councillors or that 
he was himself gOing too far in commenting on individual councillors) 1, 
The difficulties associated with this development, however, were also 
apparent in rather uneasy jokes made by some councillors about the 
reversal of roles they identified, to the extent that they now felt 
themselves to be implementing policy while the new officers were left to 
develop them2, David Blunkett, whilst stressing the value of bringing in 
·people from outside to challenge the way in which local government 
officers saw themselves, also suggested that some would be better off as 
elected pOliticians rather than officers. 
12.2 Identifying the new professionals 
The new officers were appointed as part of an attempt to break with 
more traditional forms of economic development work and of local 
government bureaucracy. As a result, apart from those seconded from other 
parts of the authority, many of them were appointed from outside local 
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government. This can be seen clearly in the backgrounds of the Principal 
Development Officers who were appointed to senior positions within the 
department. The officer with most experience of local government had, like 
Benington, worked for a Community Development Project, before being 
employed within a local authority for a short time. Another had academic 
experience and had worked with a trades council as a researcher; a third 
had been working in a University, but had previously spent several years in 
Tanzania working on economic development plans. The only woman 
appointed at this stage (to the equal opportunities post) had experience in 
the local women's movement. Later additions to the core of senior staff 
·included one initially appointed to another post within the department, 
whose main experience was as an accountant in the private sector and had 
also undertaken research for the local trades council, and another (also 
initially appointed to another position) who had been secretary of the 
Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee, which had prepared an alternative 
corporate plan for the company and inspireq many of the economic 
initiatives launched by left councils in the early 1980s (see, e.g., 
Wainwright and Elliott 1982). The secondment of Paul Skelton to the 
department from his position as Principal Strategy Officer brought another 
senior member with Community Development Project and voluntary sector 
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experience. 
In his discussion of the 'new urban left' Gyford is careful not to 
suggest that it was a formal organised grouping. Instead he stresses that 
it is almost "amoeba-like in its lack of anyone constant pattern of 
organisation" (Gyford 1985, p.17). Similarly he points out that there was 
no unified or coherent programme of 'local socialism' shared by its 
supporters or members of the 'new urban left'. The importance of these 
conclusions becomes clear in this context. The new professionals could all 
be seen to have been members of the 'new urban left'. They had experience 
of and had - mainly - been active in the movements and developing the 
.ideas identified by Gyford as part of the move to 'local socialism' (Gyford 
1985, pp. 33-42). Many of them had cut their political teeth on community 
action, had been influenced by the associated debates about the local state, 
as well as being involved in or influenced by critiques of traditional 
Labourism and forms of economic intervention (for example, as 
represented in 'Beyond the Fragments', but also in the critiques of Labour's 
industrial policy, expressed in reports such as 'State Intervention in 
Industry', in the preparation of which some of the new officers had been 
involved) (Rowbotham et a11979, and Joint Trades Councils 1980). In a 
sense, building on Rhodes (1988), the new professionals could be seen as 
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members of embryonic policy networks. 
The 'new urban left', as described by Boddy and Fudge (1984a), Gyford 
(1985), Lansley et al (1989), was a 'left' of activists and professionals, 
into which those employed in Sheffield fitted well. The "amoeba-like 
grouping" identified by Gyford already allowed for formal and informal 
linkages, and these were developed further in the course of the 1980s as 
the radical professionals became integrated into the institutions of the 
local state, through regular meetings between officers and councillors on 
specific issues, a blossoming of courses from a range of educational 
institutions, and later (1985) the setting up of the Centre for Local 
.Economic Strategies. The new policy network did not have access to any 
influence at the centre of British politics, but it did generate a wider 
policy community within which ideas could be discussed, attempts could 
be made to identify best practice and support networks developed. 
The most obvious linkages in the early appointments in Sheffield were 
through Community Development Project (~DP) experience. The influence of 
the CDPs on the 'new urban left' have been widely stated (e.g. Gyford 1985, 
pp. 34-36. See Loney 1983, for a discussion of the CDPs and their 
development) but it is more difficult to trace any direct influence. In the 
case of Sheffield in the early 1980s, it is almost too easy - at least in 
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terms of personnel- since those with COP experience included the two 
Principal Strategy Officers, the new Employment Coordinator, one of the 
. 
Principal Officers, and several of those appointed at lower levels. Keith 
Jackson who seems to have influenced an earlier period of policy 
development had also worked for one of the Projects. 
The Community Development Projects were set up in twelve inner city 
and older industrial areas of Great Britain in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as part of the U.K.'s Urban Programme, 75% funded by the Home 
Office and 25% by local authorities. Each interdisciplinary team included 
researchers employed by a University or Polytechnic, and action workers 
. employed by the local authorities, and was supervised by a council (and 
councillor) based management committee. The aim of the projects was to 
encourage developments at local- community -level which could then 
usefully be generalised throughout Britain's inner cities. According to the 
Home Office, the programme was "a neighbourhood-based experiment aimed 
at finding new ways of meeting the needs o! people living in areas of high 
social deprivation; by bringing together the work of all the social services 
under the leadership of a special project team and also tapping resources 
of self help and mutual help which may exist among the people in the 
neighborhoods" (press release 16th July 1969, quoted in COP 1977b, p. 12). 
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A key objective of the COPs was to "take some of the load off the statutory 
services by generating a fund of voluntary social welfare activity and 
mutual help amongst the individuals, families and social groups in the 
neighbourhood, supported by the voluntary agencies" (COP: Objectives and 
Strategies, 1970, quoted in COP 1977b, p. 60). 
In practice, however, most of the Projects worked rather differently. 
The two sides of the teams tended to work together, with the 
action/research distinction becoming blurred, and, more important the 
underlying principles of the initiative were soon being called into question. 
In particular, the notion that community action could solve the problems of 
,inner cities was challenged, both because it was concluded that the 
economic state of the inner cities was largely a consequence of wider 
forms of national (and global) economic restructuring (CDP.1977a) and 
because effective community work tended to encourage increased 
expectations and demands at local level, rather than (or as much as) an 
increase in voluntary welfare activity. It was argued that only by 
challenging the basic assumptions of what came to be called the British 
Poverty Programme could progress be made (COP 1977b). 
But there were also legacies of the Projects which were immediately 
relevant to the tasks of the early 1980s, working within the institutions 
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of local government. One shared feature of many of the Community 
Development Projects was the balancing act their employees had to 
perform to sustain relationships with their management committees and 
the Home Office, whilst also supporting community based organisations 
which tended directly to challenge Council departments - particularly 
Housing Departments - or to place increasing demands on them for 
financial support. The marxist inspired reports prepared by many of the 
projects also fitted uneasily with the views of their sponsors. Yet, most of 
the Projects (Batley, Southwark and Cleator Moor were exceptions) 
survived their five year life, despite threats of closure from one sponsor 
,or the other. The COPs could be seen as a dry run for models of change. 
albeit this time with a greater certainty of support from within the 
political machinery of the local state. Paradoxically, perhaps, having been 
set up with very different aims, they were among the very few practical 
examples of alternative ways of working within and around that state. 
Not only did John Benington write a highly influential critique of 
forms of local authority corporate management based on his COP 
experience (Benington 1976), but others employed in Sheffield had played 
important parts in developing the wider politics and practice of the COPs 
(e.g. as members of the collective teams responsible for COP 1977a and b) .. 
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Possibly more important in their new roles within Sheffield's officer 
structure, they looked back to the CDP experience as a model for current 
practice, suggesting that some of those with different experiences were 
less able to cope with (or understand) the complexity of their position. 
John Benington confirmed this point, explicitly suggesting that, "Those 
who did not have the necessary experience tended not to understand or else 
underestimated the ways of using and working in the local state. At best 
they tended to have a theoretical view and had read about it but they had 
very little practical effective experience of translating those theories 
into practice" (Interview, 10th April 1983). Similar comments were made 
·by several other officers with CDP experience, whose importance seems to 
have been the balancing act it assumed between broad political conclusions 
and detailed local initiative, as well as the need to maintain relationships 
with (and even formal accountability to) those who were not always 
sympathetic to the wider ambitions of those working in the Projects. 
It is dangerous, however, to make too. much of the CDP connection. 
Despite the collective publications of the Projects and some shared 
experience, they never had a unified programme. In the case of Sheffield 
the links through CDP simply confirm the existence of networks, more 
broadly summarised in terms of a 'new urban left', which was not reducible 
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to the Labour Party, and was not just a localised phenomenon. Few of the 
new officers had been actively involved in the Labour Party, although some 
were members. The focus of their attention had been on other aspects of 
the labour movement or community organisation. And this helps to confirm 
Gyford's warnings. The 'new urban left' of which many of the new officers 
were a part was a loose alliance, in large part held together by their 
differences from others and criticism of existing arrangements, rather 
than any shared programme of their own. 
In the case of Sheffield, not only did the individuals appointed come 
from different points in the radical spectrum, but the experience of the 
work they undertook served to widen rather than narrow differences in 
practice. It was clear from interviews that some were committed to 
seeking to intervene into the economy at local level. influencing the 
operation of the private sector; others rejected such a strategy, arguing 
instead that only council based initiatives (municipal enterprise and direct 
employment) were worth fighting for; some emphasised their commitment 
to the development of worker cooperatives; and others based themselves 
on a commitment to support and service community and trade union 
organisations; all of them found their relationship with the council 
machinery difficult to deal with. 
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12.3 New organisational forms 
The work of the department was divided in ways which expressed 
different priorities and different understandings within the rather 
uncertain coalition represented by the officers of local socialism. There 
was no clear and single worked out new left economic policy to be picked 
down from the shelf, and many of the differences of approach were 
reflected in the organisational divisions within the department, despite 
the frequently stated fiction that they were not based on divisions of 
·expertise or profession, but merely reflected current work priorities 
within the department. But since it was still not clear what the overall 
framework was to be, in practice an uncertain political settlement was 
reflected in rather confused organisational forms. The structure of the 
new department reflected the tensions within the ambitions of those who 
set it up, but these tensions were reinforced in the process of policy 
development. 
At first, management within the department was intended to suggest 
a new model within local government, imported from the traditions of the 
new officers, particularly the new Employment Coordinator. It was 
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assumed that the most important decisions - what Benington called the 
'employment strategy' - would be developed by the members of the 
. 
department as a collective, rather than as the result of a series of ad hoc 
decisions, taken by project teams or divisions of the department. From the 
start a coordinating group, made up of the principal development officers, 
the equal opportunities officer and the Employment Coordinator, was set 
up, to meet weekly, and develop this strategy. In addition there were to be 
regular (three weekly) meetings of the staff as a whole to consider policy, 
including the decisions of the coordinating group. Although the Employment 
Coordinator retained final powers of decision-making and could overrule 
.the coordinating group and and staff group, this represented a substantial 
modification of traditional departmental hierarchies within local 
government departments, with a model closer to that of the community 
organisations (including the Community Development Projects and 
Coventry Workshop) with which the Employment Coordinator and other 
officers were familiar. 
The organisational structure of of the department changed markedly 
over the course of the 1980s, but it is also possible to identify important 
continuities across it, and even back to the industrial development work of 
the 1970s. The initial structure agreed in 1981 was organised around five 
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broad areas of work, two of which were retained from the past - namely, 
industrial development (described as covering the promotion of trade, 
inward investment, industrial land and premises) and Sheffield Enterprises 
(described as covering financial assistance and specialist advice to 
workers' cooperatives, small firms and new job creation initiatives) (City 
of Sheffield Employment Department1982a). The other three new areas for 
development, and for which new staff were being sought in early 1982, 
were Economic Development and Major Investments, an Employment 
Research and Resource Unit and New Technology. The Department was to be 
organised around these divisions in the first instance, with each area being 
headed by a Principal Development Officer. 
The three new programme areas reflected the changing priorities of 
the department. The first, and smallest in terms of staffing, Economic 
Development and Major Investments, was also potentially the most 
ambitious, since it was concerned to explore the possibilities for directing 
large scale investment into the local economy. It assumed the possibility 
of public/private sector partnerships in which the public sector would 
have a powerful role and councils would no longer be relegated to servicing 
small firms seeking assistance (on the model of Sheffield Enterprises). 
Even at this stage, however, it was clear that Sheffield was unlikely to 
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fol/ow the enterprise board route (taken up by the Greater London Council 
and West Midlands County Council at the same time), since the head of this 
section was only to be appointed on a two year contract, and have no staff 
working directly to her/him. Although there were commitments to some 
form of enterprise board in early discussions (e.g. reflected in Notes for 
Candidates for the post of Employment Coordinator), these were soon 
translated into support for feasibility studies (e.g. in Labour's election 
manifesto in 1982). 
The second area - the Employment Research and Resource Unit - was 
the one linked most closely to Benington's past experience in a community 
'resource centre. But it also fitted in well with the ambitions of 
council/ors to be able to offer support to trade union and community 
organisations, and to provide the basis on which to undertake sectoral 
studies of the local economy, possibly feeding into local business 
decisions, seeking to influence central government policy and providing a 
context for local authority intervention. Previous reports on cutlery and 
steel had been prepared on an ad hoc basis and a more specialist unit might 
make it possible to improve consistency. Its tasks were described as : "to 
monitor Sheffield's economy, industry and firms; to disseminate 
information about employment trends to councillors, trade unions, 
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employers and community organisations; to assist groups trying to prevent 
further loss of jobs by carrying out social audits on firms threatened with 
closure or redundancy and by preparing alternative community plans for 
local industries" (City of Sheffield Employment Department 1982a). 
The identification of a division responsible for New Technology was a 
statement of intent, a recognition of the importance of the area. An 
important element of its work would be to raise the profile of new 
technology in the city, by encouraging "constructive debate, policy and 
action" (City of Sheffield Employment Department 1982a). An early aim 
was to identify the existing impact of microelectronics on existing jobs -
,in terms of numbers employed, the nature of work and patterns of 
employment. 
The other, continuing, areas of work within the department were also 
to be substantially reoriented. There was to be a move away from the 
marketing activities which had previously been so important in Industrial 
Development. The new approach questioned the strategy of supporting 
promotional trips to foreign countries (such as Japan and the West Coast 
of America) and providing support for consultants in them who would give 
advice to Sheffield companies. Instead, there was support for the building 
of links to rather different countries, such as China. In the longer term, it 
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was hoped that the development and marketing of land could reflect the 
new priorities of the new department, although in the early days it was 
accepted that the role of the Estates Surveyor's department might make 
that difficult. Within Sheffield Enterprises (soon retitled Aids to 
Enterprises), a range of new appointments seemed intended to make its old 
ambitions more difficult to achieve. Three specialist officers were 
appointed. The first (responsible for aids to industry) had the task of 
. 
giving applicants for funds advice on other sources of finance for job 
creation and investment (e.g. central government, the European Community, 
ban~s and private financial institutions); the second (responsible for 
," 
product development) was supposed to help enterprises (cooperatives as 
well as other firms) with technical and marketing advice on the successful 
development of socially useful products; the third (responsible for 
municipal enterprise) was to look at the opportunities for the council 
itself to generate jobs through its own role as local investor, purchaser 
and provider of services. So the emphasis was moved away from direct 
financial assistance to advice on other sources of investment finance and 
on product development, and a new stress was being placed on the council's 
own role as an economic actor, rather than its ability to Influence an 
'economy' defined as separate and outside itself. 
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There was a similar justification for the appointment of an officer 
responsible for equal opportunities which also took place at this time. This 
post was the result of initiative from the new chief officer. In contrast to 
the experience in other 'local socialist' authorities, equal opportunities 
had not been identified as a separate issue before his arrival and the 
continuing ambivalence of the council leadership was reflected in the way 
in which the new post fitted into the department's organisational 
structure. Although advertised as a Principal Development Officer 
reporting to the Employment Coordinator, the post was filled at a lower 
grade than the other Principal Development Officers and the person 
·appointed had no officers reporting to her. Nevertheless, the intention of 
the appointment and the involvement of the person apPointed in the 
Departmental Coordinating Group was to ensure that an equal opportunities 
"perspective is actively represented in all programmes and departmental 
decision-making" (Benington 1982, p. 2). By the end of 1982, this priority 
was given greater recognition with the setting up of a specialist project 
team, Equal Opportunities (Women and Employment). 
A further project team was set up to cover Training for Employment 
in 1982, and Municipal Enterprises which was initially part of a group with 
Economic Development became increasingly autonomous by 1983, headed by 
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a senior officer seconded from another part of the authority. So, in the 
early 1980s there were teams organised around Equal Opportunities 
(Women and' Employment), Economic Development, Aids to Enterprises, 
Industrial Development, New Technology, Training for Employment, and 
Municipal Enterprises as well as a Research and Resource Unit. Similar 
divisions survived until the mid 1980s3. 
The separate groups within the department tended to develop their 
own interests, defined partly in terms of the divisions which were implied 
by the organisational structure which they found on arrival and partly in 
terms of the different ideas with which they started and different 
,backgrounds from which they came. When the department was set up there 
seems to have been the rather naive assumption that those employed would 
start from a similar understanding of the problems, so that they could also 
begin to develop similar solutions. Since the political approach which 
underlay the department remained uncertain even as the policy developed, 
it proved rather more difficult to achieve such unity. 
12.4 Fitting into the council machinery 
One of the aims of Sheffield's council leadership in setting up the new 
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department was to influence the wider organisational culture of the 
council. It was set up as a department with representation on the Council's 
management team in part at least to ensure that its chief officer would be 
involved in arguments at senior level as part of a process of influencing 
the policy direction taken by other departments. Indeed, it was 
acknowledged from the start that the response of those departments would 
be as important to the success of the Council's employment initiatives as 
any independent action taken by the Employment Department itself. In 
addition, the department and its officers were expected to be close to the 
political priorities of the council's political leadership and not to conform 
.to the traditional civil service (and local government) model of impartial 
administration. They were to be the carriers of the new policies within the 
existing bureaucratic structures of the council, in places to which 
councillors would not normally have access. Looking back on the first year 
of the department's life, John Benington stressed its "role as a catalyst 
trying to affect the distribution of resources and the nature of decision 
making in the local authority as a whole ... There is no doubt that the work 
we have been doing has challenged many traditional assumptions - firstly, 
the notion that local government officers are there to provide neutral 
professional advice of a technical kind and secondly, that departments are 
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there simply to provide services. We are quite clear that we are not 
operating with any neutral professionalism, and quite clear that we are 
committed. We have a particular analysis and that is shared with and in 
tune with the controlling group on the City Council, and what we are saying 
is that we are offering rigorous competent [advice] but not that it is 
neutral or technical" (Alcock et al1984, pp 74-75). At its most strongly 
expressed, the new department represented an alternative form of 
corporate policy making, with ambitions to influence decisions throughout 
the council machinery. 
The area of economic development was one in which existing 
.professional structures were weak. Those working in it did not have the 
status of officers in the major service or central departments. As a result 
it was one of the easiest areas through which to introduce new approaches. 
The new department was set up outside the existing systems of policy and 
professional networks. Even 'traditional' or 'mainstream' local economic 
policy development policies were only wea~ly related to such networks. An 
Association of Industrial Development Officers did exist, but it was not 
based on any recognisable features of professionalisation. There were no 
clearly shared characteristics of industrial development officers or their 
training which made it possible to identify a 'profession'. At best the 
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Association could be seen to be at an early stage of professionalisation, 
seeking to develop and identify shared needs for training and the ability to 
take on a rep'resentational role. 
If the relative weakness of the economic development role left it 
relatively open to change, not surprisingly, the changes also encouraged 
tensions with the officers of other departments, who frequently 
commented that members of the Employment Department seemed to be 
making claims to the work of others - often suggesting that they did so 
with little (professionally based) understanding of likely consequences. 
Such comments were particularly common within the planning and 
,education departments. The equal opportunities aspects of the 
department's work, which came to involve pressures on other departments 
for change, was also seen as a challenge to the role of the personnel 
department, particularly after the appointment of a new chief officer who 
sought to develop his own equal opportunities policies. An early initiative 
to set up a one year project to "examine the City Council's employment 
patterns and practices in relation to women's employment" (quoted in City 
of Sheffield Employment Department 1983 Para 3.9.2.) was effectively 
taken over by the Personnel Department. although the researcher was 
expected to liaise with the Employment Department and another researcher 
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in the Ethnic Minorities Unit. 
In interviews, several officers from other departments began by 
stating their support for the Employment Department in principle, before. 
going on to identify particular areas of its work with which they were not 
happy. Members of the Treasurer's department expressed doubts about their 
preparedness to apply strict financial criteria to funding proposals, and 
fears about the likelihood that council funds might be wasted. The Estates 
Surveyors' Department remained critical of moves to use land and property 
in ways which they did not consider appropriate, that is looking for ways 
in which to dispose of them in ways which generated most income. The 
'intervention of the Employment Department into the field of training 
aroused irritation from the Education Department, and colleges within it, 
because it seemed able to draw on resources unavailable to them, 
undermining their provision. Even members of the planning department, 
who worked most closely with officers of the Employment Department, 
expressed concern about that Department's commitment to what were 
perceived as abstract political principles. They were concerned that the 
new officers did not have sufficient understanding of the 'need' to work 
with and be sympathetic to thedemands of developers to encourage 
investment by them. Several officers including chief officers, commented 
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on the lack of experience exhibited by officers in the Employment 
Department, noting particularly the extent to which there appeared to be 
divisions between them at meetings (see also Chandler and Lawless 1985, 
p. 196). 
Despite the political support it received, the status of the Department 
within the Council was also uncertain because it did not carry the 
responsibilities and budgets of the other departments. It did not have 
service delivery or statutory responsibilities. By 1986 the Department was 
well established with a staff of 87, but, even comparable departments 
(with few direct responsibilities for service provision) such as Central 
.Services (with a full time equivalent staff of 701) and Land and Planning 
(with 562) employed far more people. And, of course, the main service 
providers, such as housing, social services and education, employed still 
more (see Table 2). However sympathetic the politicians, or other chief 
officers, the Employment Department was unlikely to have the same 
weight in council decision making. 
But tensions were also apparent in other ways. There were continuing 
concerns from the treasurer's and legal departments about the financial 
and legal implications of the department's activities. Of the five specialist 
officers appointed to Sheffield Enterprises in 1982 two (an accountant and 
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Table 2. Full-time equivalents employed in Departments of 
Sheffield City Council. September 1986 
Department . Numbers employed (fte) 
Central services (Le. including 
administration and legal) 701 
Cleansing 947 
Design and Building Services 550 
Education 12305 
Employment 87 
Environmental Health 220 
Family and Community Services (Le. 
social services) 4344 
Housing 900 
Land and Planning (which had absorbed 
the old Estates' Surveyor's Department) 562 
Libraries! Arts/M useums 595 
Recreation 1577 
Works 4070 
Source: City of Sheffield 1987, p. 15. 
a lawyer) were to be employed through other departments but be based in 
the Employment Department. The precise nature of their relationships to 
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the City Treasury and the Administrative and Legal Department were left 
rather vague, but it appears that they were expected both to ensure that 
the new department followed the financial and legal rules of local 
government, and to give advice to the officers of the department and those 
with whom they were working on financial and legal responsibilities. In 
other words, they seem to have combined the roles of providing internal . 
(negative) control and offering (positive) advice on what was possible. The 
accountant was expected to help firms prepare proposals and advise on 
potential sources of finance within the private sector; the solicitor was 
expected to help on a range of issues, including the preparation of planning 
agreements and clarifying the legal structures of small firms. But senior 
officers in the City Treasury, in particular, were clear that they expected 
their seconded officer to concentrate more on pOlicing the operation of the 
new department than in helping firms prepare proposals for financial 
assistance. There was a concern that the radicalism of the new initiatives 
should not lead the department to take unnecessary legal or financial 
risks, particularly in offering finance to the private and co-operative 
sectors. Paradoxically these concerns may have reflected a failure to 
understand the ambitions of the new department, whose own chief officer 
was dubious about the value of providing assistance to firms in the private 
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sector, which, he felt, were likely to be drain on the limited resources 
available to the council without delivering a great deal in terms of 
employment. 
Some of the most important political tensions, as indicated above, 
were within the organisation: within the council machinery. Not only were 
there conflicts between officers in the new department and those in other 
departments, but there were also conflicts within the department itself. 
But acknowledging the importance of intra-organisational polities does not 
mean that other forms of pOlitics can be ignored. It may not be possible to 
explain developments in Sheffield solely by analysing the behaviour of 
elected pOlitiCians, but it would be equally dangerous to ignore them. 
Notes 
1. Interview with G. Green and J. Benington 7/2/84. 
2. Expressed, for example, in comments made during a bus trip organised 
for officers and councillors around the Lower Don Valley in February1983. 
3. Towards the end of the decade, the main areas of the department's work 
were identified as Municipal Enterprise, Economic and Industrial 
Development, New Technology and Product Development, Training for 
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Employment. Support for the Unemployed. and Employment Research and 
Resources. s,? formally the divisions had not changed much (Sheffield 
DEED. 1987a). By then the Council also had its own Women's Officer outside 
the Department. 
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Chapter 13. Case studies of change: towards a politics of 
partnership 
The politics of Sheffield's economic policies were not fixed at the 
start of the decade. As we have argued above, they were initially shaped by 
the new professionals. But nor did they remain fixed over the period of the 
1980s. On the contrary it is only by looking at them over this longer period 
that it becomes possible to understand the overall direction of change 
after the initial shock of 'local socialism'. In order to explore the 
.processes of change in some detail and to identify some of its key 
features, the next two sections will focus on two particular areas of 
policy development, before returning to ~ consideration of more general 
points. The two cases under consideration will be the development of the 
Red Tape Studios and the development of policies for the Lower Don Valley. 
The first of these arose from the council's new emphasis on municipal 
enterprise and was largely the product of initiatives taken by new 
professionals - it would not have been a priority for the council without 
those initiatives. The second was a long standing concern of the council 
and its Councillors, and one about which the new professionals initially 
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expressed ambivalence. At the end of the decade it dominated the council's 
economic policy. 
13.1 The Red Tape Story 
Red Tape, Sheffield's municipally owned recording studios, opened in 
1986 in a building which had previously been a car showroom (Autoways). 
The processes which made the development possible and developments 
since then highlight some of the ways in which Sheffield's economic 
development pOliCies have developed over the decade. 
In its early years, the Employment Department produced reports and 
statements which stressed its breadth of vision. The project which 
developed into Red Tape had similar origins. Helen Jackson (Chair of the 
Employment Committee) stressed that it started with a "grandiose vision 
that the popular end of the cultural industry both in video and film was 
going to be a growing industry for the future·" and that this growth should 
not simply be concentrated in London, but that there also ought to be 
successful concentrations outside London. Instead of talented individuals 
being forced to move away from Sheffield for employment and facilities, it 
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was hoped that it would be possible to provide it locally, possibly moving 
further towards new forms of employment. The vision included a desire to 
see that "training and decent wages and decent conditions" would be 
provided, so that "the young musicians and young people involved in those 
industries were not going to be exploited". This was the vision within the 
department, but it was also rooted in a more community oriented base. In 
1982 Paul Skelton was given responsibility for developing ideas and 
proposals in the field of municipal enterprise, and the idea for a recording 
studio came out of initial contacts with the Leadmill Arts Association, and 
was confirmed and developed in meetings with local bands and video 
·companies. Some of the bands involved had already been successful (e.g. 
Human League, ABC, Heaven 17, the Comsat Angels and Cabaret Voltaire), 
whilst others were still unsuccessful, and many of those active were 
unemployed. Of 500 bands in the city at the time, only around 25 had 
recording contracts. According to Skelton, "There was a wealth of activity 
which did not have any infrastructure to support it in terms of good quality 
rehearsal and recording facilities". The idea for this came, therefore, from 
the people who needed the facilities. The existence of the department 
opened up the council to demands from a group of people who had 
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previously had little interest in its workings. 
The initial phase of persuading the council to take the initiative was 
not easy. At first, the Estates Surveyor's Department sought to dispose of 
the property on commercial terms, and it was only pressure from the 
Employment Department which averted this. Secondly, however, there was 
a high degree of scepticism among councillors about the project, 
particularly in its more developed forms. Many were unconvinced by the 
argument that forms of economic activity like these were equivalent to 
the old industries which had dominated in the city. Initially attempts were 
made to raise funding from various other sources, including the Musicians' 
Union, charities and trusts, but little progress was made. As a result, a 
proposal was made to get Urban Programme assistance for the 
development, but it was not given priority selection by the Council. In 
order to ensure that some support was forthcoming, the next stage was to 
put together a very modest proposal for funding, on the basis of which 
further development might be possible in the ~uture. Eventually, the 
Committee and the Labour Group agreed to provide some £70,000 in capital 
spending to pay for the buiding of two rehearsal rooms and a four track 
porta studio (in the end closer to £100,000 was finally allocated to this 
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phase of the project). Some of the doubts of the finance officers about the 
project were overcome by the involvement of private sector accountants 
from the music industry (associated with the more successful bands who 
were involved) who were able to show that the project was likely to be 
viable. 
The success of this initial development made it easier for the project 
to be put into the next round of bids for Urban Programme support, and 
funding was attracted two build a sixteen track recording studio, and a 
third rehearsal room (Red Tape Phase 2); as well as for a further rehearsal 
room, eight track recording studio and library (Red Tape Phase 3). 
'Alongside these developments, it was possible to utilise Urban Programme 
funds to rehabilitate the building within which Red Tape is housed -
renamed AVEC (Audio Visual Enterprise Centre) - putting the building into 
sound manageable order, connecting gas and electricity, putting on a roof 
but relying on new tenants to construct their own spaces, including walls 
and floors in some cases. In managing the tenants of the building, attempts 
were made to allow community based groups to keep costs down by 
locating them next to offices or studios constructed by more commercial 
enterprises. At the end of the 1980s, AVEC contained three commercial 
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recording studios, film studios and graphic design companies, including a 
women's film co-operative and a photography gallery. Red Tape and AVEC 
were effectively put together by a partnership between local government 
(providing property and 'seed' money), central government (through the 
Urban Programme), the private sector (particularly those bands which 
invested in commercial recording studios within the building) and the 
voluntary s'ector (who are tenants of some of the spaces within the 
building). A bid had also been made for ERDF (European Regional 
Development Fund) money to provide infrastructure for proposed new 
developments, and European Social Fund money was being used to provide a 
. course for unemployed young people on recording techniques. 
By the end of the decade the ambitions of the early years had been 
reinterpreted, but were still recognisable The studios were open to wide 
range of groups, from jazz to rock, to opera (although there was some 
evidence that the local black youth felt excluded by the apparent rock 
orientation of the studios and support had been sought for a more black 
oriented studio. Red Tape itself was seeking to deal with this by 
purchasing more appropriate equipment - e.g. for sampling - and more than 
half of those on the ESF sponsored course were from ethnic minorities). 
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The next phase of development proposed to be the most ambitious. It was 
to develop the neighbouring (and larger) Kennings building. The proposals 
for this building are similar to those for AVEC but on a bigger scale. Again, 
it is intended to undertake the provision of basic infrastructure, before 
encouraging private companies to build the accommodation they need. In 
this case, however, the intention is to attract what could be seen as more 
'mainstream' tenants, including a radio station, a television station, a 
media centre with three cinema screens and a preview theatre. In the case 
of AVEC it was estimated that around £400,000 was invested from the 
'. . 
. public sector (government money through the City Council) and the overall 
total of construction costs was around £2.Sm, so that there was a 
'leverage' rate of around 8:1. It is hoped that in the Kennings Building the 
leverage rate will be more like 11 or 12:1. It was estimated that the cost 
of putting in lifts, staircases, fire escapes and repair to the fabric of the 
building would be around £1 m, so that £11-12m is expected from the 
private sector, with around 40-50 companies making investments. 
The aim is to use these developments as major elements in 
constructing a wider Cultural Industries Quarter in the area around Red 
Tape, where a number of other cultural facilities (such as the Leadmill and 
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Yorkshire Artspace) are already located. So, in a sense, the links to the 
ambitions of the past begin to be clearer. Here is the vision of a new 
industrial sector being reintroduced. And certainly the glossy publicity 
documents associated with the Quarter seem to reinforce this feeling. 
According to one, "Drawing on the wealth and creative talent and 
experience that exists in and around Sheffield, the Council is co-ordinating 
an ambitious plan to develop an entire area of the city as a centre for 
cultural industries and helping to provide accommodation and facilities for 
expanding organisations" (Economic and Public Sector Development Team, 
n.d.). There are hopes for basing a national centre for popular music here. 
Equally significant, however, the policies have developed in such a 
way that municipal enterprise in the form of Red Tape has now become, not 
an end in itself, but the basis on which to build a much more extensive 
public/private partnership. On reason for this extension have been that the 
scope for municipal enterprise was severely limited by financial 
restrictions, but it also made it possible (through 'leverage') to mobilise 
far more resources than would have been available from the council, even 
if its spending had not been restricted by controls from above. One of the 
ambitions of the left's local economic policies had always been to 
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encourage wider processes of growth. Building new relations with the 
private sector seemed to have made this realisable at last. In echoes of the 
traditional local authority role, the council provides the infrastructure on 
the basis of which private sector development prospects become 
attractive to the private sector. The new glossy material is specifically 
aimed to attract developers, in a more radical and targeted version of the 
attempts to market land and property which dominated in the 1970s. The 
document on the Cultural Industries Quarter concludes with the suggestion 
that potential tenants for the new development should contact the 
.Department. A site whose development would have been difficult has now 
been targeted and successfully managed and marketed. The pOlicies of the 
1970s were essentially market led. It was assumed that the 'market' 
(largely defined as property and development companies) knew best and 
council policies were largely 'opportunist', attempting to respond to 
demands expressed through it. In the case of Red Tape the council's role 
was more active. The officers involved sought actively to create a market, 
in which they could sell what they had available. It was a piecemeal 
process of construction finally intended to draw in a substantial 
investment of private sector funds and to make a cultural industries 
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quarter which could be more or less self sustaining. 
13.2 The lower Don Valley 
The Lower Don Valley is the old industrial heartland of Sheffield. It 
was here that may of its traditional steel and engineering plants were 
located, and it is here that the problems of industrial dereliction are at 
their most apparent. In the late 1980s around 35% of the Valley's land was 
derelict or vacant and over 1 m sq feet of industrial buildings were vacant 
and most of this space was unsuitable for conversion to modern offices 
(SERe 1987, para 2.2 .. See also Germer 1983 and Dabinett 1991 pp. 13-14 
for a discussion of the Valley's decline as a source of employment). It was 
the most direct geographical expression of Sheffield as 'steel city' (see Ch. 
9 for a discussion of its historical development) and its decline 
underpinned some of the political pressures for developing a local 
economic policy. It had been the base of Sheffield's traditional politics of 
. labour, rooted in the steel and engineering unions, and the narrow streets 
built around the factories. Pearson notes that, "The history of the valley 
features strongly in local people's perception of Sheffield's identity" 
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(Pearson 1987, p. 35). The Lower Don Valley and the communities 
associated w"ith its industries were the sources of important myths within 
local Labour politics. It was to these that some councillors (such as Bill 
Michie who was the first chair of the Employment Committee) often 
referred as providing their political roots. And the changing politics around 
the plans and proposals for the Valley neatly reflect the shifts taking 
place within local politics. 
Until the late 1970s, the land use policies for the Valley reflected its 
security as Sheffield's industrial base. The Development Plans of 1952 and 
.1957 first limited the extent of housing and then zoned the whole area for 
industrial use (Lawless and Ramsden 1990a, p. 34). The emphaSis of the 
planning process was on providing adequate supplies of industrial land to 
the firms based in the Valley. It was not until the late 1970s that the tone 
of policy began to change. Instead of assuming that land had to be set aside 
to meet the pressures of potential development, by 1979, although it was 
still assumed that the Valley would be primarily used for industrial 
development, the argument was that development had to be encouraged "to 
ensure against the possibility of a declining employment base and 
providing for employment needs not only in Sheffield but also adjoining 
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areas" (Sheffield City Council 1979, p.48, quoted in Lawless and Ramsden 
1990a, p. 38). From the end of the 1970s, the Lower Don Valley became an 
increasingly important part of the active politics of development, rather 
than simply a location in which industrial development was permitted. The 
Draft District Plan prepared in 1981 confirmed both that land in the Lower 
Don should remain allocated to industrial use, with remaining housing 
being cleared to make this possible, and that (quoting the County structure 
plan) "major effort will be needed to ensure maximum employment growth 
in the Lower Don Valley and adjoining locations" (Sheffield City Council 
1981 b p. 44). 
This was reflected in an attempt in 1980, initially led by the planning 
department and supported by George Wilson, then council leader, to put 
forward a bid for an enterprise zone to be located in the Lower Don Valley. 
The COuncil was informed in 1980 that it had been shortlisted, and - after 
some debate - agreed in April to proceed to develop a more extensive 
proposal. In effect, the new leadership was placed in a position which 
meant it had to do so or withdraw the council's initial bid. And the main 
argument was that if a bid was not made, Sheffield would lose out on 
potential new development and on access to assistance from central 
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government (see Shutt 1984 for a summary of some of the debates which 
took place in-Labour councils at this time). But the proposal submitted by 
the council was substantially different from the one which had initially 
been envisaged. It specified a number of key conditions - in particular on 
continued planning controls within the area - which meant that it was 
unlikely to be successful. It was turned down by the Secretary of State in 
February 1981. Officers of the local Chamber of Commerce argued that so 
many restrictions were placed on the proposal by the council that the 
government simply "lost patience" and went elsewhere 1. At the time there 
was some concern (expressed in an exchange of letters between the 
Directors of Planning of the two authorities) that an Enterprise Zone was 
instead awarded to Rotherham, just across the municipal boundaries from 
the Lower Don Valley. Since it seemed likely that retail and warehouse 
development would take place in the zone, it was feared that not only 
would new development tend to move across the boundary, but that any 
retail development would undermine the prosperity of Sheffield's central 
shopping area. 
There was no attempt to bid for an enterprise zone for the Valley in 
the next round of bids which took place in 1982. By this time the new 
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political leadership had gained in confidence, the strategy officers were in 
post and the flew employment department had been created. This decision 
was not a straightforward one. There was support within the Labour Group 
for preparing a bid, on the grounds that there seemed to be little 
alternative, and similar arguments were made by some members of the 
planning department, particularly because they were concerned about the 
impact of the Rotherham zone on development in Sheffield. The Chamber of 
Commerce also supported the idea of bidding for a zone. But the political 
grounds for not proceeding were strong ones. It would have been difficult 
for a political leadership associated with the local authority left to allow 
itself to be drawn into these schemes. And a series of strong arguments 
were put together by the Principal Strategy Officers, officers in the 
Employment Department and the Council's leaders. These were summarised 
in a press statement which expressed concern about the extent to which 
the planning and rating rules in the zones helped to undermine "democratic 
accountability and responsibility to the community" (Blunkett 1982a, p. 2). 
And it also went on to argue that setting up an enterprise zone was 
unlikely to bring Significant growth to the City, because neighbouring 
areas would lose industry while rental costs inside the zone rose to take 
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account of rate reductions. "It has been decided that snatching at bottles 
labelled 'Medicine' only to find that they are in fact full of poison is not 
the way to restore the industrial and economic future of Sheffield" 
(Blunkett 1982a, p. 3. See also Sheffield City Council 1982b, pp. 5-9). 
But, it was accepted that a policy was needed for the Lower Don 
Valley where the enterprise zone would have been located. Indeed, 
according to the press statement the council had "put together" and was 
"proposing to promote a totally different approach", which was described 
as "its own challenging and innovatory scheme" (Blunkett 1982, pp 3 and 4). 
The Council called on the government for support for this initiative. This 
response to the Conservative government's proposals was an expression of 
the political leadership's desire to present an alternative model, resisting 
the policy direction of the centre, supported by the ambitions of its new 
officers. It also suggested a belief in the council's own ability to develop 
initiatives, independently with no reference to partnership. 
In fact, however, the council did not yet have its own project for the 
Valley. It was able to state principles, but not yet spell out their practical 
consequences. The alternative strategy was summarised very briefly in a 
report to Policy committee. It was to be based on: 
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"i) planned growth led by the public sector - in contrast to any further 
removal of democratic controls over private development and industry; 
ii) regeneration of the local economy under local determination and 
control, with wide consultation from the bottom up, releasing the 
resources and skills of the community; 
iii) an emphasis on direct intervention to preserve existing employment 
and create new jobs, in contrast to an indirect approach through the 
property market" (Sheffield City Council 1982b, p. 11). 
Here, some of the weaknesses of the new economic strategy can be 
highlighted. 
The priorities of the council were clear enough - the councillors 
wanted a plan which would look like a convincing alternative to an 
enterprise zone. But the new Employment Department was not very well 
equipped to produce such a plan. Each section had its own priorities and 
none was convinced that it was possible to do so. Many officers were 
sceptical of the idea of any area based initiative, believing that 
concentrating resources in this way simply disadvantaged others, moving 
the problem around rather than solving it. Some of these were more 
concerned to develop campaigning strategies supporting particular groups 
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of workers threatened with redundancy, or around the construction of more 
developed campaigns around the steel industry as a whole2. Others were 
simply reluctant to become involved, not acknowledging the political 
significance of the project. Despite the proposal's high political profile, 
the officer most involved in preparing the draft complained of the lack of 
any "collective contribution, criticism - or support" from within the 
department3. The first attempt to develop a more extensive proposal 
through an officer working party led by the Employment Department was 
rejected by the Labour Group in December 1982, largely because it seemed 
unachievable, making large claims and calling for a major financial 
contribution (Sheffield City Council 1982a). It was effectively disowned 
by other departments, including the Treasury and the planning department. 
The failure of this proposal forced the department to work more closely 
with the planning department in a specialist working group, also including 
members of the estates and recreation departments and a consultant from 
outside the authority was involved in trying to explore the contributions 
available from the various sections of the department. The end result of 
this process was the production of 'An Employment and Environmental Plan 
for the Lower Don Valley', which was approved by the Labour Group in 
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November 1983, and published for consultation in 1984 (Sheffield City 
Council Central Policy Unit 1984). 
This document highlights some of the key tensions which ran through 
the Council's attempt to construct a local economic strategy. Even its 
apparent organisational home - the Central Policy Unit - confirms the 
extent to which the Employment Department had been unable to take the 
lead in developing the proposals. It is introduced by a preface written by 
David Skinner, the Chair of the Environment and Planning Programme 
Committee, rather than Helen Jackson, Chair of the Employment Programme 
Committee. More important, perhaps, the balance within it between 
explicit political campaigning and more traditional activities to be 
undertaken by departments of the council suggests both a wider acceptance 
of economic priorities within the council machinery and the beginnings of 
a move away from the more explicitly 'socialist' aspects of Sheffield's 
local socialism. It is possible to interpret the plan as an expression of the 
way in which Sheffield's commitment to new economic policies influenced 
the work of the planning department, but the balance reflected here looks 
to be rather more the reverse - the dominant language of the plan is that of 
the planners, even in the discussion of new employment zones. The plan 
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starts by stressing that it must "recognise the limits to any local 
initiative and -grasp any opportunity to relate it to wider national and 
international change" and as a consequence it is argued that "the Council's 
policy has to be seen as part of the battle for change at national level, both 
showing the direction in which the new policies can be developed and 
recognising that only major shifts in economic and industrial policy can 
rescue areas like the Lower Don". If those shifts do not take place, it is 
argued, then Sheffield's own initiatives will fail, so the proposals are 
"intended to combine the possibilities of carrying out a broader political 
campaign with practical proposals for local improvement in the short and 
medium terms" (Sheffield City Council Central Policy Unit 1984, p. 7). 
Having made these introductory comments, the document goes on to 
identify a series of initiatives, largely organised around a discussion of 
land use in the Lower Don Valley. It confirms the dominant use of the area 
for industrial purposes, although the possibility of housing development is 
also discussed, and emphasis is placed on linking industrial development 
and environmental improvement. The plan moves beyond simple statements 
of zoning, to outline initiatives intended to encourage development along 
the lines identified. It is argued that the Employment Department needs to 
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take the spatial consequences of its policies seriously, and particular 
reference is given to research and campaigning support for the remaining 
parts of the steel industry in Sheffield, although it is also recognised that 
it will be impossible to recreate the old industrial base of the area. 
Proposals are outlined for the creation of an Attercliffe Employment Area 
and a New Employment Zone, to bring together assistance for small 
business, the provision of infrastructure, landscaping and the provision of 
high standard commercial and industrial property. It is hoped that policies 
of product development will lead to demand for new sites in the area; 
co-operatives will be encouraged; and enterprise workshops will be 
located there. Alongside these proposals, there is a series of proposals for 
improving the physical environment through the construction of an East End 
Park and major landscaping, intended to provide an attractive environment 
to attract new forms of industry, linked to the development of industrial 
improvement areas and the careful monitoring of pollution. 
The final section of the plan returns to some of the concerns stated at 
the start, stressing that "success in regenerating an industrial slum 
depends ... upon recreating a political climate in which public expenditure is 
a primary instrument of economic recovery". It argues for a process of 
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consultation to include campaigning, involving all the groups in the 
community who might have an interest in the proposals. "Such a campaign 
should not only draw people together to challenge the logic of the market 
and its political backers, but provide a useful basis to challenge the notion 
, of an Enterprise Zone by emphasising that unfettered capitalism can hardly 
be expected to regenerate areas it has already destroyed" (Sheffield City 
Council Central Policy Unit 1984, p. 16). Finally, however, the ambitions of 
the plan are expressed to a set of budgetary proposals involving the capital 
expenditure of £12m spread over the years 1983-89, with the hope that 
£4m of this could be drawn from external sources (Sheffield City Council 
Central Policy Unit 1984, p. 20). By 1986-7 the council was allocating 
around £6m to projects in the Valley (Lawless and Ramsden 1990a, p. 44) 
and in 1987-8 it was absorbing nearly 40% Of the City's Urban Programme 
funding (Pearson 1987, p. 38). 
This plan emphasised the importance of public sector investment, but 
did so in a context in which such investment could not realistically be 
expected on the scale required. The strategy suggested could only work, as 
the plan itself acknowledges, if it generated political change at national 
level. Yet such a possibility looked increasingly unlikely in the mid 1980s, 
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and other strategic visions were already beginning to appear within the 
policies of the council, in this case, particularly encouraged by the 
perspectives of planners, but also in the development of policy within the 
Employment Department, and by local and national politicians. Here the 
document already hinted at needs for cooperative activity - in particular 
referring to industrial improvement areas, and suggesting ways in which 
public initiative and private sector development might interact, for 
example in encouraging small firms in Attercliffe or in the supportive 
environment of technology parks and the support for high grade landscaping 
to attract more high tech industries. It represented a move away from the 
rejection of land based strategies which had characterised the early days 
of the department. 
The plan continues to stress the need to harness "private industry and 
finance to an accountable public sector" (Sheffield City Council Central 
Policy Unit 1984, p. 21) but it also began to provide a basis on which it 
became possible to make a mqre explicit move towards notions of 
'leverage' (Le. the use of public sector investment to generate higher levels 
of investment from the private sector, or other parts of the public sector) 
and of 'partnership' between the public and private sectors, although these 
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terms were not used within it. If it was not possible to mobilise public 
sector finance, perhaps it would be possible to mobilise investment from 
the private sector, by making such investment more attractive. The 
ambition to transform the Lower Don helped to reinforce the understanding 
that existing local authority resources were inadequate. This was a point 
stressed in the comments of the City Treasury, whose officers 
persistently pointed to the importance of private sector investment, 
commenting on schemes for the Valley that the precarious financial 
position of the council was likely to lead to "the postponement of 
completion of major projects without either radical reallocation of 
resources or private sector investment" (quoted in Waterhouse 1987, p. 
19). In 1987, one of the council's chief planning officers commented that 
the plan had provided a framework within which local initiatives were 
"aimed at the concentration of finance in certain areas to attempt to tip 
the balance in favour of attracting private sector involvement" (Pearson 
1987, p. 36). 
The shift in emphasis away from industry as the sole land use in the 
Valley, also allowed the planners to behave rather more 'flexibly' in 
dealing with applications for planning permission, which resulted in the 
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approval of the massive Meadowhall development for retail use (with 
92,000 sq metres of shopping space and 28,000 sq metres of leisure and 
exhibition space). This new development was seen as a potential catalyst 
for the Valley. Despite the recognition of risks for shopping in the central 
area of the city the new development gave Sheffield the chance of 
becoming a major regional shopping centre (drawing on shoppers in a 50 
mile radius around the development), acing as a catalyst for further 
development in the Valley. It also represented a direct and powerful reply 
to the threats of retail development just across the city boundary in 
Rotherham's enterprise zone. Although plans for retail development on this 
scale had not had any place in the strategic plans produced by the council 
at any stage, this single development was likely to change the face of the 
Valley more than anything else proposed. Despite some misgivings, 
therefore, it was difficult to refuse planning permission, and it now 
appears as an important selling point in much promotional literature. 
In the course of the 1980s, the Lower Don Valley became the main 
focus of industrial policy in Sheffield. And one consequence of this has 
been to reinforce a concern about environmental degradation. It has, says 
Dabinett, previously an officer in the Department of Employment and 
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Economic Development, "encouraged the dominance of physical renewal 
over industrial regeneration," in part because DEED proved unable to 
develop an alternative approach based on the sectoral analysis of key 
industries which would then not have been restricted to a limited spatial 
area (Dabinett 1991 , p. 17). As Dabinett, himself acknowledges, however, 
such analysis would not have been very helpful without having access to 
significant funds for investment to encourage industrial restructuring or 
develop unorthodox forms of infrastructural support (e.g. through the 
provision of collective services on the technology park which has been 
.developed in the Lower Don). Despite the existence of DEED, in practice it 
proved easier to draw on finance for land aquisition and reclamation for 
environmental improvement and recreation than for industrial 
development. Even the plan prepared in 1984 effectively pushed the 
Employment Department into second place as an active participant in 
development. 
In the mid 1980s the language of partnership became more 
pronounced, and the Lower Don Valley became the focus for this, too. The 
(by now retitled) Department of Employment and Economic Development 
prepared what was called a Twin Valley strategy (Le. one covering the 
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Lower Don and Sheaf Valleys) which confirmed the mix of uses which was 
beginning to be approved in practice, and was increasingly reflected in 
planning documents, but also indicated a range of possible joint schemes 
and the extent to which the public and private sectors needed to work 
together (for example through industrial improvement areas and 
infrastructural investement) (Sheffield DEED 1987b). The strategy implied 
by this plan confirmed that the city council "did not have the resources to 
bring about the economic regeneration required on its own. City Council 
resources were seen as being a leverage on both public .. and private 
,capital. The strategy did not consist of a fixed plan but a strategy linked to 
a vision that could be shared by all groups in Sheffield" (Dabinett 1989, p. 
4). 
This vision found its institutional expression in the formation of the 
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC), which initially 
concentrated its attention on the Lower Don Valley. SERC commissioned a 
report on the Valley from Coopers and Lybrand which concluded that the 
most appropriate body to overee the regeneration of the Valley would be 
what the consultants called an Urban Regeneration Project. This project 
would be a "private sector led body in which the management board is 
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elected by the participating partners (central and local government, 
private sector and community organisations)" (SERC 1987 para 6.11 (h)). 
Planning powers would remain with the council, but the organisation would 
have the image of independence. It would have its own employees 
responsible to the new organisation's chief executive. In a sense such a 
project would be an organisational expression of the partnership reflected 
in SERC. The consultants' second choice was for an Urban Development 
Corporation in which planning powers remained with the Council, because 
the first choice could only work if it was supported by central government 
,and it was acknowledged that such support was unlikely. The balance of 
control suggested for an URP summarises the extent to which the 
partnership model moved away from a dominance by the public sector. The 
consultants proposed that its board would be made up as follows: 3 
members representing the City Council; 3 representing 'major' Sheffield 
businesses; 2 representing Lower Don Valley business; 1 representing 
English Estates; 2 representing property companies; and 1 representing 
community organisations (SERC 1987, para 6.24). 
In practice, however, this vision was never given the chance to be 
realised. Although SERC and the consultants largely endorsed the policies 
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and plans of the Council, in 1988 much of the area was designated part of 
an Urban Development Corporation, which, in principle at least, could be 
seen as a way of removing development in the Lower Don from the control 
of the Council. But such a conclusion may be premature. One leading 
Sheffield industrialist (and member of SERC) commented that it was 
precisely because of the partnership at local level that the UDC was 
possible - as a reward rather than a punishment: "By working together as a 
local partnership, the national government said that has credibility and 
... the UDC was announced" Field (1990, p.56). The council even managed to 
negotiate an agreement with the UDC when it was set up, signed at 
Sheffield's Science Park (itself the product of collaboration between the 
Department of Employment and Economic Development and English Estates) 
in July 1989. This set out a code of practice for co-operation rather than 
conflict to achieve economic regeneration and reduce unemployment in the 
City as a whole, confirming that the Corporation's responsibilities went 
beyond the boundaries of the Valley. 
Despite this, not surprisingly perhaps, the Chair of the Employment 
Programme Committee continued to express uncertainty about the extent 
to which partnership could be sustained. The continued existence of SERC 
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as an open forum is seen as one way in which the Council and 'Sheffield' 
can influence an organisation which is otherwise only answerable to 
London. But the SOC's plans have clearly borrowed from those of the 
Council- with a continued shift away from heavy industry and even 
reference to the possibility of housing - and, indeed, senior members of 
the planning department (working on the Lower Don) have transferred over 
from the Council, one as director of planning (Sheffield Development 
Corporation 1989). One of the biggest developments (at Meadowhall) was 
already agreed before the SOC was set up. When it was formed, the Board 
of the SDC not only included two Labour Committee chairs, but also the 
leader of the Conservative Group (formally appointed as one of the 
'industrialist' members), and most of the other members were also already 
members of SERC. So by the end of the decade, from setting out with 
ambitions to challenge the influence of the private sector and rejecting 
the impOSition of one central government scheme, by the end the council 
. . 
had developed extensive partnership arrangements with the private sector 
and defined a set of local interests which held different groups together, 
and had learned to live with another central initiative: indeed had become 
more able than most to integrate it within a broader political settlement 
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at local level. 
13.3 Moving towards 'partnership' 
The dominant assessment of the trajectory of Sheffield's economic 
policies in the 1980s can be summarised relatively briefly. According to 
this, the City Council began the decade committed to a process of radical 
interventionism and opposition to the operations of the market and ended 
it deeply imbedded in partnership with the private sector. This is the view 
expressed by Seyd (1990), Lawless (1990), as well as writers for 'The 
Financial Times' and representatives of the local Chamber of Commerce 
(see, e.g., Fazey 1987, Field 1990, Fogarty and Christie 1990, pp. 91-2). 
The underlying argument seems to be that the early years of the 1980s 
represented some kind of an aberration (or, more positively, an 
overambitious experiment) and that now the Council's leaders have moved 
back to a more moderate and responsible position. Just as the initiatives 
of the early period can be seen to have gone alongside turmoil (and the rise 
of a radical left) within the Labour Party, so more recent developments can 
be seen to reflect the construction of a more moderate Labour Party ready 
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to take power under the leadership of Neil Kinnock. 
Seyd, for example, argues that "the anti-capitalist ethos of the early 
1980s was replaced by a new strategy of collaboration with local capital" 
(Seyd 1990, p. 339), and senior members of the local Chamber of Commerce 
note a move away from "megaphone democracy" (quoted in Fazey 1987, p. 
15) in which the Council and the Chamber shouted at each other, to a 
relationship in which there is an "unofficial agreement" to leave 
disagreements to be dealt with behind closed doors (Field 1990, p. 50). And 
there are certainly marked differences between the rhetorical emphases of 
the early 1980s and those of the late 1980s: the first stressing the role of 
the public sector, the second emphasising the need for partnership between 
public and private sectors. Instead of arguing that market decisions and 
the private sector are to blame for decline, the new local realism stressed 
that "the two sectors shared enough common objectives to achieve some 
form of consensus" (Dabinett 1989, p. 5). Seyd concludes by reflecting of 
the shift he has identified: "If anything remains of the original socialist 
project, it is only the conviction that this local enterprise economy [which 
he says has replaced that project] can be more humane than the Thatcherite 
model, by dispersing economic benefits across the city and by maintaining 
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as decent level of community services so that all citizens can participate 
in and benefit from the city's revival" (Seyd 1990, p. 344). 
Lawless largely explains the move in terms of a number of local 
changes in the mid 1980s, including the replacement of David Blunkett as 
leader (following his election to Parliament) with Clive Betts, the 
departure of John Benington and his replacement by a "less ideological 
figure" (Dan Sequerra), the transfer to Sheffield of a number of officers 
from South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (after its abolition) and 
a growing understanding of "intellectual sophistication, but practical 
irrelevance of radical municipal intervention" (Lawless 1990, p. 13). But he 
also also stresses the changed political and economic context, pointing to 
ther dangers which Sheffield would have faced had it tried to sustain a 
lonely struggle for "a radical programme of local economic i'nterVention" 
(Lawless 1990, p. 14)4. 
This interpretation of the processes of change which characterised 
the 1980s has some merit insofar as it highiights a move away from the 
radical rhetoric of the early years, and effectively confirms the end of the 
'new urban left' or 'local socialism' as a separately identifiable political 
project. The mid 1980s did represent a watershed, as a series of factors 
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combined to confirm that local initiatives could not be transformed into a 
successful national programme, and, as a consequence, that even many 
local initiatives could not be sustained. By the mid 1980s, the hopes for 
dramatic change led by the local socialists had already faded, and the 
defeat for the local authority left in the ratecapping struggles of 1985-6, 
when Sheffield's Labour Group was split and a legal rate made despite the 
opposition of Blunkett, confirmed a less hopeful national political context. 
Sheffield claimed in its own campaign against rate capping to be against it 
"for the right reasons", presumably in contrast to other Labour groups who 
opposed it for other reasons. Although there was a final burst of 
resistance, largely expressed through attempts to maintain spending levels 
with the help of 'creative accounting', the limitations of this became clear 
with the election of the third Thatcher government in 1987 (for a 
discussion of this period, see, Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987, Ch. 8 and 
Lansley et al1989, Ch 3). It was no longer possible for a council to pretend 
that it could stand out on its own against all the pressures imposed from 
above, and it was still less possible for one department to suggest that it 
provided an alternative model. 
In the case of Sheffield it was possible to delay drawing this 
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conclusion, but however gradual the process of change the direction of 
change in economic policies was clear enough. The emphasis in Employment 
Department publications first shifted towards the defence of local 
authority employment (e.g. in commissioned material on privatisation and 
its costs, Labour Research Department et al 1985 and SCAT 1985, and in 
Sheff.ield's employment plan, City of Sheffield 1987) and then explicitly 
towards an emphasis on partnership with private sector agencies. In 
organisational terms, too, the structure of the Employment Department 
changed: it was renamed the Department of Employment and Economic 
Development (which seemed to imply a shift back towards more traditional 
methods) and its head became a Director, rather than a Coordinator. 
Although internal relationships remained less hierarchical than in many 
other departments, the structure became more formal with line 
management expressed through a Director and two deputies, rather than 
any collegiate system. It is difficult to judge whether Duncan and Goodwin 
were accurate in the conclusions they drew about the early ambitions of 
the council leadership use economic policies as a means of constructing a 
community capable of sustaining radical forms of local politics (1985a 
and b; see also Goodwin 1986). But, if they were right, then any such 
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ambitions had clearly faded by the end of the decade. 
But an analysis which stresses the extent of the break between the 
beginning and the end of the 1980s may fail to grasp more significant 
processes of restructuring. Because it focuses on the behaviour and 
policies of elected politicians as the pegs around which to construct a 
narrative, it also fails to connect with some of the key features of change 
and restructuring at the level of the local state. It suffers from many of 
the weaknesses in traditional approaches to the analysis of local 
government identified in Chapter 2, able to tell an interesting story but 
not yet able to understand its significance within wider processes of 
political and economic restructuring. 
Attempting to explain the the direction of change in terms of changes 
in the personnel involved in key positions is not ultimately very 
convincing. The changes at leadership level, for example, explain little, if 
only because they did not all take place at the same time as Lawless 
implies: Helen Jackson replaced Bill Michie'as Chair of the Employment 
Committee in 1983 (a change to which Lawless makes no direct reference) 
and remained in that position throughout the remainder of the decade; Dan 
Sequerra replaced John Benington as head of department in 1985; and Clive. 
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Betts did not replace David Blunkett until 1987. Nor is it clear that all 
these changes can be seen as moves to more 'moderate', 'responsible' or 
'less ideological' positions. Few would have suggested that the change in 
the Chair of the Employment Committee (when Helen Jackson replaced Bill 
Michie) was a move towards a less radical style. She continued to speak 
from a position on the left of the Council through the 1980s (even being 
prepared to question the wisdom of Sheffield's bid to host the World 
Student Games. Darke 1991). Similarly, the move from John Benington to 
Dan Sequerra as head of the Department is also difficult to characterise as 
a straightforward shift from a radical to a more conventional style. Until 
his appointment Sequerra had already been actively involved in the 
development of policy within the Department, as a representative (and 
Chair) of the District Labour Party, and he had generally supported the 
more radical initiatives developed within the Department, to the extent 
that his appointment was understood as promising a continuation of 
existing policy, rather than reversing it. He was not identified as a 
supporter of 'partnership' approaches, and - like Benington when he was 
appointed - the Conservatives promised to remove him when they gained a 
majority on the Council. The new Council Leader (Clive Betts) may not have 
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had quite the same political status as his predecessor, nor the same 
committment to developing a new vision of politics, but he had been a 
central part of the leadership team over the earlier years of the decade, 
and was one of the sma" group which had been involved as leaders of the 
left from the start (in the 1970s) (see, e.g. Wainwright 1987, p.109). 
Tensions between the different emphases in the development of economic 
policy remained apparent into the late 1980s. The introduction to 
Sheffield's employment plan expresses these clearly, stating that, "We 
advocate a new kind of partnership between government, local 
communities, the public and the private sector" but going on to argue that 
the "strategy we set out here is not to cut the public sector lifeline but 
instead to expand its role and use it effectively as a tool of economic 
regeneration" (Blunkett and Jackson, H. 1987, pp. 2 and 4). 
The process of change across the 1980s was a more complex one, 
which needs to be related to shifts within the local state, within the local 
economy and in the wider context of political and economic restructuring, 
which also found their local expression. By the mid 1980s, the existence of 
the department was taken for granted within the authority. The department 
was also more clearly organised on local authority lines. Hierachical 
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structures were taken for granted, with less emphasis on network 
arrangements for decision-making. Not only did the department now have 
two deputy directors, but greater care was taken about the presentation of 
cases to council committees, both in terms of ensuring that conflicting 
proposals did not come from within the department and in ensuring that 
preliminary work had been undertaken with other departments, frequently 
with the help of inter-departmental working groups and, sometimes, 
councillor/officer working groups. Having arrived with a commitment to 
less rigid forms of organisation, Benington helped to ensure that a more 
formalised structure was left to his successor. And it was also accepted 
that if change was to be achieved through the local authority machine, it 
had to involve compromise and negotiation rather than confrontation and 
challenge. 
To some extent, these were hard lessons learned within the local 
authority machine. If the department's proposals were not simply to be 
ruled out of court, and if resources were to be mobilised from other parts 
of the authority then compromise was necessary. At the start of the 
decade, the council's economic policies had a high political priority and 
were enthusiastically supported and defended by local Labour politicians. 
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But the lowering of its political profile (at least as a major source of 
political controversy) had double edged implications for the department. 
Any threat to wind it up seemed to have faded into insignificance. But this 
also implied that its officers had to operate more like those in 'traditional' 
departments, fighting their own battles, reaching their own 
accommodations and negotiating their own partnerships, instead of being 
able to rely on an automatically sympathetic hearing from politicians when 
interdepartmental conflicts arose. The 'new' professionals either had to 
move on or had become more comfortably adapted to the local authority 
system. There was a substantial turnover of staff among the leading 
officers - with most Principal Development Officers going on to jobs 
elsewhere. 
The council leaders had other political priorities which concerned 
them - in particular, manoeuvring to avoid the pressures of ratecapping 
and the maintenance of traditional services. Economic policy was no longer 
a central concern, and there was competition over limited resources with 
other departments. The effective change of political control which took 
place at the start of the 1980s opened up possibilities for new initiatives, 
which were taken up at the time and given organisational expression in the 
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formation of the Employment Department and its parent committee. But as 
the council returned to more 'normal' organisational life, within an 
increasingly hostile external environment, so the emphasis of leading 
politicians shifted towards the major departments whose committees they 
chaired, towards the problems of financial control and the possibilities of 
'creative accounting' (see discussion of 'creative accounting' and left 
councils in Clarke and Cochrane 1989). 
The work of the department became more routinised, frequently in 
projects working with other departments. Other departments had major 
claims to areas of activity which were crucial to the process of economic 
development. The most obvious of these were the Estates Surveyor's and 
Planning and Design Departments, whose roles were particularly 
significant once it was accepted that the council wanted to influence 
development in the private sector (as it did in the cases of Red Tape and 
the Lower Don Valley, despite starting points emphasising the role of the 
public sector). The merger of these departments in 1984 into a Department 
of Land and Planning increased their power within the council, as well as 
undermining the tradional conservatism of the old Estates Surveyors' 
departmentS. Although the planners frequently saw themselves as more 
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'entrepeneurial' than officers in the Employment Department, in practice, 
both sets began to move in similar directions at the same time, with a 
renewed emphasis on economic development finding formal expression in 
the changed title of the Department of Employment and Economic 
Development (DEED)6. In late 1986 a new Sheffield Development Office was 
set up, headed by a member of the planning department (who later became 
Director of Planning for the Sheffield Development Corporation), but also 
Supported by DEED. The role of the Office was to act as a 'one stop' shop for 
potential developers and investors in Sheffield. In echoes of the 
justification given for the industrial development unit in the 1970s, it 
was described as providing a team to sell the city: " a team of experts to 
promote and market Sheffield as a centre of industrial and commercial 
investment" (City of Sheffield News, November 1986, p. 1). Some in the 
business community saw the setting up of the Development Office as the 
first evidence that the council had come to accept that it could not manage 
on its own, but required the support of the private sector (Fazey 1987, p. 
15), but it was also a reflection of a changing balance of power within the 
council machinery, with the planners making greater claims to involvement 
in economic development once more. 
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Nationally, local economic interventionism became increasingly 
acceptable across a range of local authorities. It was no longer seen as a 
badge of dangerous radicalism, or, necessarily only associated with left 
Labour councils (see, e.g., Mawson and Miller 1986 for a discussion of the 
'interventionist' pOlicies of Labour local authorities which effectively 
offers a set of strategies suitable for wider use). At r'lationallevel the 
Centre for Local Economic Strategies was set up in 1985, and soon became 
a forum through which many of the councils involved in economic 
development exchanged ideas and explored alternatives. Specialist 
publications, such as 'Local Economy' and 'Local Work', appeared to reflect 
the growing interest and training courses were increasingly offered 
through INLOGOV and SAUS, but also by new providers, including 
polytechnics, for example though the Local Economic Policy Unit at South 
Bank Polytechnic. Even central government encouraged such an interest by 
local authorities, albeit through enterprise agencies and Business in the 
Community rather than left Labour councils. In practice, however, it was 
often difficult to distinguish between the policies developed, and it 
sometimes looked as if central government was having to accept processes 
of change over which it had little control (see Ch 7 above). 
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In Sheffield these broader changes found a particular local 
expression, helped by the extent to which the Council had taken on 
economic policy as a central strand of its programme in the early eighties. 
This meant that it was able to respond to some of the changes within local 
politics more easily than was the case in some other places. Paradoxically, 
perhaps, although the policies of the early eighties had largely been 
defined as 'anti-capitalist', Sheffield seemed more able to respond to 
pressures for partnership with the private sector than those councils for 
which economic policy had been defined as outside their responsibilities. 
And it was increasingly accepted across a range of departments after the 
middle of the decade. 'Partnership' was the key feature stressed by the 
Council in the late 1980s. 
Emphasising differences may understate the importance of continuity 
across the decade. With the benefit of hindsight it is easier to see that the 
changes at the start of the 1980s might have been part of a process which 
allowed local economic issues to be given a far higher political profile. 
Instead of being relegated to a small team of specialists, marketing land 
and premises, the creation of a new department brought a new legitimacy 
to the discussion of economic issues. The key break in Sheffield's politics, 
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in other words, can be seen to have been at the start of the 1980s, rather 
than the midple of the decade, because it was then that it became possible 
to move away from a principal focus on the work of the large spending 
service departments as the key definition of 'what the council did'. It 
raised the possibility of the council not only as a deliverer of services, but 
also as creator of a context intended to encourage devlopment by others as 
part of a 'local growth coalition'. Although the phrase was not used by 
councillors or officers, the council was moving towards at least some of 
the features expressed in the term 'enabling authority', particularly if 
interpreted by the strategic managers (such as Brooke 1989a and b) rather 
than as interpreted by representatives of the 'new right' (such as Ridley 
1988). 
It is perhaps not surprising that the initial expression of this shift 
took the form it did. Sheffield's economic base was being eroded: within a 
Labour tradition, its old political leaders of the right could only be 
challenged from 'the left'. At national level, debates within the Labour 
Party were encouraging similar reappraisals of the leadership, and the 
growth of local socialism as an alternative to Thatcherism. The new 
officers were themselves products of those arguments and debates, and 
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represented challenges to the rather conservative methods of local 
economic deyelopment work. The challenges were initially expressed in 
ideological terms, but their impact was more important as a base for the 
forms of co-operation and collaboration in the second half of the 1980s, 
than it was as a developed model of socialism at local level (see Senington 
1986, Cochrane 1988, p. 165). 
The cases of the Red Tape Studios and the Lower Don Valley, outlined 
above, help to illustrate the extent of consistency between the early and 
late periods, leading to new forms of politics, but more general shifts 
were taking place. The shift towards increased business involvement in 
local state institutions was perhaps the most noticeable of these The 
setting up of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) in 
1987 was a reflection of this. This Committee (of 30 members) was made 
up of representatives from the Council, Chamber of Commerce, central 
government departments, the Council for Racial Equality, the University 
and Polytechnic, the local trade unions, the'Church (the Industrial Mission), 
Members of Parliament, and SSC (Industry). When the Sheffield 
Development Corporation was set up, it too was given representation on 
the Committee. Despite its broader membership, this Committee was an 
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expression of partnership between business and the local authority. 
The m~mbership of SERC was not markedly different from that of the 
Industrial Development Advisory Committee which had existed in the 
1970s, and like that committee it has no formal status as a body able to 
make decisions and commit resources, but its political significance is 
much greater. It was not merely an advisory committee to a relatively 
minor committee of the council (see Ch. 9) but became the focus of major 
debate about the direction of development for the city as a whole. As we 
have seen, it was SERC which commissioned the consultancy which seems 
to have led to the approval of an urban development corporation for the 
Lower Don Valley. And SERe also acted as a forum within which debates 
about Red Tape could take place outside the hothouse controversy 
expressed in 'rock on the rates' headlines. Since the creation of the 
Sheffield Development Corporation. SERC has acted as a vital arena through 
which the voice of 'Sheffield' can be expressed. Helen Jackson saw it as 
valuable space in which to persuade business and government departments 
to take on the arguments of the council, whilst, in the language of Business 
in the Community expressed by Richard Field, SERC was understood as a 
"sort of 'Board of Directors' for our city," which "became the city team" 
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(Field 1990, pp. 49 and 53). Its existence implied the acknowledgement 
that the cou~cil had a legitimate place in discussing strategy for the 
economic future of the city - that future was not merely the product of 
decisions on investment taken by firms in the private sector. 
The move towards 'partnership' was not simply the product of changes 
within the council, but also reflected moves within the local business 
community, which were also consistent with wider moves encouraged by 
organisations such as Business in the Community (see Ch 5). Business 
interests were themselves beginning to take new initiatives, with some 
local commentators even referring to the "messianic zeal" of business 
leaders (Fogarty and Christie 1990, p. 91). The creation of SERe followed a 
meeting in 1986 (the Ranmoor Initiative) which brought together some 100 
people identified as community leaders, including representatives of the 
church, the professions and the health service, as well as representatives 
of central and local government, industry and commerce. 
The development of 'partnership' in the late 1980s can be seen as a 
reflection of the of the need for business to work with' local government, 
as much as a reflection of a view within the council that the local 
authority needed to find partners. The business community was recognising 
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at local level- in a way that had been rejected by government at national 
level - that partnerships with the state and other organisations were 
useful in encouraging investment and generating prosperity. The 
importance of a small group of "movers and shakers" among local 
businessmen in encouraging the development of partnership arrangements 
is stressed by sympathetic commentators seeking to spread the Sheffield 
approach: "The names of Norman Adsetts. Richard Field. John Hambidge. Bev 
Stokes and Hugh Sykes are familiar to everyone concerned with business 
involvement in the Sheffield community. Between them. they are involved 
in all the key partnership ventures and business groups and form a high 
. prOfile cadre of business leaders" (Fogarty and Christie 1990, p. 94). 
Alongside the grand structures of SERC. others were also developed at 
this time. In 1987, Sheffield Partnerships Ltd. was set up, involving the 
council, the chambers of commerce and trade and the Cutlers' company. in 
order to promote the city7. From 1988 a regular bulletin ('Success in 
Sheffield') was produced by the Partnership. with a masthead proclaiming 
that it contained "NEWS about the good things happening in England"s 
fourth city". Sheffield was said to be a "Partnership in action", which was 
expressed through a broad vision (Sheffield Vision) for the city. According 
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to this, Sheffield was or was to become a national centre for business and 
industry, Britain's new decision centre, a world leader in research and 
technology, an international centre for sport, leisure and tourism, and a 
city of life. A strategy involving a series of eight programmes of activity, 
ranging from policies for land use and physical development to policies for 
economic infrastructure and promotional campaigns, was identified to help 
realise these ambitions (Sheffield DEED 1987c). In 1988, despite the 
earlier (at least implicit) rejection of an enterprise board strategy, a local 
investment bank (Hallamshire Investments) was set up, led by the private 
sector, but including representation from the council on its board (Seyd 
1990, p. 339). 
In the early 1980s, Sheffield seemed to reject collaboration with 
central government. The refusal to bid for an enterprise zone was one 
expression of this. In practice, however, the extent of that rejection 
should not be exaggerated, and in time the council's officers became adept 
at drawing on central government schemes'to support development. The use 
of Urban Programme funds to support Red Tape is one example, and before 
the arrival of the Development Corporation, investment in the Lower Don 
Valley also relied heavily on the Urban Programme. The development of the 
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Sheffield Science Park relied on close collaboration with the English 
Estates Corporation, and the management of the park involves 
representatives of private as well as public sector. And, of course, despite 
opposing the "undemocratic imposition"of the development corporation and 
a belief that its tasks could "have been done more effectively through 
existing local partnership arrangements" (Clive Betts, Leader of the 
Council, quoted in City of Sheffield News March 1988, p.1), the council 
managed to sign a partnership agreement with SOC in 1989, has 
representation on its board and seeks to work with it in a range of other 
partnership organisations. 
Sheffield was also directly influenced by the policies of the European 
Commission with their stress on working with other agencies and those in 
the private sector. In the case of both the Lower Don Valley and Red Tape, 
the Council hoped to be able to call on European funds, but support had also 
been drawn on for the development of the Science Park. Sheffield was part 
of the Yorkshire and Humberside Integrated Development Operation (or 
lOOP) set up in 1989. lOOPs are a consequence of the way in which the 
European Commission now distributes its structural funds (including the 
European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund). The EC 
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no longer makes any judgements about particular schemes, but, instead 
approves brQad programmes (over five years) and leaves regionally based 
committees to decide how the funds will be distributed (see Preston and 
Hogg 1990 for a discussion of some of the problems for local government 
which have been associated with lOOPs). The South Yorkshire and South 
Humberside lOOP was one of the first approved in the U.K .. Each lOOP is 
overseen by a committee made up of representatives of central government 
(in this case led by the regional office of the Department of Trade and 
Industry), local government, the public utilities, local government and 
business. Proposals for particular schemes are considered by this 
committee in the light of the guidelines of the EC (a representative of the 
EC may also attend to ensure that these are met). But the key point is that 
they should involve partnership between the public and private sectors, or 
at least be supported by each, and such co-operation is institutionalised in 
the groups represented on the committee. So, at regional level, too, 
Sheffield is involved in partnership arrangements, with other levels of 
government as well as the private sector, and the existence of a parallel 
organisation at local level (SERC) gives them the advantage with 
controversial issues (such as Red Tape) that support can be made clear 
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relatively easily. 
Outside the more obvious areas of economic policy, partnership was 
also developed. Sheffield was, in 1988, the first British city to have a 
wide contract drawn up between education and business as part of the 
'Partnership in Action' campaign. The agreement was between the 
Education Committee, and the chambers of commerce and trade and the 
Cutlers' Company. It included a commitment by local companies to identify 
the skills needed by them, proposals to build networks between particular 
firms and individual schools, and agreement by the Education Department 
to prepare Records of Achievements for pupils going beyond records of 
examination to reflect the skills acquired by them. Sheffield's campaign to 
attract the World Student Games for 1991 was also understood as a 
partnership activity with the intention of making it possible to sell the 
city more effectively, and encouraging the development of facilities as 
part of a process of urban regeneration, particularly in the Lower Don 
Valley. A joint counciVbusiness delegation went to Zagreb as part of the 
process of bidding for the games in order to put Sheffield's case. The 
Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce commented that "the teamwork 
which has been displayed in making this bid to host the World Student 
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Games in 1991, is direct evidence of the power which can be generated 
when Sheffi~ld gets its act together and it is that power which will be 
applied to many other initiatives in the coming months and years" (City of 
Sheffield News September 1987, p. 5). The process of preparing for the 
games, too, was intended to be largely private sector led in partnership 
with the public sector through an independent company (Universiade GB 
Ltd) but in practice the council was finally forced to take on more of an 
active part, both in terms of organisation and financial support. The World 
Student Games experience is indicative both of the power of the 
partnership notion and some of its practical weaknesses. The campaign for 
the Games drew business leaders in to the process of promotion, fitting in 
well with their support for civic boosterism (see, e.g., Field 1990), but 
was not able to draw on enough private sector funding to make them 
financially independent. Partnership leaves the local state (or sometimes 
the central state) to provide the infrastructure needed to sustain private 
sector initiative (see Darke 1991 for a fuller 'discussion of the 
implications of the World Student Games). 
The 1980s in Sheffield have seen a dual process of change in the field 
of local economic policy, building on the ambiguity already apparent in the 
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early years of 'local socialism'. But the two sides are not necessarily 
contradictory. The first lies in the increased centrality of economic policy 
as an area of interest for local government; the second in the recognition 
that the council cannot achieve all its ambitions independently. At the end 
of the decade the acknowledgement that the local economy was a suitable 
focus for the attention of the Council was probably even clearer than it 
was at the start, but the form of involvement had moved more explicitly 
towards partnership models. At the end of the 1980s, the new politics of 
local economic policies were becoming clearer in Sheffield. They were 
based around a series of partnerships with the private sector, intended to 
manage economic change in ways which benefited both local industries and 
the local population. Politically, it encouraged the growth of bargaining 
and decision-making outside the traditional structures of local . 
government, suggesting the possibility of new forms of governance at local 
level, based around the explicit representation of functional interests, 
rather than electoral representation. It is to the implications of such 
changes that we shall turn in the next chapter. 
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Notes 
1. Interview with officers of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce,12/7/83. 
2. Publications following this line include 'From the Ashes' (Sheffield City 
Council 1982 b), 'Steel in Crisis. Alternatives to Government Policy and 
the Decline in South Yorkshire's Steel Industry' (Sheffield City Council 
1984b) and 'Electrify for Jobs. The Case for Rail Electrification' (Sheffield 
City Council 1984a). The latter was produced in collaboration with a series 
of local trade union organisations. 
3. Internal memorandum to Employment Co-ordinator, 20/12/82. 
4. This emphasis on the radicalism of the left's initiatives contrasts with 
the earli~r conclusion drawn by Lawless and Chandler which places them 
more firmly in the tradition of Crosland and social democracy (see Lawless 
and Chandler 1985, p. 260, and discussion in Chapter 7 above). 
5. The absorption (in 1991) of the department into that of Planning and 
Development (which had earlier absorbed the remnants of the Estates 
Surveyors' Department) was the final expression of this process, which 
both confirmed the move away from radicalism and the accptance of many 
of the Employment Department's activities as a more 'normal' part of the 
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council's activities. 
6. This process was reinforced by the transfer of staff from South 
Yorkshire County Council's economic development staff, with the abolition 
of the metropolitan counties in 1986, which was noted by Lawless (1990, 
p. 13). The arrival of these staff confirmed the shift already taking place, 
with a renewed interest in promotion, property and development, but they 
did not determine or create that shift. 
7. The Sheffield Development Corporation was later also represented on 
the board. 
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Chapter 14. Conclusion: the scope of local polities 
14.1 The lessons of Sheffield 
As we have seen, it is widely accepted that the nature of urban 
politics in the U.K. has changed significantly since the mid 1970s. And 
there also seems to be agreement that it is important to place that change 
within a wider context. Some (including Jessop 1990b, Harvey 1990 and 
Stoker 1990) would argue that it needs to be understood as part of a more 
extensive move away from Fordism to some other set of arrangements or 
mode of regulation. Whilst these arguments are helpful in directing 
attention towards the significance of wider processes of restructuring, 
they are by no means conclusive and - in some formulations at least (see 
Chapter 6) may be actively misleading. It is, at least, not clear that the 
resolution of a crisis also necessarily implies a move from one global 
system (even if it is described as a mode of regulation) to another. More 
modestly, perhaps, it might at least be agreed that the crisis of the 
Keynesian welfare state which characterised the 1970s has resulted in a 
process of political restructuring at local as well as national and 
international levels. But the key features which characterise the new 
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arrangements and new political settlements at local level have been less 
clear, except in terms of broad generalisation. Some of these should have 
become clearer in the course of the preceding chapters. 
The core of the argument of this thesis has been organised around an 
exploration of the implications and direction of Sheffield's changing 
economic policies across the 1980s. A justification for the use of a case 
study and of Sheffield in particular has already been given (see Chapter 9), 
but it is perhaps worth highlighting some of them again, because they help 
to point to the sorts of conclusions which can now be drawn. Until the end 
of the 1970s the municipallabourist tradition which was so important to 
the construction and maintenance of the U.K.'s local welfare state was 
dominant in Sheffield, too. Sheffield's local government history (charted by 
Blunkett and Jackson, K. 1987) fitted snugly within that tradition. Its 
experience in the 1980s, therefore, also provides a good example of the 
ways in which that state was restructured to move towards a different 
shape by the end of the decade. This is emphasised by a second aspect of 
Sheffield's recent experience, since the council had a particularly high 
profile in the 1980s, as one of the cradles of 'local socialism'. Its success 
or failure in developing a new set of initiatives can be seen as a strong 
case against which to assess arguments which stress the importance of 
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local autonomy or local democracy. If anywhere could be expected to be 
'proactive' in the sense used by Cooke (1989a and c) then Sheffield could. 
It is in this context that an uneasiness with the main ways of 
interpreting Sheffield's experience (see Chapter 11) becomes particularly 
important. If it is unsatisfactory to explain the process in simple terms as 
a move from 'left' to 'right' or from radicalism to entrepeneurialism, then 
what do alternative explanations consist of, and what implications do they 
have for our wider concerns about the development of urban politics? The 
conclusions of the previous chapter are simple enough, stressing both the 
extent of continuity across the 1980s and questioning the dominant 
interpretations of the 'break' which took place at the start of the decade. 
The 'break' needs to be defined differently, not so much in terms which 
stress the rise of local socialism as in others which point to a move away 
from the traditional approach emphasising the delivery of services within 
the welfare state towards one which more clearly and explicitly 
recognises the economic as a legitimate concern (even a major concern) 
for local government. Of course, in the past most local authorities 
(including Sheffield) provided a range of factory units and serviced land, 
but this shift went beyond that to herald an ideological as much as a 
practical change of focus. Without having a broader importance of this 
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sort, it is difficult to see why the change would have received quite the 
high level of attention which it did, locally and nationally: few would have 
argued that the local employment initiatives of the 1980s had much direct 
success in reducing levels of unemployment. 
The ambiguity at the heart of Sheffield's employment initiatives has 
already been noted. In some respects they seemed to offer the possibility 
of collectively organised alternatives to capitalist development (or 
decline) but in others they suggested that they might be able to offer a 
more rational or better organised way of handling matters. In the context 
of U.K. capitalism in the 1980s - particularly as it found its expression in 
Sheffield - this increasingly meant that radical local government was 
pushed closer and closer to forms of 'partnership' arrangement. Here 
Jessop's argument about the state's necessary reliance on private 
economic activities as the main source of employment and prosperity (even 
at national level) highlights the difficulty faced even by radical councils 
such as Sheffield (Jessop 1990b, p.179-80). Turning towards economic 
policies in a situation when it had little independent control or power in 
the economic sphere meant that business was not only likely to be able to 
influence policy indirectly, but (in the context of the 1980s) that it was 
likely to do so more directly. Hudson and Plum argue that what they call 
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the deconcentration of economic policy to local level has increased the 
power of multinational companies to influence development (Hudson and 
Plum 1986), but this may underestimate the role of local government as 
local state in mobilising political support for change and restructuring at 
local level. The pOlicies developed in Sheffield were not merely reactions 
to the demands of the private sector, but themselves helped to shape those 
demands, and make them possible (see Jessop 1990b, p. 167). The 
construction of a local growth coalition, in other words, was actively 
pursued by the local state (by officers as well as elected politicians) and 
would not have been possible without that commitment (Cox and Mair 
1991; see also Savage 1987 who, in another context, stresses the ways in 
which the strategies of local political parties interact with class 
interests and help to shape the ways in which they are expressed at local 
level). 
In part the shape taken by Sheffield's economic policies was a product 
of local social relations. The particular form of the city's tradition of 
local politics was rooted in its earlier economic development and the 
relationship which developed between the politics of labour in industry and 
in local government (see Chapter 9). The links between unions and council 
remained close long after they had been severed in other major English 
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cities, such as Birmingham. By the mid nineteen eighties, the symbolic 
references to steel city may have been more important than the reality, 
but they continued to influence local politics. 
The resilience of Sheffield's political traditions is perhaps also 
reflected in the ways in which the transition between right and left was 
managed. As we have seen (in Chapter 10) the change was significantly 
smoother than in most other councils associated with the 'local socialism' 
(including the GLC, many London Boroughs and - at the extreme - Liverpool). 
In other words, it is important to recognise the particularity of Sheffield's 
political development and to acknowledge that one of the reasons for this 
was precisely the relationship between Sheffield's local politics and local 
social relations. Taking this further, it is also necessary to acknowledge 
the extent to which the shift which took place was itself also a reflection 
of the ways in which social relations were beginning to change. In part, 
this is to say nothing more than that the collapse of the steel industry 
represented a remarkable (locally experienced) external shock to which 
the local political system had to respond. But a consideration of the more 
subtle ways in which matters changed - with a rising importance for white 
collar and service employment and a gradual increase in women's 
participation in the labour market - suggests that, at the very least, the 
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political context changed. 
Nor, however, were the political changes merely a product of local 
social relations. As we argued above, the construction of a local growth 
coalition was also the result of the active involvement of local 
. government in shaping what was possible. This means that political change 
cannot easily be explained solely in terms of Harvey's 'structured 
coherence' or Duncan and Goodwin's 'local social relations'. In Sheffield, it 
is difficult to trace any clear line from changes in the labour market (Le. 
from male manual employment to female service employment) to politics, 
although the changes which took place in the economy clearly set the 
context for pOlitical initiative. The local politicians (the councillors and 
Labour Party activists) were the product of a longer period of political 
formation and their responses to economic crisis reflected this, as well as 
reflecting wider shifts and tensions within the Labour Party. Equally 
important, however, was the role of the local state in shaping what was 
possible through its officers as well as elected politicians: the new 
officers carried with them an (admittedly confused and sometimes 
inconsistent) political programme which owed little directly to the 
Sheffield experience, and (although the high point of the 'local socialist' 
project was relatively brief) some of the initiatives they launched helped 
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provide the basis of the arrangements which came to dominate at the end 
of the decade. 
The impressive rhetoric of the early 1980s in part reflected the more 
radical side of Sheffield's ambiguous commitment to 'local socialism', but 
it was also largely possible precisely because of the extent of recession, 
the severity of decline and its particular impact in Sheffield. Whatever the 
council had said at that time, it is unlikely that there would have been 
extensive public-private collaboration at the start of the decade, not least 
because there was little interest in investment or development from the 
private sector. As limited growth and possibilities of restructu~ing 
became clearer later in the decade, so the possibility of 'partnership' 
became apparent to both sides, too. 
Our discussion of 'partnership' has tended to focus on direct 
interaction between business and other agencies in the field of economic 
development (admittedly broadly defined to include ambitious initiatives 
such as the World Student Games). But partnership has also developed more 
generally in other areas such as education, with agreements on curricula, 
course content, guarantees of standards and (in return) promises of jobs to 
school-Ieavers. Even in areas traditionally defined as those which are the 
responsibility of the welfare state, for example those associated with 
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inner city policy, have become more open to the involvement of business, 
particularly with the involvement of agencies such as Business in the 
Community. In Sheffield as in other British cities the welfare aspects of 
the local state are being fragmented with the emphasis shifting away from 
collective provision (and consumption) to individualised consumption, 
quality assurance and consumer charters. 
The general pressures towards change - leading from the Keynesian 
welfare state to what Jessop has called the Schumpeterian workfare 1 
state or what we have called the 'enterprise state' (see Chapter 6 above) -
have taken particular forms in the case of the U.K .. Certainly since the mid 
1980s and possibly from earlier in the decade in the context of attempts 
to restrict council spending. central government has encouraged the 
development of 'enabling councils', that is an approach to local government 
which emphasises its role in 'enabling' appropriate others (private or 
'voluntary' sector) to deliver services. Some aspects of this approach have 
been taken up enthusiastically by politicians and officers at local level, 
often in ways which reinterpret the pressures and proposals from above. 
This has found reflection in the increasing fragmentation of the local 
welfare state. not only in the field of economic development (in which 
there has been a mushroom growth of different organisations) but also in 
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areas which have been more central to the traditional welfare state. 
Community care legislation, for example, promises the growth of a 
division between purchaser and provider, care manager and agencies being 
managed. Alongside this fragmentation the growth of business 
organisations has been encouraged, both by central government and - more 
significantly - by business groups themselves. In some cases, the new 
organisations themselves begin to look like expressions of local states 
(e.g. Training and Enterprise Councils) and hybrid organisations take on 
similar features (e.g., in the case of Sheffield they might include the 
Sheffield Development Corporation and SERC). The role of the European 
Community, too, should not be underestimated in encouraging the 
construction of new agencies. In the case of Sheffield the example of the 
South Yorkshire lOOP is an indication of the ways in which more regional 
structures may be developed. These changes begin to make clearer the 
extent to which it is necessary to speak of the local state (or states) 
rather than 'local government'. Local government as it is usually 
understood (i.e. as elected councils) is now only a part of the network of 
local state institutions - and in some areas of its work is no longer even 
the dominant one, despite the hopes of some strategic managers (such as 
Brooke 1989a and b). More important, perhaps, it also highlights the extent 
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to which it is necessary to view the local state as a set of social relations 
because the position of different interests within it are becoming 
increasingly (if not completely) transparent. In the past it was possible to 
start an analysis of local government with an extensive preamble about the 
local state as social relations, stressing that it could not be reduced to 
the institutions of elected local government, before going on to a detailed 
analysis of those institutions (e.g. Cockburn 1977). That is no longer 
possible. 
Underlying all this in Sheffield, of course, are key changes within the 
local economy. There the old certainties of a permanent local industry 
based on steel have been substantially undermined, making it easier to 
construct a vision of economic growth based around alliances between 
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employers, developers and local government (officers and politicians). As 
Cox and Mair and Harvey note, such alliances increasingly compete with 
each other around positive images of their localities, increasingly 
marginalising those who do not fit into the images. It is possible to define 
such activity as 'proactive', but - at least in the case of Sheffield - it 
looks more like desperation, and effectively narrows the range of political 
choice and political representation, even beginning to exclude trade unions 
and continuing to exclude groups such as women and racialised minorities, 
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except insofar as they are represented through elected local government 
(as the voice of the undifferentiated community). 
Our consideration of Sheffield's experience highlights the extent to 
which locality matters to the development of local politics, indicating 
both its usefulness and its limitations. It enables us to return to and make 
judgements about some of the issues raised in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The 
ways in which Sheffield's economic policies developed suggest that some 
of the more exaggerated claims made by Cooke in his writing on localities 
(as 'centres of collective consciousness') are difficult to substantiate. 
Sheffield's identity is more complex and contested than his arguments 
would allow. It is also clear that the complexity of the interaction 
between political developments within and outside Sheffield (including, 
for example, the insertion of radical professionals who were part of a 
wider national network) and the impact of global economic shifts allow 
only limited local autonomy. On the other hand, the arguments of those 
such as Harvey who suggest that local politics is necessarily conservative 
and limited also underestimate the extent to which it allows and indeed 
encourages active involvement and attempts to challenge dominant 
interpretations of what is possible. Simarly, the arguments of those such 
as Dunleavy who stress the structural context of political change, are in 
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danger odf missing the subtle processes of interaction which shape the 
lived experience of local politics. There is a danger that starting from 
structural first principles simply writes off what is achieved in places 
such as Sheffield without looking at it more closely. 
What happened in Sheffield was significantly different from what 
happened in similar Labour controlled authorities in the U.K. at the same 
time. In this sense, local politics clearly mattered. We have already 
considered some of the differences between the ways in which different 
'local socialist' councils moved to the left and the differences between the 
programmes they adopted2. And, of course, one might have expected the 
differences between some of the 'local socialist' authorities and other 
Labour authorities, such as Birmingham and Newcastle to be greater still. 
Certainly, a contrast was sometimes explicitly drawn between Sheffield 
and Birmingham (e.g. in Sheffield City Council Social and Economic 
Strategy Steering Group 1983). More interestingly, however, it is also 
instructive to consider some of the ways in which Sheffield's particular 
approach to partnership differed from those developed in other places. 
Similar language was being utilised by a range of councils in the 1980s, as 
well as by organisations such as Business in the Community. In Sheffield's 
case, as we have seen, the notion of partnership was shaped by the policies 
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of the Employment Department (and later DEED) and its associated 
committees. Before partnership arrangements were developed, the council 
had developed its own strategy. The strategy later adopted within 
partnership arrangements seems to have owed a great deal to that of the 
council, which has continued to take a leading role. Sometimes council 
officers and councillors have complained that their policies have simply 
been borrowed by others (such as the Sheffield Development Corporation) 
who have then taken the credit. But it may be more appropriate to point to 
the way in which this has continued to allow the council to influence what 
is possible - to take the lead position in a local growth coalition. 
Elsewhere experiences and political arrangements are rather 
different, even if the language is similar (see, e.g., Sellgren 1990). In some 
places, it is clear that partnerships are being led by not by elected local 
governments but by specialist agencies, barely influenced by 'community' 
interests at least insofar as these are expressed through local elections. 
The classic example of this is probably the London Docklands Development 
Corporation (see, e.g., Docklands Forum 1991) but similar comments have 
been made about other urban development corporations, although the 
limited resources they have available to them suggests that they are 
unlikely to be able to be quite as dominant (see, e.g., Brayshaw 1990). New 
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town corporations seem to playa similar role, albeit with still weaker 
political 'partners' in local government. In Milton Keynes, for example, the 
lead position ted to conflict with local councils, to the extent that the 
(Labour controlled) Borough Council supported the (Conservative) Secretary 
of State for the Environment's decision to bring the life of the 
Development Commission to a premature end in 1992, whilst the 
(Conservative controlled) Buckinghamshire County Council argued for an 
extension. 
Elsewhere, particularly in smaller towns and cities and in places 
where there was no political challenge to the status quo at the start of the 
1980s, stress seems to be placed on private sector initiative. This has 
been expressed in the mushroom growth of enterprise agencies. Authors 
such as Bennett lay great stress on the leading role of the private sector 
on the basis of their case studies (see, e.g., Bennett and Krebs 1990). 
Askew draws an explicit contrast between Sheffield and Wakefield where 
the partnership arrangements are rather more limited. There a deal has 
been done with one particular development company (AMEC pic) to 
undertake the joint development of specific sites. Although her 
conclusions are carefully modulated, it is clear that the orientation is 
rather different in the two places. In Sheffield, partnership is is part of a 
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changed strategic understanding; in Wakefield the aims are rather more 
immediate - with simple targets for regeneration. Paradoxically. because 
the aims of partnership in Wakefield are more limited. it also seems that 
they may be more difficult to achieve. AMEC is in a more powerful 
bargaining position. precisely because it is not part of a wider partnership 
network (and a wider political vision) (Askew 1991). 
The results of the ESRC's Changing Urban and Regional System 
research programme also highlight differences between the politics of the 
local economy in the different 'localities'. In Swindon. there has been a 
shift away from council led economic development towards an acceptance 
that development consortia are likely to playa major part in the planning 
and development of new areas (Bassett and Harloe 1990); on Teesside the 
old corporatist arrangements have been found wanting with the decline of 
the chemical industry. but it is unclear what is likely to replace them - lei 
continues to have a significant political role. an urban development 
corporation encourages a focus on property development and the local 
council is left to manage high levels of local unemployment (Hudson 1990); 
in Cheltenham local authority strategies have reflected an alliance with 
the professional middle classes with development focused on 
anti-industrial prestige urban developments and the protection of the 
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town's regency image (Cowen 1990); in Thanet there is a continuing 
conflict between different business interests mediated through the local 
council which continues to promote tourism and port development. but also 
faces criticism over levels of spending from those outside the industry 
(Pickvance 1990); on Merseyside (Kirkby) the extent of business 
involvement is necessarily limited by the weakness of the local business 
sector and the lack of interest in development by the private sector, so 
that politics is more clearly oriented towards survival and community 
campaigning (Meegan 1990). 
In Birmingham the relationship is different again. There, the City 
Council clearly has played a significant catalytic role and leading 
councillors have stressed their desire to make community gain from 
development, but it is clear that business organisations also see 
themselves as undertaking strategic planning for urban regeneration. 
Birmingham Heartlands, for example, has been set up as a private company, 
650/0 owned by five development companies and 35% by the City Council. It 
now has the task of setting out a strategic planning framework, organising 
land-pooling and offering other assistance to the development consortia 
which are developing the main projects in a large area of East Birmingham 
(Carley 1991, pp. 107-109). Carley sums up the relationship positively, 
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concluding that it is "neither business-led nor public sector led, but is the 
result of balanced partnerships between the private sector, often led by 
the Chamber: of Commerce, and the Birmingham City Council" (Carley, 1991, 
p.114). 
Until its dissolution at the end of the decade the Scottish 
Development Agency was the lead organisation in economic development in 
Glasgow, with the local councils doing little more than 'levering' money 
from it for their own pet schemes (Keating 1988, pp. 191-192). And it left 
an important legacy behind in the form of Glasgow Action, a business led 
agency with ambitions to encourage urban regeneration (see Keating 1988 
pp. 186-191 for as discussion of the genesis of Glasgow Action). Like many 
other (although not a") business led approaches stress is placed on 
property development and local boosterism. In his discussion of Glasgow 
Action Boyle expresses concern that an important element in 
public-private partnerships of this sort is the emphasis placed on the 
"manipulation of the local regulatory and tax environments so as to 
stimulate private investment", public support for investment through 
grants, loans and subsidies, and the creation of "autonomous, executive, 
private public corporations" (Boyle 1989, p. 26). The final steps in this 
process have, he says, not yet been taken in Glasgow, where existing public 
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agencies have retained their reponsibilities, but it is still a possibility 
which worries him. It seems more apparent in some places than others, 
particularly Where the dangers have not been explicitly recognised by local 
politicians. If Glasgow and Birmingham are near one end of the spectrum, 
with their emphasis on the private rather than the public aspects of 
partnership, even at the end of the decade, Sheffield is clearly at the other. 
The point of listing these examples is not simply to show that there 
are differences between political processes in different places (as, for 
example, Brindley et al 1989 also do very clearly in their survey of urban 
planning), although, of course, that is one of the reasons for doing so. It is 
.also intended to show that utilising notions of corporatism (or post 
Fordism) do not solve the problem of defining local politics. Whatever the 
dominant sets of arrangements and the structural constraints which they 
create, there are still differences between the ways in which politics 
works in different places. And, more important perhaps, it is still 
necessary to go below the surface of official politics to understand the 
complexity and subtlety of the processes at work. The broad framework 
within which these need to be explored is set out in Figure 1 which is set 
out in Chapter 8. It is necessary to understand the ways in which a 
changing context for local politics is created by the operation of global and 
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notional political and economic systems, and the ways in which local 
actors set out to define their strategies within these constraints, within 
broader national (and, increasingly, European) policy networks. But it is 
also essential to understand the ways in which local arrangements 
themselves help to shape what is perceived to be possible (and therefore 
also help to determine what is possible). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which local 
actions can themselves come to influence the wider systems within which 
local politics operate. In the case of Sheffield, the development of a wider 
acceptance of the value of 'interventionist' local economic policies at local 
level, e.g., through the growth of new policy networks, helped to generate 
new opportunities and at the same time to redefine what was appropriate 
(expressed in the caricature of a shift from radical to entrepeneurial 
pOlitics across the decade). The notion of local corporatism provides a 
helpful starting point for analysis, but its precise implications need to be 
explored in different places, whether as a basis for understanding the 
operation of local politics, or as a necessary preliminary to active 
political intervention. 
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14.2 Theories of politics 
The dominant approaches to the analysis of local government and the 
local state are partial and, therefore, also inadequate. The apparently 
untheorised 'stories' of local government studies, in fact implicitly or 
explicitly assume a democratic model in which voters elect councillors 
who then tell officers what to do - or at least provide them with policy 
guidelines within which to act. In this model officers act on behalf of their 
councils which, somehow, express the general will of the area in which 
they are elected. Not only does such an approach fit less and less well with 
a world in which there are many other institutional players in the local 
pOlitical game, but, of course, it finds it difficult to acknowledge the 
importance either of the structural position of local government within a 
wider (capitalist) state system or of networks of professional power and 
influence. Paradoxically, too, the discussions in local government studies 
frequently miss the importance of understanding the 'local' element in 
local government. This is acknowledged in general terms (local democracy 
is what justifies the existence of local government) but in practice there 
is little attempt to explore the implications of this, or to identify the 
social base on which political differentiation at local level might be based. 
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More structural approaches, however, with their emphasis on the role 
of political economy and on the local state as a 'capitalist' state tend to 
play down the importance of politics, electoral and otherwise. Because 
they explain developments in terms of the needs of (or tendencies of 
development of) capitalism, they find it difficult to explain how local 
political movements can achieve changes of significance. They 
underestimate the extent to which councils may be influenced by the local 
political and social contexts within which they find themselves. And they 
also often find it difficult to grasp the ways in which political negotiation 
within the state machine may influence political programmes and political 
,accommodations. Like many approaches rooted in local government studies, 
structural approaches tend to underestimate the importance of locality -
of locally based social processes. At best the local state becomes a site of 
mediation between national and local capital, or between capital and other 
social forces. 
IncreaSingly, therefore, attempts have been made to develop an 
understanding of what makes local government local. But too often this has 
simply resulted in a picture of local politics which either implies that 
localities may themselves have more or less unified (proactive) political 
programmes or that there is a more or less direct relationship between 
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local social relations and local politics, reproducing at local level an error 
which has more frequently been made at national level, as every shift in 
party politicaf support has to be explained by corresponding shifts in local 
social structures. Much of the analysis based around notions of 'locality', 
therefore has also tended to underestimate the independent weight of 
politics - including its ability to influence the ways in which people living 
in different places understand their social meanings - as well as 
frequently ignoring the position of the local state and developing 
narratives which are just as theoretically underdeveloped as those of local 
government studies. Its focus on the local also often effectively excludes 
other levels, except through asides or general acknowledgements. So, not 
only is the wider (economic as well as political) context of local politics 
not developed, nor is the significance of the state system within which 
local politics develops explored adequately. There is rarely any explicit 
acknowledgement of the importance of policy networks (as discussed by 
Rhodes) or the development of wider political programmes (such as the 
'syndrome' of local socialism identified by Gyford) . If there were, it 
would be much more difficult to emphasise the separateness and 
particularity of local politics and the strategies which can be developed 
from them. 
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Despite these weaknesses, which will be familiar from the arguments 
in Chapters 2 and 3, each of these different approaches also has something 
to offer in the analysis of political change and it is on these positive 
contributions which we shall concentrate now, in an attempt to identify a 
more consistent way of developing the study of local politics. 
It is possible to come towards local politics either from above or 
from below, but whichever route one chooses it is misleading to remain 
either at the level of global restructuring or the rich detail of particular 
cases. The dangers of simply describing local events and developing an 
apparently straightforward narrative are probably relatively clear because 
it either makes it difficult to draw conclusions across particular case 
studies or some shared framework is already implied without being spelled 
out sufficiently to be questioned. Moving from the global downwards, on 
the other hand, has the danger that everything discovered at local level 
(whatever it is) is simply seen to confirm shifts already identified at the 
global level. Nevertheless, it is probably easier to identify significant 
processes of local change with the help of some understanding of wider 
shifts. In this case, the context for local change is given by the debate 
about global economic and political restructuring following from the crisis 
of the 1970s (which some have called a crisis of Fordism). Insofar as this 
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has been a crisis of the Keynesian welfare state, it has also been a crisis 
for its local expression, and the new forms developing at local level may 
also be suggestive of some of the ways in which the state is being 
restructured. 
But it is important to stress both that the global changes only provide 
context, and that the global context is itself the product of a series of 
adjustments taking place at local, regional and national levels in many 
places. The global, in other words, is not determinant. An understanding of 
local politics involves grasping the importance of a complex process of 
combined and uneven development which links local, national and global 
levels. In this context the sedimentary analogy is helpful in indicating how 
different rounds of economic development, social change and political 
formation leave legacies which continue to interact over time, helping to 
construct continuing traditions which shape political possibilities at local 
level. The weakness of the analogy is that it underestimates the 
importance of active political intervention to reshape what is possible. 
As suggested in the previous section, the case of Sheffield helps to 
illustrate both what is possible and the constraints placed on local 
initiative. At the beginning of the 1980s, for a short time, it was possible 
to see how the launch of new initiatives was possible, in part because of 
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the absence of general legitimacy for the central government and the 
responses to the crisis of social-democracy (and of the Labour party in 
particular). Sheffield's local government made full use of this 'relative 
autonomy' to raise the possibility of a new political vision. But that vision 
was always an ambiguous one, never fully divorced from the past nor from 
the notion that it was possible to persuade capitalist concerns to behave 
more rationally. Its autonomy was, in any case, substantially restricted, 
above all by Sheffield's weak position within the British (and global) 
economy. Early attempts to intervene directly in the restructuring of 
industry failed because of this weakness. Later, however, the possibilty of 
new forms of economic growth imposed their own pressures, as 
competitiveness between localities encouraged the council's officers to 
move closer and closer to business, financial and development interests 
through partnership and negotiation. Only through such arrangements did it 
become possible to deliver any progress. 
Jessop emphasises the dangers of identifying a capitalist state and 
deducing from all the necessary features of politics from that definition. 
But he also stresses the ways in which states tends to construct 
themselves as capitalist because of their structural position within 
capitalism. He argues that the state is a social relation whose different 
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elements combine in ways which make it difficult - although not 
impossible - to escape from the dominance of capitalist interests (hence 
his emphasis on the notion of contingent necessity) (Jessop 1990b). These 
insights are particularly helpful in analysing the local state and local 
politics, when combined with arguments which have come from more 
locally (or locality) focused research (of the sort discussed in Chapter 3). 
The case of Sheffield in the 1980s whilst showing some of the 
possibilities of moving away from narrow definitions of the capitalist 
state, also shows some of the ways in which capitalist states form 
themselves and define themselves. The capitalist state may not be a 
.machine, which can be controlled by those who take power in it through 
elections or appointment, but it can be pushed in unexpected directions for 
limited periods at least, even if the tendency is likely to be in the opposite 
direction, towards the accommodation of business interests. Following the 
arguments of Gurr and King (1987) and King and Pierre (1990), it may be 
useful to distinguish between two forms of autonomy for local states - the 
first of which refers to autonomy of local economic and social conditions 
and the second of which is concerned with autonomy from higher levels of 
the state. In Sheffield's case, it could be argued, that it proved possible to 
build a base of independence from the centre, but was less easy to escape 
493 
from the requirements of locally based economic interests. More 
positively, it might be suggested that the Council's ability to develop a 
locally based economic strategy meant that it (unlike some other councils) 
was also able to operate as a genuine 'partner' rather than merely a 
creature of business interests. 
The argument of this thesis has been that an adequate understanding 
of the processes of local politics is not possible without bringing together 
some of the key features of debates which focus on the local state and 
those which focus on notions of locality - debates within the disciplines 
of sociology and political science on the one hand and geography on the 
other. It is also necessary to utilise arguments from a range of theoretical 
, 
approaches. Most obviously, there is a need to bring together 
(neo-pluralist) arguments which stress the significance of policy 
networks, with those (marxist) arguments which emphasise the 
importance of processes of economic and social restructuring. There is, of 
course, a danger of sinking into unconvincing eclecticism if espousing a 
multitheoretical approach merely leads to haphazard borrowing from all 
over the place with little underlying consistency. The danger can be 
avoided, however, as long as there is a degree of clarity about theoretical 
starting pOints, and the extent and nature of theoretical borrowings is 
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adequately acknowledged and justified. In this case, the strength of 
marxist approaches to the analysis of the state provides the starting 
point, but the need for those approaches to incorporate rather more subtle 
understandings of political processes in practice provides the conclusion. 
Even if the accusation of eclecticism is one which can still be made, this 
is a risk well worth taking if it enables us to move beyond the set piece 
battles of the social sciences in which arguments can be dismissed simply 
because they originate from one position or another. Without moving out 
from behind our defensive ramparts it is impossible to understand either 
the complexities or possibilities of local politics, either as an object of 
study, or as an arena for action. 
This is particularly important at the start of the 1990s. Local 
government in the U.K. is moving into a new and uncertain period of change. 
Some of its main features - including forms of local corporatism, 
public-private partnerships, managerialism and new definitions of welfare 
- are becoming clearer, however. Some of them have been explored above, 
in the context of a discussion of local economic policies. But the 
restructuring of local states is taking place on a much broader basis, 
raising questions about how the local welfare state should be analysed in 
the future. The arguments of this thesis are not just relevant to the 
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analysis of economic policy, but provide an important foundation on which 
to build in undertaking that analysis. 
Notes 
1. Jessop's formulation is not intended to imply the narrow definition of 
workfare which is often taken from the U.S. model (Le. that the payment of 
benefit depends on the acceptance of employment on some makework 
scheme) but a rather broader one in which the orientation of the state 
shifts away from social welfare towards the need to encourage the 
'competitiveness of particular (possibly local) capitalist economies, 
particularly through economic innovation (these comments are drawn from 
a presentation made by Bob Jessop to the Urban Change and Conflict 
Conference, Lancaster, 1991. There was no written paper). 
2. Some of these differences are discussed in Cochrane 1988. The abolition 
of the metropolitant county councils in 1986. helped to reinforce their 
significance, as the enterprise boards created in the early part of the 
decade tried (not all successfully) to find secure routes to survival (see 
Cochrane and Clarke 1990). Some - such as the West Midlands Enterprise 
Board - stressed that they wanted to be regionally based development 
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agencies (on the Scottish Development Agency model); others, such as 
Yorkshire Enterprise presented themselves as regionally based merchant 
banks (see, e.g. Gunne" 1990). Even the board with the most radical 
reputation, the Greater london Enterprise Board (which became Greater 
london Enterprise or GlE), redefined its position substantially to confirm 
its commitment to partnership (see, e.g., Minns 1991). 
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